VOL. 4

ABHIDHARMAKOSABHASYAM

VASUBANDHU | POUSSIN | PRUDEN

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ABHIDHARMA KOSA BHASYAM

OF
VASUBANDHU

TRANSLATED INTO FRENCH BY LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN
ENGLISH VERSION BY LEO M. PRUDEN

Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam

Volume IV

Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam

of Vasubandhu

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Translated into French by Louis de La Vallée Poussin

English Version by Leo M. Pruden

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Translator's Introduction

This volume is the fourth and the last volume of an English translation of Louis de La Vallée Poussin's French translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*. This volume contains translations of Chapter VII ("The Knowledges", *jñāna-nirdeśa*), Chapter VIII ("The Absorptions", *samāpatti-nirdeśa*), and Chapter IX ("Refutation of the *Pudgala*", *pudgala-pratiṣedha*). This volume also contains a full Index to the text of the *Kośabhāṣyam*, as well as to significant entries in the Footnotes to the various Chapters.

Chapter VII deals with the type and nature of the Knowledges, and how they differ from the Patiences and from Seeing; with the characteristics and aspects of the Ten Knowledges; how the knowledge of the mind of another takes place; the differences between a defiled mind and a good or concentrated mind; the role of emptiness and non-self in the Knowledges; the Path of Meditation; the qualities and powers that accompany the Knowledge of Destruction, and related to this, the powers and assurances of a Buddha; the difference between (ordinary) compassion and the great compassion of a Buddha; the nature of the Buddha's knowledge, his methods of conversion, and his supernormal powers (*ṛddhi*).

Chapter VIII is concerned with *dhyāna* both as a state of absorption, and as states of existence in the realms of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu. This Chapter discusses *dhyāna* versus *samādhi*; whether *rūpa* or physical matter exists in Ārūpyadhātu; the origin of physical matter from the mind; the component parts of each *dhyāna*; the role of happiness in the Third Dhyāna; the role and nature of faith; which absorption can arise after which absorption; the mental object of the absorptions; the prefatory or threshhold absorptions (*sāmantakas*), and the prefatory absorptions as contrasted with *dhyānāntara*. The nature of *samādhi* is discussed with reference to its containing *vitarka* and/or *vicāra*; discussed also are the absorptions of emptiness, the absorption of the absence of characteristics, and the absorption of the absence of intention; the types of *samādhi*; the Four Immeasurables

(called in other traditions the Four Brahmavihāras); and details how a beginner should cultivate the visualization of goodwill. This Chapter concludes with a short discussion on how long the Saddharma will last, and the definition of the Saddharma as consisting of *āgama* (the teaching) and *adhigama* (its cultivation and realization). Three Kārikās then conclude the basic text of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*.

Chapter IX has long been regarded as an appendix to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, since the text of the Ninth Chapter contains no Kārikās, and its presentation is devoted to a single theme, that of refuting the idea of a *pudgala* or soul. Since this Chapter is quoted or referred to twice (pages 650, 818) in the text of the *Kośabhāṣyam*, this work was evidently known to the author of the *Kośabhāṣyam*, and so was perhaps composed prior to Vasubandhu's composition of the *Kośabhāṣyam* (as was perhaps his *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa*) to answer objections to the non-soul teaching of the Buddhists.

This Chapter is concerned with refuting the soul (here *pudgala*) theories of one sect of Hīnayāna Buddhism, the Vātsīputrīyas (also identified with Sāṁmatīyas); later in the Chapter the author refutes the theories of the Vaiśeṣikas, one of the orthodox schools of Hindu Philosophy. In this Chapter, Vasubandhu concerns himself with explaining memory and recognition: how does one account for memory and recognition in the absence of an unchanging substratum to human experience? The existence of such a substratum becomes the concern of the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

I should like to thank Mr. Ken Johnson for his unstinting work on the Index of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*; he has done a fine job of serving on numerous occasions as my editor and advisor.

Much remains to be done in *Kośabhāṣyam* studies. At present the Bangladeshi Bhikkhu, Ven. Lokananda, and I are working on publishing a Romanized edition of the text of the *Kośabhāṣyam*, and in the compilation of a dictionary to the Sanskrit text of the work. It would be a great source of joy to see an eventual translation of Yaśomitra's commentary on the *Kośabhāṣyam*, his *Sphuṭārtha-abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, a work quoted liberally in de

La Vallée Poussin's Footnotes. It will also be necessary someday to investigate the filiation of Vasubandhu's thought into that of the Mahāyāna, a task already carried out in many of Kyokuga Saeki's Footnotes to his edition of the *Kusharon*, his *Kandō-bon Kusharon.*

Leo M. Pruden.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

The Knowledges[1]

Oṁ. Homage to the Buddha.

We have spoken of the *kṣāntis* or Patiences (vi. 25d) and of the *jñānas* or Knowledges (vi. 26b), of *samyagdṛṣṭi* or Right Views (vi. 50c) and of *samyagjñāna* or Right Knowledge (vi. 76c). Are the Patiences actually Knowledges, and isn't Right Knowledge identical to Right Views?

1a. The pure Patiences are not a type of Knowledge.[2]

The eight types of pure Patience which form part of the Path of Seeing (*ābhisamayāntika*, vi. 25d-26c) are not, by their nature, knowledge;[3] for, at the moment of patience, the defilement of doubt, which each Patience abandons, is not already abandoned. But Knowledge is certain: it is produced when doubt is abandoned. These eight types of Patience are Seeing, because, by their nature, they are examination.[4] In opposition to the pure Patiences which are Seeing and are not Knowledge,

1b. The *prajñā* of destruction and of non-arising is not seeing.[5]

The knowledge of destruction (*kṣayajñāna*) and the knowledge of Non-Arising (*anutpadajñāna*, vi. 67a-b)—when they constitute Bodhi—are not Seeing, because they do not include examination, and because the intention of inquiry is not in them.[6]

1c. All other pure *prajñā* is both one and the other.

Besides the Patiences and the two Knowledges named above, pure *prajñā* is at one and the same time both seeing and knowledge, for it includes examination, and is therefore seeing; it is free from doubt, and is therefore knowledge. This refers to the eight *abhisamaya* knowledges (*duḥkhe jñāna*, etc., vi. 26) [and also to all *prajñā* of the pure Path of Meditation up to the Knowledge of Extinction].

1d. All other *prajñā* is knowledge.

All other *prajñā* which is not pure, but worldly or impure [i.e., *prajñā* associated with the five sense consciousnesses,etc., and *prajñā* associated with the mental consciousness].

1e. Six are also seeing.

Six impure *prajñās* are at one and the same time knowledge and seeing, namely the mental *prajñā* associated with the five defilements which are views by nature (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*, etc., v7) and, sixth, good *prajñā*, which is right worldly views (*laukikī samyagdṛṣṭi*, i.41).

***

How many knowledges are there? There are ten;[7] but, in short there are only two:

2a. Knowledge is pure or impure.

All the Knowledges are subsumed into two types of knowledge,

impure or worldly knowledge, and pure or supermundane knowledge. Of these two knowledges,

2b. The first is called conventional.[8]

Impure Knowledge is called "knowledge conforming to worldly conventions."

Why?

Because from usage it bears on (*ālambate*) things which exist conventionally:[9] a jug, clothing, male, female, etc. [We say "from usage," because it also bears on the real characteristics of things, unique characteristics and common characteristics, vii. 10b].

2c-d. Pure knowledge is of two types, a knowledge of *dharmas* and inferential knowledge.[10]

These two knowledges with the preceeding make three knowledges: worldly, conventional knowledge, a knowledge of *dharmas*, and inferential knowledge. Among these,

3a. Conventional knowledge bears on all.[11]

All the conditioned and unconditioned *dharmas* are the object of conventional knowledge.

3b-c. The knowledge of *dharmas* has for its object the Suffering, etc., of Kāmadhātu.

The knowledge of *dharmas* has Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Path leading to the Extinction of Suffering of Kāmadhātu for its object.

3c-d. Inferential knowledge bears on Suffering, etc., of the higher spheres.

Inferential knowledge has the Suffering, the Origin of Suffering... of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu for its object.

4a-b. When one takes into consideration the distinction of the Truths, these two knowledges, make up four knowledges.

Namely: the knowledge of Suffering (which includes the knowledge of the *dharmas* of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Suffering), the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, and the knowledge of the Path, because these two knowledges have Suffering, its Origin, etc., for their object.

4b-c. These two knowledges, fourfold, are termed the knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.[12]

The knowledge of *dharmas* and inferential knowledge, which are as we have just seen fourfold by reason of their objects, are, among the Arhats, when they are not of the nature of Seeing,[13] called the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

4d-5a. At the moment when they arise, they are inferential knowledges of Suffering and Origin.

The Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, at the moment when they first arise are, by their nature, inferential knowledge of Suffering and of its Origin in the higher

spheres, because they have for their object the *skandhas* of Bhavāgra[14] under the aspects of Suffering and Origin.[15] These two knowledges therefore have the same object.

The Knowledge of Destruction follows Vajropamasamādhi (vi. 44d); and the Knowledge of Non-Arising follows the Knowledge of Destruction.

Does Vajropamasamādhi have the same object as these two knowledges at the moment of their arising?

When it has Suffering and Origin for its object, yes; when it has Extinction and the Path for its object, no.

> 5b. The knowledge of the mind of another follows from four.

The knowledge of the mind of another follows four knowledges, a knowledge of the *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.[16]

> 5c-d. It does not know a mind in a higher sphere, faculties, personalities, nor the past and future.[17]

A mind is superior either from the point of view of its *bhūmi*, from the point of view of its *indriyas*, or from the point of view of its personality.

The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower sphere does not know a mind in a higher sphere.

The knowledge of the mind of another of a saint with weak faculties, namely a Śraddhādhimukta or a Samayavimukta (vi. 31c), does not know the mind of a saint of strong faculties, namely a Dṛṣṭiprāpta or a Asamayavimukta.

The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower saint does not know the mind of a higher saint: in order, Anāgāmin, Arhat,

Pratyekabuddha, Samyaksaṁbuddha.[18]

When the mind of another is either past or future, the knowledge of a mind of another does not know it, for this knowledge has a present mind for its object.

Does the mind of another avoid being in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another in other cases as well?

> 6a-b. The knowledge of *dharmas* and inferential knowledges do not know one another.

The knowledge of the mind of another, when it is by its nature a knowledge of *dharmas*, is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature inferential knowledge; when it is inferential by nature, it is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature a series of *dharmas*.

Why?

Because these two knowledges have for their object the *dharmas* which are opposed to Kāmadhātu and to the higher spheres respectfully.

***

There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing. That is to say, an ascetic, while he cultivates the Path of Seeing, is not endowed with the knowledge of the mind of another, because the duration of the Path of Seeing is much reduced, and because the Seeing of the Truths is rapid. But the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing can be the object of the knowledge of the mind of another.

When one desires to know, through the knowledge of the mind of another, the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing, one cultivates a preparatory exercise:

6b-d. The Śrāvaka knows two moment of Seeing; the Pratyekabuddha, three; the Buddha, without preparation, all.

When a Śrāvaka cultivates the knowledge of the mind of another in the desire to see the mind of an ascetic in the Path of Seeing, he obtains some knowing of the first two moments, the Patience of the Knowledge of the *dharmas* of Suffering and the knowledge of *dharmas*[19] — but not the following moments (the Patience of the Inferential Knowledge of Suffering...)—because the knowledge of the inferential part (Suffering in the higher spheres) of the Path of Seeing supposes a different preparatory exercise. Thus, if this Śrāvaka then begins a new exercise in order to obtain the knowledge of the inferential part, the ascetic whom he examines has already arrived at the fifteenth moment when this new preparatory exercise [which lasts thirteen moments] is finished. The whole interval between the twelfth and the sixteenth moment therefore is not in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another of the Śrāvaka (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 515c7).

In the same circumstances, the Pratyekabuddha knows three moments, namely the first two and the eighth; because the required preparatory exercise, after the consciousness of the first two moments, for the knowledge of the inferential part, is, among the Pratyekabuddhas, weak.

According to other masters, he knows the first two moments and the fifteenth.[20]

The Buddha, through simple desire, and without preparatory exercise, knows the mind of another in all the moments of the Path of Seeing.

***

What are the characteristics of the Knowledge of Destruction

and of the Knowledge of Non-Arising?

> 7. The knowledge of destruction is, with respect to the Truths, the certitude that they are known, abandoned, etc.; the knowledge of non-arising is the certitude that they are no longer to be known, to be abandoned, etc.[21]

According to the Mūlaśāstra,[22] "What is the knowledge of extinction?[23] When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me, its Origin is abandoned by me, its Extinction has been actualized by me, the Path has been cultivated by me,' then the knowledge which results from this (*tad upādāya yaj jñānam*),[24] the seeing, the knowing, the intuition, the intelligence, the discernment, the clarity, the insight,[25] is what is called the Knowledge of Destruction." "What is the Knowledge of Non-Arising? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me and is no longer to be known... the Path is no longer to be cultivated', then this knowledge... is what is called the Knowledge of Non-Arising." [See the definition vii. 12a-b.]

***

But how can one, through a pure knowledge, have such a knowledge?[26]

The Masters of Kaśmīr explain: Two conventional knowledges are consecutive to two pure knowledges: "Suffering is known by me...; Suffering is known by me and is no longer to be known." It is by reason of the characteristic of these two conventional knowledges that the Śāstra defines the two pure knowledges. [This is why the Śāstra says: *tad upādāya*...][27]

According to other masters,[28] the ascetic knows, through a pure knowledge, that he knows Suffering, etc.

***

But we have said that the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are not seeing, or views. How can the Śāstra define them as views?

The Śāstra employs the term "view" through stylistic habit,[29] using again the formula employed in the definition of the other knowledges (the knowledge of Suffering,etc.). Or rather, by reason of their characteristic of being directly perceived, these two knowledges are qualified as seeing. It is by reason of this characteristic of being directly perceived that it says in the Śāstra,[30] "Knowledge is seeing."[31]

***

There are ten knowledges: a knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, worldly, conventional knowledge, the knowledge of the mind of another, the knowledge of Suffering, the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, the knowledge of the Path, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.[32]

How are they included in one another?[33]

1. Conventional knowledge is made up of one knowledge, namely the conventional knowledge, and one part of another knowledge [namely the impure part of the knowledge of the mind of another].[34]

2. A knowledge of *dharmas* is made up of one full knowledge and one part of seven other knowledges, namely the *Kāmadhātu* part of the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path, the knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

3. So too inferential knowledge, by replacing "the Kāmadhātu

part" with "the part relating to the two higher spheres (=Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu)."

4. The knowledge of suffering is made up of one knowledge and one part of four other knowledges—that part of the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising which have the Truth of Suffering for their objects.

5-6. The knowledge of origin and of extinction are explained according to the same principle.

7. A knowledge of the Path is made up of one knowledge and one part of five knowledges: the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction, the knowledge of Non-Arising, and the knowledge of the mind of another.

8. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of one knowledge and one part of four knowledges: the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.

9. The Knowledge of Destruction is made up of one knowledge and one part of six knowledges: the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path.[35]

10. So too the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?

> 8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.

1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge, because it is not absolute knowledge.[36]

2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the *dharmas* and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to Kāmadhātu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.[37]

3. By reason of their aspect (*ākāratas*, vii.13), there is a knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two knowledges have the same object (i.e., the *pañcopādānaskandhas*, vi. English trans. p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.[38]

4. By reason of their aspect and their object (*ālambana*), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.

5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states (*caittas*) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind (*citta*); also, even though it may know the *caittas*, it is termed *paracittajñāna* (the knowledge of the *mind* of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.

6. Because "that which should have been done has been done," there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done." [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later.]

7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=*sabhāgahetu*) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.

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We have said that the knowledge of the *dharmas* [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kāmadhātu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kāmadhātu]. Furthermore

9a-c. The knowledge of *dharmas*, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.

A knowledge of *dharmas* with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres—that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation.[39]

9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kāmadhātu.

In none of its branches (Suffering, etc.) is inferential knowledge opposed to the defilements of *Kāmadhātu*.

What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?

10a-b. A knowledge of *dharmas* and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.

The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).

10b-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.

Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteristics, etc.[40]

10c-d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth.[41]

A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.

11a-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another.[42]

The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.

> 11b-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique characteristics of its object.[43]

When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (*jñeya*), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.

Pure or impure

> 11d. It has for its sphere an individual object.[44]

When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (*caitta*); when it bears on a certain mental state (*vedanā* for example), it does not bear on any other one (*saṁjñā*, for example).

If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is *sarāga* (possesses craving) as being *sarāga*",[45] since the knowledge of the mind of another does not know minds and mental states (craving, etc.) at one and the same time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its stain at one and the same time?[46]

The expression *sarāga*, possessing craving, has two meanings. A mind is *sarāga* because it is "mixed" with craving,[47] or because it is "united" to craving.[48]

The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is *sarāga* for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.

Any other impure mind[49] is solely *sarāga* to the extent that it is united to craving.

Certain masters[50] think that the Sūtra, by the expression *sarāgacitta* solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the *vigatarāga* mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called *vigatarāga*, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc.) would be also termed *vigatarāga*, for they are not associated with craving.

Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not *sarāga*, since it is not associated with craving; it is not *vigatarāga*, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Ābhidhārmikas) say, that the mind is *sarāga* through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sūtra up to "possessing delusion" (*samoha*) and "not possessing delusion" (*vigatamoha*). [See above, note 45.]

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[The Vaibhāṣikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated because it is not turned away from its object.[51] A defiled mind is distracted, because it is associated with distraction.

The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhāra, say: A mind associated with laziness is concentrated;[52] a distracted mind is any other defiled mind.

[The Vaibhāṣikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the *Mūlaśāstra* (according to the Japanese editor, *Jñānaprasthāna*, 15.9), which

says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (*saṁkṣipta*) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3.]

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A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with indolence.[53]

A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with correct effort.[54]

***

A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great persons.[55]

Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.

In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition of a future mind of the same type;[56] a good mind has a great following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind[57] of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three *skandhas*, *vedanā*, *saṁjñā*, and *saṁskāras*; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes *rūpa* (*dhyānānāsravasaṁvara*, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small

force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii. 36, English trans. p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the *dharmas* concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements (*anuśayas* vi. English trans. p. 943).

This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.

***

The defiled mind is *sa-uttara*, because it is associated with frivolity (*auddhatya*); the good mind is *anuttara*, because it is opposed to frivolity.[58]

Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.

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A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.

A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.

A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises.[59] A good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.

Such is the explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas.

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This explanation, [say the Sautrāntikas,] does not conform to the Sūtra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.

i. How does it not conform to the Sūtra?

The Sūtra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight."

"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm."[60] [It results from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated.]

But, [the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.

Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold. In fact, we can only affirm that a defiled mind, when it is associated with laziness, is distracted.[61]

But, [answer the Vaibhāṣikas,] your thesis contradicts the Śāstra!

It may. But it is better to contradict a Śāstra than a Sūtra.[62]

ii. How does this explanation lack the proper meaning of the different terms?

Because it gives the characteristics of different minds—distracted, sunken-down, small, not calm, non-absorbed, uncultivated, and undelivered on the one hand, and concentrated, well in hand, etc., on the other hand—without noting their differences.[63]

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] It is false that we do not indicate the special sense of the different terms. The quality of "defiled" of distracted minds, etc., is the same; but we explain the particular defects of these different defiled minds. In the same way we explain the particular qualities of the different good minds, in which their good qualities are not differentiated.

We answer that the meaning of the different terms is not correctly established because you fail to eliminate the objection of

contradiction with the Sūtra.[64] [The Sūtra, in fact, says that a mind accompanied by torpor and laziness is concentrated. A mind united with laziness, and defiled through union with torpor, is concentrated, but it cannot be good, for torpor is a *kleśamahābhūmika*.]

And if, [as the Vaibhāṣikas believe], the Sūtra designates, by the sunken-down mind,[65] a small mind, it would not speak separately of a sunken-down mind and a small mind. Now it distinguishes them, for it says, "When the mind is sunken down, or fears becoming sunken down, this is not a proper time to cultivate the *praśrabdhi, samādhi*, and *upekṣa* parts of Bodhi. When the mind is small or fears becoming small, this is not a fitting moment to cultivate the *dharmavicaya, vīrya*, and *prīti* parts of Bodhi."[66]

Objection [of the Vaibhāṣikas:] Is the cultivation of the parts of Bodhi partial in the case which concerns us?[67] [Must we believe that at a certain moment one cultivates *praśrabdhi, samādhi, upekṣa*, and at another moment *dharmavicaya, vīrya*, and *prīti?*][68]

No. When the text says "cultivation", it does not signify the fact of actualizing, but the fact of fixing the attention on, or taking as an object.

[Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas:][69] The mind in which indolence dominates and in which frivolity is reduced is called "sunken down" (*līna*). The mind in which frivolity dominates and in which indolence is reduced is called "small" (*uddhata*). These two minds are therefore distinct, and the Sūtra can speak of them separately without contradicting our system. But, taking into consideration the fact that these two defilements, indolence and frivolity, coexist in a single mental heap, we say that the mind which is sunken down is small.[70]

[71]We do not pretend to challenge a text of intentional meaning; but such is not the intention of the Sūtra [i.e., to designate a mind in which indolence dominates as sunken down...]

***

In the thesis presented above (p. 1099, line 23) that all minds "united with craving" (*rāgasaṁyukta*) "possess craving" (*sarāga*), what is the meaning of the expression *rāgasaṁyukta*, united with craving?

1. If a mind is united with craving, and as a consequence possesses craving, because the possession of craving continues in the series in which this mind is produced, then the mind of an imperfect saint or Śaikṣa, even when it is pure, will be termed "possessing craving", since the craving has not been completely expelled from the series of the Śaikṣa.[72]

2. If a mind is both united with craving and possesses craving through the fact of being the object (*ālambana*) of the "active craving"[73], then the impure mind of an Arhat will possess craving, since this mind can be the object of the craving of another person.[74]

If you do not admit that the mind of an Arhat can be grasped as an object through the craving of another person, how can this mind be termed impure?

Would you say that it is impure, not because it is the object of the craving of another, but because it is the object of a "general defilement" (*sāmānyakleśa*, v. 12, namely of ignorance or delusion) of another? In this hypothesis, do not say that this mind is *sarāga*, that it "possesses craving"; say rather that it is *samoha*, that it "possesses *moha*," since it is the object of the *moha* or ignorance of another.

But, we would say, none of these proposed explanations is valid. In fact the knowledge of the mind of another does not bear on the "possessions" which can be found in the series of another. Consequently when I know that the mind of another person possesses craving, this mind of another does not possess craving because it is "united with craving" in the sense that it is accompanied by the possession of craving, or in the sense that it is found in the series in which this possession has not been expelled.

The knowledge of the mind of another no longer knows the craving which would be the object of the mind of another.

Therefore a mind is not termed *sarāga* through the fact of *rāgasaṁyoga*, through the fact of being "united with rāga" in the proposed twofold sense.

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[Objection:][75] If this is the case, what is a *sarāga* mind?

[Vasubandhu:] One should determine the intention of the Sūtra. A *sarāga* mind or one "possessing craving" is not a *rāgasaṁyukta* mind, a mind "united to craving", but a *rāgasaṁprayukta* mind, a mind "associated with craving," a mind in which craving presently exists. *Vigatarāga*, "without craving" is a mind which is not associated with craving, even when this mind will be accompanied by the possession of craving.

[Objection:] The expression *vigatarāga* cannot have this meaning; for another Sūtra says that a mind which is without craving (*vigatarāga*), without anger (*vigatadveṣa*), and without ignorance (*vigatamoha*), does not fall back into threefold existence. Now if this mind is accompanied by the possession of craving, etc., it will fall back again.

[Vasubandhu:] In this other Sūtra, "a mind without craving" (*vigatarāga citta*) signifies "a mind which is not accompanied by the possession of craving" (*vigatarāgaprāpti citta*).

[Objection:] Have you not refuted your own opinion? We said in fact (page 1100, line 5) that if one calls a mind without craving *vigatarāga*, that is, a mind in which craving is not presently active, then one should term all minds associated with another defilement *vigatarāga*. But one does not say that a mind associated with hatred is *vigatarāga*, "without craving."

[Vasubandhu:] There is nothing wrong with saying that a mind without craving is *vigatarāga*. But one does not consider a mind without craving but associated with hatred as being *vigatarāga*, but rather as "possessing hatred" (*sadveṣa*), distinguishing it through its specific characteristic which is one of being

"associated with hatred."

***

When the knowledge of the mind of another attains its object, namely the mind of another person, does it attain this mind of another as this latter knows it?

No. When one knows the mind of another, one does not see the object of this mind; one does not see this mind as it itself knows something: one knows only that it is defiled, etc.; one does not know the object, color, etc., by reason of which it is defiled. If it were otherwise, the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on *rūpa*, etc., and would no longer be the knowledge of the mind of another; the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on itself: for the person whose mind I know can at the same moment know my mind.

The characteristics of the knowledge of the mind of another are set: it knows the individual characteristics of a thing (the *dravya-svalakṣaṇa*) but not its general, conventionally true characteristics (its *saṁvṛtisat-sāmānyalakṣaṇa*); it knows mind and mental states but not physical matter, the present but not the past or future, of another but not of oneself, of the sphere of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, but not of Ārūpyadhātu; or rather the pure mind and mental states, of the category to which he himself belongs: pure, he knows a pure mind and mental states; impure, he knows an impure mind and mental states. The knowledge of the mind of another is incompatible with the Path of Seeing and the Uninterrupted Path (*ānantaryamārga*), with the Samādhi of Emptiness and the Samādhi of No-Marks, and with the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. Other conditions are not excluded: the knowledge of the mind of another is compatible with the Path of Meditation (the Path of Liberation, *vimuktimārga*, and the Path of Distinction, *viśesamārga*), with the Uncommitted Samadhi (*apraṇihitasamādhi*), etc.

The teaching of the knowledge of the mind of another is ended.

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12a-b. The other has fourteen aspects by excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self.

The "others" are the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

Both have fourteen aspects (vii. 13a), excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self. In fact, these two Knowledges, even though they are of the absolute level of truth,[76] are also included in the conventional level of truth (vi. 4);[77] they are therefore foreign to the aspects of emptiness and non-self. When an ascetic departs from the contemplation in which the knowledges of the absolute truth are realized, through the force of these knowledges, later knowledges[78] are produced which are of the conventional level of truth: "my births are cut off, the religious life has been fully cultivated, I have done what should have been done, and I do not know of any more existences for me.[79]" The two knowledges, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, therefore participate in the conventional level of truth, not in and of themselves or through definition, but through their outflowing.

Are there any pure aspects outside of these sixteen aspects?

12c. There are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.

The Masters of Kaśmīr say that there are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.

12d. Some others, according to the Śāstra, affirm that there are.

The Foreign Masters maintain the opposite opinion. [For the opinion of "the other masters," see p. 1094, line 27].

The *Mūlaśāstra* says,[80] "Can one distinguish the *dharmas* belonging to Kāmadhātu through a mind not included among the Dhātus (that is to say, pure)? One can distinguish them as they are, as impermanent, suffering, empty, impersonal, cause, proximate cause, near cause, specificing cause; there is this characteristic (*sthāna*), there is this cause (*vastu*)."

One should thus consider the specific aspects through the expressions *asty etat sthānam, asty etad vastu*, as two pure aspects which are added to the eight aspects of suffering and origin.

According to the Masters of Kaśmīr, the Śāstra does not teach the existence of these two additional aspects. One should understand, "... it is fitting (*asty ayaṁ yogaḥ*) that a pure mind distinguish these *dharmas* as impermanent. . ."

The Foreign Masters answer that this interpretation is not admissible. For, if the Śāstra employs the terms *asty etat sthānam*... without referring to the pure aspects, but only through simple phraseology, it would also employ them in a parallel passage, namely when it explains, "Can one distinguish the *dharmas* belonging to Kāmadhātu by a mind susceptible of being abandoned by Seeing the Truths? Yes, one can distinguish them, namely, one becomes attached to, one hates, one prides oneself, one errs, one erroneously distinguishes these *dharmas* as self, mine (=*kāyadṛṣṭi*), as eternal or perishable (=*antagrāhadṛṣṭi*), as non-cause, non-action, nonexistent (=*mithyādṛṣṭi*), as supreme, excellent, distinguished, superior (=*dṛṣṭiparāmarśa*), as purification, deliverance, salvation (=*śīlavrataparāmarśa*), with anxiety, disagreement, or doubt."[81] This text should have the expressions *asty etat sthānam*..., if they solely signify *asty ayaṁ yogaḥ*, in the sense that it is fatal that a mind susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths considers the *dharmas* as self, mine...

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How many things constitute the sixteen aspects?

13a. The aspects are sixteen things.[82]

Certain masters said that the aspects, sixteen in name, are only seven in fact. The four aspects of the Truth of Suffering are in fact distinct from one another. The aspects of the other Truths, in their fourfold name, only constitute one thing for each Truth: *hetu* (material cause), *samudaya* (arising or origin), *prabhava* (appearance), and *pratyaya* (efficient condition) are synonyms and are only one aspect; in the same way that Śakra, Indra, and Puraṁdara are different names for one and the same personage. Ascetics contemplate, separately, the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering, and any one of the aspects, material cause, etc., of the three other Truths.

But [the Vaibhāṣikas] maintain that the sixteen aspects exist in fact, [for they should be contemplated one by one].[83]

I. For the Truth of Suffering:

1. Impermanence, because it arises dependent upon efficient causes.

2. Suffering, because it is painful by nature (vi. 3).

3. Empty, as it opposes the belief in the view of things pertaining to self.

4. No soul, as it opposes the belief in a self.

II. For the Truth of Origin:

1. Cause (*hetu*), because it has the characteristic of a seed (*bījadharmayogena*). The *hetu* is a distant or material cause. The word *yoga* signifies *nyāya* or truth.

2. Arising, as it produces. This is the near cause, that from which a *dharma* immediately arises or originates.

3. Successive appearance, which constitutes the series: seed,

shoot, stalk...

4. Efficient conditions (*pratyaya*), as realizing an effect in joint causation; for example, the coming together of efficient conditions—earth, stick, wheel, twine, water, etc.—produces a jug (see ii. 64).

III. For the Truth of Extinction:

1. Extinction, by reason of the destruction of the [impure] *skandhas*.

2. Calm, by reason of the extinction of the three fires, craving, anger, and delusion (viii. 26c).

3. Excellent, by reason of the absence of all pain.

4. Salvation, because it is disassociated from all causes of pain.

IV. For the Truth of the Path:

1. Path, because one traverses it (towards Nirvāṇa.)[84]

2. Truth, because it is *yogayukta*, that is to say, endowed with proofs, endowed with resources or means.

3. Obtaining, because it brings about correct obtaining, that is to say one obtains (Nirvāṇa through it.)

4. Definitive release, because it causes one to pass beyond in a definitive manner.

There is a second exegesis:

I. For the Truth of Suffering:

1. Impermanent (*anitya*), because it is not definitive (*anātyantika*).

2. Suffering, because it resembles a burden.

3. Empty, because it is empty of *puruṣa* (agent, etc.).

4. No-soul, because it does not obey the will.[85]

II. For the Truth of Origin:

1. Cause (*hetu*), because it comes about from that (the root *hi* signifies *gati; hetu* signifies *hinoty asmāt*).

2. Arising (*samudaya*), because there is emergence: (the *dharma* emerges from the future).[86]

3. Appearance (*prabhava*), as it is a procession (*prasaraṇa*).

4. Condition (*pratyaya*) or foundation, that is, the essential element from the action of generation.

III. For the Truth of Extinction:

1. Extinction, because of the cessation of the former suffering and of the non-continuation of subsequent suffering.

2. Calm, because it is delivered from the three conditioned characteristics (*saṁskṛtalakṣaṇas*. ii. 45c).

3. Excellent, because it is absolutely good (*pāramārthaśubha*, iv. 8c).

4. Salvation, because it supremely strengthens (9v. 8b).[87]

IV. For the Truth of the Path:

1. Path, because it is opposed to the wrong path.

2. Truth, because it is opposed to non-truth.

3. Obtaining, because it is not in contradiction with the city of Nirvāṇa.[88]

4. Definitive release, because it abandons existence in the Three Dhātus.

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Since ancient explanations differ, we are permitted to present a third explanation:

I. For the Truth of Suffering:

1. Impermanent, because it arises and perishes.

2. Suffering, because it is repugnant to the mind of Āryans (vi. English trans. p. 898).

3. Empty, because no *ātman* is found in it.

4. No soul, because this is not an *ātman*.

II. For the Truth of Origin: the four aspects of the Second Truth, cause (*hetu*), arising (*samudaya*), appearance (*prabhava*), and condition (*pratyaya*), are explained according to the *Sūtra*, "The five *upādānaskandhas* (impure *skandhas*, i. 8a) are *chandamūlaka, chandasamudaya, chandajātīya, chandaprabhava*," that is to say they have *chanda* (=desire=*tṛṣṇā*=thirst) for their root (*mūla*) or *hetu*, which brings about their arising (*samudaya*), for their condition (*chandajātīya*=*chandapratyaya*), for their appearance (*prabhava*).[89] The only difference between the Sūtra and the Śāstra is that the latter places the condition (*pratyaya*) aspect in first place, and not the appearance (*prabhava*) aspect.[90]

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What is the difference between these four types of "processions"?

A. One should distinguish four states (*avasthā*) of desire (*chanda*): 1. the affection that one experiences for oneself when one thinks, "I am", without otherwise distinguishing an actual "self," without thinking of a past or future self; 2. the desire for re-existence without any other specification; 3. the desire for a certain re-existence; 4. the desire for reincarnation, a desire which makes one accomplish a certain action.

The first desire is the initial cause of suffering—as the seed is the initial cause of the fruit—; it is called *hetu*.[91]

The second desire is that which brings about re-existence—as the production of the shoot, stalk, etc., is a casual process or arising (*samudaya*) which brings about fruit; it is therefore called *samudaya*, a cause which brings forth.

The third desire is the cause which determines the quality of suffering,—as the field, the water, the fertilizer, etc., determine the virility, the ripening, the appearance of the fruit; it is therefore called *pratyaya*, or condition.[92]

The fourth desire is the cause from whence the fruit appears—as the flower is the cause of the fruit; it is therefore called *prabhāva*, or appearance.

The fourth desire is the immediate or direct cause; the other three are the mediate or indirect causes.

B. And again, according to the Sūtra,[93] there are two groups of five "modes of desire" (*tṛṣṇāvicāritas*), and two groups of four, which are, respectively, the four desires studied above. The first two desires are of five aspects, and the last two are of four.

a. When one thinks *asmi*, "I am," general affection for one's own person without determination is produced, which is fivefold: I am such; I am the same [as formerly]; I am different; I am something that is; I am something that is not.

b. When one thinks *bhaviṣyāmi*, "I shall be," there is produced a general desire for re-existence without determination, which is also fivefold: "I shall be such, I shall be thus, I shall be different, I shall exist, and I shall not exist."

c. There is produced particularized desire for re-existence, which is fourfold: "May I be; may I be such; may I be the same; may I be different."

d. There is produced a desire for reincarnation, which is fourfold: "It is absolutely necessary that I may be, that I may be such, the same, different.[94]

The first desires are the initial cause of suffering; they are therefore the *hetu*... The rest as above.

III. For the Truth of Extinction:

1. Extinction, because it cuts off transmigration.[95]

2. Calm, because it is cessationof all suffering; thus it is said,

"All the *saṁskāras*, Oh Bhikṣus, are suffering; only Nirvāṇa alone is absolute calm."[96]

3. Excellent, because it is the highest.

4. Definitive salvation, because it is without returning.

IV. For the Truth of the Path:

1. Path, because it resembles the right path.

2. Truth, because it is true.

3. Obtaining, because it is determined; that is to say one arrives by this path and not by another, as it is said, "This path leads to purity, other systems do not lead to it."

4. Definitive release, because it is definitive separation from threefold existence.

[Fourth explanation.][97]

[I. For the Truth of Suffering:]

Furthermore, it is in order to cure persons who nourish views of permanence, bliss, of things pertaining to the self, and a soul that the aspects of impermanence, suffering, empty, and no-soul are established.[98]

[II. For the Truth of Arising:]

1. The cause aspect is opposed to the view, "There is only one cause" (*nāsti hetuḥ*, v. 7, English trans. p. 777).

2. The arising aspect is opposed to the view, "There is only one cause"—be it Īśvara, or *pradhāna* (ii. 64). Cause is a complex.

3. The appearance aspect is opposed to the idea of evolution (*pariṇāmadṛṣṭi*), the theory that *bhāva*, or existence, existing initially, transforms itself: rather, *bhāva* begins.[99]

4. The condition aspect is opposed to the view that the world is created by an intelligent being (*buddhipūrvakṛtadṛṣṭi*, iv. 1): things arise from a multiplicity of causes.[100]

[III. For the Truth of Extinction:]

1. The extinction aspect is opposed to the view that there is no deliverance.

2. The calm aspect is opposed to the view that deliverance is suffering.

3. The excellent aspect is opposed to the view that the happiness of the *dhyānas* and *samapāttis* is excellent (v. 7, English trans. p. 777).

4. The definitive release aspect is opposed to the view that deliverance is subject to falling, that it is not definitive.

[IV. For the Truth of the Path.]

The Path, truth, cultivation, and definitive release aspects oppose, respectively, the views that there is no path, that a false path is the Path, that there is another path, and that the Path is subject to falling.

13b. The aspects are *prajñā*.[101]

The aspects are by their nature mental *prajñā* or discernment. (ii. 24).

But, we would say, if this is so, then *prajñā*, the knowledge that discerns the *dharmas*, will not be endowed with the aspects, for *prajñā* cannot be associated (*saṁprayukta*) with *prajñā*. It is therefore correct to say [—with the Sautrāntikas—] that "aspect" is a mode of perceiving (*grahaṇa*) objects by the mind and mental states.[102]

Is it solely *prajñā* which perceives the different, unique characteristics (*viśeṣa*, i. 14c) of objects?

13b-c. Everything that has an object perceives.

Prajñā and all the other *dharmas* which have an object (*sālamba*)[103] perceive.

13d. Everything that exists is the object of perception.

Everything that exists is perceived by the *dharmas* which have an object.

We have therefore three more or less large categories: 1. *prajñā* is aspect, subject, and object; 2. the other minds and mental states, which are associated with *prajñā*, are subject and object; and 3. all the other *dharmas*, conditioned or unconditioned, are only object.[104]

***

We have explained the aspects of the ten knowledges; we must now explain their natures, the sphere which serves as their support (*bhūmi*), and the person (*āśraya*) in whom they arise.

14a. The first is of three natures; the others are good.

"The first" is worldly, conventional knowledge, because this knowledge is named first in the Kārika (vii. 2b)[105], and is of three types, good, bad, or neutral. The nine other knowledges are only good.

14b. The first exists in all spheres.

It exists in all spheres, from Kāmadhātu up to Bhavāgra (=*naivasaṁjñānāṁjñāyatana*).

14c. In six, the knowledge named *dharma*.

A knowledge of the *dharmas* is obtained in or through the Four Dhyānas, and in Anāgamya and Dhyānāntara.

> 14c-d. In nine, that which is called *anvaya* (inferential).

Inferential knowledge is obtained in the six spheres which have been mentioned, and furthermore, in three Ārūpyas.

> 14d. So too six *jñānas*.

When one considers them together, some six knowledges,—the knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, the Path, Destruction, and Non-Arising—are obtained in nine spheres; when they form part of the knowledge of *dharmas*, they are obtained in six spheres; when they form part of inferential knowledge, they are obtained in nine spheres.

> 15a. The knowledge of the mind of another exists in the Four Dhyānas.

The knowledge of the mind of another is only obtained in the Four Dhyānas, and nowhere else.

> 15b. It has for its support a person either in Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu.

Beings in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu realize the knowledge of the mind of another.

> 15c. The knowledge of *dharmas*, a person in Kāmādhātu.[106]

The knowledge of *dharmas* can only be realized by a person in Kāmadhātu, and not by a person in either Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu.

> 15d. Others, in persons of the three spheres.

What are the other knowledges?

They are the eight knowledges with the exception of the knowledge of the mind of another and the knowledge of *dharmas*.

***

We have explained the spheres in which one acquires the knowledges, and the sphere to which the persons who can acquire the knowledges belong. Let us explain the relationship of the knowledges with the four applications of mindfulness (vi. 15).

> 16a. The knowledge of Extinction is an application of mindfulness.

The knowledge of Extinction is an application of mindfulness which relates to a *dharma*.

> 16b. The knowledge of the mind of another is threefold.

The knowledge of the mind of another, related to the mind of another, necessarily relates to *vedanā, saṁjñā*, and the *saṁskāras*.

> 16c. The others, four.

By excluding the knowledge of Extinction and the knowledge of the mind of another, the other eight knowledges have the four applications of mindfulness for their nature [The knowledge of Suffering, in fact, sometimes relates to the body...; the knowledge of the Path, when it has pure discipline[107] for its object, is an application of mindfulness related to the body].

***

The different knowledges are the object of how many other knowledges?

> 16d. Nine knowledges are the object of a knowledge of *dharmas*.

Excluding inferential knowledge.

> 17a. Nine are the object of inferential knowledge and knowledge of the Path.

Excluding the knowledge of *dharmas* in inferential knowledge; by excluding worldly conventional knowledge in the knowledge of the Path, because it does not form part of the Path.

> 17b. Two are the object of the knowledge of Suffering and Origin.

Worldly conventional knowledge and the part of the knowledge of the mind of another which is impure, are the object of a knowledge of Suffering and of Origin.

> 17c. Ten, of four.

Ten knowledges are the object of worldly conventional knowledge, a knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

> 17c. None are the object of one.

No knowledge is the object of the knowledge of Extinction whose only object is Extinction obtained through conscious effort (*pratisaṁkhyānirodha*).

***

How many *dharmas* constitute in their totality the object of the ten knowledges? How many *dharmas* constitute the object of each knowledge?[108]

17d. The totality of their object is ten *dharmas*.[109]

What are these ten *dharmas*?

18a-b. *Dharmas* of the Three Dhātus, pure *dharmas*, unconditioned, each category being twofold.

The conditioned *dharmas* are divided into eight classes: *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu, of Rūpadhātu, of Ārūpyadhātu, plus the pure *dharmas*, all being either associated with the mind or not (*saṁprayukta, viprayukta*, ii. 22).

The unconditioned *dharmas* are divided into two classes, good and neutral.[110]

Which of these two classes of *dharmas* are the object of the ten knowledges?

1. Worldly conventional knowledge is related to ten *dharmas*; 2. a knowledge of *dharmas* is related to five: two *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu, associated or not with the mind;[111] and a good unconditioned *dharma*; 3. inferential knowledge is related to seven: two of Rūpadhātu, two of Ārūpyadhātu, and two pure, which make six, and a good unconditioned *dharma*; 4-5. the knowledge of Suffering and of Origin are related to only good unconditioned *dharmas*; 7. a knowledge of the Path is related to the two pure *dharmas*; 8. a knowledge of the mind of another is related to three; the *dharmas* associated with the mind which are of Kāmadhātu, and of the Rūpadhātu, and pure; 9-10. the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are related to nine *dharmas*, with the exception of neutral unconditioned *dharmas*.

***

Can one, through a single knowledge,[112] know all of the *dharmas*?

No.

Yet

> 18c-d. One conventional knowledge, with the exception of its own complex, knows the rest as non-self.

When a moment of conventional knowledge knows all the *dharmas* as not being a self, this is with the exception, in the totality of the *dharmas*, of 1. itself, this same moment of conventional knowledge, for the subject of knowledge cannot be its own object;[113] 2. the mental *dharmas* which are associated with it, for they have the same object as it does; and 3. the *dharmas* disassociated from the mind but which accompany it, for example, its characteristics (ii. 45c), for they are too close.

This conventional knowledge of universal consciousness belongs only to Kāmadhātu, being *prajñā* of hearing or reflection (*śrutamayī, cintamayī*, vi. English trans. p. 913), not *prajñā* of absorption (*bhāvanāmayī*, iv. 123c), for the conventional knowledge which is of this third type of *prajñā* always has a determined sphere for its object. If it were otherwise one could obtain at one and the same time detachment with respect to all of the spheres.[114]

***

The different categories of humans are endowed with how many knowledges?

A common person possesses only worldly conventional knowledge; when he is detached [from Kāmadhātu], he also possesses a knowledge of the mind of another.

As for the Āryan,

19a-b. Not detached, in the first pure moment, he possesses one knowledge.

An Āryan who is not detached through a worldly path before entering the Path, in the moment in which the Patience which is the knowledge of the *dharmas* related to Suffering (*duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*, vi. 25c) arises, possesses a single knowledge, namely worldly conventional knowledge, because this Patience is not a knowledge (vii. 1).

19c. In the second moment, he possesses three knowledges.

At the moment of the knowledge of *dharmas* related to Suffering, he possesses worldly conventional knowledge, a knowledge of *dharmas*, and a knowledge of Suffering.

19c-d. Beyond, in four moments, each time adding a knowledge.

A knowledge is added in each of four subsequent moments; at the fourth moment (the inferential knowledge of suffering) there is inferential knowledge; at the sixth moment (a knowledge of *dharmas* related to Origin) there is the knowledge of origin; at the tenth moment (the knowledge of the *dharmas* as they relate to Extinction), there is the knowledge of Extinction; and at the fourteenth moment (the knowledge of the *dharmas* as related to the Path), there is the knowledge of the Path.

Consequently, having attained the knowledge of the *dharmas* related to the Path, the ascetic possesses seven knowledges.[115]

For an Āryan who, before entering into the Pure Path (the Path of Seeing), has obtained detachment through a worldly path,

we must add the knowledge of the mind of another. A *samayavimukta* Arhat (vi.50, 56) possesses nine knowledges, by adding the Knowledge of Extinction; an *asamayavimukta* Arhat in addition possesses the Knowledge of Non-Arising (vi. 50).[116]

How many knowledges does the ascetic cultivate (acquire)[117] at one and the same time in different stages, the Path of Seeing the Truths, and in the Path of Meditation, etc.?

With respect to the fifteen minds (vi.28c-d) of the Path of Seeing:

> 20a-c. In Seeing, future patiences and knowledges exist to the extent to which they are produced.[118]

Those which are produced are acquired or cultivated. For example, when an ascetic produces the Patience of the knowledge of the *dharmas* related to Suffering, he cultivates future Patience of this same type, and he takes possession of future Patience of this same type. [And so on to the Patience of the inferential knowledge of the Path].[119] The four aspects of this Patience (impermanence, etc.) are also acquired when any one of the aspects is produced.

Why, in the Path of Seeing, is there only acquisition of the knowledge and the aspects of the type of knowledge and the aspects produced?[120]

When the Patience of the knowledge of the *dharmas* related to Suffering is produced, the *gotra*,—that is to say, the seed or the cause—of this Patience, and the *gotras* of its four aspects, are grasped,[121] whereas the *gotras* of the knowledge of *dharmas* related to Suffering, etc., are not grasped. As for the aspects, we see that the four aspects of each Truth are of the same type, for they have the same object. When one of them is produced, the *gotras* of the others are grasped.

> 20c-d. In the Path of Seeing one also acquires conventional knowledge at the moment of the three inferential knowledges.[122]

The ascetic takes possession of future conventional knowledge

at the moment of the three inferential knowledges of Suffering, Origin, and Extinction (moments 4, 8, and 12 of the Path of Seeing, vi. 26b): not at the moment of the knowledge of the *dharmas*, because, in the knowledge of the *dharmas*, each Truth has not been understood in its totality, but only relating to Kāmadhātu.

> 21a. This conventional knowledge is termed "the end of *abhisamaya*."[123]

It is termed *abhisamayāntika jñāna*, because it is cultivated (=acquired) at the end of the comprehension of each Truth.

Why does an ascetic not take possession of it at the moment of inferential knowledge of the Path (sixteenth moment of comprehension or *abhisamaya*, the first moment of the Path of Meditation)?

a. Because the Path has not been understood (*abhisamita*) formerly, through a worldly path, under its aspects of Path, Truth, etc. (above p. 1111).[124]

b. Because the Path is not susceptible of being understood in its entirety. Suffering, its Origin, and its Extinction can be respectively known, abandoned, realized, in their entirety; but the Path cannot be practiced (= actualized) in its entirety. Without doubt one cannot say of a person who is in the Path of Seeing, that, at the end of his comprehension of the Truths of Origin and Extinction, he has complete abandoning of Origin, and complete realization of Extinction:[125] yet a time will come when this abandoning and this realization will be complete. But the same does not hold for the Path, given the diversity of families (*gotra*) of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Buddha.

Some say: Because conventional knowledge accompanies the Path of Seeing. Now the sixteenth moment of this "comprehension" (the inferential knowledge of the Path) forms part of the Path of Meditation.[126] Thus one does not acquire "the end of comprehension" in the sixteenth moment.

We would say that this argument does not hold, for one should

not regard the fact that conventional knowledge does not accompany the Path of Meditation as a proof.[127]

21b. It is not destined to arise.

At no moment is there the possibility for it to arise.

This knowledge does not arise when the ascetic is in contemplation, nor when the ascetic has left his contemplation (=Seeing of the Truths). On the one hand this knowledge is incompatible with his contemplation (see above p. 1122); on the other hand the mind, outside of its contemplation, is too coarse.[128]

If this is so, how can one say that one takes possession of conventional knowledge, and that conventional knowledge is "cultivated."

[The Sarvāstivādins answer:] Formerly it was not acquired, but now it is acquired.

How can it be acquired, since it is not produced?

[The Sarvāstivādins answer:] It is termed acquired because it is acquired [and not because it should be produced].

"Acquired because it is acquired," is an unprecedented manner of speaking. You do not thus explain how conventional knowledge is cultivated. This point should be understood in the same way as the Former Masters [the Sautrāntikas] understood it. According to these Masters, one acquires conventional knowledge through the power of the Āryamārga (=the Path of Seeing). After one has left the contemplation of the Āryamārga, a conventional knowledge bearing on the Truths is realized, and it is much more distinguished than that which preceeds the obtaining of the Āryamārga itself. When one says that an ascetic acquired this conventional knowledge through the Path of Seeing, one means to speak of the acquisition of a personality (*aśraya*) capable of realizing of this conventional knowledge,[129] as the acquisition of a mineral containing gold is called the acquisition of gold itself.[130]

The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this manner of seeing things. They hold that the so-called *abhisamayāntika* conventional knowledge is an unarisen *dharma*.

21c. From the sphere or from a lower sphere.[131]

When one realizes the Path of Seeing of a certain sphere (*bhūmi*), one acquires, in the future, the conventional knowledge of this sphere or of a lower sphere. This means that if one realizes the Path of Seeing in the state of *Anāgamya*, one acquires, in the future, the Path of Seeing of a single sphere (i.e., Anāgamya), and one acquires, in the future, the conventional knowledge of two spheres (Anāgamya and Kāmadhātu): and so on until: if one realizes the Path of Seeing in the Fourth Dhyāna, one acquires, in the future, the Path of Seeing of six spheres (Anāgamya, Dhyānāntara, and the Four Dhyānas), and one acquires, in the future, the conventional knowledge of seven spheres (the same, plus Kāmadhātu).

21c. In Extinction, the last.

If one cultivates conventional knowledge at the end of Suffering and Origin, — that is to say in the moments of the inferential knowledge of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Origin, — conventional knowledge is by nature the four foundations of mindfulness (vi. 14).

If one cultivates at the end of Extinction,—that is, in the moment of the inferential knowledge of Extinction,—it is only the last foundation of mindfulness, namely the foundation of mindfulness related to *dharmas*.

21d. It has the aspects of its Truth.

When one cultivates conventional knowledge at the end of the comprehension of a certain truth, the conventional knowledge takes on the aspects of this Truth and has this Truth for its object.

21d. It proceeds from effort.

Being acquired through the power of the Path of Seeing, it is exclusively obtained through effort; it does not arise from detachment.

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The knowledges are so called because knowledge is the major element in them; if one takes into consideration their followings, they make up four *skandhas* in Kāmadhātu, and five *skandhas* in Rūpadhātu (by adding *dhyānasaṁvaralakṣaṇarūpa*, iv. 13c).

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[132]How many knowledges does one cultivate in the different states of the Path of Meditation?

22a. In the sixteenth, six, through non-detachment.

One should add "are cultivated" (*bhavyante*, according to vii. 20a). In the sixteenth moment (the inferential knowledge of the Path), the ascetic who is not detached from Kāmadhātu cultivates (i.e., takes possession of and actualizes) two knowledges in the present;[133] he cultivates (takes possession of) six knowledges in the future: namely the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, and knowledges of the Four Truths.[134]

22b. Through detachment, seven.

With respect to the ascetic already detached from Kāmadhātu, at the moment when he attains inferential knowledge of the Path, one should add the cultivation of the knowledge of the mind of another, the seventh.

> 22c-d. Above, in the Path of Meditation associated with sensual desire, there is the cultivation of seven.

Beyond the sixteenth moment, that is, in the rest of the Path of Meditation, as long as one has not obtained detachment,[135] in the preparatory paths, the uninterrupted paths, the paths of deliverance, and in the excellent paths,—there is cultivation of seven knowledges, namely a knowledge of the *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, the knowledges of the Four Truths, and worldly, conventional knowledge.

If one cultivates a worldly path,[136] one also, in the present, cultivates worldly conventional knowledge. If one cultivates a transworldly path, one also, in the present, cultivates one of the four knowledges of the *dharmas*. One will cultivate the other six knowledges in the future.

> 23a-d. In the uninterrupted paths of the victory over seven spheres, of the acquisition of the supernormal knowledges, and of the quality of Immovability, of mixed meditation. And also in the eight paths of higher deliverance.

Based on the preceding, add "there is cultivation of seven knowledges."

One cultivates seven knowledges, the same as above, in the uninterrupted paths (paths of the expulsion of the defilements and the obstacles) which make up:

1. victory over seven spheres, that is to say detachment from the Four Dhyānas and the three Ārūpyas: these spheres are "vanquished" when one is detached from them;

2. the acquisition of five supernormal knowledges, with the exception of the sixth (vii. 42);

3. entry into Immovability (vi. 57, 60c, English trans. p. 1002);

4. the mixed meditation (vi. 42) of the Śaikṣa.

If the ascetic cultivates these paths through a worldly path,[137] he cultivates, in the present, conventional knowledge; if he follows a transworldly path, he cultivates in the present one of the four inferential knowledges, and one of the two knowledges of *dharmas* (Extinction and the Path).

In the acquisition of the quality of Immovability, he does not cultivate conventional knowledge; for this latter is not opposed to Bhavāgra. Here the Knowledge of the Destruction is the seventh knowledge.

Above the detachment from the seven spheres, in the first eight paths of deliverance of Bhavāgra, the ascetic cultivates, in the future, seven knowledges, namely the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, the knowledges of the Four Truths, and the knowledge of the mind of another;[138] he does not cultivate conventional knowledge, because this knowledge is not opposed to Bhavāgra.

He cultivates, in the present, one of the four inferential knowledges or one of the two knowledges of *dharmas* (Extinction and the Path).

> 24a-b. The Śaikṣa, in the path of deliverance of the perfectioning of the faculties, cultivates six or seven knowledges.

The Śaikṣa (in opposition to the Aśaikṣa who enters the state of Immovability) in the path of deliverance (third stage) of the perfectioning of his faculties (vi. 60c), cultivates six knowledges

when he is not detached (i.e., when he is not an Anāgāmin). When he is detached, he cultivates seven knowledges, the knowledge of the mind of another being the seventh.

Some other masters say that conventional knowledge is cultivated by one who is not detached as well as by one who is detached.[139]

In the preparatory path (*prayogamārga*, first stage), both of them cultivate this knowledge.

> 24c. In the uninterrupted path, he cultivates six knowledges.

Detached or non-detached, he cultivates six knowledges,[140] as above, in the uninterrupted path (second stage) of the perfectioning of his faculties. He does not cultivate conventional knowledge, because the perfectioning of the faculties resembles the Path of Seeing; he does not cultivate the knowledge of the mind of another because this knowledge is absent from the uninterrupted path: in fact this knowledge does not oppose the defilements.

> 24d. The same in the victory over Bhavāgra.

In the uninterrupted paths of detachment from Bhavāgra, the Śaikṣa cultivates six knowledges.

> 25a. At the moment of the knowledge of destruction, nine knowledges.

The ninth path of deliverance of detachment from Bhavāgra is called the Knowledge of Destruction (vi. 44d). [The first eight have been discussed vii. 23c-d]. The ascetic then cultivates nine

knowledges, with the exception of the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

25b. An Immovable One cultivates ten knowledges.

The saint who is from the beginning an Immovable One (vi. 57c) cultivates ten knowledges at the moment when he produces the Knowledge of Destruction, for at this moment he obtains the Knowledge of Non-Arising (vi. 50a).

25c. Ten knowledges also in the last deliverance in the passage to the state of Immovability.

The ascetic who obtains the state of Immovability through the perfectioning of his faculties also cultivates ten knowledges in the last path (the ninth path of deliverance) of this perfectioning (vi. 60c).

25d. In the cases not mentioned, there is cultivation of eight knowledges.

What are the cases not mentioned?

1. The ninth path of deliverance from detachment to Kāmadhātu (excluded from the definition 22c-d);

2. the paths of deliverance from detachment to the seven spheres, to the five supernormal knowledges, to mixed meditation of the Śaikṣa (excluded from the definitions 23a-c);

3. the first eight paths of deliverance of the perfectioning of the faculties leading to the state of Immovability (excluded from the definition 25c); and

4. the preparatory path and the excellent path (*prayogamārga* and *viśeṣamārga*) of one who is detached (or an Anāgāmin).

In all these paths, there is cultivation of eight future knowledges, with the exception of the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. This is the case for the Śaikṣa.

***

The Aśaikṣa, in the preparatory path, the path of deliverance, and the excellent path of the five supernormal knowledges and of mixed meditation, cultivates nine knowledges (with the exception of the Knowledge of Non-Arising) or ten knowledges, depending on whether the Aśaikṣa is a *samayavimukta* or an *asamayavimukta*. In the uninterrupted paths of the same (five supernormal knowledges and mixed meditation), he cultivates either eight or nine knowledges, with the exception of the knowledge of the mind of another in both cases.

Nevertheless, in the path of deliverance of the two supernormal knowledges which are neutral (the divine eye and divine hearing), —this path being itself morally neutral—there is no cultivation of any future knowledge.[141]

As for the Pṛthagjana,—in the ninth path of deliverance of detachment from Kāmadhātu and the three Dhyānas; in the preparatory paths; in the paths of deliverance of the three supernormal knowledges; in the realizations of the spiritual qualities, Apramāṇas, Vimokṣas, etc.:[142] all these paths being cultivated in the Dhyānas (and not in the *sāmantakas*),—he cultivates, in the future, conventional knowledge and the knowledge of the mind of another; but not in the *nirvedhabhāgīyas* because three constitute the following of the Path of Seeing.

In the other cases, obtaining a path not previously obtained, he cultivates solely, in the future, conventional knowledge.

***

To which sphere does the knowledge belong which is cultivated in the worldly and transworldly paths?

A knowledge of the mind of another, a future cultivation, belongs to the sphere which serves as the support of the Path, or rather to the sphere which one obtains through the Path.[143]

It is not a rule that pure knowledge, cultivated in the future, will belong to the sphere which serves as the support for its arising.

> 26a-b. The knowledge that one cultivates in the future belongs to the sphere from which one is detached, to the sphere acquired, or to a lower sphere.

When, in order to become detached from one sphere an ascetic cultivates the paths (*prayoga*, etc.) of the two classes, pure or impure, he cultivates pure knowledges which are either of the sphere which he obtains for the first time by these paths, of the sphere which is the support of the path, or of a lower sphere.[144]

> 26c. In the knowledge of destruction, the pure is also of all spheres.[145]

At the moment when a knowledge of the destruction of the cankers arises (vi. 44d), there is cultivated the qualities of all the spheres, including the impure ones,[146] namely the Apramāṇas, the Vimokṣas, etc. In fact, Vajropamasamādhi cuts off these ties which are the possessions of the defilements; all the qualities will be found in a series freed from the defilements; one can thus say that they "breathe" (or that they open, that they inflate), in the manner of a sack when one cuts the ropes that bind it.[147] The Arhat has obtained rule over his mind: all the good *dharmas* come towards him, as vassals come to present their homage[148] to a prince who accedes to supreme kingship.[149]

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Is everything that has been previously obtained also cultivated?

> 26d. That which has been obtained previously is not cultivated.

What is cultivated is what has not been obtained. That which, having been obtained and lost is obtained anew—that is to say, is newly realized or actualized—is not cultivated, that is, the ascetic does not take possession of it for the future. Because this has been acquired and rejected in the past.[150]

Does the term "cultivation" (*bhāvanā*) only designate acquisition?

No. Cultivation is of four types: 1. acquisition, 2. practice, 3. opposition, and 4. expulsion.

> 27. Cultivation of good conditioned *dharmas* is acquisition and practice; there is cultivation of opposition and expulsion with respect to impure *dharmas*.[151]

There is cultivation of acquisition[152] and practice with respect to the good conditioned *dharmas*, acquisition with respect to the future and acquisition and practice with respect to the present. These two cultivations rest on the first two efforts, effort for the arising of what has not yet arisen, and effort for the growth of what has already arisen.

There is cultivation of opposition[153] and expulsion[154] with respect to impure *dharmas*; they rest on the last two efforts, effort for the non-arising of what has not arisen, and effort for the destruction of what has already arisen.[155]

Thus the good but impure *dharmas* are susceptible of four

types of cultivation; the pure *dharmas* are susceptible of the first two; the defiled and neutral *dharmas* of the last two.

The Vaibhāṣikas of the West say that there are six types of cultivation: four as above, plus the cultivation of constraint (*saṁvarabhāvanā*), and the cultivation of inspection (*vibhāvanābhāvanā*).

The first is the cultivation of the organs,[156] the eye, etc.; the second is the cultivation of the body, as it says in the Sūtra, "These six organs well subdued, well guarded..."[157] and, "There is in the body the beard, hair, etc."[158]

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr however think that these two cultivations should be included within the cultivation of opposition and expulsion.[159]

***

We have explained the knowledges. Now we must explain the spiritual qualities (*guṇas*), which are made up of the knowledges.[160] Among these qualities, there are first those which are uniquely proper to the Buddha,[161] which the Bodhisattva acquires at the moment of the Knowledge of Destruction (vi. 45) in becoming an Arhat and, at the same time, a Buddha.

These qualities are eighteen in number.

> 28a-b. The *dharmas* unique to the Buddha are eighteen, the powers, etc.

The ten powers, the four absences of fear, the three foundations of mindfulness, and great compassion:[162] this group constitutes the eighteen *dharmas* unique to the Buddha, so called because others do not acquire them by becoming Arhats.

***

We shall examine first the nature of the powers.[163]

> 28c-29. There are ten knowledges in *sthānāsthāna*; [eight in *karmaphala*; nine in the *dhyānas*, etc., in the Indriyas, in the Abhimokṣas, in the Dhātus; nine or ten in the paths; two are conventional knowledge; and extinction is made up of six or ten knowledges.][164]

The power which consists of the knowledge of what is possible and what is impossible (*sthānāsthāna*, vii. 30c) is made up of ten knowledges.[165]

> 28d. Eight in *karmaphala*;

The power which consists of the knowledge of the retribution of actions is made up of eight knowledges, with the exception of the knowledge of the Path and Extinction.[166]

> 29a. Nine in the Dhyānas, etc., in the Indriyas, in the Abhimokṣas, in the Dhātus;

The power of the knowledge of the Dhyānas, Vimokṣas, Samādhis and Samāpattis;[167] the power of the knowledge of the degree of the moral faculties of beings;[168] the power of the knowledge of the different aspirations of beings;[169] and the power of the knowledge of the different acquired dispositions of beings[170]—these four powers are made up of nine knowledges, excluding the knowledge of extinction.

> 29b. Nine or ten in the paths;

The power of the knowledge of the paths which lead to the different realms of rebirth and to Nirvāṇa, is made up of either nine knowledges or ten knowledges. If one understands "the Path *with* its result," this power then includes the knowledge of extinction (which is the result of the Path); but if one understands "the Path *without* its result," then this power is made up of nine knowledges.[171]

29c. Two are conventional knowledges;

The power of the knowledge of former abodes and the power of the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings are both conventional knowledges.

29d. Destruction is made up of six or ten knowledges.

The power of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers is made up of six or ten knowledges. One can consider the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers in and of itself as the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers which is made up of the knowledge of the *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of extinction, the Knowledge of Destruction, the Knowledge of Non-Arising, and conventional knowledge; or one can understand the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers as the knowledge which is produced in a series where the cankers have been expelled: the ten knowledges exist in such a series.

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As for the spheres which serve as the support for the powers:

30a-c. The power of former abodes and the power of death-rebirth lie in the Dhyānas; the others in all the spheres.

The knowledge of former abodes and the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings have the Dhyānas for their spheres; the other powers are of all the spheres, Kāmadhātu, Anāgamya, the Four Dhyānas, Dhyānāntara, and the Four Ārūpyas.

They arise in a male body in Jambudvīpa, that is to say in the Buddha, for Buddhas do not appear outside of Jambudvīpa.[172]

In others this tenfold knowledge is not called a power: it is only in the series of the Buddha that it is called a power, because, elsewhere, it is shackled.

30c-d. Why? Because its power does not know any obstacle.

The knowledge which knows all the objects of knowledge without any obstacle is called a power. This is why the ten powers exist only in the Buddha, because the Buddha, having expelled all the cankers and all the traces (*vāsanā*, see vii. 32d) of ignorance, knows all objects of his own accord. It is not the same for the knowledges of others, and as a consequence these knowledges are not called powers.

According to tradition, Śāriputra refused a person who asked for admission to the Order;[173] he was not capable of seeing the number of the previous and subsequent births of a pigeon chased by a hawk (?).[174]

The Buddha's knowledge is exercised without obstacle, the power of his mind is infinite and envelopes all objects (see p. 1146).

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If such is the power of his mind, what is the power of his body?

31a. Nārāyaṇa power in his body; [according to others, in his parts; this is a power the seventh term of a series which

begins with the elephant and in which each term is worth ten times the preceeding; it consists of a tangible.][175]

Nārāyaṇa is the name of a power and also the name of one who possesses this power, namely the god Nārāyaṇa: the same for Cāṇūra and Mahānagna. The power of the body of the Buddha is equal to that of Nārāyaṇa.

31b. According to others, in his parts;

According to others, each part of his body (*saṁdhi*) possesses this power.

The Bhadanta, [the Dārṣṭāntika Master], says that his physical power is like his mental power, that is, infinite; for, if it were otherwise, the body of the Blessed One would not be able to support infinite knowledge.[176]

The Buddhas have *nagāgranthi* power in their body parts, Pratyekabuddhas have *śaṁkalā* power, and Cakravartins have *śaṅku* power.[177]

What is the extent of Nārāyaṇa power?

31c. This is a power the seventh term of a series which begins with the elephant and in which each term is worth ten times the preceeding;

There is a series: *prākṛtahastin, gandhahastin, mahānagna,*[178] *praskandin, varāṅga, cāṇūra,* and *nārāyaṇa.*[179] The power of each term is worth ten times the power of the preceeding term: ten *prākṛtahastins* make one *gandhahastin* and so on.[180]

According to others, this is the case for the first six terms; but ten *cāṇūras* are equal to a half-*nārāyaṇa*, and two half-*nārāyaṇas* are equal to one *nārāyaṇa*.

According to the author of this book, among the definitions of the physical power of the Buddha, that one is true which makes this power the greatest.[181]

31d. It consists of a tangible.

The physical power of the Buddha is, by its nature, a tangible (*spraṣṭavyāyatana*). It consists of primary elements of a special nature.

According to others, however, it is a *rūpa* derived from the primary elements, but a derived *rūpa* different from the seven derived tangibles, *ślakṣṇatva*, etc. (i. 10d).[182]

As for the four assurances (*vaiśāradya*),[183]

32a-c. Assurance is fourfold

The Buddha possesses four assurances which are explained in the Sūtra.

32c. Resembling the first, the tenth, the second, and the seventh power.

1. The first assurance, the assurance that he has attained supreme comprehension with respect to all the *dharmas*, resembles the first power (the power of the knowledge of what is possible and what is impossible); it consists of ten knowledges, and can exist (lit. "be supported") in all of the spheres.

2. The second assurance, the assurance that he has the knowledge of the destruction of all the defilements, resembles the tenth power, the power of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements: it consists of ten knowledges, and can exist in six spheres.

3. The third assurance, the assurance that he can fully explain the *dharmas*, resembles the second power, the power of the knowledge of the retribution of actions:[184] it consists of eight knowledges, and can exist in all of the spheres.

4. The fourth assurance, the assurance that he can explain the Path leading to definitive deliverance, resembles the seventh power, the power of the knowledge of the paths which lead to the different realms of rebirth and to Nirvāṇa: it consists of ten or nine knowledges, and can exist in all of the spheres.

How can the knowledges be called assurances (*vaiśāradya*)?

The word *vaiśāradya* signifies "absence of fear" (*nirbhayatā*). By reason of the fact that he knows that he has understood all the *dharmas*, destroyed all the defilements, etc., the Buddha is free from fear in the assemblies. Thus *vaiśāradya* is knowledge.

[In our opinion] the assurances, being a result of knowledge, are not knowledge by nature.[185]

***

What are the three applications of mindfulness of the Buddha?

32d. Three are mindfulness and awareness (*prajñā*).[186]

The Sūtra[187] explains at length the three applications of mindfulness of the Buddha: 1. When his disciples, unanimous, respectfully listen, accept and practice his teaching, he experiences neither joy nor satisfaction, but he remains indifferent, in full mindfulness and awareness. 2. When his disciples, unanimous, do not hear, do not accept and do not practice his teaching, he does not experience displeasure nor impatience, but he remains indifferent, in full mindfulness and awareness. 3. When some of his disciples hear, accept and practice his teaching, while others, not hearing, do not accept and do not practice his teaching, he does

not experience joy and displeasure, but remains indifferent in full mindfulness and awareness. These three applications of mindfulness are, by their nature, mindfulness and awareness.

But a Śrāvaka who is free from the cankers, whose disciples are either respectful or not respectful, or respectful and not respectful, experiences neither joy nor displeasure, nor either joy or displeasure. Why consider the three applications of mindfulness as *dharmas* unique to a Buddha?

Because the Buddha has abandoned joy and displeasure along with their traces. Or rather because the disciples are the disciples of the Buddha: it is admirable that the Buddha does not experience either joy or displeasure from their respect or disrespect; but the disciples are not the disciples of the Śrāvakas from whom they receive the teaching: there is nothing admirable in the fact that these Śrāvakas do not experience joy or displeasure.

***

> 33a. Great compassion is a conventional mental state; [it is great through its factors, its aspects, its object, its equality, and its excellence; it differs from (ordinary) compassion in eight ways.][188]

Great compassion is, by its nature, conventional knowledge (vii. 2b). In the contrary case, it would be, in its nature, absence of hatred as is ordinary compassion (viii. 29); like ordinary compassion, it would not embrace all beings of the Three Dhātus, it would not envision the three types of suffering.

Why is the compassion of the Blessed One termed "great"?

> 33b. It is great through its factors, its aspects, its object, its equality, and its excellence.

1. By reason of its factors (*saṁbhāra*); it is produced in fact by a great provisioning (*saṁbhāra*) of merit (*puṇya*) and knowledge (*jñāna*).[189]

2. By reason of its aspects, of the modality under which it grasps things: it considers things as painful by reason of the threefold suffering, the suffering inherent in suffering itself, the suffering inherent in change, and the suffering inherent in the *saṁskāras* (vi. 3),[190] whereas ordinary compassion only envisions the suffering inherent in suffering itself.

3.By reason of the object, for it has for its object all beings in the Three Dhātus.

4. By reason of its equality, for it is equally concerned with the happiness and benefit of all being.

5.By reason of its excellence, for no other compassion which has arisen surpasses it.[191]

How does great compassion differ from ordinary compassion?

33c. It differs from ordinary compassion in eight ways.

1. With respect to its nature: ordinary compassion is absence of hatred, whereas great compassion is absence of ignorance.

2. With respect to its aspect: ordinary compassion takes on the form of one suffering, whereas great compassion takes on the form of threefold suffering.

3. With respect to its object: ordinary compassion is concerned with the beings of one Dhātu, whereas great compassion is concerned with the Three Dhātus.

4.With respect to its sphere: ordinary compassion is of the sphere of the Four Dhyānas,[192] whereas great compassion is of the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna.

5. With respect to the personality which serves as its support: ordinary compassion arises in the series of the Śrāvakas, etc.,[193]

whereas great compassion arises in the series of the Buddhas.

6. With respect to its acquisition: ordinary compassion is obtained through detachment from Kāmadhātu, whereas great compassion is obtained through detachment from Bhavāgra.

7. With respect to its protection: ordinary compassion does not protect, whereas great compassion protects.[194]

8. With respect to compassion: ordinary compassion is an unequal compassion, for it sympathizes only with beings who are suffering, whereas great compassion is an equal compassion, turned towards all beings equally.

***

We have explained the qualities which belong only to the Buddhas and which distinguish them from other beings. Do the Buddhas resemble one another among themselves?

Under certain conditions, yes; under other conditions, no.

> 34. In *saṁbhāra, dharmakāya* and their service to beings, the Buddhas are identical; not in their duration of life, their caste, their stature, etc.[195]

The Buddhas are identical in that they have, in their previous existences, equally accumulated merit and knowledge, in that they have realized the same *dharmakāya*;[196] and in that they equally carry out service to others.

But the Buddhas differ through the difference in the duration of their lives, their caste, their *gotra*, the dimensions of their bodies, etc. According to the period in which they appear, their life is long or short, they are Kṣatriyas or Brahmins, they belong to the Gautamagotra or to the Kāśyapagotra, and their bodies are great or small. The word *et cetera* indicates that the Dharma of the

Buddhas lasts a long or short period of time, accordingly as, at the moment of their appearance, the beings to be converted are straight or crooked.[197]

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All intelligent persons who reflect on the threefold perfection[198] of the Tathāgatas necessarily produce a profound affection, a profound respect with respect to them. This threefold perfection is the perfection of their causes which consists of the provisions of merit and knowledge; the perfection of the result which consists of the *dharmakāya*; and the perfection of benefit which consists of service to all beings.

i. The perfection of cause is fourfold: 1. Cultivation of the accumulation of all qualities and all knowledge;[199] 2. prolonged cultivation;[200] 3. uninterrupted cultivation; and 4. zealous cultivation.

ii. The perfection of the result is fourfold, for the realization of the *dharmakāya* includes four perfections, that of knowledge, of abandoning, of power and of material body.

a. The perfection of knowledge is fourfold: 1. untaught knowledge; 2. universal knowledge (that is to say knowledge of all individual characteristics); 3. omniform knowledge,[201] (that is to say knowledge of all manners of being); and 4. spontaneous knowledge (knowledge through the simple desire to know).

b. The perfection of abandoning is fourfold: 1. abandoning of all the defilements; 2. definitive abandoning (not susceptible of falling away); 3. abandoning of the defilements with their traces (because no bond remains); and 4. abandoning of the obstacles to *samādhi* and *samāpatti* [of such a sort that the Buddha is doubly delivered (vi. 64a)].[202]

c. The perfection of power is fourfold: 1. perfection in the mastery of creating, transforming, and maintaining an external

object;[203] 2. perfection in the mastery of abandoning and prolonging life;[204] 3. perfection in the mastery of movement through resistant bodies, through space, to very distant location, of great speed, and mastery in the reduction of a large body to a small volume;[205] and 4. perfection of marvellous qualities, multiple and natural.[206]

d. The perfection of the material body is fourfold: 1. perfection in marks (*lakṣaṇa*); 2. perfection in secondary marks (*anuvyañjana*); 3. perfection in power (that is to say possession of Nārāyaṇa's power, vii. 31); and (with respect to internal events) perfection of the body whose bones are like diamonds; and (with respect to external events) emissions of rays of light (which exceed one hundred thousand suns.)

iii. The perfection of service is fourfold: 1-3. to deliver definitively (*atyanta*) from the suffering of the three painful realms of rebirth; 4. to deliver from the suffering of transmigration; or rather: 1-3. to install into the three vehicles; 4. to install into good realms of rebirth.

Such are, in short, the perfections of the Buddhas. There would be no end of our discussion if we were to speak of them in great detail. Only the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, if they were to prolong their existence for numbers of *asaṁkhyeyakalpas*, would be capable of knowing and speaking of their grandeur. It is enough to know that the Buddhas, endowed with qualities, knowledges, powers, and infinite and extraordinary benefits, are like mines of jewels.

Nevertheless fools (*bāla* = *pṛthagjana*), themselves poor in qualities—and judging based upon themselves—have no spiritual aspirations: they understand in vain the extolling of the merits of the Buddha and they do not conceive affection either for the Buddha or his Dharma.

The wise, on the contrary, understand the explanation of the qualities of the Buddha, conceiving, with respect to the Buddha and his Dharma, a mind of faith which penetrates to the marrow of

their bones. These persons, through this single mind of faith,[207] surmount an infinite mass of actions of unnecessary retribution;[208] they obtain excellent human and divine rebirths; and, finally, they arrive at Nirvāṇa. This is why the Tathāgatas are said to be a supreme field of merit; for this field gives forth fruits which are certain, agreeable, abundant, rapid, (experienced in this life), and of excellent issue. The Blessed One, in fact, has proclaimed, "If anyone plants a small root of good in the field of merit which are the Buddhas, he will first possess heavenly realms of rebirth and then he will obtain the Deathless (*Ekottara*, 24.15).[209] We have explained the eighteen qualities unique to the Buddhas.

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35a. There are other qualities which the Buddhas have in common with Śaikṣas

The Buddhas possess innumerable qualities which they have in common either with Śrāvakas

35b. And Pṛthagjanas

Or with ordinary persons.

35c. Absence of Contention, Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, the Unhindered Knowledges, the Supernormal Knowledges, etc.

These are: the Samādhi Absence of Contention, the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, the Four Unhindered Knowledges, the Supernormal Knowledges, the Dhyānas, the Ārūpyas, the Eight Samāpattis, the Three Samādhis, the Four Apramāṇas, the Eight Vimokṣas, the Eight Abhibhvāyatanas, the Ten Kṛtsnāyatanas, etc.

The first three are common to both the Buddhas and the Āryans; the Supernormal Knowledges, the Dhyānas, etc., can also belong to ordinary persons.

***

Araṇā [is the power to hinder the arising of another's defilements].[210] The Arhats know that the sufferings of beings are produced through their defilements; they know that they themselves are the most worthy field of merit (iv. 103, 117a); they fear that others might generate defilements with respect to them [which would be particularly injurious to them];[211] thus they generate a knowledge of such a nature that no other person will produce, with respect to them, lust, hatred, pride, etc. This knowledge puts an end, in beings, to *raṇa*, or contention, which is a defilement, a cause of torment: it is thus called *araṇā* or absence of contention.

What are the characteristics of the so-called Araṇā Samādhi, the Absorption Absence of Contention?

36a. Absence of Contention is conventional knowledge;

By nature it is conventional knowledge, as it results from its object.

36b. It is of the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna;

It exists in ("has for its support") the Fourth Dhyāna, which is the best of the easy paths (vi. 66).

36c. It is produced by a person who is Immovable.

It is produced by Immovable Arhats (*akopyadharman*, vi. 56) and not by others: for others are not capable of radically cutting off their own defilements (they are in fact subject to falling) and so they cannot arrest the defilements of others.

36d. It is produced by humans.

It is produced by humans, for it is only a being in the human realm of rebirth who can cultivate it in the Three Dvīpas.

36e. It relates to the defilements of Kāmadhātu, is future, and has a real object.

It bears on the defilements of others, in Kāmadhātu, in the future, and "has a real object" (*savastuka*), "May no defilements arise in others with respect to me!" The *savastuka* defilements are craving, anger, etc., which are abandoned through Meditation (vi. 58).

The *avastuka* defilements of others (vi. 58), which are abandoned through Seeing, are not susceptible of being arrested, for the universal (*sarvatraga*) defilements (v. 12), which exist in the totality of their sphere, also exist in the series of another.[212]

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As is the Samādhi Absence of Contention,

37a-b. So too the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution; [but it has all for its object].[213]

Like the Samādhi Absence of Contention, the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution is, by nature, conventional knowledge; like Absence of Contention, it exists in the Fourth Dhyāna, it is produced in the series of an Immovable One, and it is meditated upon by a being in the human realm of rebirth.

37b. But it has all for its object.

But, unlike the Samādhi Absence of Contention, it bears on all the *dharmas*.

Yet[214] the Vaibhāṣikas say that the *dharmas* of Ārūpyadhātu are not known by a direct seeing through the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution—being of the Fourth Dhyāna, this knowledge does not bear on a higher sphere. These *dharmas* are known through inference (*anumāna*). In fact, one knows 1. the outflowing of Ārūpyadhātu, namely the extreme calm which follows, in a subsequent existence, from a former existence in Ārūpyadhātu; 2. the conduct of Ārūpyadhātu, that is to say the practice of the Ārūpya Samāpattis which will produce an existence in Ārūpyadhātu,—and one can infer from a cause to its result and from a result to its cause. As the farmer knows a seed from its fruit and a fruit from its seed, seeing a calm person, one concludes, "He is reborn falling from Ārūpyadhātu, but he will be reborn in Ārūpyadhātu." Such is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas.

Others believe however that the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution bears on Ārūpyadhātu, for there is nothing that is not within the mental range of the Buddhas.[215]

One who would produce the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution begins by forming a resolution, holding a certain object in his consciousness; he enters into the Fourth *prāntakoṭika* Dhyāna (viii. 41a): this is the preparatory exercise. As soon as he leaves this absorption, he produces an exact consciousness in conformity with his resolution the sphere of which varies according to the power of his absorption.[216]

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37c-d. So too the Unhindered Knowledges of *dharmas*, of objects, of etymological explanations, and of eloquence.[217]

There are Four Unhindered Knowledges: the Unhindered

Knowledge of *dharmas*, the Unhindered Knowledge of things (*artha*), the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanations (*nirukta*), and the Unhindered Knowledge of eloquence (*pratibhāna*). They are like the Samādhi Absence of Contention in that they belong solely to the Immovable Ones who are humans. But they differ from it with respect to their object, the sphere in which they are acquired, and their nature.

> 38a-b. The first three are unhindered knowledges bearing, in this order, on name, the thing, speech.[218]

Infallible (*avivartya*) knowledge of names, phrases, and syllables (ii.47a) is the Unhindered Knowledge of *dharmas*.[219]

Infallible knowledge of the thing is the Unhindered Knowledge of things.

Infallible knowledge of speech is the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation.

> 38c-d. The fourth is the knowledge of exact and facile expression, and of mastery with respect to the Path.[220]

Infallible knowledge which confers the capacity to express oneself in an exact and facile[221] manner and which also confers never failing attention on a person who is a master in absorption is the Unhindered Knowledge of eloquence.[222]

> 39a-b. Its object is speech and the Path; [it is made up of nine knowledges.][223]

Speech and the Path are the object of this Unhindered Knowledge.

39b. It is made up of nine knowledges.

Which, in its nature, is made up of nine knowledges with the exception of the knowledge of extinction.

39c. It is of all the spheres.

It can arise in an ascetic who exists in any of the spheres, from Kāmadhātu to Bhavāgra, since it has for its object either speech or the Path.

39c. Unhindered Knowledge of things (*artha*) is made up of ten or six.

Artha or thing signifies "all the *dharmas*": in which case the Unhindered Knowledge of things is, by its nature, the ten knowledges; but if *artha* signifies Nirvāṇa, then it is made up of six knowledges: the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of extinction, the Knowledge of Destruction, the Knowledge of Non-Arising and conventional knowledge.

39d. It arises everywhere.

That is to say it can exist in any sphere.

39d. The others are conventional knowledge.

Two Unhindered Knowledges (of the *dharmas* and of etymological explanation) are conventional knowledge, for they have names, phrases, and syllables, etc., and speech, for their object.

40a. The Unhindered Knowledge of *dharmas* exists in Kāmadhātu and the Dhyānas.

It therefore exists in five spheres. Above them, names are absent [and so too phrases and syllables].[224]

40b. The Unhindered Knowledge of speech exists in Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna.

The Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation exists only in Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, because *vitarka* is absent above them.[225]

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According to the *Prajñaptipāda*, the Unhindered Knowledges are in the following order: 1. the infallible knowledge of name, phrase, and syllable; 2. the knowledge of the thing (*artha*) expressed by its name, etc.; 3. the knowledge of the expression of the characteristics of the thing, its number (singular, dual, or plural), its gender (feminine, masculine, or neuter), the time, etc.;[226] 4. the knowledge of what is not possible (*asaktatā*) [=which produced the *asaktatā*] either of the expression, or of phrases and syllables. In this way the order of the Unhindered Knowledges is justified.

According to others, *nirukti* is an etymological explanation (*nirvacanaṁ*), for example: *rūpyate tasmād rūpam* (it is physical matter because it can be crushed), *vijānātīti vijñānam*, (it is consciousness because it knows or distinguishes), *cinotīti cittam* (it is mind because it accumulates); *pratibhāna* is the rejoinder.[227]

According to the School, the preparatory exercises of the Four Unhindered Knowledges are, in this order, the study of calculation,

the word of the Buddha, the study of sounds (*śabdavidyā*), and the study of causes (*hetuvidyā*),[228] for a person who has not cultivated these four disciplines is not capable of producing the Four Unhindered Knowledges. But, in fact,[229] the study of the word of the Buddha alone suffices to achieve the four preparatory exercises.

40c. One only obtains them together.

If a person obtains one Unhindered Knowledge, he obtains the others; if he does not obtain them all, he does not obtain any of them.

***

The six qualities described above, Absence of Contention, etc.

40d. These six are *prāntakoṭika.*

They receive this name because they are obtained through the power of the Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna (vii. 41a-c).

41a. It is sixfold.

The Fourth Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna is made up of six things: it consists of 1. Absence of Contention, 2. the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, 3-5. three Unhindered Knowledges (with the exception of the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation), and 6. the Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna itself.[230]

Even though the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation may be obtained through the power of a Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna, it does not arise in the Fourth Dhyāna, for it has Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna for its sphere; consequently it is not included within the Fourth Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna.

What is the Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna?

It is the last *dhyāna* in the Fourth Dhyāna.[231]

> 41b-c. It is the last *dhyāna*, in a series with all the spheres and carried to its maximum.[232]

a. The Fourth Dhyāna is "in a series with all the spheres" when one cultivates it in the following manner: from a good mind of Kāmadhātu, one enters into the First Dhyāna; from the First Dhyāna, into the Second, and so on up to *naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana* (= the Fourth Dhyāna); then, one redescends to a good mind of Kāmadhātu; finally, from this mind, one ascends again to the Fourth Dhyāna.

b. One cultivates the Fourth Dhyāna; after having cultivated in an inferior manner, one cultivates in a medium manner; after having cultivated in a medium manner, one cultivates in a superior manner. Each one of these three categories is divided into three. The Fourth Dhyāna is therefore made up of nine categories. The highest category of the Fourth Dhyāna is called "carried to the maximum" (*vṛddhikāṣṭāgata*). The Dhyāna which possesses these two qualities is called *prāntakoṭika*, because its end (*koṭi*) has been traversed (*pragatā*) to the extreme (*antam*).[233]

Koṭi signifies both "type" (*prakāra*) and "summit, apex," as one says: *cātuṣkoṭika praśna*, that is, a fourfold question; or as one says: *bhūtakoṭi*, "the limit of existence."[234]

These qualities of the Buddha are

> 41d. With the exception of the Buddha, acquired through effort.

With the exception of the Buddha, the other Āryans acquire these six qualities, the Samādhi Absence of Contention, etc., only through effort, and not through detachment, since all do not

possess them.[235] The Buddha alone acquires them through detachment, for the Buddha obtains all his qualities in a single stroke, from the beginning, at the moment of the Knowledge of Destruction, through detachment.[236] Later, he actualizes them at his will, without effort; for the Buddha is the master of all the *dharmas* that he possesses.

***

We have explained the three categories, Absence of Contention, Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, the Unhindered Knowledges, which are common to the Āryans. Among the qualities which also belong to ordinary persons (*pṛthagjanas*)[237] we must explain the Supernormal Knowledges.

> 42a-d. Realization of the knowledge of supernormal power, of ear, of the mind, of past existences, of death and rebirth, of the destruction of the cankers; this is the sixfold supernormal knowledge.[238]

There are six supernormal knowledges: 1. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the sphere of *ṛddhi* or supernormal power (that is to say, displacement and creation);[239] 2. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of divine hearing;[240] 3. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge or consciousness of the mind of another;[241] 4. [242]the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the memory of past existences;[243] 5. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of divine sight (of the death and birth of all beings);[244] and 6. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers.[245]

Even though the sixth supernormal knowledge belongs only to

the Āryans, since the first five are also possessed by ordinary persons, and by reason of the characteristics of the greatest number of supernormal knowledges, here all of the supernormal knowledges are considered as common to the Āryans and to ordinary persons.[246]

> 42d. They are *prajñā* of deliverance.[247]

They are by their nature the *prajñā* of the Path of Deliverance, like the results of the religious life.[248]

> 43a. Four are conventional knowledge.[249]

Four, with the exception of the supernormal knowledge of the minds of others and the supernormal knowledge of the destruction of the cankers, are conventional knowledges (vii.2).

> 43b. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of five knowledges.

The fifth supernormal knowledge is by nature the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, conventional knowledge, and the knowledge of the mind of another.[250]

> 43c. The supernormal knowledge of the destruction of the cankers is similar to the power.[251]

Exactly like the power of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers, this supernormal knowledge is made up of six or ten knowledges. So too, it can exist in all of the spheres and relates to all objects.

43d. Five exist in the Four Dhyānas.[252]

The first five supernormal knowledges exist in the Four Dhyānas, that is to say, they are obtained by an ascetic in any of these Dhyānas.

***

Why do they not exist in the non-material absorptions, the Ārūpyas?

a. The first three have *rūpa* for their object (see p. 1162, line 14). Thus one cannot produce them in the *ārūpyas*.

b. The knowledge of the mind of another is prepared through the gate of physical matter (*rūpa*), that is to say through a path which has color and shape for its object.[253] Now the non-material absorptions do not have physical matter for their object.

c. As for the memory of previous existences, the ascetic prepares for this by going over again and again the course of successive states (*anupūrvāvasthāntarasmaraṇāt*);[254] now the non-material absorptions do not have the *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu for their object, and when a memory of past existences is actualized, it bears, as the Sūtra says, on the place, the *gotra*, etc., and on material *dharmas*.[255]

d. In fact the ascetic who wishes to know the mind of another first considers, in his own series, the characteristics of his body and mind, "Such is my body, such is my mind." As he has considered his own body and mind, in this same way, envisioning the series of another, he takes into consideration the characteristic of the body and mind of another: thus he knows the mind of another and the supernormal knowledge arises. When the supernormal knowledge is realized, the ascetic no longer considers the *rūpa* of the body; he directly knows the mind.[256]

e. The ascetic who wishes to remember his past existences, begins by grasping the characteristic of the mind which has just perished; from this mind, he again considers the states which it immediately succeeds in the present existence up to the mind at

emembers one moment of mind of his antarābhava), this supernormal knowl- der for him to remember the previous preliminary exercise is the same.

eginner in the practice of this supernor- ese existences only in their chronological ce is acquired, he remembers them by existences.

ly that which has been experienced

ow can there be remembrance of the do not return here, the ascetic does not d he has not experienced them in their ons are not born in this heaven.

ecause he has experienced them through who remembers them understands, "The are such." The experience, in fact, is nd hearing.

om Ārūpyadhātu, arise here produce this y means of the series of another.

which consists of the memory of past e of a Dhyāna, and one cannot, through ind which is in Ārūpyadhātu.

n by means of their own series.[258]

the first three supernormal knowled- owledge of the sphere of *ṛddhi*, of divine ght,—consists of the observation of t.[259] When this preparation is achieved, in each case.

e supernormal knowledges do not exist pyadhātu.[260]

44a. They have their own sphere or a lower sphere for their domain.[261]

Through the Supernormal Knowledge of magical power of a certain sphere, acquired in a certain *dhyāna* (vii. 43d), one possesses the powers of displacement and creation (vii. 48) in this sphere or in a lower sphere, but not in a higher sphere.

So too, through the Supernormal Knowledge of divine hearing, one understands the sounds of the sphere to which the Supernormal Knowledge belongs, or the sounds of a lower sphere, but not the sounds of a higher sphere.

Through the Supernormal Knowledge of the mind of another, one does not know the mind of another when it is of a sphere higher than that of the Supernormal Knowledge.

Through the Supernormal Knowledge of the memory of past existences, one does not obtain the memory of existences in a sphere higher than that of the Supernormal Knowledge.

Consequently, a mind in Ārūpyadhātu cannot be attained either through the Supernormal Knowledge of the knowledge of the mind of another, nor through the Supernormal Knowledge of the memory of past existences, because this mind in Ārūpyadhātu is of a sphere higher than that of the Supernormal Knowledges.[262]

***

How are the Supernormal Knowledges acquired?

If they have not been acquired in a past life, they are acquired only through effort.

44b. Already cultivated, they are acquired through detachment.

When they have been cultivated in a past life, they are acquired through detachment. [The ascetic takes possession of them through the sole fact that he detaches himself from Kāmadhātu and enters a Dhyāna]. Nevertheless, intense, they are acquired only through effort. Their manifestation always supposes an effort, except in the case of the Buddha, who acquires any of the Supernormal Knowledges through simple detachment, and actualized them at will (ii. 44a, vii. 41d).

> 44c. The third is made up of three applications of mindfulness.[263]

The supernormal knowledge of the mind of another contains three applications of mindfulness,—*vedanā, citta*, and *dharma* (vi. 14)—because it has the mind and its mental states for its object.

> 44d. Supernormal power, hearing, and sight make up the first application of mindfulness.[264]

The supernormal knowledges of supernormal power, divine hearing, and divine sight, make up the first application of mindfulness, that is, the body as an application of mindfulness, for they have *rūpa*, color and shape, for their object. The supernormal knowledge of supernormal power has four external *āyatanas*, with the exception of sound, for its sphere.[265] And divine hearing and divine sight have both sound and *rūpa* for their domain.

If this is the case, how can the Supernormal Knowledge of the divine sight know, as the Sūtra explains,[266] that "These beings endowed with bad physical actions, with bad vocal actions, deniers (*apavādaka*) of the Āryans, produce false views, attach themselves to views and to wrong actions, because of which, at the end of their lives, they fall into bad realms of rebirth..."?

The Supernormal Knowledge of divine sight does not know

that a being is endowed with a mental action, that a being has conceived a false view, etc. But there is another knowledge which accompanies the Supernormal Knowledge of divine sight,[267] which arises in the series of the Āryan, and which knows mental action, etc. As this knowledge is produced through the power of the Supernormal Knowledges of divine sight, it receives, together with this Supernormal Knowledge, the name of "Knowledge of death and rebirth."

***

As their natures are not determined in the Kārikā, it follows in and of itself that the two Supernormal Knowledges of memory of past existences and the destruction of the cankers have for their nature the four applications of mindfulness.[268]

> 45a-b. The Supernormal Knowledges of hearing and sight are neutral; the others are good.[269]

The Supernormal Knowledges of divine hearing and divine sight are morally neutral, for, by nature, they are *prajñā* associated with auditory and visual consciousness.

If this is the case, how can one say that they are of the sphere of the Four Dhyānas? In fact, there is no visual or auditory consciousness in the Second Dhyāna and above (i.46).

There is no contradiction here, for we express ourselves in this way by consideration of the organs. The organs, the ears and eyes, which are the support of the Supernormal Knowledges, are produced through the power of the Four Dhyānas and belong to their sphere: they therefore exist in the four spheres. The Supernormal Knowledge, being supported on the organ, is therefore said to be supported on (= exist in) the Four Dhyānas.

Or rather, we express ourselves in this way because we consider

the *ānantaryamārga* (or preparation, above p. 1160, line 25) of the Supernormal Knowledge; in fact the *ānantaryamārga* of the Supernormal Knowledge of divine hearing and divine sight is supported on four spheres, the Four Dhyānas.[270]

The other supernormal knowledges are good.

If this is the case, why does the *Prakaraṇapāda* say, "What is supernormal knowledge? It is good *prajñā*"?

This definition refers to the greater number of cases (*bāhulika*) or to the essential (*prādhānika*). The supernormal knowledges are, in the greater number of cases, good; and the good supernormal knowledges are the most essential.

***

According to the Sūtra, there are three Aśaikṣa Wisdoms (*vidyā*).[271] To which supernormal knowledges do these wisdoms correspond?

> 45c-d. Three supernormal knowledges are wisdom, [because they bring about the cessation of non-wisdom relative to the past, etc.][272]

The three wisdoms,—the Aśaikṣa wisdom which consists of the realization of the knowledge of past lives, the Aśaikṣa wisdom which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the death and birth of all beings, and the Aśaikṣa wisdom which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers,—are, in the order of the Sūtra, the fifth, the second, and the sixth supernormal knowledges.

Why are these three supernormal knowledges called wisdoms (*vidyā*)?

45d. Because they bring about the cessation of non-wisdom (ignorance) relating to the past, etc.

It is because the memory of past existences (=the fourth supernormal knowledge) brings about the cessation of error relating to the past, the knowledge of death and birth (=the fifth supernormal knowledge) brings about the cessation of error relating to the future, and the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers (=the sixth supernormal knowledge) brings about the cessation of error relating to the present.[273]

Which of these three supernormal knowledges really belongs to the Aśaikṣas?

46a. The last belongs to the Aśaikṣas.

The knowledge of the destruction of the cankers belongs only to the Arhat.

46a-b. The two others are said to belong to the Aśaikṣas when they arise in the series of an Aśaikṣa.[274]

The other two supernormal knowledges are said to belong to an Aśaikṣa when they arise in the series of an Aśaikṣa: by nature however, they are neither-Śaikṣa-nor-Aśaikṣa. (ii. 38a)

If this is so, why not admit that these two supernormal knowledges are, when they are produced in a Śaikṣa, the wisdom of a Śaikṣa.

46c-d. We admit that they exist in the Śaikṣa, but then they are not called wisdoms because the series of the Śaikṣa is associated with non-wisdom.[275]

In fact the Buddha did not say that these two supernormal knowledges are Śaikṣa *dharmas*.

Why?

When a series is associated with non-wisdom (*avidyā*, ignorance) it is not correct to give the name of wisdom (*vidyā*) to the supernormal knowledge which is produced in this series, for the supernormal knowledge is obscured by the non-wisdom.[276]

***

The Sūtra says that there are three methods of conversion.[277] To which supernormal knowledges do they correspond?

> 47a-b. The first, the third and the sixth are the methods of conversion.[278]

The supernormal knowledges of ṛddhi, of the knowledge of the mind of another, and of the destruction of the cankers, are, in this order the three methods of conversion (*prātihārya*): "to carry off" (*har*), that is, to convert, through miracles (*ṛddhiprātihārya*), through reading the mind of someone (*ādeśanāprātihārya*), and through the Teaching (*anuśāsanīprātihārya*).

The prefix *pra-* signifies *ādikarman* (initial action), and the prefix *ati-*signifies *bhṛśam* (forceful): these three supernormal knowledges are called *prātihārya* because, thanks to them, the work of conversion (*haraṇa*) is begun (*pra-*) and done in an intense manner (*ati-*).

Through them, one carries away (*haranti*) the mind of persons to be converted, from the very first (*āditas*) and very forcefully (*ati bhṛām*).

Or rather, they receive the name of *prātihārya*, for through

them one first or forcefully makes oneself a master of persons who hate (*pratihata*) the Good Law, or of those who are indifferent.[279] Through them, one makes persons of hostile, unbelieving, or non-zealous mind, produce a mind of refuge, a mind of faith, or a mind of practice.[280]

> 47b. Conversion through the Teaching is the best.[281]

Among the three methods of conversion, conversion through the Teaching is the best.

> 47c-d. Because it does not exist without supernormal knowledge, and because it confers the fruits of salvation and of well-being.

Conversion through miracles and conversion through reading someone's mind can be produced by means of wisdom.[282] There is a wisdom called Gāndhārī:[283] the person who possesses it can fly through space. There is also a wisdom called Īkṣaṇikā:[284] the person who possesses it can read the mind of others. Conversion through the Teaching cannot be realized by such means, and as a consequence, since it is never separated from the supernormal knowledge of the destruction of the cankers,[285] it is superior to the other two.

Further, the first two methods of conversion are only capable of captivating the mind of another for a short period of time, and they do not produce any important results. But the third method of conversion causes others to produce beneficial results; for by means of this method of conversion, the preacher teaches, in truth, the means to salvation and to well-being.

***

What is ṛddhi?

48a. Ṛddhi is absorption.[286]

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the word *ṛddhi* designates absorption or *samādhi*. The absorption is so named, for it is due to it that the work succeeds (*saṁṛdhyati*).

***

What does ṛddhi consist of?

48a-b. From it, there arises displacement and fictive creation.[287]

Displacement (*gati*) is of three types: transport displacement, displacement through *adhimokṣa* (intention), and rapid displacement like the mind.[288]

48c-d. Rapid displacement like the mind is unique to the Master.[289]

This displacement goes very quickly, like the mind; from whence its name of *manojava*. Only the Buddha possesses it, not other beings. The body arrives at a great distance even in the time it takes to think of arriving there. This is why the Buddha said that the sphere of the Buddha is incomprehensible.[290] The Master also possesses the other two displacements.

48c-d. The others possess displacement of transport and of *adhimokṣa*.

Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas elevate their bodies and move, as a bird[291] gradually raises his body and moves.[292] As for the displacement of *adhimokṣa*, when one does it, through the power of intention (*adhimokṣa*), what is distant becomes close:[293] through this *adhimokṣa* the object comes quickly.

> 49a-c. Fictive creation in Kāmadhātu is made up of four external *āyatanas*; [it is of two types; fictive creation of the sphere of Rūpadhātu is made up of two *āyatanas*.][294]

Fictive creation (*nirmita*) is of two types, of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, and of the sphere of Rūpadhātu. The first consists of the creation of physical matter, odor, taste, tangibles which are external,[295] with the exception of sound. The second consists of the creation of physical matter and tangibles only, because odors and tastes do not exist in Rūpadhātu.[296]

> 49b. It is of two types.

Fictive creation in Kāmadhātu is twofold, accordingly as it is connected with the body of the ascetic himself or with another: for example an ascetic transforms himself into a tiger, or he creates, apart from himself, a tiger.[297]

> 49c. Fictive creation of the sphere of Rūpadhātu is made up of two *āyatanas*.

The same holds true of fictive creations in Rūpadhātu. A person who is in Kāmadhātu and one who is in Rūpadhātua are each capable of four types of fictive creations, so creation is eightfold.

But when a person in Rūpadhātu produces a fictive creation in Kāmadhātu, is it not found to possess odor and taste?

No, there is no possession, no more so than a person does not possess clothing or attire, even though they are bound to his body, because these things, not being living organisms (*asattvasaṁkhyāta*, i. 10b), are not bound to the sense organs.

Yet certain masters say that a person in Rūpadhātu can only create two *āyatanas*, physical matter and tangibles, for they fear that if this person creates odors, etc., he will be found to possess odors, etc.

***

Is it through the supernormal knowledge of creation itself that the ascetic creates fictive, created objects (*nirmita*)?

No.

How is this?

It is created as a result of supernormal knowledge (*abhijñāphala*, ii. 72b. English trans. p. 314).

What is this *dharma* that you term the result of supernormal knowledge?

> 49c-d. It is through a mind capable of creating fictive beings (*nirmāṇacitta*) that one creates. They are fourteen in number.

A result of supernormal knowledge are minds capable of creating fictive, created objects. These minds are fourteen in number.

> 50a-b. They are the results of the Dhyānas, from the number of two up to five, in this order.

These minds are fourteen in number, being differentiated by their Dhyāna (fundamental Dhyāna, *mūladhyāna*) which serves as their support.

Two minds are the results of the First Dhyāna: the first of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, and the second of the sphere of the First Dhyāna.[298]

Three minds are the results of the Second Dhyāna: two of the two lower spheres (Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna) and one of the same sphere as the Dhyāna of which it is the result, so therefore of the Second Dhyāna.

In the same way four and five minds are the results of the Third and Fourth Dhyānas. The mind capable of creating fictive objects, the result of a certain Dhyāna, is of the sphere of this Dhyāna or of a lower sphere.

50b. They do not arise from a lower Dhyāna.[299]

The Dhyāna mind of a lower sphere does not produce a mind capable of creating fictive beings (that is, a result of a Dhyāna) of a higher sphere, because its power is too small.

A fictive being,—that is to say, a magical being—of a lower sphere, but which is the result of the Second Dhyāna, prevails over, from the standpoint of its going and coming, a being of a higher sphere, which is a result of the First Dhyāna.[300] The same for the following Dhyānas.

50c. One obtains them like a Dhyāna[301]

One obtains a mind capable of creating fictive beings, a result of a *mūladhyāna*, as one obtains the Dhyāna, that is to say, through detachment, for the result is obtained at the same time as its support.

50c-d. A mind capable of creating fictive beings proceeds from a pure Dhyāna and from itself; [it produces the two.][302]

Its result, a mind capable of creating fictive beings, is produced from a Dhyāna. This mind does not lead to a departure from contemplation.

50d. It produces the two.

A first mind capable of creating fictive beings arises from a pure (*śuddhaka*, viii. 6) Dhyāna. Then successive minds capable of creating fictive beings arise from a mind of their same type, that is to say, of the first, of the second... mind capable of creating fictive beings: the former mind of this series thus produces a subsequent mind capable of creating fictive beings. The last mind is followed by a pure Dhyāna. Therefore the mind capable of creating fictive beings comes from two minds (a pure Dhyāna and a mind capable of creating fictive beings) and produces these same two. This is to suppose that the person who has a mind which is capable of creating fictive beings—the result of an absorption, and morally neutral—does not again enter a Dhyāna, that he would not depart from this Dhyāna, in the same way that one enters through a door and leaves through this same door.

51a. One creation takes place through one mind of its sphere.

All the fictive, created (*nirmita*) things are created by a mind of their sphere, for a mind capable of creating fictive beings of a certain sphere does not produce a being belonging to another sphere.

51b. But speech also takes place through a mind of a lower sphere.[303]

Speech uttered by fictive (*nirmita*) being also depends, in certain cases, on a mind of a lower sphere.

Speech uttered by a fictive being in Kāmadhātu or of the First Dhyāna takes place by virtue of a mind of the sphere of this created being. But a fictive being of a higher sphere, of the Second Dhyāna, etc., speaks by virtue of a mind of the First Dhyāna: for in the higher spheres a mind endowed with *vitarka* and *vicāra* (ii. 33, English trans. p. 203) and capable of producing *vijñāpti* (iv. 7d) does not exist.

51c. With the creator, except in the case of the Master.

When the *nirmātar*, the person who produces fictive beings (*nirmita*), produces a number of fictive beings, all speak when their creator speaks, because their *vāgvijñāpti* (iv. 3d) or vocal action, is common to all. This is why the stanza says, "When one speaks, namely the creator, all his creatures speak; when one remains silent, all remain silent."[304]

This rule does not refer to the Buddha, for he possesses a perfect mastery in absorption: at his will, fictive beings speak one after the other; they question the Buddha and the Buddha answers; the Buddha questions them and they respond.

***

But, one would say, when the mind which produces the voice arises, the mind capable of creating fictive beings no longer exists: therefore at this moment the fictive being does not exist; thus how does a fictive being speak?

51d. The fictive being speaks, because its creator sets speech into motion through another mind, after having empowered the fictive being.

Through the power of a mind previous to its entry into contemplation and creation, the creator empowers (*adhitiṣṭhati*) the fictive being, "May it last!" By means of another mind, he causes it to speak. Therefore, even though the fictive being speaks, the two minds,—that which creates it and that which causes it to speak,—are not simultaneous, and yet the vocal action takes place with the fictive being for its support.

52a. Empowerment continues after death.[305]

It is not only for the duration of his own life that the creator is capable of empowering a thing in such a manner that it endures; his empowerment can also make the thing last after his own death.

It is thus, through his own empowerment that Kāśyapa the Great made his bones last until the advent of Maitreya.[306]

52a. But not with respect to that which is not hard.

It is only a hard thing which is susceptible of being empowered for a long period of time. This is why Kāśyapa the Great did not empower his flesh.

52b. Some other masters say no.

The body protected by the power of empowerment is not capable of lasting beyond death. If the bones of Kāśyapa last, it is through the protection of the gods.[307]

52c-d. From the beginning, the ascetic creates a single creation through numerous minds capable of creating

fictive beings; the contrary, when his practice is purified.[308]

A beginner, by means of numerous minds capable of creating fictive beings, produces a single fictive being; later, when his practice is complete, the ascetic produces at his own will, by means of a single such mind, many or few creatures.

53a. Produced through meditation, it is neutral.

The mind capable of creating fictive beings, when it is acquired through meditation (that is, when it is the result of a Dhyāna, or of a supernormal knowledge), is morally neutral: the result of a supernormal knowledge is in fact one of the classes of neutral items (ii. 71b).

53b. Innate, it is threefold.

But when it is innate, it can be good, bad, or neutral: for example gods, *nāgas*, etc., who have been created with a view to aiding or harming.

Also capable of being created, among the ten material (*rūpin*) *āyatanas*, are nine *āyatanas*, with the exclusion of sound, namely, the eye, visible things, the ear, the organ of smell, etc.[309]

[But if nine *āyatanas* are capable of being created, there can therefore be creation of organs (*indriya*): there can therefore be an apparition of a new being (*sattva*), for the organs are of *rūpa* (color and shape) which belong to living beings.][310]

The organ is not capable of being created. Yet one can say without being incorrect that "creation consists of nine *āyatanas*," for creation—whether it refers to the transformation of the body of the creator or to the creation of a distinct body—consists of four *āyatanas*, physical matter (*rūpa*) odors, tastes, and tangible things, and does not exist independently of the five organs.

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[311]Ṛddhi is, we have said, of two types: produced through meditation (or Dhyāna), and innate.[312]

It is also of three other types:

53c-d. Ṛddhi is also produced through mantras, plants, and actions; in all five types.

It is produced through meditation (*bhāvanāja*), or innate (*upapattilābhika*), or created through mantras (*mantrakṛta*), created through the use of drugs or medicines (*oṣadhikṛta*)[313] or produced through karma (*karmaja*).[314]

Examples of the fifth type (produced through karma) are the ṛddhi of Māndhātar, etc., and the ṛddhi of beings in intermediate existence (iii. 14d).

***

Are divine sight and the divine hearing called "divine" in the proper sense of the word, because they are of the nature of the organs of the gods, or rather figuratively so, because they are as if they were divine?

They are "as divine" in the case of the Bodhisattvas, Cakravartins, and Gṛhapatiratnas.[315]

When they are divine in the proper sense of the word[316]

54a-b. Divine sight and divine hearing are of pure *rūpa* of the sphere of the Dhyānas.[317]

By reason of a preparatory exercise consisting of meditation on

light and sound—the ascetic is in the Dhyānas, and in the eyes and ears of the ascetic—eyes and ears which are in Kāmadhātu—there is found to be attracted (ii. 10a, English trans. p. 166) a pure *rūpa*, a matter derived from the primary elements of the sphere of the Dhyāna in which it exists, subtle and excellent. This *rūpa* constitutes his eyes and ears; it sees and understands; it constitutes what is called divine sight and divine hearing. Arising by reason of physical matter (*rūpa*) of the sphere of the Dhyānas, the organs are therefore divine in the proper sense of the word.

> 54c-d. They are always active, non-deficient; they bear on the distant, the subtle, etc.

Divine sight and divine hearing of this category, obtained through meditation,[318] are never *tatsabhāga* (i. 42), but are always accompanied by visual or auditory consciousness.

They are never deficient; for they come in pairs, and are in a good state (lit. "not seized by squinting"), as are the organs of beings born in Rūpadhātu.

They grasp what is obscured, subtle, distant, etc. On this point, there is a stanza, "The eye of flesh does not see *rūpa* which is distant, obscured, or subtle; it does not see in all directions. Divine sight, the contrary."[319]

[320]When one sees the *rūpas* by means of divine sight, are the objects of sight near or far away?

The objects are near or far away according to the person and according to the eye. If they desire to see, but make no effort to do so, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas see, respectively, a Sāhasra, a Dvisāhasra, or a Trisāhasra universe (iii. 73). If they make an effort,

> 55a-b. The Arhat, the Rhinoceros and the Master see a Dvisāhasra, a Trisāhasra, infinite universes.[321]

If a Śrāvaka, desiring to see by divine sight, makes a great effort, he will see a Dvisāhasra Madhyama Lokadhātu.[322] A Pratyekabuddha will see a Trisāhasra Mahāsāhasra Lokadhātu. And the Buddha the Blessed One, will see the Asaṁkhya Lokadhātu: he sees according as he desires.

Why is this?

As his knowledge extends to all the *dharmas*, so too his divine sight extends to all the *rūpas*.

***

Is only ṛddhi innate, or can other supernatural powers be innate?

> 55c. The others are also innate.[323]

Four powers,—divine hearing, divine sight, memory of past existences, and knowledge of the mind of another,—are also innate. But the innate powers are not called supernormal knowledges.

> 55c-d. Divine sight, when it is innate, does not see intermediary beings.[324]

It is not capable of seeing the color and shape of intermediate beings which are seen only by the divine sight of supernormal knowledge. For the rest, innate divine sight is similar to the divine sight of supernormal knowledge.

> 56a. This knowledge of the mind of another is of three types.

This knowledge signifies the knowledge of the mind of another when it is innate. It can be three types: good, bad, or neutral.

> 56b. Also when it is produced through reflection (*tarka*) or through formulas (*vidyā*).

When it is produced through reflection or through formulas, the knowledge of the mind of another can be morally good, bad, or neutral. A person, through the study of the *Īkṣaṇikaśāstra*,[325] is capable of interpreting signs: his knowledge of the mind of another is produced through reflection; so too one can know the mind of another through *mantras*. But, produced by meditation or Dhyāna, this knowledge is only good.[326]

A knowledge of the mind of another, and memory of past existences are innate in the beings in hell. Through these two knowledges,

> 56c. The beings in hell know from the very beginning.[327]

From their birth and as long as they are not crushed by their sufferings, they know the minds of others and remember their past existences (see iv. 80d).

Beings in the other realms of rebirth where a knowledge of the mind of another and a memory of past existences are innate always know because their sufferings do not overwhelm them.

> 56d. Among humans, not innate.[328]

Among humans, the five powers, ṛddhi, etc., described above, are not innate.

If this is so, how do certain persons, the Bodhisattvas, naturally

possess a remembranace of past existences?

The remembrance of past existences that they possess by nature is not innate among them, that is, acquired by the mere fact of their human birth; it results from certain actions.

How is this?

A knowledge of the memory of past existences is of three types: a result of meditation (the supernormal knowledge described above), innate (as among the gods), or realized through action (as is the case with the Bodhisattvas).

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1. This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first deals with 1. the distinction between patience (*kṣānti*), knowledge (*jñāna*), and seeing (*dṛś*) (Kārikā 1); 2. the characteristics of the ten knowledges (2-9); 3. the aspects of the ten knowledges (10-13b); 4. different questions, *praśnanirdeśa* (13c-27); and the second deals with the qualities (*guṇa*) which consist of knowledge (*jñānamaya* (28-55). (This is according to the gloss of the Japanese editor, Kyokuga Saeki.)

Among Vasubandhu's sources, the *Prakaraṇapāda*, xiii. 10, fol.14: definition of the ten *jñānas; darśana* which is not *jñāna;* object of the *jñānas* (14b11); reciprocal inclusion (15a3); why? (15a8); which *jñāna* is *sāsrava, anāsrava, sāsravapratyaya, saṁskṛta*, etc. Pāḷi sources, *Saṁyutta*, ii.57, *Dīgha* iii.226-227. *Paṭisambhidāmagga, Vibhanga*, 306-344, especially 328.

2. On *jñānadarśana*, see vii. 27c. *Prajñā* (that is to say the *caitta* described in ii.24 which accompanies all minds) is either pure (*anāsrava*) or impure (*sāsrava*).

i. Pure, *prajñā* is "knowledge" (*jñāna*) or "patience" (*kṣānti*).

a. "Knowledge" signifies a consciousness of certitude, free from doubt (*niścita; jñānaṁ niścitarūpeṇa utpadyate*).

Knowledge can be "pure contemplation" (*paratyavekṣaṇamātra;* below note 6); such as *ksṣyajñāna* and *anutpūdajñāna* (vi.67a-b).

It can be accompanied by *saṁtīraṇa*, by *parimārgaṇāśaya;* in other words, it can be an *upanidhyānapūrvaka manasikāra* (i.41c- d): in this case it is *darśana* a "view" or seeing. This knowledge includes the desire to instruct itself; it is preceded by reflection; let us say then that it is "consideration" or examination. Nevertherless the Western equivalents are insufficient, for they do not refer to a "discursive" consciousness, but to a consciousness which can last only one moment, which is produced in the states of absorption free from *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

b. Patience is not free from doubt, since it has for its end the production of knowledge through the expulsion of doubt. It does not arise as certitude (*niścaya*), but as "consent" (*kṣamaṇarūpeṇa*). Perhaps we can render this nuance by saying that the ascetic, in the state of patience, thinks, "The *dharmas* are doubtless transitory . . .," and, in the state of knowledge, "The *dharmas* are transitory . . ." The pure patiences are thus *śaikṣī samyagdṛṣṭi* (i.4a). They are produced in fact in the course of the Path of Seeing and as a consequence they belong to the *Śaikṣa*. And they are *darśana*.

ii. Impure, *prajñā* is associated either with the five sense consciousnesses (eye consciousness, etc.), or with the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).

In the first case, it is knowledge (*jñāna*); it is never "seeing."

In the second case, it is knowledge (*saṁvṛtijñāna*, vii.2b); and it is "seeing": a. when it is bound to bad opinions (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*, etc., i.41a), b. when it is good (*kuśala*), that is to say associated with right views (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). However it happens that it is, improperly, termed "patience": the third *nirvedhabhāgīya* (vi.18c) is in fact a "knowledge", even though it is termed "patience."

3. *Prakaraṇa* (xxiii.10, 10b3) quoted in the *Vyākhyā ad* vii.7.

4. *saṁtīraṇātmakatvāt* = *upanidhyānasvabhāvatvāt* (*Kośa* i.41; below note 6 and viii.1).

The impure *kṣāntis* (for example vi.18c) are *jñāna*, or more precisely *saṁvṛtijñāna* (vii. note 40). *Vyākhyā: amalā eva kṣāntayo na jñānam ity avadhāraṇāt sāsravāḥ kṣāntayo jñānam ity uktaṁ bhavati.*

5. See vii.4b. *Dhī* = *prajñā, dṛś* = *dṛṣṭi* = *darśana*. The *prajñā* or consciousness which consists of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (*kṣayajñāna*), of the knowledge of no new arising of the defilements (*anutpādajñāna*), is not *dṛṣṭi*, or *darśana*.

6. As long as the ascetic has not done what he should do (*kṛtakṛtya*), he reflects

(*dhyāyati*), he inquires (*parimārgayati*) into the subject of the Truths. When he has done that which he should have done, he only contemplates (*pratyavekṣaṇamātra*) the Suffering which is known, etc., and he no longer inquires. [Compare *Samantapāsādikā,* 168, *Milinda* 338 (note trans. ii. p. 240), *paccavekkhaṇañāna*].

7. Hsüan-tsang here enumerates the ten *jñānas: saṁvṛti, dharma, anvaya, duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga, paracitta, kṣaya,* and *anutpādajñāna;* an enumeration which, in the original, is given later on page 12. This is not the order of the *Śāstra,* below note 32.

8. See vii.3a, 7a, 8, 10b, 12a-b, 18c, 20c-21. *Vyākhyā: saṁvṛtau bhavaṁ sāṁvṛtam,* and below: *svabhāvataḥ saṁvṛtir jñānaṁ saṁvṛtau vā jñānaṁ saṁvṛtijñānam.*

See below vii.21.

The Mādhyamikas distinguish between *lokasaṁvṛtijñāna* and *yogisaṁvṛtijñāna* (see for example *Bodhicaryāvatāra* ix.2). The latter corresponds to the *laukika jñāna pṛṣṭhalabdh, Kośa,* vi. trans. p. 141-2; and vii.12a-b (*pṛṣṭhaja*), 20c.

9. *Saṁvṛtisadvastu,* vi.4; *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* i.12, *Kathāvatthu,* v.6.

10. Pure *jñāna* is the consciousness of the general characteristics of the *dharmas;* it is called *dharmajñāna* when it bears on the *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu, *anvayajñāna* when it bears on the *dharmas* of the two higher Dhātus, vi.26.

11. The Andhakas (*Kathāvatthu,* v.6) say: *sammutiñāṇaṁ pi saccārammaṇam eva:* Conventional knowledge has for its object *only* the Truths (according to Aung and Rhys-Davids).

12. See vi.44d, 50a, vii.1, 7, 12a-b.

13. Paramārtha: "when they are not by nature *aśaikṣi samyagdṛṣṭi.*" We have seen (vi.50d) that all the Arhats possess "correct view proper to the Aśaikṣas"; this *samyagdṛṣṭi* is by its nature *darśana;* it consists of *dharmajñāna* and *anvayajñāna.*

14. *Kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādajñāna* necessarily have Bhavāgra from whence the Arhat is about to deliver himself for their object. When a person dies from a poisoned wound, the poison, after having spread over all the body, concentrates itself, at the moment of death, in the wound; in this same way the ascetic's *jñāna* concentrates itself on the object to be abandoned, namely the *skandhas* of Bhavāgra; it bears on Suffering (*yena pīḍyate*) and its Arising.

15. *Vyākhyā: duḥkhākārair anityādibhiḥ/ samudayākārair vā hetvādibhiḥ* . . . Paramārtha: "under six aspects of *duḥkha* and *samudaya* (Gloss of the Japanese editor: *anitya, duḥkha, hetu samudaya, prabhava, pratyaya:* two aspects of suffering, four aspects of its arising. See below vii.12a-b, which justifies the correction of Hsüan-tsang).

16. The consciousness of another's mind, in principle, is conventional knowledge, *saṁvṛtijñāna.* But when another's mind is a pure mind, that is to say a mind forming part of the pure path (*darśanamārga* or *bhāvanāmārga*), the consciousness which I have of this mind should be pure; it embraces *mārgajñāna,* pure knowledge relative to the Path; the following *mārgajñāna* which is relative to Kāmadhātu or to the higher spheres is either a *dharmajñāna* or an *anvayajñāna.* Therefore the knowledge of the mind of another (*paracittavid*) contains four *jñānas.*

17. See vii.11a-d and the Balas, Abhijñās, etc.

18. The text has: *Paracittajñāna* by the lower does not know the higher: it does not know, by the Anāgāmin path, the path of the Arhat . . .

19. He begins the preparatory cultivations from the time that he sees that the ascetic is about to enter into *darśanamārga;* this cultivation is accomplished when he sees the mind of another occupied in the *duḥkha* of Kāmadhātu, in *duḥkha* as part of *dharmajñāna.*

20. On the *paracittajñāna* of the Pratyekabuddhas, see *Vibhāṣā TD* 27, p. 515a18, p. 515c7, and elsewhere. Four opinions according to Saṁghabhadra, namely the two opinions mentioned by Vasubandhu, and also: "The Pratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 8, 14", "The Pratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 11 and 12." The third opinion is the correct one: for if he knows moment 8, it is because his preparatory cultivation with its consciousness as part of *anvayajñāna* lasts only 5 moments; thus during moments 9-13 he could prepare himself for the consciousness of moment 14.

21. *Nettippakaraṇa*, 15: *khīṇā me jātīti idaṁ khaye ñāṇaṁ nāparaṁ itthattāyā ti pajānāti idam anuppāde ñāṇaṁ.*

22. Paramārtha, "According to the Abhidharma." This is the text of the *Prakaraṇa, TD* 26, p. 694a8 (Hsüan-tsang's translation); see also *Jñānaprasthāna, TD* 26, p. 1021c.

23. Omitted by Paramārtha; given by the *Prakaraṇa* and Hsüan-tsang.

24. The *Vyākhyā* explains *tad upādāya* as *tat puraskṛtya.* See p. 1108.
Hsüan-tsang translates *tad upādāya* as *yu-tz'u* 由此, "by reason of this" (Gloss of the editor: "the *jñāna* which grasps these aspects: Suffering is known . . ."); Paramārtha has *i-tz'u- i* 以此義 "taking this meaning into consideration"; the *Prakaraṇa* has *yu-tz'u-erh-ch'i* 由此而起

25. We have, *Nettippakaraṇa*, 54: *cakkhu, vijjā, buddhi, bhūri, medhā, āloka.* Compare *Kośa*, vi.54d.

26. In fact pure *jñāna* bears on *duḥkha,* on the *dharmas* and their general characteristics, and not on a "self" knowing the *duḥkha,* a self which implies the formula *duḥkhaṁ me parijñātam.* All knowledge which envisions a "self" is *saṁvṛtijñāna,* conventional, impure knowledge.

27. The specific (*viśeṣa*) characteristic of the two pure *jñānas,* which are *nirvikalpa,* is known by inference (*anumīyate*) by reason of the two *saṁvṛtijñānas* which are their outflowing (*niṣyanda*). Below vii.12a-b.

28. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: *pāścātyaśramaṇasautrāntikādayaḥ.* According to these masters, there are some pure aspects outside of the sixteen recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas (see below vii.12c).

29. See ii. trans. p. 263, iv. trans. p. 701.

30. The *Śāstra* is quoted in the *Vyākhyā: yat tāvaj jñānam darśanam api tat/ syāt tu darśanam na jñānam aṣṭāv ābhisamayāntikāḥ kṣāntayaḥ.* According to the note of the Japanese, the *Jñānaprasthana, TD* 26, p. 957c2, and the *Prakaraṇapada, TD* 26, p. 694c5.

31. Paramartha adds: "Furthermore, in order to indicate that the *darśanas* here differ from the *dṛṣṭis* discussed above."

32. Same order in the *Prakaraṇapada, TD* 26, p. 693c22. The order differs in Hsüan-tsang (above note 7) and *Mahāvyutpatti,* 57.

33. This question is absent in Paramārtha and in the original. The original has *tatra* . . . = "Among these *jñānas, saṁvṛtijñāna* constitutes . . ."

34. *Vyākhyā: saṁvṛtijñānaṁ saṁvṛtijñānam eva svabhavāsaṁgrahataḥ/ ekasya ca paracittajñānasya bhāga ekadeśaḥ/.*

35. The part which presents the aspect "*Duḥkha* is known by me . . ."

36. The *Vyākhyā* does not give the *Śāstra*'s definition. *Prakaraṇapada, TD* 26, p. 694a3: *lokasaṁvṛtijñānaṁ katamat/ sāsravā prajñā.*

37. Definition of the *Śāstra*, quoted in the *Vyākhyā* and which corresponds to *Prakaraṇa*, *TD* 26. p. 693c23:

dharmajñānaṁ katamat/ kāmapratisaṁyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu yad anāsravaṁ jñānam/ kāmapratisaṁyuktānāṁ saṁskārāṇāṁ hetau yad anāstravaṁ jñānam/ kāmapratisaṁyuktānāṁ saṁskārāṇāṁ nirodhe yad anāsravam jñānam/ kāmapratisaṁyuktānāṁ saṁskārāṇāṁ prahāṇāya mārge yad anāsravaṁ jñānam idam ucyate dharmajñānam/ api khalu dharmajñāne dharmajñānabhūmau ca yad anāsravaṁ jñānam idam ucyate dharmajñānam. anvayajñānam katamat/ rūpārūpyapratisaṁyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu yad anāsravam jñānam . . . See vi.26, *anvetīty anvayajñāna.*

38. Correct *sāsravahetuka* vi., note 11, line 11.

39. *Vyākhyā:nirodhamārgau hy adhātupatitau/ tāv adharāv api na hīnau vyavasthāpyete/ duḥkhasamudayasatye tv adharabhūmike nihīne/ na tadālambanaṁ dharmajñānaṁ rūpārūpyadhātupratipakṣa ity avagantavyam. Nirodha* and *mārga* do not form part of the *Dhātus*. To consider *nirodha* with respect to Kāmadhātu (*nirodhe dharmajñāna*) is to also combat the *kleśas* of the higher spheres.

In the state of *darśanamārga*, it is the *anvayadharmakṣāntis* which expell the *anuśayas* of the higher spheres.

40. *Vyākhyā: ṣoḍaśākāram uṣmagatādiṣu/ svasāmānyalakṣaṇādigrahaṇād iti svalakṣaṇagrahaṇāt sāmānyalakṣaṇagrahaṇāc ca/ ādiśabdena bhuṁkṣva tiṣṭha gacchety evamākāraṁ ca/ na hy ete svalakṣaṇākārāḥ kiṁ tarhy evamākārā eva.*

In the *uṣmagatas*, etc. (vi.17c), *saṁvṛtijñāna* grasps the sixteen aspects of the Truths. *Saṁvṛtijñāna* grasps their general characteristics (for example, impermanence), their unique characteristics (for example, the specific characteristic of *rūpa*); and it also grasps the aspect which is expressed by the words "Eat! Go! . . .": such a *saṁvṛtijñāna* does not have for its aspect a unique characteristic, and one can only say that it is *evamākāra*, "of such an aspect."

41. According to Paramārtha: *svasvasatyākārataś catuṣṭayam.*

42. Paramārtha: *paramanojñānam api tathāmalam. Cetopariyāye ñāṇa* or *paricce ñāṇa* (=*paracittajñāna*) is not *sammatiñāṇa* (*Vibhaṅga*, 330). The Andhakas think that it bears solely on the mind, *Kathāvatthu*, v.7, and wrongly maintain that a Śrāvaka can, through this *ñāṇa*, know when others attain a result, v.10.

43. See note 42.

44. See note 42.

45. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra: *sarāgaṁ cittaṁ sarāgaṁ cittam iti yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti/ vigatarāgaṁ cittam vigatarāgaṁ cittam iti yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti/ yathā sarāgaṁ vigatarāgam evaṁ sadveṣaṁ vigatadveṣaṁ samohaṁ vigatamohaṁ saṁkṣiptaṁ vikṣiptaṁ līnaṁ pragṛhītam uddhatam anuddhatam avyupaśāntaṁ,vyupaśāntam asamāhitaṁ samāhitam abhāvitaṁ bhāvitam avimuktaṁ vimuktam iti yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti.*

According to the glosses of the *Bhāṣya*, one should add the two pairs *amahadgata* and *mahadgata, sa-uttara* and *anuttara* before *avyupaśānta:* in all twelve pairs. However these two pairs are missing in the Sūtra quoted in the *Vijñānakāya* (*TD* 26, p. 534a1-a5) and in the edition of the Sūtra quoted by the *Vyākhyā* below vii.42a-d.

According to Saeki, the list of the *Ekottara* (*TD* 2, p. 776b20) includes some eleven parts, that of the *Madhyama* (*TD* 1, p. 553b19) has ten, by omitting *uddhata-anuddhata* and *avyupaśānta-vyupaśānta*, and by adding *sadoṣa-adoṣa*; that of the *Saṁyukta* (*TD* 2, p. 150a6) has ten pairs.

Pāḷi sources, for example *Saṁyutta*, v. 265, *Aṅguttara*, iv.32, *Vibhaṅga*, 329, *Visuddhimagga*, 410 (whose explanation diverge from those of the Abhidharma). We have

only eight pairs: *sarāga-vitarāga, sadosa-vītadosa, samoha-vītamoha, saṅkhitta-vikkhitta, mahaggata-amahaggata, sauttara-anuttara, asamāhita-samāhita,* and *avimutta-vimutta.*

46. *Vyākhyā: yathā yadā vastram iti paricchinnākāraṁ vijñānam utpadyate na tadā malaṁ gṛhṇāti* and vice versa. See i, trans. p. 67.

47. That is to say "associated with *rāga, rāgasaṁprayukta.* All this paragraph is according to *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 950a24, quoted by Saeki, xxvi.8a.

48. These two explanations will be commented upon and refuted above page 1105 and following.

49. That is to say any mind defiled (*kliṣṭa*) but not associated with *rāga;* any neutral mind; any good (*kuśala*) worldly (*laukika*) mind. The supramundane mind, a mind forming part of the Path, is not *sāsrava.* See page 1105 line 14.

50. There are three opinions.

First masters: A mind associated with *rāga* is *sarāga;* a mind opposed to *rāga* is *vigatarāga.*

Second masters: A mind united with *rāga,* which can be understood in two ways, as above note 49, is *sarāga.*

Third masters: A mind associated with *rāga* is *sarāga;* a mind not associated with *rāga* is *vigatarāga.*

According to the *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27, p. 950a24 and following), the second opinion is the best one. Vasubandhu adopts the third opinion.

51. Paramārtha: "because its object is small."

52. In the *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27, p. 950c8), *lüeh* 略 ("abbreviated, reduced"), in Hsüan-tsang, *chü* 聚 ("concentrated").

53. Ibid. an *atilīna* mind is *kosajjasahagata, kosajjasaṁpayutta.*

54. Ibid. The *atipaggahita* mind is *uddhaccasahagata uddhaccasaṁpayutta.* In *Divya, pragṛhīta* = "elevated, high" (as a mountain palace, etc.).

55. The "great person" *par excellence* is the Buddha. This paragraph is according to the *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 950c20: The defiled mind is small because it is cultivated (*sevita*) by a *svalpajana* (?*hsiao-sheng,* 小生 "a small person"); the good mind is great because it is cultivated by a *mahājana.*

Objection: Do we not see that an immeasurable number of beings cultivates the bad, that a small number of beings cultivates the good? How can one say that the defiled mind is cultivated by *svalpajana?*

We do not say "small" because the category is small in number; that which has few pure *dharmas* is called small.

56. *Bhāvanā* = *pratilambha,* acquisition. According to the principle: *kuśalasaṁskṛtā dharmā bhāvayitavyāḥ* (iv.127c). "These are the good *saṁskṛta dharmas* which one acquires in a future state." See below vii.25d.

57. Paramārtha: "past and future".

58. On *sa-uttara,* iv.127d, v. trans. p. 818.

59. It is not released when it is good-impure (*kuśalasāsrava*) and when it arises in a series where the *kleśas* have not been cut off. On deliverance of the mind, see vi.76c.

60. For *saṁkṣipta,* Paramārtha has *lüeh,* 略 Hsüan-tsang, *chü* 聚 ;*samnirodha,* Paramārtha: *she* 攝 (=*saṁgraha*), *ch'ih* 持 (*dhar*), Hsüan-tsang: *chih* 止 (*śamatha*).

Saeki observes that, according to the Sautrāntikas, *vipaśyana* and *śamatha* are excluded.

Saṁyutta, v.279: *katamaṁ ca bhikkhave ajjhattaṁ saṁkhittaṁ cittam/ yaṁ bhikkhave cittaṁ thīnamiddhasahagataṁ thīnamiddhasaṁpayuttam/ idaṁ vuccati . . ./ katamaṁ ca . . . bahiddhā vikkhittaṁ cittam/ yaṁ . . . cittaṁ bāhiddhā pañca guṇe ārabbha anuvikkhittam anuvisaṭam/ idaṁ vuccati . . .*

61. Hsüan-tsang translates: "In fact we do not admit (*pu-hsü* 不許 = *na pratijñāyate*) that a defiled mind, associated with langour, is distracted." The same for Paramārtha: "We do not establish (*pu-li* 不立) . . ."

Vyākhyā: kim iti kṛtvā vikṣiptatvam atra na pratijñāyate/ kim middhasahagate citte vikṣiptatvaṁ nāstīti na pratijñāyate āhosvid vidyamānam api vikṣiptatvaṁ saṁkṣiptatvenāvasthāpitatvān na pratijñāyate/ ubhayathāpi vyācakṣate/ kecid vyācakṣate/ middhasahagatāt kliṣṭād yad anyat kliṣṭaṁ tad vikṣiptaṁ pratijñāyate middhasahagataṁ tu kliṣṭam akliṣṭaṁ vāviśeṣeṇa saṁkṣiptam eveti/ apare punar vyācakṣate/ yan middhasaṁyuktaṁ tat saṁkṣiptam eva na vikṣiptam/ yat tu viṣayeṣu visṛtaṁ tad eva vikṣiptam ity ato'tra middhasaṁprayukte citte [vikṣiptatvaṁ] na pratijñāyate.

62. *Vyākhyā: abuddhokyam abhidharmaśāstram ity abhiprāyaḥ.* Compare *Kośa*, i.3, iii.32.

63. The defilement, *kliṣṭatva,* of the first minds is not differentiated: it consists of association, *saṁprayoga,* with the *kleśas* which are found in all defiled minds; the goodness, *kuśalatva,* of the second minds consists of association with the *dharmas* which are found in all good minds, ii.25, 26.

Vyākhyā: sarvāṇi tāni kliṣṭāny uktānīti/ kliṣṭatvalakṣaṇam eṣāṁ vikṣiptādīnām avimuktāntānam/ Kliṣṭatvam punaḥ kleśamahābhūmikaiḥ saṁprayogaḥ/ saṁ ksiptapragṛhītādīnāṁ cābhinnalakṣaṇavacanān nārthaviśeṣa ukto bhavati . . ./ kuśalatvam eṣām abhinnam/ kiṁ punaḥ kuśalatvam/ kuśalamahābhūmikaiḥ saṁprayogaḥ.

64. *Vyākhyā: sūtre hi styānamiddhasahagataṁ saṁkṣiptam uktam/ styānayogena yat kliṣṭaṁ middhasaṁyuktaṁ tat saṁkṣiptaṁ na kuśalaṁ styānasya kleśamahābhūmikatvāt.*

65. The Vaibhāṣikas are of the opinion that: *yad eva līnaṁ tad evoddhatam,* "a *līna* mind is an *uddhata* mind." We draw this conclusion from their definition: *līnaṁ cittaṁ kliṣṭaṁ kausīdyasaṁprayogāt; uddataṁ cittam kliṣṭaṁ auddhatyasaṁprayogāt.* (Below note 70, for another version).

66. If *līna* and *uddhata* were identical, the Sūtra would say: "When the mind is *līna* it is not the time to cultivate *praśrabdhi . . . prīti.* When the mind is *uddhata* it is not the time to cultivate *praśrabdhi . . . prīti.*" Or rather: "When the mind is *līna* or *uddhata* it is not the time to cultivate *praśrabdhi . . . prīti.*"

67. The cultivation of the seven parts of Bodhi is simultaneous.

68. With regard to *smṛti,* the Blessed one said: *smṛtiṁ khalv ahaṁ sarvatragatāṁ vadāmi.*

69. Hsüan-tsang: "But we are not in contradiction with the Sūtra! Even though a defiled mind is both *līna* and *uddhata,* the mind in which *kausīdya* predominates is termed *līna* in the Sūtra; the one in which *auddhatya* predominates is called *uddhata* in the Sūtra. But, considering their constant association, I say that they are one in nature."

70. A defiled mind is *līna* through association with *kausīdya;* a defiled mind is *uddhata* through association with *auddhatya.* Compare ii, trans. p. 194.

71. *Vyākhyā: Ācārya āha nābhiprāyikaṁ yāvat sūtre tu nāyam abhiprāya iti.*

72. A Śaikṣa has, at the present time, a pure mind, for example the thought of impermanence; but there remains in him the possession of the *rāga* of Kāmadhātu if he is not an Anāgāmin . . .

73. *Anuśayānarāgālambanatvāt,* see v.17.

74. The thoughts of the Arhat which form part of the Arhat are never impure, for these thoughts are pure by definition and are not the object of the "active" defilements of another, v.18a-b; but these conventional thoughts (*saṁvṛtijñāna*), like his body, are impure (*sāsrava*) in the sense that the defilements of another can become active with respect to them (i.4b). See viii.25c.

We observe that Paramārtha translates very clearly: "If a thought is *sarāga* by the fact that it grasps *rāga* as its object; . . . *yuan yü wei ching chieh* 緣欲爲境界

75. The second masters, above note 50.

76. "Even though they have a real thing for their object."

77. See above page 1094 line 19.

78. See above page 1094 line 11.

79. "Arising is extinguished by me": that is to say: arising is abandoned; this is to see the Truth of Arising under four aspects (vii.13a); "The religious life is cultivated": four aspects of the Path; "That which should be done is done": four aspects of Extinction; "I do not see any further existence": two aspects of the Truth of Suffering, impermanence and suffering. Among the commentaries on this fourfold formula, *Samantapāsādikā*, i.168. Some remarks, of which I should like to be more confident, in *Nirvana* (1925), p. 60.

80. The *Vyākhya* explains: *asty etat sthānam ity asty etal lakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ/ asty etad vastv ity ayaṁ hetur ity arthaḥ/ yogavihitato vijānīyād ity aviparītato vijānīyād ity arthah/.*

According to Saeki, this is an excerpt from the *Vijñānakāya, TD* 26, p. 559c29 and p. 565a16. This formula and the formula of wrong views (page 1109 line 20) are repeated to repletion (with some variants) in the *Vijñānakāya*, on the subject of the multiple types of thoughts: "Does a thought belonging to Kāmadhātu know 1. the *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu, 2. the *dharmas* of Rūpadhātu, 3. the *dharmas* of Ārūpyadhātu, 4. the *dharmas* not included in the Dhātus, 5. the *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu . . .?" This thought is good, bad, neutral, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. The way in which a thought sees these different *dharmas* depends on its nature and on the nature of these *dharmas*.

I do not find the passage where the *Vijñānakāya* explains the manner in which a thought "not included in the Dhātus" sees the *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu. But it explains itself with respect to the thoughts of the Śaikṣa and the Aśaikṣa (which are two types of thoughts not included in the Dhātus), p. 565a16. Its text is identical to that quoted by Vasubandhu, with the difference that the formula *asty etat sthānam asty etad vastu* is preceded by the words *asty eṣo hetuḥ* (?), *asty eṣa utpāda* (?).

The mind of the Śaikṣa or Aśaikṣa only knows the *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu under the aspects of the first two truths (*anitya . . . pratyayatas*); a good mind of Kāmadhātu however knows the *dharmas* under the aspects that Vasubandhu has specified (vi.49d) as characteristics of the "worldly path": *audārikatas, duḥkhilatas, āvaraṇatas,* and even *śalyatas,* etc.

81. The Seeing of the Truths at least partially dispells *rāga, dveṣa, māna,* and *moha.* A thought to be abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths would contain *rāga,* etc.; the text therefore says *rajyeta,* etc. This thought is not free of *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* so it considers the *dharmas* as *ātman* and *ātmīya;* it is not free of *antaghrāhadṛṣṭi,* and so considers the *dharmas* as destined to perish (*uccheda*) or as eternal (*śāśvata*) . . .

We have this formula throughout the *Vijñānakāya, TD* 26, p. 559c29, p. 563b20, p. 578b8, and elsewhere.

82. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 408c9, and the *Saṁyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, TD* 28, p. 918a19.

The *ākāras* of the Vimokṣamukhas, viii.24.

The specification of the *ākāras* of the Abhidharma are not found in the Abhidhamma (see for example *Paṭisambbhidāmagga,* i.107, 118, 241, *Visuddhi,* 494); it is not canonical: *Aṅguttara,* i.38 (list of *saññās*), and iv.422 where the ascetic considers the Amatādhātu as *śanta, panīta,* etc., and the things of his stage as *dukkha, roga, gaṇḍa,* etc. We have seen (vi.49), the *ākāras* of the worldly path: we have to observe that Vasubandhu gets his inspiration from the *Vijñānakāya,* fol. 59b, line 18 and elsewhere.

83. It results from this that *abhisamaya* is *anupūrva,* vi.27.

84. On the meaning of *mārga* and *pratipad,* vi.65b-d, 66a, vii.28c.

85. See *Saṁyutta,* iii.66, for variants.

86. Compare v.27, trans. p. 820.

87. Compare vi.60a.

88. Hsüan-tsang: "going, entering into the city of Nirvāṇa." Compare vi68: *pratipan nirvāṇapratipādanāt.*

89. These explanations are according to the glosses and the context. *Vyākhyā: chandamūlakā iti chandahetukā ity arthaḥ. tṛṣṇāparyāya iha chandaḥ. chandasamudayā iti chandasamutkṣamā (?) ity arthaḥ* (read *samutthānā?*). *chandajātīyā iti chandapratyayā ity arthaḥ.*

Paramārtha translates *jātīya* by *sheng* 生 , "to arise," and *prabhava* by *yu* 有 , *bhava,* "existence"; Hsüan-tsang has respectively *lei* 類 , "species," and *sheng* 生 , "to arise."

Saṁyutta, iii.100, *Majjhima,* iii.16: *pañcupādānakkhandhā kiṁmūlaka . . . chandamūlakā.* In another context, *Aṅguttara* iv.400: *taṇhāmūlaka.*

We have *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* ii.111: *jarāmaraṇaṁ kiṁnidānaṁ kiṁsanudayaṁ kimjātikaṁ kiṁpabhavam.*

90. *Vyākhyā: prabhavaśabdaḥ kevalaṁ paścāt pathitavyah/ ābhidhārmikair iti vākhyādhyāhāraḥ/ sūtrānusaraṇam hi kartavyam ity abhiprāyaḥ.* The Ābhidhārmikas, in the list of the aspects of this Truth, should place the *prabhava* aspect after the *pratyaya* aspect, for one should be guided by the Sūtra.

91. The five *upādānaskandhas* are thus said to have this type of *chanda* for their *mūla* or *hetu.*

92. On *vīrya, vipāka* and *prabhāva* of a fruit from the earth as food, or of a drug, *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha,* 16.22, *Kandalī,* 130, *Suśruta,* i.1 and 40.

93. Paramārtha: "According to the Sūtra of the *tṛṣṇāvicaritas,* there are two groups of five, and two groups of four." All that follows to page 1114 line 30 is omitted.

Our text is closely related to *Aṅguttara,* ii.212, on the eighteen *taṇhāvicaritas,* where the readings are uncertain, and to *Vibhaṅga* 392-400, where they are more certain but remain difficult to interpret (Mrs. Rhys Davids had the kindness to communicate to me the text of the *Sammohavinodanī* and the *Manorathapūraṇī;* see the following note).

We can compare the list: "Did I exist in the past? . . .," *Kośa,* iii.22c, *Majjhima,* i.8, i.111, *Visuddhimagga,* 599, *Madhyamakavṛtti,* 593.

According to chapter ii trans. p. 282, *chanda* is relative to the future.

94. The *Vibhaṅga,* in place of *sad asmīti* and *asad asmīti* has 1. *as'asmīti* (=*nicco'smi* . . .) and 2. *sāt'asmīti* or *sat'asmi* (=*ucchissāmi na bhaviṣsāmi*). The commentary says: *atthīti asa/ niccass'etam adhivacanam.* Mrs Rhys Davids remarks: *as* = *asa* = *asan* = *asanto* = "bad," *Jataka,* iv.435: *satam vā asan* (accusitive singular). We would have: "I am bad, I am good." The *Manorathapūraṇī* explains *sata* by *sīdati* in the sense of *anicca:* this is the explanation that we have encountered for *satkāya, Kośa,* v. p. 873. The commentary of the *Vibhaṅga* understands *syām* as "Shall I be?"

95. On *pravṛtti,* ii.6. Perhaps *vaṭṭūpaccheda* = *vartmopaccheda* that I think we must read in *Mahāvastu,* ii.285, iii.200, quoted in *Kośa,* ii. trans. note 395.

96. According to Saeki, *Saṁyukta* 17.16; see also *TD* 2, p. 66b14.

97. In his shorter treatise, Saṁghabhadra takes into consideration this explanation in order to prove that the "aspects" are indeed sixteen in number.

98. *Vyākhyā: nityaṁ sukham ātmīyam ātmeti ca dṛṣṭiś caritam eṣāṁ ta ime nityasukhātmīyātmadṛṣṭicaritāḥ.*

99. See v.26, trans. note 98; iii.50a.

100. The meaning of *pratyaya* is discussed in *Kośa,* iii.28.

101. 13b-d. On *ākāra,* see ii.34b-d, trans. note 173.

102. This explanation is satisfactory, for we indeed conceive that *prajñā*—the discerning consciousness (ii.24)—grasps the "aspects", that is to say grasps things (*ālambana*) in a certain manner (as impermanent, etc.). Furthermore this explanation takes into account the word *ākāra:*

One takes the sound *ā* from *ālambana,* the final *kāra* from *prakāra,* and one has *ākāra* by cancelling *-lambanagrahaṇapra-.*

103. On the *dharmas* "which have an object", *Kośa,* ii.34b. *Kathāvatthu,* ix.3-7; *Vibhaṅga,* 428, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi,* 1185, 1508. The *Madhyamakavṛtti,* 84, quotes the *Āgama: sālambanā dharmāḥ katame/ sarve cittacaittāḥ.*

104. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 408c25: There are three systems: 1. *Prajñā* is *ākāra, grāhaka,* and *gṛhya;* the *cittacaittas* associated with *prajñā* are *grāhaka* and *gṛhya;* what is concomitant (*sahabhū*) with *prajñā* and what is *cittaviprayukta* is *gṛhya.* 2. All *cittacaitta* is *ākāra, grāhaka, gṛhya;* all other *dharmas* are *gṛhya.* 3. All *dharmas* are *ākāra;* but the *samprayuklta dharmas* are *ākāra, grāhaka* and *gṛhya* and the *viprayuktadharmas* are *ākāra* and *gṛhya* (The meaning of *ākāra* is quite different here).

105. In the *Śāstra, dharmajñāna* begins the list.

106. We can understand why a being in Ārūpyadhātu cannot manifest the *dharmajñāna* which has for its object suffering, its arising, etc. of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, but why are beings in Rūpadhātu incapable of it? We have seen that a person manifests this *jñāna* by entering into the *dhyānas* (which are *Rūpadhātu*) (vii.14c). Some say: "*Dharmajñāna* has for its end the detesting (*vidūṣaṇā*) of Kāmadhātu; now a person in Rūpadhātu has abandoned Kāmadhātu by the very fact that he has transmigrated to a sphere of detachment [from Kāmadhātu]; therefore the *dharmajñāna* does not have to arise. The case of a person detached from Kāmadhātu [and who has entered into a *dhyāna* due to this detachment] is different: he can manifest the *dharmajñāna* because his existence in Kāmadhātu is not exhausted."

Saṁghabhadra explains differently why *dharmajñāna* can only be manifested by beings in Kāmadhātu: *tatsamāpattivyutthānacittānāṁ kāmadhātāv eva sadbhāvāt/ anuparivartakāśrayābhāvād vā/ dharmajñānānuparivartakasya hi śīlasya kāmāvacarāṇy eva bhūtāny āśrayā dauḥśīlyasamutthāpakakleśaprāptivibandhakatvāt prātipakṣikatvāt/ tāni ca tatra na santīti dharmajñānaṁ kāmadhātvāśrayam eva:* "Because it is only in Kāmadhātu that the thoughts of departing from the absorption [in which one realizes *dharmajñāna*] is possible; or rather because, in the two higher spheres, the elements (*bhūtas*) which can serve as the support (*āśraya*) of the type of morality (*śīla*) which necessarily accompanies *dharmajñāna* are missing. This morality is opposed to the *kleśas* which produce immorality (*dauḥśīlya*); immorality exists only in Kāmadhātu; the elements susceptible of supporting morality which are opposed to this therefore exist only in Kāmadhātu.

107. See iv.13c.

108. This preamble is missing in Paramārtha.

109. According to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha literally translates his original which is rendered in Tibetan by: *chos bcu dag ni sbyar bar bya:* "Ten *dharmas* should by placed in relationship", and he adds the Bhāṣya: "In order to determine the object of the *jñānas,* one should establish the relationship of the ten *jñānas* with the ten types of *dharma.* What are these ten types of *dharmas?* . . ."

110. On one hand *pratisaṁkhyānirodha* or Nirvāṇa, on the other hand *apratisamkhyānirodha* and *ākāśa.*

111. *Mārge dharmajñāna* bears on the Path; the morality which is *anāsravasaṁvara,* that is to say *rūpa* (iv.13c) forms part of the Path.

112. Hsüan-tsang: Is there a moment of knowledge which grasps all the *dharmas* for its object?

This appears to be the beginning of the discussion of *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 43a2, quoted by Saeki: "Is there a *jñāna* which knows all the *dharmas?* No. What is it that the *jñāna,* which knows that all the *dharmas* are not an *ātman,* does not know? It does not know itself; it does not know the *dharmas* which are associated with it or which coexist with it. By saying that it does not know itself, one refutes the thesis of the Mahāsāṁghikas; by saying that it does not know the *dharmas* associated with it, one refutes the thesis of the Dharmaguptas (*fa-mi-pu* 法密部); by saying that it does not know the *dharmas* which coexist with it, one refutes the thesis of the Mahīśāsakas; by saying that *jñāna* knows, one refutes the thesis of the Vātsīputrīyas [which attribute consciousness to the Pudgala?]."

Compare *Kathāvatthu,* v.9, where the Andhakas quote a text: *sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccato diṭṭhesu taṁ pi ñānaṁ aniccato diṭṭhaṁ hoti.* The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra: *ihāsmākaṁ bho gautama upasthānaśālāyāṁ saṁniṣaṇṇānāṁ saṁnipatitānām evaṁrūpo'natarākathāsamudāharo'bhūt/ śramaṇo gautamaḥ kilaivam āha/ nāsti sa kaścic chramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yaḥ sakṛt sarvaṁ jānīyāt sarvaṁ paśyed iti/ tathyam idaṁ bho gautama/.*

113. *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* ix.18: *na cchinatti yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manaḥ.* This is a common position in Indian philosophy; nevertheless the Sautrāntika-Vijñānavādins say that the lamp illumines itself. By a curious contradiction, the Vaibhāṣikas who deny that the mind knows itself, admit that sensation (*vedanā*) is felt not by another sensation, but by the very fact that it is present (iv.49).

114. Paramārtha omits the last phrase ("If it were otherwise . . .") and translates: "When it is a *jñāna* in Kāmadhātu it is a *prajñā* of hearing and reflection; when it is a *jñāna* in Rūpadhātu, it is only a *prajñā* of hearing, not of meditation, for this last type of *prajñā* always has a determined sphere for its object."

Vasubandhu follows the *Saṁyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya, TD* 28, p. 953c21: "This *jñāna* is a *prajñā* of hearing, and reflection, but not of meditation; for the *prajñā* of absorption has a delimited object."

Vyākhyā: tasya vyavacchinnabhūmyālambanatvād iti/ yasmād bhāvanāmayaṁ rūpāvacaraṁ saṁvṛtijñānaṁ vyavacchinnām eva bhūmim ālambate/ kāmadhātuṁ vā prathamaṁ vā dhyānaṁ yāvad bhavāgraṁ vā/ kiṁ kāraṇam/ ānantaryavimuktimārgānāṁ adharottarabhūmyālambavatvād yathoktaṁ yathākramaṁ śāntādyudārādyākārā uttarādharagocara iti vacanāt (vi.49) *yadi ca tat sarvabhūmyālambanaṁ syāt sarvato yugapad vairāgyaṁ syāt/ prayogaviśeṣamārgayor yathāsaṁbhavaṁ kā cid eva bhūmir ālambanam/ katham/ nirvedhabhāgīyaprayogamārgasaṁgṛhītasya hi yasya kāmadhātur ālambanam na tasyetarau dhātū/ yasyetarau dhātū na tasya kāmadhātur ālambanam/ aśubhāpramāṇābhibhvāyatanādividūṣaṇaviśeṣamārgasa ṁgṛhītasya kāmadhātur evālambanaṁ netarau dhātū.*

According to Yaśomitra, a faithful interpreter of Vasubandhu who is, on this point,

approved of by Saṁghabhadra, it is solely through a *prajñā* of meditation (*bhāvanā*) that one obtains detachment (*vairāgya*). The *prajñā* of hearing and reflection, which is in Kāmadhātu, cannot bear on the *dharmas* of all the spheres: it is not enough to become disgusted with it: the *prajñā* of *bhāvanā* is more powerful (iv.123c). Based on this, Vasubandhu concludes that the universal consciousness of "the absence of self" of the *dharmas* belongs to Kāmadhātu, for if it belonged to Rūpadhātu (that is to say arising from *bhāvanā*, and being obtained in the *dhyānas*) it would produce detachment from all of the spheres. Saṁghabhadra contests this reasoning, for the *prajñā* cultivated in *dhyānas* (impure *prajñā*, since it is a *saṁvṛtijñāna*) never includes disgust for the higher sphere to which it wishes to deliver itself (vi.49)

Let us note here that Hsüan-tsang translates the two *pādas* 18c-d (*TD* 29, p. 138a22) by three *pādas*: "*Saṁvṛtijñāna*, by excluding its group, together has all the *dharmas* for its object, by comprehending them under the aspect of non-self", and he adds a fourth *pāda*: "it arises from hearing and reflection."

Saṁghabhadra, in his second treatise, the *Prakaraṇaśāsana* (*TD* 29, p. 952a10) corrects the *kārikās* where Vasubandhu departs from correct Vaibhāṣika doctrine; the version of Hsüan-tsang (p. 138a23) gives, in the fourth *pāda*: "It arises from hearing, reflection and meditation." Saṁghabhadra thinks in fact (in his first treatise, the *Nyāyānusāra*, *TD* 29,p. 742c18 and following): "This *jñāna* is only in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, but not in Ārūpyadhātu . . . It is a *prajñā* of hearing, reflection, and meditation (*bhāvanā*): for these three *prajñās* are capable of having all the *dharmas* for their object with the exclusion of themselves and their group. It is true that the Sautrāntika (=Vasubandhu) says: 'This *jñāna* is not a *prajñā* of meditation . . .' But this is false. In our system the *prajñā* of meditation of the sphere of the *dhyāna* takes for its object the sphere in which it is found, namely, the higher sphere; it produces disgust with respect to the lower sphere, and joy with respect to the higher sphere: thus it does not produce detachment with respect to the higher sphere. The argument of the Sautrāntika is therefore null and void."

It appears that, according to what Yaśomitra says here, we should consider as *viśeṣamārga* (vi.65) the disgust (*vidūṣaṇa*) which includes [the qualities, *guṇa*, namely] *aśubhā* (vi.9), the *apramāṇas* (viii.29) and the *abhibhvāyatanas* (viii.35a). All these qualities are *viśeṣa* (v.10a, trans. p. 785); they are acquired through *prayoga*, *ānantarya*, *vimuktimārga*, and are prolongued in *viśeṣamārga* (vi.65); see vii.25d.

115. Hsüan-tsang: In the states or moments which do not include any augmentation of the number of *jñānas* (3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th moments of *abhisamaya*), he possesses the *jñānas* of the last previous moment which does include augmentation. Therefore, at the beginning of *bhāvanāmārga* (16th moment), he necessarily possesses seven *jñānas*.

116. This last phrase has been added by Hsüan-tsang.

117. *Vyākhyā: iha dvividhā bhāvanādhikṛtā pratilambhabhāvanā niṣevaṇabhāvanā ca/ pratilambhabhāvanā prāptitaḥ/ niṣevaṇabhāvanā saṁmukhībhāvataḥ.*

"Cultivation" is understood here as the acquisition or taking possession, and manifestation. (See vii.27).

118. *Yathotpannāni bhāvyante* = *yāni yāny utpannāni tāni tāni bhāvyante* (*bhāvyante* = *bhāvanāṁ gacchanti*). *Bhāvyante* signifies "are acquired", since it refers to future *kṣāntis* and *jñānas*.

119. The *kṣānti* or *jñāna* produced are *sabhāgahetu* (ii.52a)—a cause whose result resembles it—of a future *kṣānti* and *jñāna* of the same species.

120. The question does not refer to the *kṣāntis* because there are no *kṣāntis* in

bhāvanāmārga.

Vyākhyā: bhāvanāmārge tu punaḥ sarveṣāṁ jñānānāṁ sabhāgavisabhāgānāṁ tadākārāṇāṁ ca saṁmukhībhāvāt sarveṣāṁ hetavo labdhā bhavantīti tadviśiṣṭā jñānākārā bhāvanāṁ gacchanty anāgatāḥ/.

121. Above page 1135.

122. *Darśanamārga* is all pure (*anāsrava*) and the ascetic who cultivates it does not produce a *saṁvṛtijñāna* in the course of his practice. But he takes possession in moments 4, 8, and 12 of the *saṁvṛtijñāna* relative to each Truth: leaving the Path of Seeing, he possesses, and will be able to manifest, a conventional, worldly (*sāṁṛrta, laukika*) consciousness of the Truths, which is called *pṛṣṭhalabdha,* see vii.2b.

123. We have seen above (vii.7, note 25) that the "patiences" produced in the course of *abhisamaya* are called *ābhisamayāntika.*

Mahāvyutpatti, 54.20 (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 188c9): *abhisamayāntikaṁ kuśalamūlam* (translated into Tibetan as *mṅon par rtogs pa'i lam mtha' las 'byuṅ ba and mṅon par rtogs pa'i 'jug pa las 'byuṅ ba = abhisamayamārga-anta-udbhava, abhisamaya-avatāra-udbhava*), followed by 54.21: *kṣayajñānalābhikaṁ kuśalamūlam* = roots of good (or qualities) obtained at the moment of *kṣayajñāna* (vii.26c); and 245, 486.

124. But all persons, in the course of *saṁsāra,* have understood Suffering, its Arising and its Extinction by the worldly path (*Vyākhyā*).

125. In fact Arising should again be abandoned by the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, and again by the Path of Meditation, whereas all Suffering is perfectly known (*parijñāta*) by the Seeing of Suffering. But the Arising which should be abandoned by the Seeing of Arising is found to be already abandoned. (Paramārtha's translation).

126. The Vaibhāṣikas think that the sixteenth moment belongs to *bhāvanāmārga* (vi.28c); some other schools include it in *darśanamārga.*

127. *Vyākhyā: vayaṁ hi bhāvanāmārgaparivāro'pi tad iti brūmaḥ.*

128. This paragraph is missing in Hsüan-tsang. The *Vyākhyā* furnishes a different explanation: *darśanamārgalabhyaṁ tat tasya kathaṁ bhāvanāmārga saṁmukhībhāvo bhaviṣyati/ darśanamārge cotpattyanavakāśo'syāsti iti tad anupattidharmakam iti varṇayanti Vaibhāṣikāḥ.*

129. On *āṣraya,* see iii.41, i. p. 78, ii. p. 285, iv. p. 593, 613, 649, v. p. 771.

130. *Vyākhyā: gotraṁ tadutpādane samartho hetuḥ/ tatra bhavaṁ gautrikaṁ saṁvṛtijñānam.* On *gotra* in the sense that we have it here (*sabhāgahetu*), see i. p. 78, vii. p. 1124.

131. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 18c28.

132. From Kārikā 22 to Kārikā 26c Hsüan-tsang departs from the original (which Paramārtha faithfully translates) both for the Kārikā and the Bhāṣyam.

133. Namely *anvayajñāna* and *mārgajñāna,* because *mārge'nvayajñāna* is, by its nature, these two *jñānas.*

134. Not *saṁvṛtijñāna,* because it has been acquired formerly (*labdhapūrvatvāt*); see vii.27. Not *paracittajñāna,* because the ascetic is not *vītarāga.*

135. Therefore in the four types of paths of the eight stages of *bhāvanāmārga* where one abandons the first eight categories of *kleśas* of Kāmadhātu, and also as long as one has not abandoned the ninth. On these four types of paths, see v.61, vi.65b, (46d, 61d), vii.18c, 25d.

136. Namely the *śāntādyudārādyākāro bhāvanāmārgaḥ,* see vi.49.

137. See vi.61b.

138. See vii.5c.

139. Everyone agrees that *saṁvṛtijñāna* is not cultivated in the *ānantaryamārgas* of the perfecting of the faculties (vii.24c).

140. Of *dharma, anvaya,* and the Four Truths.

141. *Vyākhyā: dvayos tv abhijñāvimuktimārgayor iti/ divyaśrotradivyacakṣurabhijñāvimuktimārgayor avyākṛte śrotracakṣurabhijñe iti vacanāt (vii.42) tadvimuktimārgāv avyākṛtau/ na cāvyakṛtasya dharmasyānāgatabhāvanāsti.* See above note 56.

We understand by this that, by realizing these Abhijñās, one does not take possession of the same future Abhiñāas.

142. The three Abhijñās are *ṛddhi, pūrvenivāsa* and *cetaḥparyāya.*

143. An ascetic detaches himself from Kāmadhātu by a worldly path which has for its support (*saṁniśrayeṇa,* that is to say "is cultivated in") *anāgamya* (introductory stage of the First Dhyāna) and, through this detachment, he obtains the First Dhyāna; at the moment of the ninth *vimuktimārga* of this detachment, he cultivates a *saṁvṛtijñāna* of the sphere of the *anāgamya* or of the sphere of the First Dhyāna; and so on until: he detaches himself from *ākiñcanyāyatana* through the worldly path practiced in the *sāmantaka* (preparatory) stage of *naivasaṁjñānasaṁjñāyatana,* he obtains a *saṁvṛtijñāna* of the sphere of the *sāmantaka* or of the sphere of the *naivasaṁjñānasaṁjñāyatana. Saṁvṛtijñāna* is cultivated under the same conditions when the ascetic detaches himself from Kāmadhātu through the path cultivated in pure (*anāsrava*) *anāgamya.*

But if the ascetic obtains the first pure *dhyāna* by practicing the pure path in the First Dhyāna, the *saṁvṛtijñāna* that he obtains is of the sphere of the *sāmantaka* of the Second Dhyāna which is opposed to the first . . . to the ninth category of the defilements (*kleśas*) of the First Dhyāna—for this is the first time that this ascetic obtains the first pure *dhyāna.* And, in the ninth *vimuktimārga* of the path by which he obtains the first pure *dhyāna,* he cultivates, in the future, a *saṁvṛtijñāna* of the second *dhyāna* (*Vyākhyā*).

144. An ascetic takes his support from the second pure *dhyāna* and, in this manner, detaches himself in the Third Dhyāna: the pure *jñāna* which is cultivated is of the sphere of the Path, that is to say of the Second Dhyāna; it is moreover in the ninth *vimuktimārga* of detachment, of the sphere in which he detaches himself, namely the Third Dhyāna; it is also of a lower sphere, namely of the First Dhyāna, of *anāgamya.* For it happens that the preparatory path is of a lower sphere: the *jñāna* of a lower sphere will therefore be able to be cultivated.

But when an ascetic detaches himself from the Second Dhyāna by taking as his support the *sāmantaka* of the Third Dhyāna, neither in the *ānantarya* nor in the *vimukti* paths can a pure *jñāna* of the sphere of the *sāmantaka* be cultivated: in fact there is no pure *jñāna* in this *sāmantaka* (viii.22a). The cultivated *jñāna* will be inferior to the Path: of the Second Dhyāna, of *dhyānāntara,* of the First Dhyāna, or of *anāgamya.*

145. Hsüan-tsang: "Only in the first *kṣayajñāna* does he cultivate all of the impure qualities of the nine spheres." With the gloss: "In the first *kṣayajñāna,* that is to say in the ninth *vimuktimārga* of detachment from Bhavāgra, and in the ninth *vimuktimārga* of the five perfecting of the faculties" (*TD* 29, p. 139c25).

146. *Et cetera* refers to *abhibhvāyatana, kṛtsnāyatana,* etc.

147. *Peḍā, Divya,* 251.4, 365.8, a bag holding jewels or *alaṁkāras; phelā, ibid.* 503.24, *Mahāvastu,* ii.465 (*phelā, phelikā*); Bloch, *Marathe,* 370; classical, *peṭa, peṭā, peṭī;* Pāḷi: *pelā.*

Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha: "as, when their bonds are cut, beings who were bound and strangling, now breathe."

The meaning is that, at the moment of *kṣayajñāna,* there is produced the possession of all the qualities to a great degree of excellence.

148. Compare the first Cakravartin King, *Kośa,* iii. 96c.

149. Hsüan-tsang (p. 139c16) adds a *pāda:* "Arisen above he does not cultivate the lower":, a thesis developed in the *Vyākhyā:* When one obtains the quality of Arhat (that is to say *kṣayajñāna*) in Kāmadhātu, the *aśubhās,* etc., of the Three Dhātus are "cultivated" (*bhāvanām gacchanti*); when one obtains the quality of Arhat in Rūpadhātu, or in Ārūpyadhātu, the same qualities are cultivated belonging to these Dhātus. The same with respect to the different *bhūmis* of these Dhātus; one who obtains the quality of Arhat in *naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana* cultivates only the qualities belonging to this *bhūmi.*

150. a. *Vyākhyā: yad vihīnaṁ punar labhyate saṁmukhīkriyate saṁsārocitaṁ na tad anāgataṁ bhāvyate bhāvitotsṛṣṭatvāt saṁsāre/ yad evātra dhyānāpramāṇādy anucitaṁ saṁsāre viśiṣṭam anāsravānuguṇaṁ tatsaṁmukhībhāve tajjātīyam evānāgataṁ viśiṣṭaṁ bhāvyata ity ācāryo darśayati.* It is some vulgar qualities, encountered in the course of transmigration, that one manifests, and that one abandons. These qualities are not the object of "cultivation," that is to say "are not possessed in a future state." But when one actualizes the distinguished qualities, the Dhyānas, the Apramāṇas, etc., rare in the course of transmigration, and which are favorable to the acquisition of pure qualities, one takes possession of them for the future. This is what Vasubandhu intends to say.

This explanation depends on Vasumitra's thesis that there is cultivation of some distinguished qualitiies, *saṁsārānucatvāt,*but not of others.

b. Hsüan-tsang: "The *dharma* previously acquired and then lost, and now acquired anew, is not 'cultivated' because of this, because one reacquired it without effort. One manifests the *dharma* not previously acquired with effort, and it is thus 'cultivated' in the future, because its force is great. Produced after having been acquired, it is not cultivated in the future, because its force is small, being produced without much effort." This version is based on the explanation of Saṁghabhadra.

c. Saṁghabhadra (in his *Nyāyānusāra, TD* 29, p. 745b18; see also his *Prakaraṇaśāsana, TD* 29, p. 954c9, which does not exactly correspond) is quoted by the *Vyākhyā: ācāryasaṁghabhadro'py etam evārthaṁ vyācaṣṭe/ labdhapūrvaṁ na bhāvyate/ yat pratilabdhavihīnaṁ punar labhyate na tad bhāvyate/ arthād gamyate yad alabdhapūrvam labhyate tad bhāvyate/ yatnābhimukhīkaraṇāt/ apratipraśrabdho hi mārgo yatnenābhimukhīkriyata iti tadāvedhabalatvād anāgato bhāvanāṁ gacchati/ pratilabdhapūrvas tv ayatnena saṁmukhībhavati bhāvitapratiśrabdhatvāt kṛtakṛtyadattaphalatvāc ca vegahīna iti tatsaṁmukhībhāvād anāgato na bhāvyata iti/ yo'nāgato yatnena janyate sa bhāvyata ity abhiprāyaḥ/*

The *Vyākhyā* continues: *tad evaṁ sati yad uktaṁ saṁvṛtijñānaṁ tāvad iti vistareṇa tad āryasaṁtānapatitam eva gṛhyate.*

That is to say: if this is the case, what is said of the cultivation of *saṁvṛtijñāna* should also be understood of the *saṁvṛtijñāna* of the Āryan. The *Vyākhyā* then mentions the opinion of Vasumitra, and the objection of the Vaibhāśikas: *saṁsārānucitatvād iti ācāryavasumitreṇātra likhitam/ atra kila vaibhāṣikā āhuḥ/ naitad evam/ kutaḥ/ yasmād alabdham eva tad bhavati tyakyatvāt tasmād bhāvitotsṛṣṭasyāpi punarlābhe bhavaty eva bhāvaneti/ kathaṁ tad apūrvaṁ bhavati yāvatālabdhapūrvam iti/ na hy evaṁvidhaṁ loke prasiddham iti/.*

Finally, one can understand "what has not been obtained" (*alabdhapūrva*) as what has not been obtained in this life: *apare punar vyācakṣate ekaṁ janmedam abhikṛtyoktaṁ na janmāntaram/ yad vihīnam asminn eva janmani punar labhyate na tad bhāvyate bhāvitotsṛṣṭatvāt/ janmāntare tu yal labhyate tad bhāvyate.*

151. See *Kośa,* vi. 1, note 2; vii, p. 1104, *Atthasālinī,* 163.

152. *Bhāvanā* which consists of taking possession of a future *dharma*. In the same way *niṣevaṇabhāvanā* consists of *niṣevaṇa*.

153. *Pratipakṣabhāvanā* signifies the *bhāvanā* which consists of *pratipakṣa*, "opposition": *pratipakṣo mārgo yathoktaṁ sūtre bhāvitakāyo bhāvitacitta iti bhāvitakāyacittapratipakṣa ity arthaḥ/ kāyapratipakṣaḥ punaś caturdhyānavairāgyāya yo margaḥ/ tathā hy uktaṁ bhāvitakāyo bhikṣur ity ucyate bhāvitacitto bhāvitaśīlah/ kathaṁ bhāvitakāyo bhavati/ kāyād vigatarāgo vigatatṛṣṇo vigatapipāso vigatapremā vigataniyantiḥ* (?)/ *atha vā yo'sau rūparāgakṣayānantaryamārgah/ so'nena vigatarāgo bhavatīty āgamaḥ. Saṁyutta*, iii.7, 11, 190, iv.111; *Aṅguttara*, iii.106; *Majjhima*, i.237.

How the mind is termed *bhāvita*, above vii.p. 1102.

154. *Vinirdhāvanabhāvana* is the cutting off of possession of the defilements, *kleśaprāpticcheda*.

155. The order of the *pra(d)hānas* differs in the *Mahāvyutpatti*, 39; see vi.2c, 67. Hsüan-tsang omits this reference to the *pradhānas*.

156. *Indriyabhāvanā*, *Majjhima*, iii.298; *indriyasaṁvara*, *Saṁyutta*, i.54, *Aṅguttara*, iii.360, *Majjhima*, i.269, 346, etc.

157. *Saṁyukta*, *TD* 2, p. 76b2: *ṣaḍ imānīndriyāṇi* [*susaṁvṛtāni subhāvitāni* . . .] *Indriyasaṁvara* or *saṁvarabhāvana* is, by its nature, memory and attention: *sa punar indriyasaṁvaraḥ smṛtisaṁprajñānasvabhāva uktaḥ*.

158. *Madhyama*, *TD* 1, p. 647a3 (a paraphrase), *Majjhima*, iii.90; *Saṁyutta*, iv.111; *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 228, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 57, etc.

159. *Vibhāvanābhāvanā*, or *kāyabhāvanā* is nothing other than the expulsion (*vinirdhāvana*) of the defilements of which the body is the object.

160. According to Hsüan-tsang. The original has: We have explained in general that the Arhats, whoever they are, take possession of the "qualities" at the moment when they produce the "consciousness of the destruction of the *āsravas*." (vii.26c) There are eighteen qualities which belong to the Buddha . . .

Kathāvatthu, iii.1-2: the "forces" do not belong to the Buddha (thesis of the Andhakas).

Paṭisambhidāmagga, i.7, sixty-three *ñāṇas* of which six belong to the Buddha; *Milinda*, 285.

161. On *āveṇika*, the definition of *avidyā āveṇikī* (*Vyākhyā*, *ad* v.12, 14, ii.29) which is quoted and translated by Burnouf, *Lotus* 648: *saṁparko veṇir ity ucyate/ na veṇir aveṇiḥ pṛthagbhāva ity arthah/ evaṁ hy uktam aveṇir bhagavān aveṇir bhikṣusaṁgha iti pṛthag bhagavān pṛthag bhikṣusaṁgha ity abhiprāyaḥ/ aveṇyā caraty āveṇikī nānyānuśayasahacāriṇīty arthaḥ. Aṅguttara*, v. 74. The Saṁgha does not divide . . . *na āveni kammāni karonti no āveni pātimokkham uddisanti* (=*na pṛthak karmāṇi* . . .)

There are five qualities which belong exclusively to women (*āveṇīya* and *āveṇika*), *Divya*, 2.3, 98.22, etc.; Burnouf, *Introduction*, 169.

The good that I have done is my *āveṇiya* riches, *Jātaka*, iv.358.

162. a. This is the list of *Divya*, 182.20, 268.4.

b. Yaśomitra says: Such is the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas. Some other masters admit eighteen *āveṇikas* distinct from these, namely: *nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam, nāsti ravitam* (=*sahasā kriyā*), *nāsti dravatā* (=*krīḍābhiprāyatā*), *nāsti nānātvasaṁjñā* (=*sukhaduḥkhāduḥkhāsukheṣu viṣayeṣu rāgadveṣamohato nānātvasamjñā*), *nāsty avyākṛtamanas, nāsty apratisamkhyāyopekṣā, nāsty atīteṣu pratihataṁ jñānadarśanam, nāsty anāgateṣu pratihataṁ jñānadarśanam, nāsti pratyutpanneṣu pratihataṁ jñānādarśanam, sarvaṁ kāyakarma jñānānuparivarti, sarvaṁ vākkarma jñānānuparivarti, sarvaṁ manaskarma jñānānuparivarti, nāsti chandahāniḥ, nāsti vīryahāniḥ, nāsti smṛtihāniḥ, nāsti samādhihānih,*

nāsti prajñāhāniḥ, nāsti vimuktijñānadarśanahāniḥ. This contradicts iv.12, vi.59.

This list, with some close variants, is found in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 9 (an extract, according to Wogihara, from the *Tsa-chi* 雜集 of Sthiramati) which is quoted here by the Japanese editor of the *Kośa.* We will find in *Madhyamakāvatāra* (vi.213, p. 322-337) a commentary extracted from the *Dāraṇīśvaraparipṛcchā.* Very close too are the lists of *Mahāvastu*, i.160 (see the note p. 505) and the Pāḷi sources, *Abhidhānappadīpikā* and *Jinālaṁkāra* (Burnouf, *Lotus*, 649, Kern, *Geschiedenis*, i. 272, *Milinda*, 285).

The particularity of Yaśomitra's list is in the first terms: *nāsti skhalitaṁ nāsti ravitaṁ nāsti dravatā;* the *Mahāvastu* and the *Mahāvyutpatti* have: *nāsti (s)khalitam nāsti ravitam nāsti muṣitasmṛtitā;* the *Jinālaṁkāra* gives: . . . *natthi davā* (commented upon as *kicchābhippāyena kiriyā*, a bad reading for *khiḍḍābhippāyena*), *natthi ravā* (commented upon as *sahasā kiriyā*). Note the close relationship with the glosses of Yaśomitra: *dravatā* = *krīḍābhiprāyatā, a* = *sahasā kriyā* (=Tibetan *ca co*, "outcry" = Chinese: "defect of the voice"). For *dravatā, Mahāvastu-Mahāvyutpatti* have, we would say *muṣitasmṛtitā* (which has, perhaps a double use with the ninth declension: *nāsti smṛter haniḥ*), but Candra Das (p. 511) has a variant *muṣitā* or *muditā*, which suggests the idea of *krīḍā.*

Apratisaṁkhyāyopekṣa is an *upekṣā* or indifference, which does not result from the consciousness, due, we would say, to apathy, not to wisdom (see vii.8).

c. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (iii.4) admits 140 *āveṇikas* (see *Muséon*, 1911, 170): 32 and 80 marks, 4 "omniform" (*sarvākāra*) purities, 10 *balas*, 4 *vaiśaradyas*, 3 *smṛtyupasthānas*, 3 *ārakṣaṇas* (compare the 4 *ārakṣyas* of *Mahāvyutpatti*, 12), *mahākaruṇā, asaṁpramoṣadharmatā, vāsanāsamudghāta, sarvākāravarajñāna* (compare *sarvathājñāna, Kośa*, vii. p. 1146).

d. The *āveṇikas* of the Bodhisattva, *Mahāvyutpatti*, 29, and *Madhyamakāvatāra*, vi.212.

163. *Lotus*, 343, 781, Spence Hardy, *Manual*, 380 and other works quoted in *Dharmasaṁgraha*, p. 51; *Mahāvyutpatti*, 7 (according to the *Yogaśāstra*).

Pāḷi list in the *Jinālaṁkāra* of Buddharakṣita; the ancient "Sanskrit" source is the *Mahāvastu*, i.159 (a valuable commentary by the editor, p. 502-505); on the other hand, *Paṭisambhidā*, ii.174, *Vibhaṅga*, 335.

The Buddha is *daśabala, Mahāvagga*, i.22.13; "Dasabala" is the title of a *vagga* of the *Saṁyutta;* see however the observations of Rhys Davids, *Milinda*, ii. 134. the ten *balas* of the Bodhisattva, *Mahāvyutpatti*, 26.

The *balas* are explained, according to the *Dhāraṇīśvaraparipṛcchā* in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Tibetan translation, p. 369-395.

If the *balas* belong to the Śrāvakas; if the first nine *balas* are pure or *āryan* "knowledges", *Kathāvatthu*, iii.1-2.

164. A different list in the smaller *Vyutpatti*, 5 (Minayev, 1887). The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra: *daśāyuṣmantas tathāgatabalāni/ katamāni daśa/ ihāyuṣmantas tathāgataḥ sthānaṁ ca sthānato yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti/ asthānaṁ cāsthānataḥ/ idaṁ prathamaṁ tathāgatabalaṁ yena balena samanvāgatas tathāgato'rhan samyakṣaṁbuddha udāram ārṣabhaṁ sthānaṁ pratijānāti brāhmaṁ cakraṁ pravartayati parṣadi samyakṣiṁhanādaṁ nadati// punar aparam āyuṣmantas tathāgato'tītānāgatapratyutpannāni karmadharmasamādānāni sthānato hetuto vastuto vipākataś ca yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti yad āyuṣmantas tathāgataḥ pūrvavad yāvad vipākataś ca yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti idaṁ dvitīyaṁ tathāgatabalaṁ yena balena . . .// Punar aparam āyuṣmantas tathāgato dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamapattināṁ saṁkleśavyavadānavyavasthānaviśuddhiṁ yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti yad āyuṣmantas . . . 3.//. . . Parapudgalānām indriyaparāparatāṁ yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti . . . 4. // . . . nānādhimuktikaṁ lokam anekādhimuktikaṁ yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti . . . 5. // . . . nānādhātukaṁ lokam anekadhātukam . . . 6. // . . . sarvatragāminīṁ pratipadam . . . 7. // . . . anekavidhaṁ pūrvanivāsam anusmarati/ tadyathaikām api jātim dve tisraś catasraḥ pañca ṣaṭ saptāṣṭau nava daśa viṁśatim yāvad anekān api saṁvartavivartakalpān anusmarati/ api nāma te bhavantaḥ sattvā yatrāham āsa evaṁnāmā evamjātya evaṁgotra evamāhāra evaṁsukhaduḥ-*

khapratisamvedī evaṁdīrghāyur evaṁcirasthitika evamāyuṣparyantaḥ/ so'haṁ tasmāt sthānāc cyuto'mutropapannaḥ/ tasmād api cyuta ihopapannaḥ/ iti sākāraṁ sanidānaṁ soddeśam anekavidhaṁpūrvanivāsamanusmarati/ yadāyuṣmantas ... 8. // ... divyena cakṣuṣā viśuddhenātikrāntamanuṣyakeṇa sattvān paśyati cyavamānān apy upapadyamānān api survarṇān durvarṇān hīnān praṇītān sugatim api gacchato durgatim api yathākarmopagān sattvān yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti/ amī bhavantaḥ sattvāḥ kāyaduścaritene samanvāgatā vāgmanoduścaritena samanvāgatā āryāṇām apavādakā mithyādṛṣṭayo mithyādṛṣṭikarmadharmasamādānahetos taddhetu tatpratyayaṁ kāyasya bhedāt paraṁ maraṇād apāyadurgativinipātaṁ narakeṣūpapadyante/ amī punar bhavantaḥ sattvāḥ kāyasucaritena samanvāgatā ... samyagdṛṣṭikarmadharmasaṁpādanahetos (?) ... sugatau svargaloke deveṣūpapadyante/ yad ... 9. // ... āsravāṇāṁ kṣayād anāsravāṁ cetovimuktim prajñāvimuktiṁ dṛṣṭa eva dharme svayam abhijñāya sākṣātkṛtvopasaṁpadya prativedayate/ kṣīṇā me jātir uṣitaṁ brahmacaryaṁ kṛtaṁ karaṇīyaṁ nāparam asmād bhavaṁ prajānāmīti yad āyuṣmantas tathāgataḥ ... 10. //

165. This first *jñānabala* is by nature ten *jñānas. Sthānāsthāna* is divided into 1. *saṁskṛta,* which is eightfold; 2. *saṁprayukta* (associated with the mind), of four types—Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, Ārūpyadhātu, and *anāsrava;* 3. *viprayukta* (disassociated from the mind), the same; and 4. *asaṁskṛta,* which is either morally good or neutral.

Sthānāsthānabala as *saṁvṛtijñāna* bears on these ten things; as *dharmajñāna* on five; as *anvayajñāna* on seven ...

How are these ten things *sthānāsthāna*? See the Sūtras: "There is the *sthāna* (possibility, *saṁbhava*) that a male realizes Buddhahood (*buddhatvaṁ kārayiṣyati*); there is the *asthāna* (impossibility, *asaṁbhava*) that a female ...; there is the possibility that a male becomes Brahmā (*brahmatvaṁ kārayiṣyati*); there is the possibility of the destruction of suffering ...

Definition of this *bala, Vibhaṅga,* p. 335.

166. Action and its result are in fact included within the Truths of Suffering and Arising, not in the Truths of Extinction or the Path.

167. We have Four Dhyānas (viii.1), Eight Vimokṣas (viii.32), Three Samādhis (*śūnyatā,* etc., viii.24), Two Samāpattis (*asaṁjñi* and *nirodha,* ii.42) and Nine *anupūrvavihārasamāpattis* (*dhyānas, ārūpyas, nirodha*). The same in *Vibhaṅga,* 339.

168. That is *indriyaparopariyatta, Vibhaṅga,* 340, *Paṭisambhidā,* i.121. *Indriya* is rendered in the stanza by *akṣa;* the Buddha knows if the faculties of beings (faith, etc.) are weak, etc, (*parāpara*). (*Vibhaṅga* is more developed).

169. *Adhimukti* = *adhmokṣa* = *ruci* (i.20); the Buddha knows the aspirations of beings, their likes.

170. Saṁghabhadra explains: *pūrvābhyāsavāsanāsamudāgata āśayo dhātur iti;* the Buddha knows the mental dispositions which result from former habits and practices. On *vāsanā,* vii.30c, 32d; on *āśaya,* iv. note 375, and p. 663, vi.34, *Vibhaṅga,* 340. The *Vibhaṅga* differs and places the consciousness of *āśaya, anuśaya,* etc., in the seventh *bala.*

171. The knowledge relative to *nirodha* is only included in the knowledge of the Path (*pratipad*) if one understands *pratipad* as *pratipatphala;* in fact *pratipad* is not the cause of *nirodha* even though it is the cause of the realms of rebirth.

The *Vibhaṅga* (p. 339) does not envision the *pratipad* of *nirodha;* the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* takes it into consideration.

172. On the expression *jambuṣaṇḍagata,* see iii.41 at the end.

173. This is the story recounted in the *Sūtrālaṁkāra* of Aśvaghoṣa, trans. Huber, p. 283. Saeki refers to the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish, TD* 4, no. 202) where the story is much

more detailed, see *TD* 4, p. 376b2-p. 380a10; *Dsanglun* of Schmidt, 107-128. See also *Zapiski*, vii.281, 286, and *Histoire des Religions*, 1903, i.323. According to a note by P. Pelliot, the hero is called Śrīvṛddhi. Saeki also mentions *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 530c19 and following.

The *Vyākhyā* explains: Śāriputra searches in vain to see in the series of this person a root of good "which could produce deliverance" (*mokṣabhāgīya*, iii.44c, iv.124, vi.24c, vii.34), and as a consequence refused to admit this person into the Saṁgha. But the Bhagavat saw this root of good and confered *pravrajyā* upon him. On this occasion the Bhagavat, questioned by the Bhikṣus, said: "He did an action so that he obtained the state of Arhat. For actions do not mature in water . . . and the rest." And it says: *Mokṣabījam ahaṁ hy asya susūkṣmam upalakṣaye/ dhātupāṣāṇavivare nilīnam iva kāñcanam//* (Quoted in *Vyākhyā*, i. p. 5; translated by Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 340).

174. Paramārtha: "It is related also of the pigeon chased by the hawk that Śāriputra was not capable of knowing the beginning and the end of his rebirths [as a bird?]."

The *Vyākhyā* has: *upapattyādiparyantājñānaṁ ceti/ ādiśabdena cyutiparyantājñānam*, that is to say: [There was also ignorance on the part of Śāriputra] concerning the limit of births and deaths [of the pigeon . . .].

175. *Yogasūtra*, iii.24, on the acquisition of the power of an elephant, etc.

176. *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 155a8: As the Sūtra says, the body of the Bodhisattva has the force of Nārāyaṇa. What is the measure of this force? There are those who say, "The force of nineteen bulls is equal to the force of one *hao-niu* 豪牛 (Couvrier: a bull which has long hair down to the joints of his legs) . . ." There are some who say: "This measure is too small. In the body of the Bodhisattva, there are eighteen great joints: each has the force of Nārāyaṇa . . ." The Mahābhadanta says: "This measure is too small. In the same way that the force of the mind is infinite, so too the force of the body. How do we know this? . . . When the Bodhisattva undertakes the resolution: "I shall not get up before I have attained Bodhi . . . ," the great chiliocosm moved in some six different ways, but the very hairs of the Bodhisattva did not stir . . ."

177. This is an explanation of the opinion of others. *Vyākhyā: saṁdhiṣv anya ity uktam/ asthisaṁdhiviśeṣopanyāsaḥ/ nāgagranthir iti vistaraḥ/ nāgagranthasaṁdhayo buddhāḥ/ nāgapāśo nāgagranthiḥ/ śaṁkalāsaṁdhayaḥ pratyekabuddhāḥ/ śaṅkusaṁdhayaś cakravartinaḥ.*

178. On the Mahānagnas, see *Divya*, 372, Burnouf, *Introduction* 363, *Lotus*, 452. Cāṇūra is an enemy of Kṛṣṇa.

179. In *Mahāvyutpatti*, 252 (which relys on the *Kośa*), *varāṅga* precedes *praskandin.*

180. Paramārtha replaces ten with one hundred.

181. The original has *yathā tu bahutaraṁ tathā yujyate.* Paramārtha adds: "Why? Because the force of the Buddha is without measure." The *Vyākhyā* says: "The author defends the first opinion, for the reason that, otherwise, the body of the Buddha would not be able to support the force of infinite knowledge."

182. Five opinions in *Vibhāṣā* (see *TD*, p. 154b8 where the discussion begins; the theories are given p. 154c24-p. 155a7), and four in Saṁghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra* (*TD* 29, p. 748b12-b20).

183. The Sūtra (*Ekottara*, *TD* 2, p. 645b27), quoted in the *Vyākhya*, is very close to *Aṅguttara* ii.8 (*vesārajja*): *catvārīmāni śāriputra tathāgatasya vaiśāradyāni yair vaiśāradyaiḥ samanvāgatas tathāgato'rhan samyaksaṁbuddha udāram ārṣabhaṁ sthānaṁ pratijānāti brāhmaṁ cakraṁ* (*Kośa*, vi.54) *pravartayati parṣadi samyak siṁhanādam nadati/ katamāni catvāri samyakṣaṁbuddhasya vata me sata ime dharmā anabhisaṁbuddhā ity atra māṁ*

kaścic chramaṇo vā brahmaṇo vā saha dharmeṇa codayet smārayet/ tatrāhaṁ nimittamapi na samanupaśyāmi evaṁ cāhaṁ nimittam asamanupaśyan kṣemaprāptaś ca viharāmi abhayaprāptaś ca vaiśāradyaprāptas ca udāram ārṣabham . . . Same text quoted in the *Vijñānakāya*, *TD* 26, p. 544a6, which has: *chramaṇo vā brahmaṇo vā devo vā māro vā brahmā vā* . . .

In *Majjhima*, i. 501, the *vesārajjas* are attributed to all Arhats; compare *Mahāvagga*, i.6.32. In a fragment of the *Saṁyukta*, *JRAS*, 1907, p. 377, the Householder Śroṇa is *vaiśāradyaprāpta* (an epithet of the Srotāpanna).

The young lion (*kiśora*) possesses *vaiśāradya*, *Bodhicarya*, vii.55.

The *vaiśāradyas* of the Bodhisattva, *Mahāvyutpatti*, 28, *Daśabhūmi*, viii, *Madhamakāvatāra*, 320.

Etymology of the word *vaiśāradya*, Wogihara, *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 41.

184. The readings of *Mahāvyutpatti*, 8, differ a little:. . . 3. *antarāyikadharmānanyathātvaniścitāvya-karaṇa*. . . 4. *sarvasaṁpadadhigamāya nairyāṇikapratipattathātva-vaiśāradya*.

185. Paramārtha differs: As these absences of fear are realized by *jñāna*, the *jñāna* is called *vaiśāradya*. What is the reason for the four *vaiśāradyas*? They are useful to oneself and to others. The first two are useful to the Buddha himself; the last two are useful to others. Or rather the four are useful to others, for they expel all defilement both in the speaker and in his discourse.

186. The *Vibhāṣā* remarks: These three *smṛtyupasthānas* are included within *sthānāsthānajñānabala*, and within the six *satatavihāras* (see iii.35d, at the end).

187. When the disciples have the contrary attitude, *tathāgatasya nāghāto bhavati nākṣāntir nāpratyayo na cetaso'nabhirāddhiḥ*.

Compare *Majjhima*, iii.221 (very close) and i.379; *Mahāvyutpatti*, 11.

For *utplāvitatvam*, see *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 13, note 3; *manasa utplavaḥ* in *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 183.6.

188. See Asaṅga, *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, xvii.43; *Divya*, 359 (the *kṛpā* of the *Śrāvaka*); compare the stanzas in *Divya*, 96, 125 and Huber, *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, p. 284.

189. The *pāramitās* of giving, the precepts, and patience are the provisions of merit; the *pāramitā* of *prajñā* is the provision of knowledge.

The *pāramitā* of absorption or *dhyāna* gives rise to merit, as it is the cultivation of the Four Apramāṇas (viii.29), and it gives rise to knowledge as it is the cultivation of the thirty-seven "adjuncts of Bodhi" (vi. p. 1022).

The *pāramitā* of energy or *vīrya* is also doubly useful: *na hi vinā vīryeṇa dānaṁ dīyate śīlaṁ samādīyate kṣāntir bhāvyata iti puṇyasaṁbhārabhāgīyam vīryaṁ bhavati/ tathā nāntareṇa vīryaṁ prajñā bhavati* . . .

Same doctrine in the Mahāyāna (where it is explained that the *pāramitās* are *pāramitās* by the fact of *prajñā*), in *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix.1.

When and how the Bodhisattva practices the *pāramitās*, *Kośa*, iv.111.

190. On *ākaraṇa*, ii.34b, vi.18a.

191. An excellence which results notably from *saṁskāraduḥkhatākāra* and *prajñāsvabhāvatā*.

192. In this formula, one undertakes, along with the First Dhyāna, Anāgamya and Dhyānāntara. Compassion is of the six *bhūmis*.

193. "Śrāvakas, etc." refer to the Pratyekabuddhas and Pṛthagjanas.

194. By *karuṇā*, the Śrāvakas have simply compassion (*karuṇāyante*); they experience commiseration, affliction; they do not protect one from the fear of *saṁsāra*. But the

Bhagavat, having compassion along with *mahākaruṇā*, protects one from the great terror of *saṁsāra*.

195. a. Differences between Buddhas, *Kośa*, iv. 102, trans. p. 685, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I.vii, *Muséon* 1911, 173 (life, name, *gotra*, body); Wassilieff, 286 (314). *Kathāvatthu*, xxi.5:the Theravāda admits differences, *vemattatā*, for the body (*sarīra*), the length of life and light (*pabhā*); the Andhakas admit other differences. *Milinda*, 285 (differences between Bodhisattvas, family, time period, length of life, stature). Below note 197.

b. Vasubandhu groups together, vii.28-34, the elements of a Buddhology. Interesting from this point of view are the following passages of the *Kośa:*

i.1. Difference of the wisdom of the Buddha and that of other saints; omniscience (also *Kośa*, ix). The Buddha and the Bodhisattvas are Bhagavats.

ii.10. Abandoning of the *āyuḥsaṁskāras;* victory over the Four Māras.

ii.44, vii.41d, 44b. All the qualities (*guṇa*) acquired through detachment and actualized at his will.

ii.44, vi.24a. The conquest of Bodhi in thirty-four moments.

ii.62. Knowledge of the future.

iii.94. Time period of the appearance of Buddhas.

iv.12. *Avyākṛta* mind, "non-absorbed" mind; the Nāga.

iv.32. The cult of the Buddha.

iv.32. The Dharmakāya, refuge; the Rūpakāya.

iv.73. Accepts the gifts made to Stūpas. iv.102. Retribution of his former actions.

iv.102. Schism.

iv.109. The marks of the Bodhisattvas, the objects of their minds.

iv.109, vii.30, 37, 42. The memory of the Buddha.

iv.121. The cult of Caityas.

vi.59. Falling away from the joys of the absorptions.

viii.28. Conquest of Bodhi through the Fourth Dhyāna.

c. On the Bodhisattva, and in particular, the future Buddha Śākyamuni.

iii.94, iv.108-112. Origin, vows, and practice of the *pāramitās* (iv.117), duration of his career (because the Bodhisattva is naturally charitable, iii. 94a), development of the marks.

iv.106. Death of the Bodhisattva.

vi.23. Change of vehicle, animal births of the Bodhisattva.

Last birth, iii.9, *jarāyuja* and why (relics); 13a, in the form of an elephant; 17a, conscious at conception, etc.; 41, a Pṛthagjana until sitting under the Bodhi Tree; 53d, the Vajrāsana; 85a, free from premature death. [According to the *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*, *Cosmologie*, p. 327, explanation of the marks; 331, rain of flowers; 332, 334, life in the womb; 333, miracles at his birth; 335, why he has a son, why he is of good family, why he is not born in such a continent, etc. On the mother of the Bodhisattva, death on the seventh day, 331, 337; when pregnant, sheltered by fire, etc.].

196. *Vyākhyā: anāsravadharmasaṁtāno dharmakāyaḥ/ āśrayaparivṛttir vā:* "The Dharmakāya is a series of pure *dharmas* (*Kośa*, iv.32) or a renewing of the psycho-physical organism, the personality (*āśraya*)." Some examples of the renewing of the personality, iv.56, trans. p. 631; see viii.34d.On the *dharmakāya* of the mother of the Buddha, of an Upāsaka who has entered the Path, see Huber, *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, 217, 390.

Dīgha, iii.84 (*Ajjaññasutta*): *Tathāgatassa hetam Vāseṭṭha adhivacanaṁ dhammakāyo iti pi brahmakāyo iti pi dhammabhūto iti pi brahmabhūto iti pīti* (Fragment of the commentary in *Dialogues*, iii.81.

Frequently *dharmakāya* = the body of scriptures = the second *ratna*, *Divya*, 396, Przyluski, *Açoka*, 359, etc.; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, i.1.

For the Mahāyāna, we quote only the *Abhisamayālaṁkāra*, vi.2 - 11; JRAS, 1906, 943; Burnouf, *Introduction*, 224; *Si-yu-ki* (= *Hsi-yu-chi*), end of book iv.

197. The word *ādi* is not in the Sanskrit or Tibetan *Kārikās*. Paramārtha: "the word *et cetera* indicates the duration of the Law, the destruction or the non-destruction of relics, etc. Such are the differences due to the time period when the Buddhas appear."

The time of the seven Buddhas, their cast, *gotra,* length of life, tree, etc., in *Mahāpadānasuttanta, Dīgha,* ii.1 and *Dīrgha, TD* 1, p. 1c19. The Law of Kāśyapa lasts eight days; that of Śākyamuni lasts one thousand years (see viii.39). *Kośa,* iii.93a.

198. "Perfection" is a term more useful than exact. The *Kośa*'s presentation is frequently clarified by the theories of the Mahāyāna which we find notably in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (for example First Part, Chap. V, on *prabhāva, Muséon,* 1911, p. 155).

199. *Sarvaguṇajñānasaṁbhārābhyāsa:* the qualities (*guṇa*) are by their nature five *pāramitās;* the knowledges (*jñāna*) are the *prajñāpāramitā. Abhyāsa,* exercise = *punaḥ punaḥ prayogaḥ.*

200. *Dīrghakālābhyāsa: tribhir asaṁkhyeyair mahākalpaiḥ* (Doctrine summarized, iv. p. 691-2). Ānanda thinks that to become a Buddha through meditation for six years is to become a Buddha quite easily . . . (Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes,* ii.100).

201. *Vyākhyā: sarvathā jñānam iti sarvaprakārāvabodhanārthena.*

However, according the the gloss of the Japanese editor who follows Fa-pao, *sarvatra jñāna* is to be understood as the consciousness of common characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), impermanence, etc.: from this point of view any Arhat knows all thing (see *Vyākhyā,* i.15, p. 73: no salvation for one who does not know all *dharmas*); and *sarvathā jñāna* is the consciousness of self characteristics, which is *āveṇika,* proper to the Buddha (see the stanza on the tail of the peacock, *Vyākhyā,* i. p. 6, and *Kośa,* Chapter IX, trans. Hsüan-tsang, *TD* 29, p. 157c23; compare p. 155a1).

The *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 382c23, teaches that the Buddha possesses both *sarvatra jñāna* and *sarvathā jñāna* relative to the twelve *āyatanas;* whereas Śāriputra possesses only the First Dhyāna, which he owes to the teaching of the Master.

202. *Vāsanā,* above p. 1143.

203. We have: *apūrvabāhyaviṣayotpādana* = *nirmāṇa; aśmādīnāṁ suvarnādibhāvāpādana* = *pariṇāma; dīrghakālāvasthāna* = *adhiṣṭhāna.* On *nirmāṇa* and *adhiṣṭhāna,* see vii. 49 and following.

204. See *Kośa,* ii. trans. p. 165.

Ekottara, TD 2, p. 639a14: The Buddha asked Śāriputra, "Why do you not remain a *kalpa* or more?" Śāriputra answered, "I hold that the life of the Bhagavat himself is very short. The longest life does not go beyond one hundred years; and as the life of beings is short, the life of the Tathāgata is also short. If the Tathāgata continues to live a *kalpa,* I too shall continue to live a *kalpa*... "How can Śāriputra speak thusly? Beings are not capable of knowing whether the life of the Tathāgata is long or short. Śāriputra should know that there are four incomprehensible things about the Tathāgata. (Compare the four *acinteyyas* of *Aṅguttara,* ii.80, *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī,* i.22).

205. Compare the power of *saṁkṣepa-prathana,* a Mahāyāna text, *JRAS,* 1908, 45; also *Dīgha,* ii.109

206. a. *Vividhanijāścaryadharmasaṁpad.* This is the *sahajaprabhāva* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi, Muséon,* 1911, 161.

The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra: *dharmataiṣā buddhānāṁ bhagavatāṁ yat teṣāṁ gacchatāṁ nimnasthalaṁ ca samībhavati yad uccaṁ tan nīcībhavati yan nīcaṁ tad uccībhavati andhāś ca dṛśiṁ pratilabhante badhirāḥ śrotram unmattāḥ smṛtim . . .*

These are, almost identically, the *citrāṇy āścaryāṇi adbhutadharmāḥ* of *Divya,* 250-251. Compare the quotation in *Milinda,* 179.

b. Hsüan-tsang adds here: "Or rather conversion of those difficult to convert; the solution of difficult questions; the teaching that leads to salvation; to defeat Māra, Tīrthikas, etc."

207. On *adhigama*, see viii.39a.

208. Actions involving necessary retribution (iv.50) are *alaṅghanīya*, "insurmountable."

209. According to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha: "Anyone who, having come into this world, plants a small amount of merit in the Buddha, after having taken up heavenly births, certainly obtains an immortal dwelling." But the *Vyākhyā* has: *kārān ity upakārān pūjādikān*. Therefore Vasubandhu quotes here the stanza of the *Divya*, p. 166: *ye'lpan api jine kārān kariṣyanti vināyake/ vicitraṁ svargam āgamaya lapsyante'mṛtaṁ padam.* (On *Divya*, xii, Lévi, *T'oung Pao*, 1907, p. 107).

210. *Raṇa* = *kleśa Raṇayati kleśayatīty arthaḥ. Araṇāvihārin* in *Divya* and in the Pāḷi sources (*JPTS*, 1891, 3).

a. See *Kośa*, i.8 where the *Bhāṣya: raṇā hi kleśā ātmaparavyābādhanāt* is explained: *ye hy ātmānaṁ parāṁś ca vyābādhante te raṇā yuddhānīty arthaḥ.*

There are three *raṇas, skandharaṇa, vāgraṇa,* and *kleśaraṇa.*

To the reference in *Kośa*, i. trans. note 37, add: "*Maitrī* and *Araṇā*," *Séances Ac. de Belgique*, April 1921; *Kośa*, iv.56; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, fol. 37b and 83a; *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, xx.45; Śarad Chandra Dās, 1164.

b. The *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27, p. 898b23) enumerates the five means by which the Arhat avoids producing defilement in another: 1. purity of attitude (walking, etc.); 2. Knowledge of what he should say and should not say . . . 5. before entering into a village to beg, he examines whether a man or woman could, because of him, produce any defilement.

c. The doctrine of the Mahāyāna, for example the *Mahāyāna-saṁgraha* (9.2) differs from that of the *Kośa:* The Pratyekabuddha only arrests *savastuka* defilements, whereas the Buddha arrests all the defilements . . . The Buddha creates *nirmitas* or fictive beings . . . " (*TD* 31, p. 151c).

d. The *araṇā* of the Śrāvaka and the Buddha are defined in *Abhisamayālaṁkāra*, vi.7:
śrāvakasyāraṇā draṣṭṛnṛkleśaparihāritā/
tatkleśasrota-ucchittyai grāmādiṣu jināraṇā//

The *araṇāsamādhi* of a Śrāvaka: "May there be no arising of any defilement in anyone who sees me! (*māsmaddarśanāt kasya cit kleśotpattiḥ syāt*)." But, for the Tathāgatas: "He roots out, in the villages, etc., the process of the defilements in all persons."

211. He who kills an Arhat commits a "mortal sin," even if he does not know that this is an Arhat, iv.103; the monk who insults a junior monk who is an Arhat is reborn five hundred times as a slave.

212. An Arhat causes another person to have no hatred with respect to himself, without however rooting out hatred in another; he can only cause another person to not have *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, "the idea of a personality," with respect to himself; for if another person has *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, he has *satkāyadṛṣṭi* with respect to all persons.

213. *Abhisamayālaṁkāra*, vii.8: *anābhogam anāsaṅgam avyāghātaṁ sadā sthitam/ sarvapraśnāpanud bauddhaṁ praṇidhijñānam iṣyate//* On *praṇidhijñāna*, see ii.62a, p. 300, vi.22c, p. 938, Chap. IX (Hsüan-tsang, xxix.9a); *Mahāvyutpatti*, 48.52.

214. I interpret the *Bhāṣya* according to the *Vyākhyā*, which says simply: *ārūpyas tu na sākṣāt praṇidhijñānena jñāyante/ niṣyandacaritaviśeṣāt tu/ karṣakanidarśanaṁ cātreti vaibhāṣikāḥ.*

215. *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 897b24: Does *praṇidhijñāna* know the future? Some say that by reason of the past and of the present he infers (*pi-chih* 比知 : to compare, to know)

the future; the same way that a person infers with certainty from fields or seeds that there will be a certain fruit. Some say that, if this is the case, *pranidhijñāna* is an *anumāna*, an inferential reasoning, not a *pratyakṣa* or direct perception. We say that *pranidhijñāna* does not know a result through its present cause, nor a cause through its present result: it is therefore *pratyakṣa* and not *anumāna*. (Compare *Kośa*, ii.62, p. 300).

Aṅguttara, iv.402, on the fact that the Bhagavat knows that Devadatta is destined for hell; on the omniscience of the Bhagavat, see *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, ii.194-195.

Explanations of Āryadeva, *Catuḥśatikā*, 257 (*Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1914, p. 492): . . . *anāgatārthālambanaṁ yogināṁ praṇidhijñānaṁ/ yathārtham . . . tāttvikayā kalpanayā dṛśyante'nāgato bhāvah.*

Kathāvatthu, v.8 (on consciousness or knowledge of the future: Andhakas).

216. *Yāvāṁs tatsamādhiviṣaya iti:* that is, as a Śrāvaka, the ascetic knows what is of the sphere of the Śrāvaka . . . (vii.55 and elsewhere).

217. The four *Pratisamvids* are, it appears, the consciousnesses which make an excellent preacher. Burnouf, *Lotus*, 838-842 (*pratisaṁvid* = distinct consciousness); Childers, 366; Spence Hardy, *Manual* 499; a valuable note in the *Appendix* of the translation of the *Kathāvatthu*, p. 377-382.

Pratisambhidā is to be understood in the very general sense of exact consciousness, for example: *Paṭisambhidāmagga*.

The four *paṭisambhidās*, *Paṭisambhidāmagga* i.119, *Vibhaṅga*, 293, 331, *Niddesa*, 234 (interesting), *Visuddhimagga*, 440-443; the four *pratisaṁvids*, *Daśabhūmaka*, ninth sphere (very different definitions); *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Third Part; *Dharmasaṁgraha*, 51, *Mahāvyutpatti*, 13, *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, xviii.34-37, xx.47 (the third is the gift of languages of different countries).

Artha and *dharma* are explained vii.39c-d. . . . *teṣu dharmeṣv arthapratisaṁvedī bhavati dharmapratisamvedī* . . . *Vyākhyā*, i. p. 56; *Dīgha*, iii.241. *dharmānusārin*, *Kośa* vi.29a-b.

218. a. The Chinese render *pratisaṁvid* by *wu ai chieh* 無礙解 or *wu ai chih* 無礙知 = "unhindered understanding," "unhindered knowledge."

The *Vyākhyā* (*ad* 37c-d) has a gloss: *avivarti ity aśakyaṁ vivartayitum.*

The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (below) has *asaktam avivartyam.*

The meaning of *asaktam jñānam* is fixed by the definition of Bodhi in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Bodhi is pure (*śuddha*) knowledge, universal (*sarvajñāna*) and immediate (*asaṅgajñāna*): a knowledge obtained "by a simple bending of the mind," *ābhogamātreṇa*, without this bending being repeated, *na punaḥ punar ābhogaṁ kurvataḥ* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. vii. *Muse'on* 1911, p. 170).

b. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, fol. 100a (I.xvii.7): *yat sarvadharmāṇāṁ sarvaparyāyeṣu yāvadbhāvikatayā yathāvadbhāvikatayā ca* (See vi. note 326) *bhāvanāmayam asaktam avivartyam jñānam iyam eṣāṁ [bodhisattvānāṁ] dharmapratisaṁvit/ yat punaḥ sarvadharmāṇām sarvalakṣaṇeṣu . . . iyam eṣām arthapratisaṁvit/ yat punaḥ sarvadharmāṇām eva sarvanirvacaneṣu . . . iyam eṣāṁ niruktipratisaṁvit/ yat punaḥ sarvadharmāṇām eva sarvaprakārapadaprabhedeṣu . . . iyam eṣāṁ pratibhānapratisaṁvit/*

By reason of these four, *skandhakauśalam, dhatvāyatanakauśalam, pratītyasamutpādasthānāsthānakauśalam*, the *dharmas* are well known and well preached.

219. Here the *dharma* is *deśanā*, the teaching (*deśanādharma*), as it is said: "I shall teach you the *Dharma*, propitious in the beginning, propitious in the middle, propitious in the end, of good meaning, of good syllables; the single complete, pure, purified *brahmacarya*, I shall promulgate it to you." [We have *pratipattidharma* in the text: "What is the *Dharma*? The Eightfold Path." We have *phaladharma* = *nirvāṇa*, in the text: "Take refuge in the *Dharma*." See iv.31, vi.73c.]

But the word of the Buddha is *nāman* or *vac*, see *Kośa*, i.25, trans. p. 86.

220. The expression *yuttamuttapaṭibhāna* in *Aṅguttara,* ii.135; explained in *Puggalapaññatti:* the *yuttapaṭibhāna* person, when questioned, answers well, but not quickly; the *muttapaṭibhāna* person answers quickly, but not well; the *yuttamuttapaṭibhāna* person answers quickly and well. The preacher of *Divya,* 329,493 is *yuktamuktapratibhāna;* of *Avadānaśataka,* ii.81, *yuktamuktapratibhānin* and *yuktamuktavidhānajñā.* [Compare the *asaṁsaktākṣarapada* of the *Mahābhārata,* xviii.6.21, Hopkins, *Great Epic,* 364?].

I translate *mukta* by "easy," "without difficulty" according to the Pāḷi; Paramārtha has *li chang shih* 離障失, free from the defect of any obstacle.

221. Above page 1154 line 16.

222. On the meaning of *pratibhāna* see *Mahāvastu,* i.511, *Avadānaśataka,* i.48.10, ii.50.12, 81.

223. When it has voice for its object (*vāgālambanā*) it is, by nature, *duḥkha, samudaya, dharma, anvaya, kṣaya, anutpāda,* and *saṁvṛtijñānas.*

When it has the Path for its object, it is *mārga, dharma, anvaya, kṣaya, anutpāda, paracitta,* and *saṁvṛtijñānas.*

224. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 904a25: Three opinions. First opinion: it is of Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna; second opinion: it is of Kāmadhātu and the Four Dhyānas; third opinion: it is of Kāmadhātu and Anāgamya, Dhyānāntara and the Four Dhyānas. P'u-kuang observes that the first opinion supposes that *nāman* is bound to the voice, and that the other two opinions suppose that *nāman* is bound to the body. Fa-pao does not agree.

225. The Sūtra says: *vitarkya vicārya vācaṁ bhāṣate* (ii.33, p. 203).

226. The word *ādi* includes *kāla, kāraka,* etc.

227. According to Paramārtha: "*Pratibhāna* is to speak victorious words of demonstration and refutation"; according to Hsüan-tsang: "A flow of words without a dike."

228. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 76.12.

229. Paramārtha: "But, according to other masters . . . " Hsüan-tsang: "In fact, only the study . . . "

230. *Kiṁ cit tadvyatiriktaṁ kevalaṁ prāntakoṭikam iti:* "There is a *prāntakoṭika,* distinct from the preceding ones, called simply *prāntakoṭika.*" According to the gloss of Saeki, this refers to the *prāntakoṭika* upon which the Saint supports himself in order to reject his life . . . (See *Kośa,* ii.10a, trans. p. 168; vi.59, note 389).

231. For the Sarvāstivādins, only the Fourth Dhyāna can be *prāntikoṭika;* according to Sthiramati (*Tsa-Chi,* 9.9), all Four Dhyānas and all four *ārūpyas* are *prāntakoṭika. Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 895c6.

232. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 67.5 and Dharmaśarīra.

233. Hsüan-tsang adds: "*Prānta* signifies 'not passing beyond'; this absorption is called *prānta* because another cannot pass beyond it." Hsüan-tsang translates *prāntakoṭi* = *pien-chi* 邊際 (limit-end), Paramārtha, *yuan-chi* 遠際 (distant-end).

Compare *Yogasūtra,* ii.27, *prāntabhūmi.*

234. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 94.2, *bhūtakoṭi, shih-chi* 實際, *chen shih chi* 眞實際, *yan day par mtha'* (which appears to signify "the true limit"). Burnouf, *Lotus,* 309, observes that *bhūtakoṭi* is not the equivalent of Bhavāgra, "the highest stage of existence," since, in the *Lankavatar, bhūtakoti* signifies *śūnyatā* or emptiness.

The gloss of Kyokuga Saeki, "*bhūta* = all the *dharmas*" appears to be very good. The *Madhyamakāvatara* (Tibetan trans. p. 344) says clearly that *nirodhasamāpatti* = *bhūtakoṭisamāpatti.* (It belongs to the Bodhisattva stage of Dūraṁgamā). The ascetic who

has attained Bhavāgra can penetrate into *nirodhasamāpatti* (ii.44d. p. 229), which is "the true end," "the absolute end of existence."

The use of *bhūtakoṭi* in Mahāyāna writings does not interest us here; let us mention however *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* ix.2.38, *Śikṣāsamuccaya,* 257, *Madhyāntavibhāga,* i.15; Commentary on the *Nāmasaṁgīti,* vi.6: *aviparyāsārthena bhūtakoṭiḥ; Madhyamakāvatara.* 340.

235. vi. trans. p. 1012.

236. At the moment when he becomes a Buddha by becoming an Arhat, by detaching himself from Bhavāgra, ii. p. 227.

237. If the Tīrthikas possess the five *abhijñās,* yes, according to the Haimavatas, Sarvāstivādins, and Vātsīputrīyas; no, according to the Mahīśāsakas, and Dharmaguptakas (according to Vasumitra and Bhavya).

Pūrṇa, who is only a *prajñāvimukta* (and not a *ubhayatobhāgavimukta,* vi.64a), is not able to exercise supernormal powers (*ṛddhi*) "in common with the Tīrthikas"; but he quickly obtains the six *abhijñās* (*Divya,* 44).

238. By reading *upapad* for *upapāda* (?).

The bibliography on the *abhijñās* is infinite. *Majjhima,* i.34, ii.238, *Dīgha,* i.8, iii.110; *Aṅguttara,* iii.245; *Visuddhimagga,* 202, 373, 406; *Compendium,* 209 and above all the *Introduction,* p. 61 and following; *Mahāvyutpatti,* 14, *Dharmasaṁgraha,* 20; *Daśabhumi,* iii. (trans. *Madhyamakāvatara,* p. 57, *Muséon* 1907); *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* vii.1.9; *Śikṣāsamuccaya,* 243, *Bodhicarya,* ix.41.

Abhijñā, compare *ohiñāṇa* in Hoernle, *Uvāsaga,* trans. p. 48.

For the primitive sense of the word, see Burnouf, *Lotus,* 820; Kern, *Lotus,* 131; Rhys Davids, *Milinda,* ii.231, *Dialogues,* i.62, 157; Windisch, *Geburt,* 9.62. *Abhi-jñā* is spoken of with reference to a knowledge of the Truths, vi.54c, 66, ix. (Hsüan-tsang xxix.14b), etc.

239. On *ṛddhi,* iv.117d ("an ornament of the mind"). vi.69 (*ṛddhipāda*), vii.47 (*ṛddhiprātihārya*), 48 (*gamana* and *nirmāṇa*), 53 different types of *ṛddhi;* viii.35b (*āryā ṛddhi*).

a. We have: *ṛddhiḥ samādhiḥ/ ṛddhiviṣayo nirmāṇaṁ gamanaṁ ca/ ṛddhiviṣaye jñānaṁ tasya sākṣātkriyā saṁmukhībhāvah* (*Vyākhyā*).

For the definition *ṛddhi = samādhi,* vi.69, p. 1024, vii. 48a; *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* ii.205-206.

Mahāvyutpatti: ṛddhividhijñāna; Pāḷi: *iddhividhā, iddhippabheda; prabheda* can be understood as in *prajñāprabheda,* viii.27c.

The Pāḷi sources occasionally includes *ṛddhi* in the category of the "knowledges"; *yamakapāṭihire ñāṇa* is the knowledge having the miracle of the water and the fire for its object; *iddhividhe ñāṇa* (*Paṭisambhidāmagga,* ii.125, i.111); *pañcābhiññāñaṇa* and *aṭṭhasamāpattiñāṇa* (*Mahāniddesa,* 106).

b. The Sūtra of the *Ṛddhyabhijñā* is quoted in the *Vyākhyā,* vi. 69; it presents some variants to the Pāḷi edition (*Dīgha,* i.77, *Majjhima,* i. 34, *Aṅguttara,* ii.280; commentaries in *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* ii.207, *Visuddhimagga,* 373-406), and also to the text of the *Mahāvyutapatti,* 15 (according to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*): *anekavidham ṛddhiviṣayaṁ pratyanubhavati/ eko bhūtvā bahudhā bhavati/ bahudhā bhūtvā eko bhavati/ āvirbhavati tirobhāvam apy anubhavati/ tiraḥ kuḍyaṁ tiraḥ prākāraṁ [tiraḥ parvatam] asajjamānah kāye (?) gacchati tadyathākāśe/ pṛthivyām unmajjananimajjanaṁ karoti tadyathodake/ udake'bhidyamānena srotasā gacchati tadyathā pṛthivyām/ākāśe paryaṅkeṇa kramati tadyathā śakuniḥ pakṣī/ imau vā punaḥ sūryacandramasāv evaṁ maharddhikāv evaṁ mahānubhāvan pāṇinā āmārṣti parimārṣti yāvad brahmalokaṁ kāyena vaśe vartayata* (see note 293) *itīyam ucyata ṛddhiḥ.*

Pāḷi edition: . . . *sa evaṁ samāhite citte ānejjappatte iddhividhāya cittam abhinīharati abhininnāmeti/ so anekavihitaṁ iddhividhaṁ paccanubhoti/ eko pi hutvā . . . Anekavihitam*

iddhividham corresponds to *anekavidham ṛddhivisayam.* Yaśomitra explains *ṛddhiviṣaya* as "the operation of magical power, the object of the consciousness which realizes the miracle" and employs the expression *ṛddhiviṣaye jñānam* as in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* i.111: *iddhividhe ñāṇam.* Rhys Davids-Stede mention *Vinaya,* iii.67 (*Pārājikā,* ii.47): "There is no sin in this magical operation(*iddhivisaye*) for those who possess *iddhi,*" and *Nettippakaraṇa,* 23: " . . . impossible to resist at death, if not through the operation of magic (*aññatra iddhivisayā*)." [The version "extent of psychic power" is not admissible].

Pratyanubhaviati-paccanubhoti, Lotus, 838 (on *Divya,* 204); we have *ṛddyānubhava* in *Avadānaśataka* ii.129 (=*ṛddhi*); *ānubhāva* = "supernatural power" (Childers).

c. According to *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (ii.207), the miracles of the Sūtra of the *Ṛddhyabhijñā* (above b) are one of the ten *iddhis, adhiṭṭhāna iddhi* [The same *Compendium*]. See *Kośa,* vii.52a; on different manifestations of *ṛddhi,* vii.38 and following.

Prabhāva is not to be confused with *ṛddhi* (above page 81). Occasionally we have *ṛddhiprabhāva* as *ṛddhisaṁpad, ṛddhivaśitā,* or *ṛddhyaiśvarya.*

240. The Sūtra continues with a description of *divyacakṣus* and *pūrvanivāsānusmṛti.*

241. The fifth *abhijñā* in the Sūtra.

iha bhikṣuḥ parasattvānāṁ parapudgalānāṁ vitarkitaṁ vicaritaṁ manasā mānasaṁ yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti/ sarāgaṁ cittaṁ sarāgamiti yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti/vigatarāgaṁ . . . sadveṣam . . . vigatadveṣaṁ . . . samohaṁ . . . vigatamohaṁ . . . vikṣiptaṁ . . . saṁkṣiptaṁ . . . līnaṁ . . . pragṛhītaṁ . . . uddhataṁ. . . anuddhataṁ . . . avyupaśāntaṁ. . . vyupaśāntaṁ . . . samāhitaṁ. . . asamāhitaṁ. . . abhāvitaṁ . . . bhāvitaṁ . . avimuktaṁ . . . vimuktaṁ cittaṁ vimuktaṁ iti yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti/ iyam ucyate cetaḥparyāyajñānasākṣātkriyābhijñāa. Above page 1099 and following.

Explanation of the expression *cetaḥparyāya: cetaḥparyāyo viśeṣo raktaṁ dviṣṭaṁ mūḍham iti vā/ karmo va paryāyaḥ kadā cid raktaṁ kadā cid dviṣṭaṁ mūḍham vā.*

Another name of this *abhijñā* is *paracittajñāna,* see above page 1098.

242. Abhijñās four, five, and six are the three "knowledges" acquired by the Bodhisattva on the night of Bodhi; on the three knowledges, see vi.45.c.

243. *Vyākhyā: iha bhikṣur anekavidhaṁ pūrvanivāsaṁ samanusmarati iti bahuḥ sūtravad grantho yāvad iyam ucyate pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñānasākṣāt kārābhijñā.*

Below (*ad* vii.43.d): . . . *amī nāma te sattvā yatrāham abhūvam evaṁnāmā evaṁgotra evaṁjātir evaṁsukhaduḥkhapratisaṁvedī evaṁcirasthitika evamāyuḥparyantaḥ/ so'ham tasmāc cyuto'nutropapannaḥ/ tasmād api cyuto'mutropapannaḥ/ tasmāc cyuta ihopapanna iti sākāraṁ soddeśam [sanidānam] anekavidhaṁ pūrve nivāsam anusmaratītīyam* . . . (Variants in the Pāḷi edition).

Commentary in the *Samantapāsādikā,* i.158.

This *abhijñā* is not to be confused with *jātismaratā* which is one of the "natural powers" of the Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, vii.55, iv.109, notes 493 and 494 (the limits of the consciousness of the past).

244. This is the third *abhijñā* in the Sūtra. It has two names: Hsüan-tsang calls it *divyacakṣus,* Paramārtha, *cyutyupapādajñāna. Mahāvyutpatti* has *cyutyupapatti,* the *Sūtrālaṁkāra, cyutopapāda.*

Kośa, viii.27c, *Suttanipāta,* 1112, 1136, *Saṁyutta,* iii.213.

245. See *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* i.115, the explanation of *āsavakkhaya* as a function of the three pure *indriyas* (*Kośa,* ii.4) and of the results (Srotāpaanna, etc.) [Curious description of *bhavāsava*].

246. See page 1164 line 5.

247. According to *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 728a28, reproduced almost literally in the *Bhāṣya.*

248. *Vyākhyā:* In the same way that the results of the religious life (vi.51), as conditioned *dharmas,* are by nature *vimuktimārga.* See Below note 257, note 270.

249. Saṁghabhadra: According to the Westerners, six *jñānas:* for example *dharma, anvaya, duḥkha, samudaya* and *mārgajñānas,* and knowing *saṁvṛta* things of the past.

250. What is under consideration here is the consciousness of the mind of another, which is pure (four of the five *jñānas* enumerated, with the exception of *saṁvṛtijñāna*) and impure (*saṁvṛtijñāna* and *paracittajñāna*).

251. See vii.28c.

252. According to the *Compendium,* 61, the fifth *dhyāna* is *adhiṭṭhānapādakajhāna,* that is to say the *dhyāna* which serves as the support for the process of volitions which creates the manifestation of the *abhijñā.* But *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* ii.205 considers the Four Dhyānas the four *bhūmis* of *ṛddhi.*

253. Same doctrine in *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* i.113: "Such *rūpa* has its origin in *saumanasyendriya . . .* "

254. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 518c25: Does the preparatory exercise (*prayoga*) take place through a memory of "moments" (*kṣaṇa*) or of sucessive "states" (*avasthā*)? Evidently by a memory of states, not of moments. If the ascetic proceeds by reviewing moment to moment, death would come before he had reviewed one half of his life. How does one complete the *prayoga* exercise? . . . P'u-kuang: There are three explanations; the second is the best, because the word "to complete" (in "to complete the *prayoga* exercises") should not be understood in a narrow sense (*fei pi chü* 非必局, Couvreur, 1904, p. 244).

255. According to the Sūtra quoted above: . . . *sākāraṁ soddeśam* . . . (above note 243).

256. According to Paramārtha; Hsüan-tsang: "he no longer considers *svacittarūpa.*"

257. According to Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang: " . . . and up to his remembering the moment before *antarābhava.* [Gloss of the Japanese editor: "that is to say, the last thought of his former existence"]. Then the *prayoga* or preparatory exercise of *pūrvanivāsa [anusmṛti]* is achieved." *Prayoga* is *ānantaryamārga; abhijñā* is *vimuktimārga.*

258. *Vyākhyā: parasaṁtatyadhiṣṭhānenotpādanam iti/ dhyānasaṁgṛhītaṁ pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñānam/ tena cārūpyāvacaraṁ cit cittaṁ na gṛhṇātīti/ kathaṁ ca punaḥ parasaṁtatyadhiṣṭhānenotpādanam/ samanantaraniruddhān manovijñānāt parakīyān nimittam udgṛhyeti vistaraḥ* (see page 1159 line 25)/ *anyeṣām iti ya ārūpyebhyo na pracyutās teṣām svasaṁtatyadhiṣṭhānenaivotpādanaṁ pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñānasya sukaratvāt.*

259. The discipline by which the ascetic obtains divine sight (or *jñānadarśana*) is defined in *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* i.114. One should cultivate *alokasañña* day and night (*Dīgha,* iii.223). How the ascetic produces trembling of the earth, *Dīgha,* ii.108. "Lightness," i.10d, 12c.

260. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Furthermore, in the Ārūpyas, *vipaśyanā* is deficient, *śamatha* is in excess: now the five *abhijñās* should be in a sphere where *vipaśyanā* and *śamatha* are in equilibrium. By this very fact, Anāgamya, etc., are also out of the question."

261. Quoted in *Vyākhyā ad* vii.36.

262. According to Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang is briefer, and places a note here on the extension of the power of the *abhijñā* of different saints, a note which Vasubandhu places above, page 1177.

263. Paramārtha: the *abhijñā* of the mind of another is included in three *smṛtyupasthānas.*

264. Paramārtha: *ṛddhi,* ear and eye are the first [*smṛtyupasthāna*].

265. See vii.49.

266. Compare *Majjhima,* i.22, *Saṁyutta,* ii.214.

267. There is another knowledge, *abhijñāparivārajñāna.*

268. Hsüan-tsang's version of the *Kārikā* has: "The other [*abhijñās*] are four [*smṛtyuupasthānas*]," and the Bhāṣya: "The other *abhijñās* are included in the four *smṛtyupasthānas,* because they have the five *skandhas* for their object."

269. See vii.25d, page 1133.

270. All acquisition includes two paths, the path which removes the obstacle, and the path of deliverance. We have seen that the *abhijñās* are "*prajñā* of the path of deliverance" (vii.42d). According to the opinion presented here an ascetic depends on any of the Dhyānas for everything that is necessary for the obtaining of the *abhijñā* of divine sight; but the obtaining itself is of the First Dhyāna.

271. These are the three knowledges of *Majjhima,* i.22, 246 (acquired in the three watches of the night of Bodhi); see viii.27c; *Aṅguttara,* vi.211, *Dīgha,* iii.220, 275.

272. Compare iii.25, 31. In certain sources, we have a list of eight *vijjās* among which are six *abhiññas, Childers, 571, Visuddhimagga,*202.

The *Vyākhyā* quoted the Sūtra: *tripiṭo bhavati trividya iti.* Compare *tevijja, tevijjaka.*

273. Bhagavadviśeṣa and others explain the formula "in order," *yathākramam,* as follows: One destroys error relative to the past by the remembrance of former existences; error relative to the present by the consciousness of death and rebirth; and error relative to the future through the consciousness of the destruction of the *āsravas* (for one says *nāparam asmād bhavaṁ prajānāmi*). In fact, the order of the time periods is past, present, and future.

But Saṁghabhadra (in his *Nyāyānusāra, TD,* p. 754a14) explains: Remembrance of former existences puts an end to error relative to the past; the consciousness of death and rebirth puts an end to error relative to the future; and the consciousness of the destruction of the *āsravas* puts an end to error relative to the present. This is why these three *abhijñās* are *vidyās.* By the first, one sees the suffering of self and others; by the second, the suffering of others, and one experiences *saṁvega* or disgust; thus disgusted, one produces the third, and one sees the happiness of Nirvāṇa. This is why these three *abhijñās* are *vidyā.*

Yaśomitra shows that the thought of Vasubandhu is correctly interpreted by Saṁghabhadra.

274. Paramārtha: "Two have the same name, having arisen in its series."

275. Paramārtha: "In the Śaikṣa, they are not called *vidyā* because the series is accompanied by *avidyā.*" Hsüan-tsang has only one *pāda:* "In the Śaikṣa, there is obscurity, not *vidyā.*"

In *Saṁyutta,* ii.58, the ascetic in possession of purified *dhamma-ñāṇa* and *anvaya-ñāṇa* is called a *diṭṭhisaṁpanna,* and *sekha ñāṇa* and *sekhā vijjā* are attributed to him.

276. According to Paramārtha.

According to Hsüan-tsang, "There is error-obscurity in the Śaikṣa. Thus, even though the first two *abhijñās* exist in him, they are not called *vidyā,* and even though, for a certain time, they conquer and destroy obscurity, they are again obscure: therefore they are not called *vidyā.*"

277. We have *pāṭihāriya, pāṭihārika, pāṭihera,* and *pāṭihīra,* Senart *Kacchāyana,* 536; Childers, 361; Kern, *Manual* 60; Geiger, *Pāḷi Grammar* 51.

Pāṭihīra = a miracle; *yamakapāṭihīra* in *Paṭisambbhidāmagga,* ii.125.

Milinda 309, miracles produced on the tomb of one who has attained Nirvāṇa through their former *adhiṭṭhāna* (see *Kośa,* vii.51), by the *adhiṭṭhāna* of the gods or of believers.

Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate *tao* 導 ; in *Mahāyutpatti, pien-hua* 變化 to change-convert, *shen-pien* 神變 *ṛddhi*-change.

278. *Dīgha,* i.193, 212, iii.220, *Aṅguttara,* i.170 (belonging to numerous Bhikṣus), v.327; *Mahāvastu,* iii.116; Burnouf, *Lotus,* 310, *Divya,* xii, the *Prāṭihāryasūtra.*

The *prāṭihāryas* are means (*upāya*) of seduction (*āvarjana*), *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* i.6.

279. This phrase is not in Paramārtha. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 146.7, *pratihatacitta.*

280. Hsüan-tsang: "These three *abhijñās,* in this order, cause one to take refuge in the Buddhadharma, to believe in it, and to cultivate it (in the sense of *adhigama*)."

281. *Ṛddhiprātihārya* is inferior because one can produce *ṛddhi* by formulas: Vasubandhu here records an old opinion, *Dīgha,*i.213 (below note 283). [But the Buddha cultivates *iddhipāṭihariya, Dīgha,* iii.9, and elsewhere]. We should mention *Culla,* v.8.2 (the story of Piṇḍola): one who manifests his *uttarimanussadhamma iddhipāṭihāriya* to householders is guilty of a *dukkaṭa* [or better: "he who manifests his magical powers"] [See the remarks of Rhys Davids on the period of the usage of the term *dukkaṭa, Dialogues,* iii.3]; compare *Divya,* 275, and Przyluski, *Açoka,* 80.

Dīgha, iii.112, says that *iddhi* which is "holy, free from *āsava* and from *upadhi*" is equanimity (*upekkhā*), and that the *iddhi* of miracles (*eko pi hutvā,* etc.) is *iddhi* which is "not holy (*na ariyā*), possessing *āsava* and *upadhi.*" See viii.35b.

Aṅguttara opposes *dhamma-iddhi* and *āmisa-iddhi* (i.93); Devadatta only obtained *puthujjanikā iddhi* (*Culla* vii.1.5. and commentary to *Dhammapada* 17).

The *anusāsanavidhās* of *Dīgha,* iii.107, have nothing in common with *anuśāsanī.*

282. Paramārtha translates *vidyāsthāna;* Hsüan-tsang has the expression that Eitel translates "magic incantation" in the words of the *Atharva Veda.*

The four *ādesanavidhās, Dīgha,* iii.103.

283. See *Divya,* p. 636 at the bottom.

Dīgha, i.213: *atthi kho bho gandhārī nāma vijjā/ tāya so bhikkhu anekavihitam iddhividhaṁ paccanubhoti/ eko pi hutvā . . . / imaṁ kho aham iddhipāṭihāriye ādīnavaṁ sampassamāno iddhipāṭihāriyena . . .jigucchāmi . . .*

[*Dialogues,* i.278: in *Jātaka,* iv.498, this *vijjā* is a charm for making one invisible].

Gāndhārī-Gāndhārī is a *vidyādevī* (Hemacandra).

It is by the *Gṣndhṣramantra* that the hero of Ralstom-Schiefner, *Tibetan Tales,* p. 288 (Kanjur iv.171) obtains the fruits of the mountain Gandhamādana.

284. Hsüan-tsang, *īkḍaṇi;* Paramārtha, *īkḍaṇikṣ.* Below vii.56b. *Bodhicaryṣvatṣra,* ix.25; *Saṁyutta,* ii.260, *itthi ikkhanikṣ.*

atthi maṇiko (maṇikā) nāma vijjā/ tṣya . . . parasattānam . . . cittaṁ pi ādisati cetasikaṁ pi ādisati . . . /. . . jigucchāmi/ katamaṁ ca kevaddha anusāsanīpāṭihāriyam . . .

[*Dialogues,* i. 278, Buddhaghosa identifies the "jewel charm" with *cintāmaṇī vijjā;* Rhys Davids refers to *Jātaka,* iii.504, *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī,* 265, 267, 271.]

285. Hsüan-tsang: "*Anuśāsanīprātihārya* can only be realized through *āsravakṣayābhijñā,* thus it is *avyabhicārin.*" According to the editor, we should understand: "thus it necessarily has the results of salvation and happiness."

286. See above note 239.

The ten types of *iddhi,* of which the last three interest us here (*adhiṭṭhāniddhi, vimubbaniddhi, manomayiddhi*), are defined in the Introduction to the *Compendium, p. 60 (Paṭisambhidāmagga,* ii.205, *Atthasālinī,* 91, *Visuddhi,* 202, 373, 766). Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Psychology,* 199.

For the limits of the power of *iddhi,* see *Kathāvatthu,* xxi.4.

Bodhisattvabh*ūmi,* i.5 (*Muséon,* 1911, p. 156-164).

287. Paramārtha: *atra ākāśagamanam nirmitam.* Hsüan-tsang: "The *viṣaya* is twofold, *gamana* and *nirmita.*"

Saṁyutta, v.282, is interesting.

288. "Displacement of *adhimokṣa,*" originating from *adhimokṣa, ādhimokṣika.*"

"Rapid displacement like the mind." We have, in *Divya,* 52-53, the narration of the journey of the Buddha and Maudgalyāyana through the Marīcika universe. They go by means of Maudgalyāyana's *ṛddhi,* by using Sumeru as a spring-board: the journey takes seven days; but they return instantly through the *ṛddhi* of the Buddha: "What is the name of this *ṛddhi? Manojavā.*" *Ibid,* p. 636 at the bottom, a *manojavā vidyā.* Rhys Davids-Stede mentions *manojavā* as an epithet of horses, *Vimānavatthu.*

289. See above page 1146-7.

290. Compare *Aṅguttara,* ii.80, *Divya,* 53.

291. *Pakkhī sakuno.* See the explanations of *Visuddhi,* p. 396.

292. *Pṛthagjanas* possess this first *gamana* (Hsüan-tsang).

293. The *Paṭisambhidā* quoted in *Visuddhi,* 401: . . . *brahmalokaṁ gantukāmo . . . dūre pi santike adhiṭṭhāti santike hotū ti santike hoti:* Desiring to go to Brahmaloka, he creates *adhiṭṭhāna* that this may be near or far: "May this be near!" and this becomes near. [This is the explanation of the Sūtra *kāyena vasaṁ vatteti,* above note 239b.

294. Four *āyatanas,* not sound; see page 1173 and vii.51b.

295. *Bāhya,* external, in the sense of *anupātta,* not constituting a sense organ in the service of the mind, *Kośa,* i.34c.

296. As we have seen i.30b-d.

297. Compare the definitions of the three magical *iddhis* in *Compendium,* Introduction, p. 61 and *Visuddhi,* 405.

298. That is to say, a mind of the sphere of Kāmadhātu through which one creates *rūpa* of Kāmadhātu, and a mind of the sphere of the First Dhyāna through which one creates *rūpa* of the First Dhyāna. vii.51a-b.

299. Paramārtha: "Not higher"; *Bhāṣya:* "The mind that is capable of creating fictive beings of a higher sphere is not the result of a mind of a lower *dhyāna.*" Hsüan-tsang does not translate this *pāda* in the *Kārikā,* but in the *Bhāṣya:* "[The mind that is capable of creating fictive beings] does not depend on a lower sphere."

300. A fictive being created in Kāmadhātu by a mind capable of creating fictive bengs of the Second Dhyāna, even though it is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, can appear in the heaven of the Second Dhyāna. A fictive being created in the heaven of the First Dhyāna by a mind capable of creating fictive beings of the First Dhyāna does not have access to the heaven of the Second Dhyāna.

301. One obtains the *dhyānas* through detachment (*vairāgya*). By becoming detached from Kāmadhātu one obtains the First Dhyāna. At the same time, one "takes possession" of the minds capable of creating fictive beings which can exist in this *dhyāna.*

302. Is there a falling away (*vyutthāna*) from contemplation at the end of *nirmāṇacitta*? No. 50c-d. It proceeds from pure *dhyāna* and from itself; it is followed by the two. After *śuddhaka dhyāna* there succeeds an *abhijñā* of fictive creation. After this *abhijñā* of fictive creation there succeeds *nirmāṇacitta,* the result of this *abhijñā.* After this *nirmāṇacitta* there succeeds innumerable *nirmāṇacittas,* which do not arise from another *citta.* Finally after the last *nirmāṇacitta* there succeeds an *abhijñā* of fictive creation. After this there succeeds a

śuddhaka dhyāna or a *nirmāṇacitta*. How is this? If the person who is in the *samādhiphala* (*samādhiphalasthitasya* = *nirmāṇacittasthitasya*) does not return to the *mūladhyāna*, there will be no falling away (*vyutthāna*) from the *samādhiphala*.

303. Quoted in *Vyākhyā*, ii.71b.

304. This stanza is commented on in *Vyākhyā*, i. p. 27 (Petrograd 1918). See *Divya*, 166, closely related to the *Kośa*: *yaṁ khalu śrāvako nirmitam abhinirmimīte yadi śrāvako bhāṣate nirmito'pi bhāṣate/ śrāvake tūṣṇībhūte nirmito'pi tūṣṇībhavati/ ekasya bhāṣamāṇasya sarve bhāṣanti nirmitāḥ/ ekasya tūṣṇībhūtasya sarve tūṣṇībhavanti te// bhagavān nirmitaṁ praśnaṁ pṛcchati bhagavān vyākaroti* (Read rather: *bhagavantaṁ nirmitaḥ praśnaṁ pṛcchati/ bhagavān vyākaroti/ nirmitaṁ bhagavān praśnaṁ pṛcchati/ nirmito vyākaroti*). Compare *Dīgha*, ii.212. *Madhyamaka*, xvii.31-32.
On the *nirmitas*, *Kāraṇaprajñapti*, xi. *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 45.

305. a. We encounter many times *adhiṣṭhāna*, *adhitiṣṭhati*, in the sense of "making last" (*ādhiṣṭhānikī ṛddhi*, iii.9; below note 306; ii. page 165, *āyuḥsaṁskārān adhitiṣṭhati (stapayati)* = *adhiṣṭhānavaśitā;* vii. p. *adhiṣṭhānaprabhāva*.
b. Numerous uses in a little or non-technical sense, for example *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ii.45: "The preacher is *adhiṣṭhita* (=*ātmasātkṛta* by the messengers of Yama"; *Mahāvastu*, iii.376; *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 314: "Beings who do not understand the speech of the Bodhisattvas are possessed (*adhiṣṭhita*) by Māra." *Śikṣāsamuccaya* 356: "All good actions are presided over (*adhiṣṭhita*) by diligence"; *ibid.* 285: "The Bodhisattva makes his dispositions (*āśaya*) well guarded, purified, taken in hand (*svadhiṣṭhita*)"; *Saṁyutta*, v.278: *suggahīta svadhiṭṭhita; Saṁyutta*, iii.10, 135 (*adhiṭṭhānābhiniveśa* of the defilements in the mind).
c. *Adhitiṣṭhati* = "To exercise a certain action on a thing, a person, oneself, by means of *adhimokṣa*, 'volition, will,' applied to this thing, etc."
This general sense is specialized, in the *Kośa*, into the sense of "making last"; [in the vocabulary of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, ii.207, it refers to the miracles of multiplication, etc.; ii.207; see also *Atthasālinī*, trans. p. 121 and *Compendium*]. But it is through *rūpādhiṣṭhānabala* (*Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 330.11) that flowers place themselves around the head of Dīpaṁkara (*Divya*, 251.1); the Buddhas convert through *adhiṣṭhāna* (= *ānubhāva*), *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, i.5.
d. Burnouf translates "benediction" from *byin kyi rlabs*. It is, he says, through the benediction of a Thera that a person travels in the *Thūpavaṁsa;* it is through a benediction of the Buddhas that the Bodhisattvas form vows to become Buddhas. (See the two *abhiṣṭhānas*, of which the second is a consecration, *abhiṣeka*, of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, Nanjo, p. 100). The eighth *bhūmi* is the *adhiṣṭhānabhūmi* (a great variety of Chinese equivalents): this *bhūmi* is so called because it cannot be shaken (*parāvikopanatvāt*).
e. Compare *Gītā*, iv.6: *prakṛtiṁ svaṁ adhiṣṭhāya saṁbhavāmy ātmamāyayā*, and *Lotus*, xv.3: *ātmānam adhiṣṭhahāmi sarvāṁś ca sattvān . . . nirvāṇabhūmiṁ cupadarśayāmi . . . na cāpi nirvāmy ahu tasmi kāle.*

306. *Divya*, 61. *maitreyaḥ . . . kāśyapasya bhikṣor avikopitam asthisamghātaṁ dakṣiṇena pāṇinā gṛhītvā* . . . On all the legends relative to Kāśyapa, Przyluski, *J.As* 1914, ii.524, and *Açoka*, 169, 331; *Fa-hien* (=Fa-hsien), chap. xxxiii.
Kośa iii.9d examines why the Bodhisattva is born from a womb, and not through an apparitional birth. It is with an end to being able to leave his relics, for the bodies of apparitional beings disappear at their death. This explanation is given by the masters who deny the *ādhiṣṭhānikī ṛddhi* of the Bhagavat.

307. Dreams provoked by the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the gods, *Vinītadeva ad Nyāyabindu*, p. 47 (Tibetan translation in *Bibl. Indica*).

308. Commentary in *Aṅguttara*, i.209.

309. *Manaāyatana* and *dharmāyatana* are not capable of being created, because the fictive being (*nirmita*) is devoid of mind, as results from the *Śāstra: nirmitaḥ acintiko vaktavyaḥ / . . . nirmātuś cittavaśena vartate* (*Vyākhyā*). This *Śāstra* is the *Kāraṇaprajñāptiśāstra,* analyzed in *Cosmologie bouddhique,* p. 340-341.

310. See i.10b. It has been said above, page 1169, that "creation" consists of external *āyatanas.*

311. Hsüan-tsang puts *Kārikā* 54 before *Kārikā* 53c-d.

312. The *ṛddhi* that certain beings possess because they belong to a certain category of beings.

Examples of innate *ṛddhi, Mahāvagga,* i.15.2, vi.15.8, *Culla* vii.1.4; 2.1. The four *iddhis* (beauty, long life, absence of sickness and good digestion, popularity) of the king of the *Mahāsudassanasutta* have something of the supernatural about them; but when Ajātasattu promises to destroy the Vajjyas, however great their *iddhi* may be, however great their *ānubhāva* may be (*Mahāparinibbāna*), the sense of these expressions remains doubtful. His minister Vassakara is without doubt a good magician.

313. *Ṛddhi* produced by "magic," through the power of formulas or herbs.

314. For example, the *ṛddhi* that certain persons possess from birth, such as Māndhātār, not because they are humans, but by reason of certain actions; differing thus from innate *ṛddhi* (see below note 328).

315. These persons possess eyes and ears "arisen from karma."

316. Hsüan-tsang: What do the expressions "divine sight," "divine hearing" designate? If they refer to *prajñā,* consciousness, the expression "eye", "ear" is improper. If they refer to the material organs (*rūpīndriya*), how are the organs Abhijñās? The *Kārikā* says: "Divine sight and divine hearing are of pure *rūpa* . . . "

317. "Pure *rūpa*" is *rūpaprasāda, Kośa,* i.9c; the organs are *bhautika,* "derived matter," i. trans. p. 100.

Compare *Kathāvatthu,* iii.7-8.

318. In opposition to divine sight which is innate in the gods.

The divine sight of the gods is defiled by eleven *apakṣālas,* iii.14a; see vii.55d.

319. According to Hsüan-tsang: "Divine sight sees without omission." It sees in all directions, before, behind (*pṛṣṭhatas*), on the side (*pārśvatas*), during the day, during the night, in light, in darkness (see i. p. 90).

320. In the version of Hsüan-tsang, *Kārikā* 55a-b is placed after *Kārikā* 43. And the *Bhāṣya* is modified: "In respect to the activity of the Five Abhijñās, extended or narrow, in the universes (*lokadhātu*) which are their domain, all the Āryans are not similar. The Śrāvakas, the Pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhas, when they do not make an extreme act of attention, produce the activity of their mastery in movement (*gamana*) and in creation (*nirmāṇa*), the first in a *mahāsāhasra* universe, the second in a *dvisāhasra* universe, and the third in a *trisāhasra* universe. When they make an extreme act of attention, in a *dvisāhasra* universe, in a *trisāhasra* universe, and in infinite universes."

321. Quoted in a comentary to the *Nāmasaṁgīti* (*ad* vi.18, *asaṅgadṛk*).

322. On the chiliocosms, see iii.73.

323. The gods of Kāmadhātu and the Anāgāmins in Rūpadhātu possess, by the fact of their births, these four powers. These powers are absent in Ārūpyadhātu.

324. This is explained iii.14a; above note 318.

325. The treatise of the *īkṣaṇikas* (*Manu*, ix.258, etc.). Above note 284.

326. *Atthasālinī*, 91.

327. The five powers (*ṛddhyādika*) are, for humans, either *vairāgyalābhika* (= *abhijñāphala*) or *tarkavidyauṣadhakarmakṛta*, not *upapattilābhika*.

328. *Upapattilābhikaṁ hi nāma yad upapattikāla eva sarveṣāṁ nisargato labhyate/ na tu yat kasya cid evopapattikālād ūrdhvam/ yathā pakṣiṇām ākāśagamanam.*

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Absorptions

Oṁ. Homage to the Buddha.

We have studied the qualities (*guṇa*) of the knowledges (the *praṇidhijñānas,* the *abhijñās,* etc.). Let us now study the natures of the Dhyānas, etc. We shall speak first of their supports (*aśraya*), that is, the mental states in which these qualities are produced.

1a. The Dhyānas are twofold; (the Dhyānas are four in number; the Dhyānas as existence have been defined. The concentrations are the applications of pure minds on a single object; with their concomitants, they are the five *skandhas.*)[1]

(We shall first study the Dhyānas, since they are,—with the exception of the Ārūpyas or "non-material concentrations",—the support of all qualities, either common or specific, pure or impure.)

Each of these Dhyānas is of two types: *samāpatti,* absorption or concentration, and *upapatti* or existence.[2]

1b. The Dhyānas are four in number.

There are four Dhyānas, the First to the Fourth.

1c. The Dhyānas as existence have been defined.

The Dhyānas as existence have been defined in the Third Chapter of this book. How are they defined? It says, "The first Three are threefold and the Fourth is eightfold."[3] (iii.2)

> ld. Concentration is the application of a pure mind on a single object;

In general, Dhyāna as absorption is defined as an application of a pure mind on a single object,[4] for the Dhyānas have *samādhi* or concentration (ii, p. 190) for their nature.

> le. With their concomitents, they are the five *skandhas.*

If one consideres *samādhi* with its following, Dhyāna as absorption has the five *skandhas* for its nature.[5]

***

What is "application on a single object"?

The fact that minds have a single object.[6] [The Sautrāntikas object]: If this is the case, then what is designated by the word *samādhi* are the minds themselves which have a single object. There is no reason to admit the existence of a separate thing, a certain mental *dharma,* as *samādhi.*[7]

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] What is called *samādhi* is a certain *dharma* by which the minds are concentrated, applied on a single object. The concentrated minds are not *samādhi.*[8]

Here many difficulties present themselves:

1. Since minds are momentary, each of them has a single object. What then is the role of *samādhi?*

2. *Samādhi* causes the second mind to not be distracted or

turned aside from the object of the first mind. But if this is the case, then the *samādhi* does not exercise any action with regard to the first mind which you consider as associated with *samādhi.*

3. Why imagine *samādhi* in and of itself? Why not admit that the minds are applied to a single object by reason of the causes that you assign to *samādhi?*

4. Finally, you have defined *samādhi* as a universal *dharma* (*mahābhūmika,* ii.24): hence all minds should possess the characteristic of being concentrated.

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer this last objection:] No, because of the weakness of the *samādhi.*[9]

The Sautrāntikas say that the minds which have the same object constitute *samādhi*: *samādhi* does not exist separately. For it is said in the Sūtra that the Four Dhyānas are *adhicitta śikṣa,* the "higher mental learning"; another says that the Four Dhyānas are the primary element in the purification of the mind (*cittapariśud-dhipradhāna*).[10]

What is the meaning of the word *dhyāna?*

[11]By reason of *dhyāna* the ascetic is "concentrated" and capable of *upanidhyāna.*[12] *Upanidhyai* signifies "to know truly", as it is said in the Sūtra, "He who is concentrated knows truly".[13] (The root *dhyai* is used in the sense of *upanidhyāna.*)

In the School [of the Sarvāstivādins], all *dhyāna* is *prajñā* [whereas in some other schools, *dhyāna* is *cinta* or reflection].[14]

***

If the Dhyānas are absorptions or *samādhis,* then are all absorptions,—good, bad, or neutral,—Dhyāna?

No. Only absorptions filled with certain excellences are called Dhyānas. So too in the world, it is the sun that is called "the light maker" (*bhāskara*) (and not the firefly).

What are the excellences?

Samādhi is in fact excellent: it is an absorption filled with "parts" (*aṅgasamāyukta*, viii.10), which goes by the means of the yoke of calmness (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyana*) [that is to say, in which calmness and insight are in equilibrium],[15] that is termed in the Sūtra "happiness in this world" (*dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāra*, viii.27) and "the easy path" (*sukhapratipad*, vi.66), the path by which one knows better and easily. It is thus the excellent absorptions which are called *dhyāna*.

But if *dhyāna* is an absorption filled with parts, how can a defiled absorption be called *dhyāna?*

Because it is bad *upanidhyāna.*

But this entails false conclusions. [In fact, one cultivates bad *upanidhyāna* with a mind controlled by sensual desire, and this state cannot be a *dhyāna.*]

No. We give the name of *dhyāna* to the defiled state that resembles true *dhyāna*, as, in the world, one calls a thing that resembles a grain, although incapable of germinating, "rotten grain", and not a pebble, etc. [In the same way one speaks of a *pārājika* Bhikṣu, iv.39c-d.] And the Blessed One speaks of bad *dhyāna.*[16]

***

What are the characteristics of the First to the Fourth Dhyāna?

> 2a. The First is filled with *vicāra*, *prīti*, and *sukha*, (parts that the following [Dhyānas] successively abandon).[17]

The First Dhyāna is a good concentration filled with *vicāra*, *prīti*, and *sukha* [that is to say, associated with a *vicāra* filled or associated with *prīti* and *sukha*]. This also says implicitly, "filled

with *vitarka*," for *vitarka* necessarily accompanies *vicāra*, as smoke accompanies fire. It does not happen that *vicāra* is associated with *prīti* and *sukha* without at the same time being associated with *vitarka*.[18]

2b. Parts that the following (Dhyānas) successively abandon.

The Second, Third, and Fourth Dhyāna are characterized by the successive abandoning of each of these three parts; eliminating *vicāra*, the Second Dhyāna is only filled with *prīti* and *sukha*; eliminating *prīti*, the Third Dhyāna is only filled with *sukha*; and by eliminating *sukha*, these three parts are absent from the Fourth Dhyāna.

***

We have described the Dhyānas. What are the Ārūpyas?

2c. So too, the Ārūpyas (which are made up of four *skandhas*).[19]

a. The Ārūpyas, that is, the absorptions of, and the rebirths in Ārūpyadhātu are like the Dhyānas in their number and nature.

There are four Ārūpyas and each Ārūpya is twofold, existence and concentration. [The existences have been defined in the Third Chapter, iii.3]. The concentrations of Ārūpya, in their nature and in general, are applications of pure minds on a single object.

By reason of this double similarity, the stanza says "So too, the Ārūpyas" (are like the Dhyānas).

2d. They are made up of four *skandhas*.

b. The Dhyānas are accompanied by five *skandhas,* but the Ārūpyas are accompanied by only four *skandhas,* for no *rūpa* or physical matter accompanies it.

> 2e. It arises out of separation from lower spheres.[20]

All the Ārūpyas are concentration; but there are four Ārūpyas because the concentration that constitutes each Ārūpya proceeds from separation from a lower sphere. Ākāśānantyayatana is the absorption that proceeds from separation from the Fourth Dhyāna; and so on to Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana (or Bhavāgra) which proceeds from separation from Ākiṁcanyāyatana.

What is separation?

The paths (Ānantaryamārga and Vimuktimārga) by which the ascetic is delivered from the lower spheres, because these paths have turned him away from them.

> 3a-b. They are called *vibhūtarūpasaṁjñā* together with three *sāmantakas.*[21]

[The basic or *maula* Ārūpyas, with the preparatory stages or thresholds, the *sāmantakas* of the three higher Ārūpyas are defined as abodes of "those who have conquered the idea of physical matter."]

The first *sāmantaka,* the threshold of Ākāśānantyāyatana is not called a *sāmantaka* because it has the Fourth Dhyāna for its object, and so the idea of physical matter is not completely transcended in it.

The Ārūpyas are so called because there is no *rūpa* or physical matter in them: they are made up of the four *skandhas* as mentioned above.

[Hsüan-tsang: 3c. There is no *rūpa* in Ārūpyadhātu.]

This should be proved, say some Schools, for we maintain that there is some physical matter, *rūpa,* in the Ārūpyas.

But then why are the *ārūpyas* called *ārūpyas,* "absences of physical matter"?

They are called this because their *rūpa* is reduced, in the same way that a little red (*īṣatpiṅgala*) is called "reddish" (*āpiṅgala,* "absence of red") (i.17, English trans. p. 75).

So be it; but what type of physical matter is in Ārūpyadhātu?

i. If you say that this physical matter is neither the body nor the voice, but merely the physical matter that constitutes bodily and vocal discipline (*kāyavāksaṁvaramātra,* the *rūpa* that forms part of the *dharmāyatana,* iv. p. 561), then how can this discipline exist in the absence of body and voice? And how can a *rūpa* derived from the primary elements (*bhautika*), namely discipline, exist in the absence of these same primary elements (*mahābhūtas*)? If you answer that bodily and vocal discipline exists in Ārūpyadhātu without the cooperation of primary physical matter, in the same way that pure discipline exists without primary elements of their same, i.e., pure, nature, then this answer does not hold, for pure discipline has impure primary elements for its support, elements in the sphere in which the Āryan is born (iv.6).

This proof for the absence of physical matter does not hold only for existence in Ārūpyadhātu, but also for the absorption of Ārūpyadhātu,[22] [in which *saṁvara* or discipline, which is *rūpa,* is also absent].

ii. If you attribute material organs (*rūpīndriya*) to the beings in Ārūpyadhātu, how can you say that the physical matter of Ārūpyadhātu is subtle?

Because their dimensions are very small; the beings are therefore of reduced *rūpa* (*īṣadrūpa*), so the beings are then

"without physical matter."

But if you reason in this way, then the tiny and invisible aquatic animals [of which the *Vinaya* speaks] would also be "without *rūpa*."

Would you say that the physical matter of Ārūpyadhātu is transparent (*accha,* ii. English trans. p. 173)? But intermediate beings and the beings in Rūpadhātu also possess transparent physical matter.[23]

Would you say that the physical matter of Ārūpyadhātu is more transparent and so merits being called "absence of physical matter"? But then you should only call the highest stage of Ārūpyadhātu "absence of physical matter," for bodies will be all the more transparent the more distinguished is the absorption of the stage to which they belong.[24]

Furthermore, the physical matter of Rūpadhātu (or of the Dhyānas) cannot be perceived by an eye in a lower sphere, since it is too transparent. How does this differ from the physical matter that you attribute to Ārūpyadhātu?

Finally it is a gratutitous affirmation to maintain that the name of the first two Dhātus (i.e., Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu) correspond to their objects (*anvarthasaṁjñā*),[25] but that this is not so in the case of Ārūpyadhātu.

iii. It is maintained that physical matter exists in Ārūpyadhātu. There are four arguments in favor of this position:

1. It is said that life and warmth are interconnected (*saṁsṛṣṭa*).[26]

2. It is said that *nāman* (i.e., the four nonmaterial *skandhas*) and physical matter support one another, like two bunches of roses.[27]

3. It is said that *nāmarūpa* (both the material and nonmaterial *skandhas*) are caused by the consciousenss (*vijñāna*).[28]

4. It is said that consciousness does not come or go independently of physical matter, sensation, ideas, or the *saṁskāras*.[29]

These texts are not decisive, for there is reason to interpret them:

1. The Sūtra says that life (*āyus*) is associated with warmth, which is physical matter. But does this refer to all types of life or only to life in Kāmadhātu?[30]

2. The Sūtra says that *nāman* and *rūpa* (the nonmaterial and the material *skandhas*) support one another. But does this refer to all of the Dhātus or only to Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu?

3. The Sūtra says "*vijñānapratyayaṁ nāmarūpam*" ("the nonmaterial and material *skandhas* are conditioned by the consciousness").[31] But does this text teach that all consciousness—either a consciousness caused by the *saṁskāras* of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu, or a consciousness caused by the *saṁskāras* of Ārūpyadhātu, (that is, a consciousness caused by actions retributable by an existence in Kāmadhātu . . .)—is a cause of the material and nonmaterial *skandhas?* Rather, it teaches that all material and nonmaterial *skandhas* have consciousness for their cause.[32]

4. The Sūtra denies that consciousness comes and goes independently of the four "abodes of consciousness" (*vijñānasthiti,* iii.7), that is, independently of *rūpa, vedanā, saṁjñā,* and the *saṁskāras*. But should this Sūtra be understood as meaning "independently of all of these abodes together"?

We would say that the Sūtra expresses itself in a general manner: we do not have to interpret it, and we do not have the right to think that it refers to Kāmadhātu, etc.

The answer does not hold, for to hold to the letter of the Sūtra, one would come to absurd conclusions:

1. Life would necessarily accompany all warmth, even if it be external warmth.

2. External physical matter would be supported by the nonmaterial *skandhas*.

3. External physical matter would be caused by consciousness.

4. There would be material food (lit.: "food taken by the mouthfuls") in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, for the Sūtra says, in a general way, that there are four types of food (iii.40), in the same way that it says in a general way that there are four "abodes of consciousness": from whence you conclude that the "abode of physical matter" exists in Ārūpyadhātu.

No, for the Sūtra, while expressing itself in a general way concerning the four types of food, formulates exceptions to the rule: it speaks of a being "who surpasses the gods who nourish themselves with material food";[33] and it speaks of beings "who nourish themselves with joy".[34]

Very well, but does not the Sūtra also say, and categorically so, that there is no physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu? It says, 1) "One departs from the *rūpas* through the Ārūpyas"; 2) "These states of calm deliverance, beyond the *rūpas,* namely the Ārūpyas . . .";[35] 3) "There are existences without physical matter, absolutely passing beyond the ideas of physical matter":[36] now, if physical matter were to exist in the existences or the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu, beings who are in Ārūpyadhātu would have ideas of their own physical matter. And the Sūtra would not say that an ascetic obtains these existences and absorptions by passing beyond all ideas of physical matter.

Our opponent answers that the Sūtra, in these different passages, intends to speak not of physical matter in general, but of gross physical matter of a lower sphere.

We answer that, in this hypothesis, 1. one should understand in the same sense the text relative to material food, which would exist, albeit subtly, in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu; 2. one should say that an ascetic leaves the *rūpas* through the Dhyānas, and that the Dhyānas belong to Ārūpyadhātu, for the Dhyānas are beyond the coarse *rūpas* of a lower sphere, namely Kāmadhātu; 3. one should say that, through the Ārūpyas, the ascetic leaves sensation (*vedanā*), etc., for the Ārūpyas are beyond the sensations of lower spheres, and one should call them "without sensation," etc. But the

Sūtra does not express itself in this way. We then assume that the Ārūpyas are beyond any and all physical matter.

[Objection.] How can the Ārūpyas be the "leaving" of the *rupas?* The Blessed One, in fact, denies that existence (*bhava*) can be the leaving of existence: "I say that one cannot leave *bhava* through *bhava*."[37] The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner with reason, for one cannot leave a certain existence (or mode of existence, *bhava*) by means of this same existence, and one can neither leave all of the existences nor definitively leave any existence by means of any existence whatsoever.

Finally the Blessed One says that there is *rūpa, vedanā, saṁjñā,* the *saṁskāras,* and *vijñāna* in the Dhyānas, and that there is *vedanā* . . . and *vijñāna* in the Ārūpyas. If there were truly *rūpa* in the Ārūpyas, why did not the Blessed One say that there is *rūpa* in them, as he did for the Dhyānas?

Hence,

3c. There is no *rūpa* in the Ārūpyas.

[From the two arguments given above, it follows that there is no physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu. The masters who maintain the existence of physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu maintain a thesis that is false and in contradiction to reason.]

If this is the case, then when a being obtains an existence in Ārūpyadhātu, his series of physical matter is cut off for numerous cosmic periods (iii.81). When this being is finally reborn in a lower sphere, where does his physical matter come from?[38]

3d. Physical matter arises from the mind (*citta*).

A cause was formerly produced—a certain action, etc.,—which should ripen in physical matter; a trace (*vāsanā*) of this cause

remains in the mind: its efficacy now matures;[39] the physical matter that now arises arises from the mind.

But how can a mind in Ārūpyadhātu exist without being supported by physical matter, *rūpa?*

Why could it not exist without physical matter?

Because it never happens here below that a mind exists without a body.

But, by virtue of this same reasoning, you should deny that beings in Rūpadhātu live on material food. Moreover we have already explained[40] how a mind in Ārūpyadhātu has *nikāya* ("genre") and *jīvita* ("life") as its support.

***

Do the Ārūpyas receive their different names,—Ākāśānantyāyatana, etc.,—from the fact that they have space (*ākāśa*) etc., for their objects?

No. The first three,

> 4a-c. Ākāśānantya, Vijñānānantya, and Ākiṁcanya are named after their preparatory exercises.

The three lower Ārūpyas receive their names from the fact that, in their preparatory exercises, one considers space, etc.[41]

> 4c-d. Because of its weakness, the (next) absorption is called Neither-Ideas-Nor-Absence of Ideas (*nasaṁjñānāpyasaṁjñākaḥ*).[42]

The Fourth Ārūpya receives its name from the fact that *saṁjñā*, "ideas," is very weak in it. Ideas are not active in it, but neither is it completely without ideas.

Without doubt, one prepares himself for this Ārūpya by considering, "Ideas[43] are a sickness! Ideas are an ulcer! Ideas are an arrow! The absence of ideas (*āsaṁjñika,* compare ii.41b) is stupidity (*saṁmoha*)![44] This is calmness, this is excellent, the Faculty of Neither-Ideas-Nor-Absence of Ideas!" But it is not by reason of this preparatory exercise that the Fourth Ārūpya receives its name.

And why is the Fourth Ārūpya conceived of, by the ascetic who finds himself in the preparatory absorptions, as Neither-Ideas-Nor-Absence of Ideas?[45]

It is because of the slightness of the ideas in it. This is the explanation of its name.

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5a. There are then eight things that are basic absorptions;

The Four Dhyānas and the Four Ārūpyas are the eight basic absorptions.[46]

5b. The (first) seven are threefold.

The first seven of these eight are threefold.

5c. Enjoyment, pure, and free from the defilements.

They are associated with enjoyment, are pure, and are free from the defilements.

5d. The eighth is twofold.

Bhavāgra is associated with enjoyment and is pure, but it is not

free from the defilements.

> 6a. The absorption of enjoyment is associated with thirst; (a pure absorption is of a worldly order of good; it is the object of enjoyment of the first; the absorption free from the defilements is transworldly.)[47]

For enjoyment is itself thirst (=desire).

> 6b. A pure absorption is of a worldly order of good;[48]

Worldly good is also termed "good," because it arises in conjunction with the pure *dharmas,* such as non-desire, etc. (iv.9a).

> 6c. It is the object of enjoyment.

Pure absorption is the object enjoyed by the absorption of enjoyment. As soon as the pure absorption disappears, the absorption of enjoyment that enjoys it arises. (The ascetic has then left the pure absorption that he is enjoying; but he is concentrated by virtue of the fact of the absorption of enjoyment which he enjoys).[49]

> 6d. The absorption free from the defilements is transworldly.

The absorption free from the defilements is transworldly. (It cannot be the cause of or the object of desire; hence it is not enjoyed).

***

The Dhyānas are filled with "parts" or items, but not the Ārūpyas (because calmness and insight are in equal measure in them; below, note 77).

How many parts[50] are there in each Dhyāna?

> 7-8. There are five parts in the First: [*vitarka, vicāra,* joy [*prīti*], happiness [*sukha*], and *samādhi;* four in the Second: faith and joy, etc.; five in the Third: equanimity, mindfulness, awareness (*samprajñāna*), happiness, and *samādhi;* and four in the last: mindfulness, equanimity, the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness [*aduḥkhāsukha*], and *samādhi*].[51]

There are five parts or items in the First Dhyāna.[52]

> 7b. *Vitarka, vicāra,* joy, happiness, and *samādhi.*

The teaching of the School is that *samādhi* or concentration is at one and the same time both Dhyāna and a part of this Dhyāna, whereas the other parts are only parts of Dhyāna, but not Dhyāna itself.

But in our opinion, it is the same for the five-part Dhyāna as for a four-part army, which does not exist apart from its parts.[53]

> 7c. Four in the Second: faith and joy, etc.

The Second Dhyāna contains four parts: joy, happiness, concentration of the mind on a single object (*cittaikāgratā*), and internal purity of faith (*adhyātmasamprasāda*).

> 8a. Five in the Third: equanimity, mindfulness, awareness, happiness, and stability (=*samādhi*).

The Third Dhyāna possesses five parts: 1) equanimity (not *vedanopekṣa,* the sensation of indifference, but *saṁskāropekṣa*), joy which is free from movement towards any object(*anābhogalakṣaṇa*);[54] 2) mindfulness (that is, not losing sight of the motive or reason [*nimitta*] for this equanimity, *upekṣanimittāsaṁpramoṣa*);[55] 3) *saṁprajñānam* (consciousness or awareness relating to this mindfulness); 4) happiness; and 5) *samādhi: sthiti* or stability is a synonym for *samādhi,* as the Sūtra says, "What is right *samādhi?* It is stability of the mind."

> 8b. And four in the last: mindfulness, equanimity, the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness, and *samādhi.*

The Fourth Dhyāna possesses four parts: 1) the sensation of indifference (lit.: the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness), 2) pure equanimity (*upekṣapariśuddhi*), 3) pure mindfulness, and 4) *samādhi.*

These are the eighteen parts of the Dhyānas: the First and the Third Dhyānas have five parts each, and the Second and the Fourth Dhyānas have four parts each. In respect to their names, there are eighteen parts. (But how many of these eighteen are distinct things?)

> 9a. Regarded as things, there are eleven parts.[56]

Regarded as things or substances (*dravya*), there are eleven parts.

There are five in the First Dhyāna, plus 1) internal purity or faith in the Second Dhyāna; 3-5) equanimity, mindfulness, awareness and happiness in the Third Dhyāna; and 6) the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness in the Fourth Dhyāna.

There are then some parts of the First Dhyāna that are not

parts of the Second Dhyāna. There are four alternatives: 1) parts of the First Dhyāna that are not parts of the Second Dhyāna, namely *vitarka* and *vicāra;* 2) part of the Second Dhyāna that is not part of the First Dhyāna, namely faith; 3) parts common to the First and the Second Dhyānas, namely joy, happiness, and concentration of the mind on a single object (*cittaikāgratā*); and 4) parts that do not belong to either of the First or the Second Dhyānas, namely all of the other parts.

The correspondance of the parts of the other Dhyānas is established according to the same principles.

***

Why do you say that the happiness of the Third Dhyāna constitutes a separate thing?

Because the happiness of the Third Dhyāna is agreeable sensation (*sukhā vedanā*), whereas

> 9b. In the first two Dhyānas, happiness (*sukha*) signifies well-being (*prasrabdhi*).[57]

In the First and Second Dhyāna, *prasrabdhi* (=*karmaṇyatā,* "aptitude" or well-being," ii, English trans.p. 191) is called happiness: here we have *prasrabdhisukha,* happiness which consists of *prasrabdhi.*In the Third Dhyāna, there is only the sensation of happiness (*sukhā vedanā*).[58]

In fact, in the first two Dhyānas, there can be no faculty of happiness (*sukhendriya*).

The reason for this is: 1) the happiness attributed to these Dhyānas cannot be bodily happiness,[59] in light of the fact that the five sense consciousnesses are absent in a person who has entered into contemplation;[60]

2. the happiness attributed to these Dhyānas cannot be mental

happiness because these Dhyānas possess joy. Now joy is "satisfaction" (*saumanasya*) and it is inadmissible for joy and happiness, even happiness of sensation, to coexist; they cannot even succeed one another, for the First Dhyāna possesses five parts, and the Second, only four.

[Thesis of the Dārṣṭāntikas:]

i. In the first three Dhyānas, there is no mental sensation of happiness, but only a bodily sensation of happiness, which constitutes the part called "happiness" of these Dhyānas (and is activated in the course of the absorption).[61]

Objection: In this hypothesis you should explain how the Sūtra could say, "What is the faculty of happiness (*sukhendriya*)? The bodily and mental sensation of happiness produced by reason of an agreeable contact is what is called the faculty of happiness."

This reasoning is not authentic, answer the Dārṣṭāntikas, as the word "mental" (*caitasika*) has been added. In all the sects the text merely reads "bodily happiness."

Further, they continue, regarding the part of the Third Dhyāna called happiness, the Sūtra says in its own words that, in this Dhyāna the ascetic "experiences happiness through his body" (*sukham . . . kāyena saṁpravedayate*).[62] Would one maintain that the word "through the body" (*kāyena*) signifies "through the body of the mind" (*manaḥkāyena = manaḥsamudāyena,* "through the accumulation which is the mind"), and that one should translate, "the ascetic experiences happiness through this complex which is the *manas*"?[63]

ii. [The explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas,] that the happiness part of the first two Dhyānas is well-being (*prasrabdhi, karmaṇyatā*) is untenable, for the well-being of the Fourth Dhyāna is certainly greater than the well-being of the first two Dhyānas, and the Sūtra does not attribute a happiness part to the Fourth Dhyāna.[64]

[If the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] "The well-being of the first two

Dhyānas is called happiness because it is favorable to the sensation of happiness, whereas the well-being of the Fourth Dhyāna does not have this character," [then the Dārṣṭāntikas will answer,] "The well-being of the Third Dhyāna, like that of the first two, is favorable to the sensation of happiness; why do the Vaibhāṣikas not attribute *prasrabdhisukha,* happiness which consists of well-being, to the Third Dhyāna, but rather a happiness consisting of an agreeable mental sensation (*vedanāsukha*)?"

[If the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] "In the Third Dhyāna, well-being whose character is *karmaṇyatā* or aptitude (ii, English trans. p. 91) is opposed by equanimity, whose character is *akarmaṇyatā,*" [the Dārṣṭāntikas will deny the truth of this assertion:] for them well-being is accumulated through equanimity, since it results from the fact that the well-being of the Third Dhyāna is greater than the well-being of the first two Dhyānas.

Finally, the Sūtra says,[65] "When the Noble Śrāvaka, having realized the joy born of separation, abides in absorption, then five *dharmas* have been abandoned by him, and he has achieved the cultivation of five *dharmas,* namely joy, well-being, happiness, *prajñā,* and *samādhi.*" In this Sūtra, well-being is listed separately from happiness; it should be distinct from happiness in order for the list of the five *dharmas* to be complete. Thus, in the first two Dhyānas, happiness is not well-being.[66]

iii. [Objection of the Vaibhāṣikas:] In order for the happiness of the first two Dhyānas to be agreeable bodily sensation, it is necessary for the person in absorption to produce a consciousness of touch (*kāyavijñāna*). And this is not possible. [Answer of the Dārṣṭāntikas:] In the state of absorption, the body is penetrated by a wind born of excellent mental concentration (*samādhi*); this wind is a tangible which is agreeably felt (*sukhavedanīya*) and is called well-being. Hence there is produced a consciousness of touch (together with the agreeable sensation associated with this consciousness).

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] When this consciousness is produced, there is "a distraction of the mind towards an external object": hence the

ascetic would fall away from his *samādhi.*

Answer of the Dārṣṭāntikas:] No, for agreeable or happy bodily sensation which arises from *samādhi,* being internal, is favorable to *samādhi.*[67]

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] But would the ascetic fall away from the *samādhi* when he produces the consciousness of touch?

[Answer of the Dārṣṭāntikas:] No, and for this same reason: this consciousness is favorable to *samādhi.* Immediately after the appearance of this consciousness, the *samādhi* is taken up again.[68]

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] How can the body (*kāyendriya*), which is in Kāmadhātu, give rise to a touch consciousness (i.e., *prasrabdhi*), which is, according to you, a type of wind in Rūpadhātu (i.47c)?

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] This criticism does not hold, for this consciousness of touch is produced by reason of well-being.[69]

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] There is a difficulty in regarding well-being as a tangible.[70] Let us suppose that the ascetic is in possession of transworldly, undefiled Dhyāna: the tangible (well-being) and the consciousness of touch (*kāyavijñāna*) which he has will be undefiled, for some of the parts of defiled Dhyāna cannot be undefiled, while the others are defiled. [Now the Sūtra says that "All eyes . . . all tangibles are defiled".]

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] There is no contradiction here. In fact physical well-being (*kāyasya karmaṇyatā*) is defined as "a part of Bodhi."[71] If the Vaibhāṣikas answer, "Even though it is not a part of Bodhi, it is so defined because it is favorable to the part of Bodhi called well-being and which is mental well-being," we would say that, for the same reason, one can consider bodily well-being as undefiled. [If the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] "Bodily well-being cannot be undefiled, for the Sūtra declares that all tangible things are defiled,"[72] we would say that this Sūtra is of intentional meaning and refers to all tangible things with the exception of physical well-being, to the consciousnesses of touch with the exception of the consciousness of touch which cognizes well-being.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Do you admit that certain parts of undefiled *dhyāna* are undefiled, and that certain parts are not undefiled?

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] The undefiled part is not simultaneous to the non-undefiled part; we know indeed that (bodily) happiness does not exist at the same time as (mental) joy.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Then the First Dhyāna will not have five parts, and the Second Dhyāna will not have four parts.

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] If Scripture attributes the parts of happpiness and joy to the first two Dhyānas, this is because these Dhyānas are susceptible, successively, to happiness and joy; in the same way Scripture attributes *vitarka* and *vicāra*—which can only exist successively—to the First Dhyāna.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] We affirm that *vitarka* and *vicāra* coexist; but the example that you cite to prove the non-coexistence of the parts is not proved.

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] This example is proved; for *vitarka,* which is a coarse mental state, and *vicāra,* which is a subtle mental state, are contradictory and cannot coexist.[73] And you did not say what harm there is in their not coexisting.[74]

Let us consider the theory of the "parts": one determines the specific features of the Second Dhyāna and of those following by eliminating two, three, or four parts: it is for this reason that the First Dhyāna is said to contain five parts, because the other Dhyānas are defined by the elimination, successively and in order, of the first four of these parts. This is why ideas (*saṁjñā*) and the other *dharmas* of the First Dhyāna are not considered as parts, for they are not cut off in the following Dhyānas. If you do not accept this explanation, then why does the First Dhyāna have only five parts?

But, [say the Vaibhāṣikas,] the five parts are only called parts because they are useful to the Dhyāna. No, this cannot be the case, [answer the Dārṣṭāntikas,] since mindfulness and *prajñā* are more

useful to the Dhyāna than are *vitarka* and *vicāra.*

***

A certain school[75] maintains the system that has been presented, but the ancient masters (*pūrvācāryas*) are not in agreement on this.[76] Consequently the point should be further examined.[77]

***

What is the *dharma* called "internal purity (or faith)" (*adhyātmasaṁprasāda*)?[78]

When the agitation of *vitarka* and *vicāra* has come to an end, the series flows calmly and clearly: this is what is called internal purity. As a river agitated by waves, so too the series, by reason of the agitation of *vitarka* and *vicāra,* is not calm or clear. [This is the explanation of the Sautrāntikas.]

But if we admit this explanation, then internal purity is not a thing in and of itself. Thus there will not be eleven things in the Dhyānas. Then one must say

9c. Purity is faith.[79]

Purity (*prasāda*) is a thing in and of itself, namely faith (*śraddhā*). When the ascetic acquires the Second Dhyāna, he produces a profound faith: he admits that the spheres of absorption themselves can be abandoned. This faith is called internal purity. Faith, having purity (*prasāda,* vi.75) for its characteristic, is called purity. Having abandoned externals, it flows equally and so *prasāda* is internal and equal; hence it is termed "internal purity" or *adhyātmasaṁprasāda.*[80]

According to other masters [the Sautrāntikas], *vitarka, vicāra,*

samādhi, and internal purity are not separate things.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] If these are not separate things, how can one say that they are mental *dharmas?*

[The Sautrāntikas:] Some special states of mind receive the name of mental states because they arise in the mind.[81]

But the system of the Abhidharma does not admit this theory.[82]

***

[Objection of the Sautrāntikas:] You have said that joy is satisfaction (*saumanasya*), a happy or agreeable mental sensation. How would you establish this definition?

If joy is not satisfaction, then what is the *dharma* that is called joy?

We follow another school.[83] According to this school, there exists a *dharma* distinct from satisfaction, a mental state called joy. The hapiness of the three Dhyānas is satisfaction; hence joy, which is distinguished from happiness, is distinct from satisfaction. It is not admissible that happiness, in the Dhyānas, is satisfaction.

9c-d. Joy is satisfaction. This is proved by two texts.[84]

The Blessed One says in the *Viparītasūtra,*[85] "In the Third Dhyāna the faculty of satisfaction (*saumanasyendriya*) which has previously arisen is destroyed without remnant; in the Fourth Dhyāna, the faculty of happiness (*sukhendriya*) is destroyed without remnant."

He says in another Sūtra,[86] "By reason of the abandoning of the faculty of happiness and the faculty of suffering, and by reason of the previous disappearance of the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmanayendriya*) and the faculty of satisfaction."

These two texts prove that there is no faculty of satisfaction in the Third Dhyāna. Hence joy is satisfaction, and not happiness.

***

Does defiled *dhyāna* possess the parts that we have just studied?

No.

What are the parts that are absent in each defiled *dhyāna?*

> 10a-c. In the defiled Dhyānas there is no joy, happiness, faith, *sampradhīḥ* (=awareness, *saṁprajanya*), mindfulness, pure equanimity nor pure mindfulness.

When it is defiled, the First Dhyāna does not contain joy and happiness "arisen from separation", because it is not separated from the defilements of Kāmadhātu (see *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 814a23).

The Second Dhyāna does not contain internal purity (=faith), because it is troubled by the defilements; the defilements cause it to be unclear.

The Third Dhyāna does not contain mindfulness and awareness, because it is confused by a defiled happiness.

The Fourth Dhyāna does not contain the purity of equanimity or the purity of mindfulness, because it is soiled by the defilements.

That is what some say.

> 10d. According to some, (there is no) well-being and equanimity.

According to others, there is no 1) well-being in the first two

Dhyānas, and 2) no equanimity in the last two, because well-being and equanimity are *dharmas* that are only found in a pure mind (*kuśalamahābhūmika,* ii.25).

***

The Blessed One teaches that three Dhyānas are "disturbed" (*sa-injita*) because of "faults" (*apakṣālas*).[87]

> 11a-b. As it is free from the eight faults, the Fourth is undisturbed.

What are the eight faults?

> 11c-d. *Vitarka* and *vicāra,* the two breaths, and the four of which happiness is the first.

The eight faults are *vitarka, vicāra,* happiness, suffering, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, inbreathing, and outbreathing. None of these eight is found in the Fourth Dhyāna: this is why it alone is termed "undisturbed." It is true that the Sūtra says that the Fourth Dhyāna is undisturbed because it is not agitated by *vitarka* and *vicāra,* by joy and happiness.[88] (But the intention of this passage is not to attribute the breaths, etc., to the Fourth Dhyāna; the Sūtra is merely noting its difference from the other Dhyānas.)

According to others, the Fourth Dhyāna is "undisturbed" (*aneñjyam*) because it is like a lamp which, in a sealed place, is not agitated by the wind.

***

Do the arisings of *dhyāna* existences (*dhyānopapattayaḥ*) or existences in Rūpadhātu, possess the same sensations (*vedanās*) as

do the absorption of the Dhyānas?

No, they do not.

Why is this?

> 12. In the *dhyāna* existences, there is satisfaction, happiness, and equanimity; equanimity and *sumanaskatā* (=*saumanasya,* satisfaction); happiness and equanimity; and equanimity.[89]

a. In the First Dhyāna existence, there are three sensations: 1) the sensation of happiness (*sukhavedanā*) associated with three consciousnesses (eye, ear, and body consciousness); 2) the sensation of satisfaction of the sphere of the mind consciousness (*manovijñāna*); and 3) the sensation of equanimity associated with four consciousnesses (eye, ear, body, and *manas*).

b. In the Second Dhyāna existence, there are two sensations, namely satisfaction and equanimity, both of the sphere of the *manas.* There is no happiness here, because the five sense consciousnesses are absent.[90]

c. In the Third Dhyāna existence, there are two sensations, namely happiness[91] and equanimity, both of the sphere of the *manas.*

d. In the Fourth Dhyāna existence, there is a single sensation, the sensation of equanimity.

Such is, with respect to the sensations, the differences between the Dhyāna existences and the absorptions of *dhyāna.*

***

If, from the Second Dhyāna on, three consciousnesses (eye, ear, and body consciousness) are absent, as well as *vitarka* and *vicāra,* how can beings born in the three higher Dhyānas see, hear, and

touch? How can they produce the bodily or vocal act of informing (*vijñaptikarman,* iv.7d; see also i.46 and following)?

We do not say that beings who are born in these Dhyānas lack visual consciousness, etc. They possess these consciousnesses, but not in the Second, the Third or the Fourth Dhyānas:

> 13a-c. In the Second Dhyāna and above, the body, eye, and ear consciousnesses, and the consciousness that sets the act of informing into motion belong to the sphere of the First Dhyāna.[92]

The eye consciousness, etc., and the consciousness that sets into motion the act of informing do not exist in the Second Dhyāna and above.[93] But the beings of these Dhyānas manifest these consciousnesses, in the same way as they manifest a fictive mind of creation (*nirmāṇacitta*) of a lower sphere,[94] and, by means of these consciousnesses, they see, hear, touch, and produce the action of informing.

> 13d. These consciousnesses are undefiled-neutral.

The four *dhyānas* which beings in the Second Dhyāna and above manifest, belong to the sphere of the First Dhyāna. Hence they are not defiled, because these beings are detached from the lower spheres; but they are not good, because the good of a lower sphere is less good.[95]

***

How does the acquisition of the absorptions of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu take place accordingly as they are pure, undefiled, or defiled? (see viii.5).

14a-b. One who does not possess them acquires them, pure, through detachment or through birth.

One who does not possess these absorptions obtains them by detaching oneself from a lower sphere or by taking up birth in a lower sphere (*adhobhūmyupapattitas*),[96] with the exception of the fourth absorption of Ārūpyadhātu, or Bhavāgra, which one acquires solely by detaching oneself from the third absorption.

What is the meaning of the expression, "He who does not possess them"?

This signifies "One who has not acquired them or who has lost them." In fact a person who possesses these pure absorptions of the falling (*hānabhāgīya*) class, etc. (viii.17) can, through cultivation, obtain pure absorptions of a higher class (i.e., of penetration, *nirvedhabhāgīya*); one who possesses pure absorptions of the duration (*sthitibhāgīya*) class can, through falling, obtain pure absorptions of the falling class.

The *Vibhāṣā*[97] also says, "Can one acquire a pure *dhyāna* through detachment? Can one abandon a pure *dhyāna* through detachment? Can one acquire a pure *dhyāna* through falling? Can one abandon a pure *dhyāna* through falling? Can one acquire a pure *dhyāna* through birth? Can one abandon a pure *dhyāna* through birth? Yes, in the case of the First Dhyāna of the falling class."

In fact, 1) one obtains this *dhyāna* through detachment from Kāmadhātu; 2) one loses it through detachment from Brahmaloka (: by passing through the Second Dhyāna); 3) one obtains it by falling from detachment in Brahmaloka; 4) one loses it by falling from detachment in Kāmadhātu; 5) one obtains it by rebirth from here up to Brahmaloka; and 6) one loses it by rebirth into Kāmadhātu. [Hsüan-tsang: The same for the absorptions of the other spheres].

14c. One acquires them, undefiled, through detachment.

That is, "one who does not possess them." The Āryan who detaches himself from a lower sphere acquires the undefiled absorption of a higher sphere. This rule only refers to the ascetic who has completely abandoned the absorption in question.

One who already possesses an absorption acquires this same absorption of undefiled quality under other conditions. Through the knowledge of extinction (*kṣayajñāna,* vi.44d), one acquires the undefiled absorption of an Aśaikṣa; through the perfectioning of his faculties (*indriyasaṁcāra,* vi.60), one acquires an undefiled absorption of a Śaikṣa or an Aṣaikṣa, according to the case. [Hsüan-tsang: The undefiled absorption, already possessed, is again acquired through cultivation or through falling, as explained above.]

But cannot one say that the ascetic, through entry into the certitude of the acquisition of absolute good (*samyaktvaniyāma,* vi.26a), acquires undefiled absorption for the first time?[98]

No, for the ascetic who, before pursuing the acquisition of the result of the state of Sakṛdāgāmin, has obtained the result of the state of Srotaāpanna (an *ānupūrvana,* ii.16c) can enter into this certitude in the state of Anāgamya (viii.22c); he does not necessarily acquire the basic absorption. [Hsüan-tsang: Now the Treatise only examines the case that necessarily includes the acquisition of the absorptions.]

> 14d. One acquires them, defiled, through falling and through birth.

One who falls from the detachment of a sphere acquires the defiled absorption of this sphere. One who, dying in a higher sphere and reborn in a lower sphere, acquires the defiled absorption of this second sphere.

***

How many types of absorptions arises after how many types of absorptions?

1. Six absorptions can arise after the first undefiled *dhyāna*: 1-2) pure and undefiled absorption of the same sphere;[99] and 3-6) pure and undefiled absorption of the Second and Third Dhyānas.

2. Seven absorptions can arise after undefiled Ākiṁcanyāyatana: 1-2) pure and undefiled absorption of the same sphere; 3-6) pure and undefiled absorption of Vijñānānantyāyatana and Ākāśānantyāyatana;[100] and 7) pure absorption of Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana, because this *āyatana* does not contain any undefiled absorption.

3. Eight absorptions can arise after the Second undefiled Dhyāna: 1-2) pure and undefiled absorption of the same sphere; and 3-8) pure and undefiled absorption of the Third, Fourth, and First Dhyāna.

4. Nine absorptions can arise after undefiled Vijñānānantyāyatana: 1-2) two of the same sphere; 3-6) four, namely two of Ākāśānantyāyatana and two of the Fourth Dhyāna; and 7-9) three, two of Ākiṁcanyāyatana and one of Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana.

5. According to these same principles, one will see that ten absorptions can arise after the *dhyāna* and *ārūpya* absorptions not specified above.[101]

The rule is formulated briefly:

> 15a-c. After the undefiled, up to the third sphere above or below, there arises the good.

[The word "good" designates the pure absorption and the undefiled absorption, for both are morally good (iv.8).]

After an undefiled absorption, we have: 1) either two types of absorption of the same sphere as this undefiled absorption, namely

pure and undefiled; or 2) two types of absorption, pure or undefiled, of a higher sphere or of a lower sphere until the third in either direction. In fact, by reason of its too great distance, the ascetic is not capable of jumping over two spheres.

After inferential knowledge (*anvayajñāna,* vii.3c), one can enter into the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu, but not after the knowledge of the *dharmas* (*dharmajñāna*), because this has a lower sphere for its object.

We have seen which absorptions arise after the undefiled absorptions.

> 15c-d. The same after the pure, by adding the defiled of its sphere.

A defiled absorption of the same sphere can arise after any pure absorption. The rest as for the undefiled absorption.[102] A defiled absorption cannot arise after an undefiled absorption.

> 16a. After the defiled, the pure and the defiled of its sphere.

A pure or a defiled absorption of the same sphere can arise after a defiled absorption.

> 16b. And the pure of a lower sphere.

Wearied of the defilements of the sphere in which one finds oneself,—defilements belonging to the defiled absorption of a higher sphere,—the ascetic produces an esteem for the pure absorption of a lower sphere. Therefore, after the defiled absorption of a higher sphere (the Second Dhyāna), a pure absorption of a lower sphere (the First Dhyāna) can arise.

There is a difficulty. If an ascetic were in a position to distinctly

know a defiled absorption and a pure absorption, he would be able to pass from the higher defiled absorption to the lower pure absorption. But, being defiled, he is not capable of this distinct knowledge; how then can he, after a defiled absorption, produce a pure absorption?

By the force of a previous resolution (*praṇidhāna*). He made the resolution, "May I be able to obtain a lower pure absorption! What have I to do with a higher defiled absorption?" The "series" develops of itself by reason of this resolution, and, as a consequence, the lower absorption arises after the higher defiled absorption, in the same way as a person forms the resolution to sleep until a certain time, falls asleep, and then wakes up at that fixed time.

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The undefiled absorptions, of whichever sphere, never arise after a defiled absorption. [There is no reciprocal generation between these two types, whereas a pure absorption is in reciprocal generation with both the undefiled and defiled absorptions.]

We have said that the defiled absorption that succeeds the pure or defiled absorption is always of the sphere of the absorption which it follows. This rule should be understood of life in the course of the absorption; but

> 16c-d. At death, after the pure, the defiled of any type can arise.[103]

At death, a defiled mind of any sphere can arise following a pure absorption obtained through birth.

> 16d. After the defiled, nothing higher.

At death, only a defiled mind of the same sphere or a lower sphere can follow Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu.

***

We have seen that the undefiled absorption can follow the pure absorptions; but it cannot follow all types of pure absorptions.

17a-b. The pure absorption is of four types, of falling, etc.

The pure (*śuddhaka*) absorption is of four types: of falling (*hānabhāgīya*), of duration (*sthitibhāgīya*), of progress (*viśeṣabhāgīya*), and of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*). Nevertheless, the pure absorption of Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana is only of three types, excluding the category of the pure absorption of progress, because it has no higher sphere.[104]

What are these four types?

17b-d. In order, they are suitable to the arising of the defilements, to its own sphere, to a higher sphere, to the undefiled.

When the pure absorption is of such a nature that it tends to lead to the arising of the defilements, it is called an absorption "of falling."

When the pure absorption tends to lead to its own sphere, it is called an absorption "of duration."

When the pure absorption tends to lead to a higher sphere, it is called an absorption "of progress."

When the pure absorption tends to lead to the undefiled absorption, it is called an absorption "of penetration" (vi.20a).

Therefore it is from this last category of pure absorptions that the undefiled absorption arises.

***

What is the reciprocal generation of these four categories of absorption?

> 18a-b. After the absorption of falling, etc., two, three, three, one.

After the absorption of falling, there can arise absorptions of falling and duration.[105]

After the absorption of duration, three can arise, with the exception of the absorption of penetration.

After the absorption of progress, three can arise, with the exception of the absorption of falling.

After the absorption of penetration, only an absorption of penetration can arise.

We have seen (viii.15a-c) that immediately after a pure absorption or an undefiled absorption of a certain sphere, there can arise a pure absorption of an undefiled absorption of the third sphere above or below. When this is produced, the ascetic passes over a sphere and changes the characteristics of his absorption: he cultivates what is called the "transitional absorption" (*vyutkrānta-kasamāpatti*). How is this absorption actualized?

> 18c-19b. Going and coming in two ways over the eight spheres, in immediate succession, by passing over one sphere, going to the third sphere of a different type, is called "transitional absorption".[106]

"Going and coming": "to go" is to take up the absorptions in ascending order; "to come" is to take up the absorptions in descending (or reverse) order.

"In two ways" refers to undefiled absorption and defiled absorption. This refers to the pure absorptions, not to the defiled absorptions.

"The eight spheres" means the Four Dhyāna absorptions, and the Four Ārūpya absorptions.

"In immediate succession" signifies by degrees.

"By passing over one sphere" means by skipping a sphere.

The preparatory exercise (*prayoga*) includes four successive disciplines: 1) cultivation of the eight defiled absorptions in ascending and descending order; 2) when this cultivation is assured, there is cultivation of the seven undefiled absorptions in ascending and descending order; 3) when this cultivation is assured, then the ascetic, in order to gain mastery in absorption, passes from the first defiled *dhyāna* into the third *dhyāna* of this same quality; from this he passes into Ākāśānantyāyatana, from this into Ākiṁcanyāyatana; and he then descends in the same way, since all of the absorptions are defiled; 4) when this cultivation is assured, there is cultivation in the same way, and in the two ways, of the undefiled absorptions.

When the ascetic is capable of passing from the first defiled *dhyāna* into the third undefiled *dhyāna*, from this into defiled Ākāśānantyāyatana, from this into undefiled Ākiṁcanyāyatana, and to return in the same way, then he has realized the entry into the third absorption of a different quality and has returned from this absorption: the transitional absorption has been achieved.[107]

It is impossible to skip over two spheres and enter into a fourth, because a fourth sphere is too distant.

The transitional absorption is cultivated only by humans of the Three Dvīpas; by Arhats who are non-circumstantially delivered, that is, those who realize absorption of their own accord, those

who are delivered independently of circumstances (the *asamaya-vimukta* Arhats, vi.57) because they possess mastery in absorption. The Dṛṣṭiprāptas (vi.31c), that is, the ascetics in whom *prajñā* dominates, (who are informed by speculative views, *dṛṣṭi*), are of keen faculties and possess mastery in absorption; but they lack the first condition. Arhats whose liberation is occasional and circumstantial (the *samayavimukta* Arhats, vi.56c) have destroyed the defilements, but the second condition is absent. Both are therefore incapable of cultivating the transitional absorption.

***

How many *dhyāna* and *ārūpya* absorptions can be actualized by beings in different spheres?

> 19c-d. The *dhyāna* and *ārūpya* absorptions have for their support (*āśraya*) beings of their own spheres or of a lower sphere.

A being in Bhavāgra (=Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana) can actualize the absorption of Bhavāgra. Beings in lower spheres down to Kāmadhātu can actualize it also. In the same way the absorptions of the other spheres can be actualized by beings who are in the sphere of these absorptions or in lower spheres. But a being reborn in a higher sphere cannot actualize the absorption of a lower sphere:

> 19d. A lower absorption has no usefulness.

An absorption of a lower sphere does not have even the smallest amount of usefulness for a being born in a higher sphere, because this absorption is, by comparison, mediocre.[108]

Such is the general rule, which admits of one exception:

20a-b. But, in Bhavāgra, it is by entering the Āryan absorption of Ākiṁcanya that one destroys the defilements.

A being born in Bhavāgra realizes the Āryan, that is, the undefiled absorption of Ākiṁcanyāyatana in order to destroy the defilements relating to Bhavāgra. In fact, the pure (=undefiled) Path cannot be cultivated in Bhavāgra;[109] but on the other hand, Ākiṁcanya is very close to it.

***

What is the object of the Dhyāna and Ārūpya absorptions?

20c. Associated with thirst, absorption has its own existence (*bhava*) for its object.

"Absorption associated with thirst" (=desire) signifies the absorption of enjoyment (viii.6). It has for its object "its own *bhava*," that is, the *bhava* of its sphere. *Bhava* signifies "that which is defiled" [This is another manner of presenting the doctrine of viii.6: the absorption of enjoyment has for its object a pure but defiled absorption, not an undefiled absorption]. It does not have a lower sphere for its object, for the ascetic that cultivates the absorption of enjoyment of a certain sphere is detached from the lower sphere.[110] He does not have a higher sphere for his object, for the spheres are delimited by desire.[111] He does not have an undefiled absorption for his object, which would imply that it is pure.[112]

20d. Pure absorption has all that exists for its object.

The pure or undefiled absorption takes as its object all of the

dharmas that exist, conditioned (*saṁskṛta*) and unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*).[113] Nevertheless

> 21a-b. The pure Ārūpya absorptions of the principal spheres do not have lower defiled absorptions for their object.

The pure absorptions cultivated in the principal spheres of Ārūpyadhātu—in opposition to the Dhyāna absorptions and to the absorptions cultivated in the *sāmantakas* of Ārūpyadhātu (viii.22)—do not have for their object the defiled *dharmas* of lower spheres, but the *dharmas* of their own sphere or of a higher sphere.

The undefiled *dharmas* grasp all inferential knowledge (*anvayajñāna,* vii.3c) for their object, the *sarvānvayajñānapakṣa;* they do not concern themselves with the knowledge of the *dharmas* (the *dharmajñāna,* whose object, namely Kāmadhātu, is too distant); they no longer concern themselves with the extinction (which is undefiled) of a lower sphere, which would be possible only if they were concerned with this sphere.

The absorptions cultivated in the *sāmantakas* of Ārūpyadhātu have for their object the lower sphere, for they include an irresistable Path (*ānantaryamārga*) whose sole object is the lower sphere.[114]

***

Among the three types of *dhyāna* and *ārūpya* absorptions,—undefiled and supermundane (*anāsrava*), pure (*śuddhaka*), and defiled (*kliṣṭa*),—which one destroys the defilements (*kleśas*)?

> 21c-d. The defilements are abandoned through the undefiled absorptions.

Any undefiled absorption is capable of cutting off the defilements; not the pure absorptions, nor even less, the defiled absorptions.

The pure absorption does not cut off the defilements of a lower sphere, for the ascetic can only obtain the pure absorption of a certain sphere because he is detached from a lower sphere; he does not cut off the defilements of his sphere, for he does not oppose these defilements;[115] he does not cut off the defilements of a higher sphere, because they are more subtle than he himself.

21d. And also by means of the *sāmantakas,* (likewise pure).

If the *sāmantakas* of the *dhyānas* and the *ārūpyas* are pure, they cut off the defilements, because they are opposed to a lower sphere.

***

How many *sāmantakas,* prefatory or threshold absorptions, are there?

22a. There are eight *sāmantakas* in the basic absorptions.

Each basic absorption has a *sāmantaka* or prefatory absorption, through which one enters into the basic absorption.

Are the *sāmantakas* of three types,—undefiled, pure, or defiled,—like the basic absorptions? Do they possess the same sensations (*vedanā,* namely joy or *prīti* in the first two Dhyānas, happiness or *sukha* in the Third, and equanimity or *upekṣa* in the Fourth) as they do?

22b. They are pure; they possess the sensation of equanimity.[116]

The *sāmantakas* are exclusively pure and are associated with the sensation of equanimity, because one traverses them through effort, because the abhorance of the lower sphere has not yet disappeared,[117] and because they are the Path by which one detaches oneself from the lower sphere.[118] Therefore they only contain the sensation of equanimity and they are not associated with enjoyment.

22c. The first is also Āryan.

The first *sāmantaka* is called Anāgamya.[119] It is of two types, pure and Āryan, that is, undefiled.

The *sāmantaka* mind through which one enters an existence is defiled; but the *sāmantaka* mind through which one enters absorption cannot be defiled, for this thesis has been refuted (above, p. 1253, line 16).[120]

22c. Some say that it is threefold.[121]

Other masters say that the Anāgamya *sāmantaka* is also associated with enjoyment.[122]

***

Does *dhyānāntara*, the intermediate *dhyāna*, differ or not from *sāmantaka?*

It differs from it. In fact *sāmantaka* is the door to detachment from a lower sphere, but this is not the case for *dhyānāntara.* Furthermore

22d. *Dhyānāntara* is without *vitarka.*[123]

The First basic *dhyāna* and the first *sāmantaka* are associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra.* In the seven higher absorptions (the basic Dhyānas and their *sāmantakas*), there is neither *vitarka* nor *vicāra.* Only *dhyānāntara* is filled with *vicāra* without being filled with *vitarka;* consequently it is superior to the First Dhyāna but inferior to the Second. This is why it is called *dhyānāntara,* or intermediate *dhyāna.*[124]

Consequently in the higher spheres there is no *dhyānāntara,* for the other spheres do not have, like the First, a higher and a lower (*viśeṣābhāvāt*).[125]

***

To how many categories does *dhyānāntara* belong? What sensation does it have?

23a. To three;

It can be associated with enjoyment, a pure absorption, and an undefiled absorption.

23b. It has the sensation of equanimity.

Like the prefatory or threshold absorptions (*sāmantakas*), it has the neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable sensation, for it is associated with the faculty of equanimity (iv.48). One progresses through it through effort (*abhisaṁskāravāhin*)[126] and therefore it cannot be associated with satisfaction (*saumanasya*). Hence it is considered to be a "difficult path" (*duḥkha pratipad,* vi.66).

What is the result of *dhyānāntara?*

> 23c. It has Mahābrahmā for its result.[127]

Whoever cultivates this absorption to the highest degree is reborn as Mahābrahmā.

***

[We have explained the absorptions or *samāpattis.*[128]

What are the *samādhis?*]

The Sūtra[129] says that there are three types of *samādhi:* 1) *samādhi* with *vitarka* and *vicāra,* 2) *samādhi* without *vitarka* but with *vicāra,* and 3) *samādhi* without *vitarka* and *vicāra. Dhyānāntara* is *samādhi* without *vitarka* but with *vicāra.*

As for *dhyānāntara,*

> 23d-e. Up to it, *samādhi* exists with *vitarka* and *vicāra;* (beyond, *samādhi* exists without either).[130]

All *samādhi* that is below *dhyānāntara* contains *vitarka* and *vicāra.* This refers to the First Dhyāna and to any other *samādhi* supported by the First Dhyāna.[131]

> 23e. Beyond, *samādhi* exists without either.

Above *dhyānāntara,* all *samādhi* is without *vitarka* and *vicāra,* from the *sāmantaka* of the Second Dhyāna to the Fourth Ārūpya absorption.

The Sūtra[132] teaches that there are three absorptions, the absorption of emptiness (*śūnyatāsamādhi*), the absorption of the absence of characteristics, (*ānimittasamādhi*), and the absorption of the absence of intention (*apraṇihitasamādhi*).

24a. The absence of characteristics has the aspect of the Tranquil.[133]

The absorption associated with the aspect of the Truth of Extinction (*nirodhasatya*),—that is, the absorption in which the ascetic considers extinction,—is called the absorption of the absence of characteristics. This absorption has four aspects.[134]

Why does it receive this name?

Because Nirvāṇa or extinction, being free from ten characteristics (*nimitta*) is called *animitta.* The absorption that has Nirvāṇa for its object is thus *ānimitta.*[135] The ten characteristics or marks (*nimitta*) are: 1-5) the five *āyatanas,* external sources of the sense consciousnesses, physical matter (*rūpa*), sound, etc.; 6-7) male and female; and 8-10) the three characteristics of conditioned things (the *saṁskṛtalakṣaṇas,* ii.45), arising, duration-and-change, and death.

24b-c. Emptiness has the aspects of emptiness and non-self.[136]

The absorption associated with the two aspects of emptiness (*śūnya*) and of non-self (*anātman*) is called the absorption of emptiness (*śūnyatāsamādhi*). There are thus two aspects, the last two aspects of the Truth of Suffering.

24c-d. The absence of intention is associated with the other Truths.

The absorption of the absence of intention is the absorption that grasps the other ten aspects.

On the one hand, there are aspects of impermanence (*anitya*) and suffering (*duḥkha,* the first two aspects of the Truth of

Suffering) and the four aspects of the Truth of Origin, which provoke dread (*udvega*), and on the other hand, the four aspects of the Path, for the Path is like a raft and should necessarily be abandoned.[137]

The absorption that grasps these ten aspects is turned toward the passing beyond of things that are impermanent, suffering, arising, and the Path; it is then called *apraṇihita,* free from *praṇidhāna,* the will or desire for something.

On the contrary however, Nirvāṇa, under these four aspects and as the object of the absorption of the absence of intention, should not be abandoned; and the last two aspects of the Truth of Suffering, namely emptiness and non-self, the object of the absorption of emptiness, do not provoke dread, for these two aspects belong to Nirvāṇa as well as to conditioned things.

***

These three absorptions (*samādhi*) are of two types

> 25a. Pure or immaculate (*amala*).[138]

They are pure (*śuddhaka*) or immaculate, that is undefiled (*anāsrava*), acordingly as they are worldly or transworldly. Worldly, they exist in eleven spheres; transworldly, they exist in the sphere of the Path.[139]

> 25b. Immaculate, they are the three gates to deliverance (*vimokṣamukha*).[140]

When they are undefiled, they are also called "the gates to deliverance", because they are effectively the gates leading to Nirvāṇa or deliverance (*mokṣa*). We have emptiness as a gate to deliverance (*śūnyatāvimokṣamukha*), the absence of characteristics

as a gate to deliverance (*ānimittavimokṣamukha*), and the absence of intention as a gate to deliverance (*apraṇihitavimokṣamukha*).

25c-d. There are also three other absorptions (*samādhi*) called "emptiness of emptiness", etc.[141]

They are also called the absorption of the emptiness of emptiness (*śūnyatāśūnyatāsamādhi*), the absorption of the absence of intention in the absence of intention (*apraṇihitāpraṇihitasamādhi*), and the absorption of the absence of characteristics in the absence of characteristics (*ānimittānimittasamādhi*), because they have respectively, and in a manner that we shall explain, the absorptions of emptiness, the absence of intention, and the absence of characteristics for their objects.

26a-b. The first two refer to the Aśaikṣa under the aspects of emptiness and impermanence.

They have for their object the absorption of the Aśaikṣa; that is, they have respectively the absorption of emptiness and the absorption of the absence of intention as realized by an Arhat for their object (see viii.27a).

The absorption of the emptiness of emptiness considers the absorption of emptiness, which considers the *dharmas* as empty and non-self, as empty but not as non-self, because a view of non-self does not provoke the same dread as does a view of emptiness.[142]

The absorption of the absence of intention in the absence of intention (*apraṇihitāpraṇihitasamādhi*) has the absorption of the absence of intention of the Aśaikṣa for its object, an absorption which considers things under ten aspects, impermanence, suffering, etc. (viii.24c), by considering them as impermanent. It does not consider them as suffering, nor as cause (*hetu*), origin (*samudaya*), condition (*pratyaya*), or appearance (*prabhava*), for

the absorption of the absence of intention, being undefiled, is not suffering or cause; and although the absorption of the absence of intention is the Path, the absorption of the absence of intention in the absence of intention (*apraṇihitāpraṇihitasamādhi*) no longer considers it as a Path, the truth (*nyāya*), the route, (*pratipad*), nor as pertaining to the truth (*nairyāṇika*), because the goal pursued by the ascetic is that of becoming disgusted with the absorption of the absence of intention.[143]

> 26c-d. The absence of characteristics in the absence of characteristics has for its object extinction (*kṣayam*) not attained through conscious effort, and considers it as tranquil (*śānta*).[144]

This is to say that the absorption of the absence of characteristics in the absence of characteristics has for its object the extinction that is not attained through conscious effort (*apratisaṁkhyānirodha*) of the absorption of the absence of characteristics,[145] and considers this extinction under the aspect of tranquility, thinking, "This extinction is tranquil".

It does not have for its object the extinction attained through conscious effort (*pratisaṁkhyānirodha*) of the absorption of the absence of characteristics, for this absorption is undefiled, and there is no extinction attained through conscious effort of anything that is pure.[146]

And of the four aspects under which one can consider extinction attained through conscious effort, namely extinction (*nirodha*), tranquility (*śānta*), excellent (*praṇīta*), and leaving (*niḥsaraṇa*, 9vii.13a), the aspect of tranquility is the only one that is appropriate here.[147] In fact, the characteristic of extinction belongs to the extinction not attained through conscious effort, as well as to the extinction brought about by impermanence;[148] the extinction not attained through conscious effort is not excellent, for it is morally neutral (*avyākṛta*);[149] it is not leaving, for it is not disconnection from the defilements.[150]

***

The three absorptions (*samādhi*) are exclusively

27a. Defiled (lit: possessing the defilements, *sāsrava*).

Because they hate the Path [: they turn away from it, regarding it as empty, etc.] Now such absorptions are not pure, or undefiled *dharmas*.

***

Where do they arise?

27a-b. Among humans, (among the Unshakeable Ones).[151]

They are cultivated only by humans of the Three Dvīpas, and not by the gods.

Among whom do they arise?

27b. Among the Unshakeable Ones.

Only among the Arhats of the Unshakeable (*akopya,* vi.56a) class, and among no other Arhats.

In what sphere (*bhūmi*) do these also exist?

27c. With the exception of the seven *sāmantakas*.

These absorptions arise ("have for their support") eleven

spheres, namely Kāmadhātu, Anāgamya, the eight basic absorptions (Dhyāna and Ārūpya absorptions, with the exception of the prefatory absorptions, *sāmantakas*) and *dhyānāntara*.

***

The Sūtra says that there are four cultivations of absorption (*samādhibhāvanā*): "There is a cultivation of the absorption that cultivates, practices, repeatedly cultivates, which has for its result the possession of happiness in this world," and the rest.[152]

> 27c. The First good Dhyāna is the cultivation of the absorption that has for its result happiness; (the supernormal knowledge of the [divine] eye has sight for its result; the cultivation of good arisen from exercise has comprehension for its result; the absorption likened to a Vajra (= Vajropamasamādhi) of the Fourth Dhyāna has the extinction of the defilements for its result.)[153]

1. The "First good Dhyāna" is the first pure (*śuddhaka*) or undefiled *dhyāna*. Through this *dhyāna*, the ascetic obtains "happiness in this world" (*dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāra*).[154] This holds for the other three Dhyānas as for the First Dhyāna.

This absorption does not necessarily have for its result happiness beyond this world, for the ascetic who possesses it can fall from it, he can be reborn higher, or he can obtain Nirvāṇa: in these three cases he does not enjoy happiness in a future life.

> 28a. The supernormal knowledge (*abhijñā*) of the eye has sight for its result.

2. The second cultivation of the absorption has for its result the acquisition of the seeing of knowledge (*jñānadarśana*).[155] This is the supernormal knowledge of the divine eye (*divyacakṣurabhijñā*).[156]

> 28b. The cultivation of good arisen from exercise has comprehension for its result.

3. The third cultivation of the absorption has for its result the attainment of the excellent forms of *prajñā (prajñāprabheda).*[157] This is the *samādhibhāvanā* of the superior qualities which arise from cultivation, that is, the qualities of the three spheres and pure, undefiled qualities.[158] The *samādhi* that produces these qualities is called the *samādhibhāvanā* of these qualities.[159]

> 28c. The absorption likened to a Vajra of the Fourth Dhyāna has the extinction of the defilements for its result.

4. In the Fourth Dhyāna there is produced an absorption that is called the cultivation "like a Vajra" (*vajropama*). This absorption destroys all of the defilements.

***

According to the School, the Blessed One, in setting forth this fourfold cultivation of the absorptions, teaches his own cultivation.

How is this?

Because he places himself in the Fourth Dhyāna in order to realize the Vajropamasamādhi (vi.44b) which, as we have seen, can be realized in other states of absorption.[160]

***

We have explained the absorptions. Let us explain the qualities (*guṇa*) that the ascetic realizes by being in the absorptions.[161]

29a. The Immeasurables (*apramāṇas*) are four in number.[162]

They are goodwill or friendship (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (*muditā*), and equanimityā(*upekṣa*). They are called the Immeasurables (*apramāṇas*) because they apply to an immeasurable number of beings, drawing after them an immeasurable merit, and producing immeasurable [retributive] results.[163]

29b. Because they oppose ill-will, etc.,[164]

In order the four Immeasurables oppose ill-will (*vyāpadā*), harm (*vihiṁsā*), dissatisfaction (*arati*), and sensual craving (*kāmarāga*) and hostility (*vyāpadā*). Goodwill causes persons who are given over to ill-will to abandon ill-will, and so on.

We have seen that the meditation on loathsome things (*aśubhabhāvanā,* vi.9c) opposes sensual craving (*kāmarāga*); we learn here that equanimity also opposes it.

What is the difference between the meditation on loathsome things and equanimity in their opposition to sensual craving?

According to the *Vibhāṣā (TD* 27, p. 427c), there is reason to distinguish, with respect to sensual craving, craving for the visible things (*varṇa*) of Kāmadhātu, and sexual craving (which is craving for a certain tangible thing). Now meditation on loathsome things opposes the first of these two craving, whereas equanimity is opposed to the second.[165]

We would say rather that meditation on loathsome things is opposed to sexual craving, (for this meditation eliminates all desire relating to color, shape, aspect, contact, or bearing); whereas equanimity is opposed to craving that has for its object father, mother, children, and parents.

***

[What are the Immeasurables?]

29c. Goodwill is the absence of hatred.

The nature of goodwill is the absence of malice.

29d. So too compassion.

This is also the case for compassion.

29e. Joy is satisfaction.

The nature of joy is satisfaction (*saumanasya,* ii.8a).

30a. Equanimity is the absence of desire.

The nature of equanimity is the absence of desire.

[But if equanimity is the absence of desire,] how can it oppose ill-will?

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] Because ill-will is provoked by desire.

We would say rather that equanimity is both the absence of desire and the absence of ill-will.[166]

***

[What are the aspects or the objects of the Immeasurables?]

30a-c. Their aspects are happiness, unhappiness, joy, and beings.

Happy beings (*sukhita*) are the object of goodwill. The ascetic produces with regard to them a mind having the following aspect, "Beings are happy!"[167] and by this, he enters the meditation of goodwill (*maitrībhāvanā*).

Suffering beings (*duḥkhita*) are the object of meditation. With regard to them the ascetic thinks, "Beings are unhappy!"[168] and, by this, he enters the meditation of compassion (*karuṇābhāvanā*).

Joyful beings (*modantāṁ*) are the object of joy. With regard to them, the ascetic thinks, "Beings are joyful!"[169] and, by this, he enters into the meditation of joy (*muditābhāvanā*).

Beings considered merely as beings and without making any distinction, are the object of equanimity. With regard to them the ascetic produces a mind having the following aspect, "Beings!" and, by this, by means of what can be called "impartiality" (*mādhyasthya*),[170] he enters into the meditation of equanimity (*upekṣābhāvanā*).

Yet, to consider the beings who do not possess happiness as happy is an intentional view (*adhimokṣa*)[171] not conforming to the facts, and is erroneous (*viparīta*).

No; it is not erroneous: 1) when the ascetic thinks, "Beings are happy!" the sense is "May beings be happy!" 2) there is no error in his intention, for 3) the ascetic indeed knows that he conceives an intentional view. And even though the ascetic himself is mistaken, what harm in there in that? Would you say that the Immeasurables are bad because they take beings as they are not? But they are the roots of good since they oppose ill-will, etc.

***

The Immeasurables have living beings for their object. More precisely

> 30d. They have the living beings of Kāmadhātu for their sphere.

In fact they oppose ill-will with respect to these beings.

However, according to the Sūtra,[172] the ascetic produces the mind of goodwill with regard to one cardinal direction, with regard to two cardinal directions, . . . The Sūtra speaks of the physical world but it has in view the beings that are to be found in the physical world.

In what spheres does the ascetic produce the Immeasurables?

> 31a. Joy in two Dhyānas.

One cultivates joy (*muditā*) in only the first two Dhyānas, for joy is satisfaction (*saumanasya*) and satisfaction is absent in the other Dhyānas.

> 31b. The others in six spheres.

The other three Immeasurables exist in six spheres: in Anāgamya, in *dhyānāntara,* and in the Four Dhyānas.

> 31c. Or, according to some, in five.

However, according to other masters, they are in only five spheres, with the exception of the Anāgamya.

According to still other masters, they exist in ten spheres, by adding to the six 7) Kāmadhātu and 8-10) the three *sāmantakas* of

the higher Dhyānas. The number varies accordingly as one attributes the Immeasurables to a state of non-absorption (i.e., Kāmadhātu) as to a state of absorption, or to the prefatory stages (the *sāmantakas*) as to the principal Dhyānas.

***

We have said that the Immeasurables oppose ill-will, etc. Does this mean that one could abandon the defilements by means of the Immeasurables?

31d. There is no abandoning through the Immeasurables.

For the Immeasurables have the basic Dhyānas for their sphere or places of their arising;[173] because they include an arbitrary or voluntary (*adhimukti-*, ii.72) judgment and not an exact judgment; and because they have for their object living beings and not the general characteristics of things (*dharmasāmānyalakṣaṇas*, ii.72, English trans. p. 320).

However in their preparatory stage (*prayoga*), the Immeasurables disturb ill-will, etc., and the Immeasurables dispel (lit.: "render distant") ill-will already abandoned: this is why we have said above that the Immeasurables oppose ill-will, etc.

More specifically:[174] goodwill, compassion, etc., cultivated in Kāmadhātu and in Anāgamya (viii.22c), the preliminary stages (iv., p. 706), only resemble goodwill, compassion, etc. in a state of absorption which will be cultivated in the basic Dhyānas, the stages of the Immeasurables properly so called. After having disturbed ill-will, etc., by means of preliminary goodwill, compassion, etc., the ascetic produces, in the absorption of Anāgamya, a path of abandoning (*prahāṇamārga*)—independent of goodwill, compassion, etc.,—by which he abandons the defilements. Once the defilements are abandoned, the ascetic obtains detachment from Kāmadhātu, enters the basic Dhyāna, and then obtains the

Four Immeasurables of the sphere of the basic Dhyāna. The defilements are thus dispelled, and made distant, and the ascetic will henceforth be invincible, even when he encounters powerful causes of defilement.

How does the beginner (*ādikārmika*) cultivate goodwill?

He calls to mind the happiness that he himself has experienced; he hears one speak of the happiness experienced by others, by the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas, the Śrāvakas, and the Pratyekabuddhas. He forms the vow that all beings shall obtain this happiness.

When his defilements are too strong, the ascetic is not capable of carrying out his intention impartially: he should then divide all beings into three categories, friends, persons to whom he is indifferent, and enemies. The first category is also divided into three: good friends, medium friends, and lesser friends; and in the same way the third (=enemies). The category of persons to whom he is indifferent is not so subdivided: thus there are altogether seven groups. Having made this division, the ascetic first forms the vow of happiness with regard to his good friends; he then follows this with a vow of happiness with regard to the medium friends and lesser friends. Finally the ascetic no longer distinguishes the three categories of friends; he then forms the same vow with regard to persons to whom he is indifferent and with regard to his enemies. Through the force of all these, he produces, with regard to his greatest enemies, the same vow of happiness as with regards his dearest friends.

When this meditation or cultivation of the vow of happiness, sevenfold and impartial, is achieved, the ascetic then progressively enlarges the domain of this vow, embracing his town, his country, one cardinal direction, and then all the universe. When all beings, without exception, are embraced in his infinite mind of goodwill, the meditation of goodwill is achieved.

Those who take pleasure in the qualities of others easily and rapidly cultivate goodwill, but not so those who take pleasure in

discovering the faults of others. For even persons who have cut off their roots of good (iv.79) are not without their good qualities, and one can even find faults among the Pratyekabuddhas themselves: the consequences of the ancient good deeds of the former, and the bad deeds of the latter, are visible in their bodies, etc.

So too one should understand the meditation or cultivation of compassion and joy. One sees beings falling into the ocean of suffering: one forms the vow (*adhimucyate*): "May they be delivered from suffering! May they enter into joy."[175] In this way one exercises himself in compassion and joy. One who cultivates equanimity takes as his point of departure the category of persons to whom he is indifferent, for the aspect of equanimity is, as we have seen, merely "Beings!"[176]

***

In what sphere of rebirth does one cultivate the Immeasurables?

31e. One produces them among humans.

Only humans can cultivate the Immeasurables and not beings in any of the other spheres of rebirth.

***

When a person possesses one Immeasurable, does he necessarily possess all of the others?

He does not necessarily possess them all.

31f. He necessarily possesses three.

The person who has produced the Third Dhyāna or the Fourth Dhyāna cannot possess joy, since satisfaction is absent in these Dhyānas. When one possesses one Immeasurable, one always possesses three.

***

What are the Deliverances (*vimokṣa*)?

32a. The Deliverances are eight in number.[177]

According to the Sūtra:[178] "One endowed with physical matter sees physical matter" (*rūpi rūpāṇi paśyati*):[179] this is the First Deliverance; 2) not having the idea of internal visible things, he sees external visible things: this is the Second Deliverance; 3) bringing forth agreeable Deliverance, he dwells in this absorption: this is the Third Deliverance (see below, note 196).

The Fourth to the Seventh Deliverances are the four absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu (Ākāśānantyāyatana, etc.). The Eighth Deliverance is the absorption of the extinction of ideas and sensations (*saṁjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*).

32a-b. The first two are meditations on loathsome things; (in two Dhyānas).[180]

The first two Deliverances are, by their nature, meditations on loathsome things (vi.9), for they have for their aspect the idea of a corpse turning blue, etc. [The ascetic considers internal and external visible things, his body or external bodies, under the aspects of a corpse turning blue, etc.] Consequently the rules that concern the first two Deliverances are the same as for the meditations on loathsome things.

32b. They are in two Dhyānas.

They are cultivated only in the first two Dhyānas; when they are cultivated in the First Dhyāna, they oppose[181] attachment to the visible things (*varṇarāga*) of Kāmadhātu; cultivated in the Second Dhyāna, they oppose attachment to the visible things of the First Dhyāna. [In the Second Dhyāna there is no attachment to visible things that should be opposed in the Third Dhyāna, viii, p. 1232, 1241,]

32c. The Third in the last Dhyāna.

The Third Deliverance can only be cultivated in the Fourth Dhyāna.

32d. It is the absence of desire.

It is by nature the root of good absence of desire, not a meditation on loathsome things; in fact it takes for its object a thing that it considers as good: it therefore has the aspect of something good.

***

These three Deliverances, with the *dharmas* that are associated with them, are the five *skandhas*. As for the Deliverances of Ārūpyadhātu:

32d. They are good Ārūpyas and absorption.

The Third to the Seventh Deliverances are the good *ārūpyas*,

that is, they are pure or undefiled (viii.5), and they pertain to absorption (*samahita*), but not the *ārūpya* that is produced at the end of life[182] [viii.16c, note 103].

According to others, the mind and mental states produced by retribution among beings born in Ārūpyadhātu are not concentrated.

The name of "Deliverance" is also given to the Path of Deliverance (Vimuktimārga) of the prefatory stages of the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu (*ārūpyasāmantakasamāpatti,* viii.22), but not to the Irresistable Path (the path of abandoning, Ānantaryamārga) of these same prefatory stages: for these have for their object the lower sphere that they abandon, and the Deliverances receive their name from the fact that they turn away from the lower sphere.[183]

33a. The absorption of extinction (*nirodhasamāpatti*).

The Absorption of Extinction, or more fully the absorption of the extinction of ideas and sensations (*saṁjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*) is the Eighth Deliverance. We have already mentioned it.[184] It is called "Deliverance" because it turns away from ideas (*saṁjñā*) and sensations (*vedita* = *vedanā*); or rather because it turns away from all conditioned things.[185]

According to others, the Eight Deliverances[186] are called deliverances because they deliver one from the obstacles to absorption.[187]

***

The absorption of extinction is realized

33b. Immediately after a subtle-subtle mind.[188]

A mind in Bhavāgra (=Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana), which belongs to the ascetic who is in a position to realize the absorption of extinction, is subtle in comparison with any mind associated with ideas (*saṁjñā*).[189] "Subtle-subtle" (*sūkṣmasūkṣma*) signifies a mind more subtle, but yet one which enters the absorption of extinction [that is to say, "upon which there immediately succeeds . . ."].

> 33c-d. Going out into a pure mind of the sphere of the same absorption, or into a lower Āryan mind.

The absorption of extinction comes to an end when there appears either a pure mind (viii.5) of the sphere of Bhavāgra, the Fourth Ārūpya—the sphere to which the absorption of extinction belongs—or an Āryan, that is, an undefiled mind of the sphere of the Third Ārūpya. Then there is entry into the absorption of extinction by a defiled mind, and going out by a defiled or undefiled mind.[190]

***

What is the object of the Deliverances?

> 34a. The first ones have for their object the visible things of Kāmadhātu.

The first three Deliverances have for their object the physical matter (*rūpāyatana*) of Kāmadhātu, unpleasant physical matter in the first two, pleasant physical matter in the Third.

> 34b. As for those that are non-material, all that which belongs to the Knowledge, the Suffering of their sphere and of a higher sphere, etc.

The Deliverances of Ārūpyadhātu have for their object the Suffering of their sphere and a higher sphere,[191] the cause and the extinction of this Suffering, the totality of Non-dual Knowledge (*anvayajñāna*), the extinction not attained through conscious effort (*apratisaṁkhyānirodha*)[192] and space (*ākāśa*).[193]

***

We have seen (32a-c) that the first two Deliverances belong to the first two Dhyānas, that the Third Deliverance belongs to the Fourth Dhyāna. Why is there no Deliverance in the Third Dhyāna?

Since body consciousness is absent in the Second Dhyāna, there is no craving for the visible things of this Dhyāna [which should be opposed in the Third Dhyāna], because the Third Dhyāna is "agitated by its excellent pleasures".

But if there is no craving for visible things in the Third Dhyāna, what purpose does the ascetic pursue in producing the Third Deliverance [which is a meditation on an agreeable physical object]?

The ascetic should gladden his mind which the meditation on loathsome things has depressed; or rather he should take into consideration his achievement or his lack of achievement. He asks himself if the first two Deliverances have been achieved or not. If, in his contemplation on an agreeable object (the Third Deliverance), defilements do not arise, then the first two Deliverances have been achieved.[194] In fact the ascetic cultivates the Deliverances, the Dominent Āyatanas, etc., with a twofold purpose: 1) to remove, to render more distant, the defilements; and 2) to obtain mastery in absorption. This mastery has for its result the production of the qualities, such as Absence of Contention (Araṇā), etc., and the production of the supernormal powers (*ṛddhi*) of the Āryans: the supernormal power by which a saint

transforms objects or causes them to last, by which he gives up his life, etc.[195]

***

Why does the Sūtra use the expression "having experienced [through the body] (*[kāyeṇa] sākṣātkṛtvā*) in the definition of only the Third and the Eighth Deliverances?[196]

It is because of their excellence and because they are found to exist in the final sphere of the two Dhātus.[197]

***

> 35a. The Dominant Āyatanas (*abhibhvāyatanas*) are eight in number.[198]

1. There is the idea of internal physical matter,[199] and there is the seeing of a small amount of external attractive and unattractive physical matter: [at this time there is the thought, "I have succeeded in (*abhibhūya*) in knowing all of the *rūpas,* I have succeeded in seeing all of the *rūpas.*[200] This is the First Dominant Āyatana.] 2. There is the idea of internal physical matter, and there is the seeing of an unlimited amount of external physical matter. 3. There is an absence of any idea of internal physical matter, but there is the seeing of a small amount of external physical matter. 4. There is an absence of any idea of internal physical matter, but there is the seeing of a large amount of external physical matter. These are the first four Dominant Āyatanas.

5-8. There is an absence of any idea of physical matter, but there is the seeing of external blue, yellow, red, and white. These make a total of eight.

> 35b. Two are like the First Deliverance.

The first two Dominant Āyatanas are similar to the First Deliverance.

35c. The following two are like the Second.

The Third and the Fourth Dominant Āyatanas are like the Second Deliverance.

35d. And the last four are like the Third Deliverance.

And the last four are like the Third Deliverance.

What is the difference between the Deliverances and the Dominant Āyatanas?

Through the Deliverances, one is only "delivered", but through the Dominant Āyatanas, one attains domination of their object. This domination includes the view of the object as one desires and the absence of any defilement provoked by the object.[201]

***

36a. There are ten All-Encompassing Āyatanas (*kṛtsnāyatanas*).[202]

They are called all-encompassing" (*kṛtsna*) because they embrace their object in its totality and exclusively.[203]

They are ten in number: this is the totality of earth, water, fire, and wind; blue, yellow, red, and white; plus the uninterrupted *āyatanas* (*ānantyāyatanas*) of space and consciousness (the First and the Second Absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu).

36b. Eight are the absence of desire.

The first eight are, by nature, the root of good which is absence of desire: (with their concomitant *dharmas*, they are the five *skandhas*).

36c. They belong to the last Dhyāna.

They are realized by an ascetic in the Fourth Dhyāna.

36d. They have Kāmadhātu for their object.

They refer to the visible things (*rūpāyatana*) of Kāmadhātu.

However some think that the Fourth, the All-Encompassing Āyatana of Wind (*vāyukṛtsnāyatana*) has for its object the tangible thing that is called the wind element (*vāyudhātu*). Some think that the first four have tangible things for their object, while the last four have visible things for their object.[204]

36e. Two are pure *ārūpya*.

The last two are pure absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu.

36f. They have the four *skandhas* of their sphere for their object.

Their objects are the four *skandhas* of the sphere to which they belong (the First and Second absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu).

***

The Eight Dominant Āyatanas have the Eight Deliverances for their "entry" and the Ten All-Encompassing Āyatanas have the

Eight Dominant Āyatanas for their entry: the following, in fact, are superior to the preceding ones.

All these qualities can have the mental series of a Pṛthagjana or the mental series of an Āryan for their support, with the exception of the Deliverance of Extinction (*nirodhavimokṣa*) which can only be produced by Āryans.

***

(Concerning the acquisition of these qualities and the persons who can produce them:)

> 37a. Extinction has been explained.

All of the types of the Deliverance of Extinction have been previously mentioned.

> 37b. The others are obtained either through detachment or through cultivation.

The qualities other than the Deliverance of Extinction are obtained either through detachment (*vairāgya*) or through cultivation (*prayoga*) accordingly as they have been, or have not been, habitually cultivated.

> 37d-c. The qualities of Ārūpyadhātu are obtained by beings of the Three Dhātus; the others, only by humans.

The Deliverances and the All-Encompassing Āyatanas of Ārūpyadhātu are cultivated by beings born in any of the Three Dhātus. But only humans can cultivate the other absorptions,—the three Deliverances, the Eight Dominant Āyatanas, and eight

All-Encompassing Āyatanas,—because these absorptions arise through the power of the Teaching.

If this is the case, how can beings born in the spheres (*bhūmi*) of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu realize the *dhyāna* and *ārūpya* absorptions higher than the spheres in which they are born?

They can do this be reason of the power of cause, of actions (*karma*), and the nature of things (*dharmatā*).

> 38a-b. In two spheres, it is through the power of cause and of action (*karma*) that one produces the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu.[205]

In Rūpadhātu and in the lower spheres of Ārūpyadhātu, the higher absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu arise through the power of cause,[206] when they have been, in the course of a previous existence, closely and intensively cultivated.[207] They also arise through the power of action (*karma*), that is to say, by reason of the imminent retribution of a previous action of the category "to be retributed later," including a sphere of retribution higher than that (Rūpadhātu or the lower spheres of Ārūpyadhātu) in which one is born. This is because someone who is not detached from a lower sphere cannot be reborn in a higher sphere.[208]

> 38c-d. In Rūpadhātu, it is through these two powers, and also by reason of the nature of things, that one produces the *dhyānas*.

Beings born in a lower stage of Rūpadhātu produce *dhyānas* higher than the stages in which they have been born because of the two powers described above. Also, at the period at the end of the world,[209] they are produced through the force of *dharmatā*.[210] In this period, all the beings of lower spheres produce higher *dhyānas*, for the efficacy of good *dharmas* becomes fully developed.[211]

***

How long will the Good Law (*saddharma*) of the Blessed One last, during which time these different types of *dharmas*[212] can be clearly known and seen?[213]

39a-b. The nature of the Good Law of the Master is twofold, *āgama* and *adhigama.*[214]

Āgama ("the traditions") is the teaching, the Sūtra, the Vinaya and the Abhidharma.[215] *Adhigama* ("holiness"[216] or understanding) are the *dharmas* aiding Bodhi (the *bodhipākṣikadharmas,* vi.67b, cultivated by the Āryans of the Three Vehicles, and the results of the religious life, vi.51, obtained through the Three Vehicles.) Such is the Good Law, twofold in its nature.

39c-d. Those who preach it and who cultivate it support it.[217]

Those who preach the Good Law, the Sūtras, etc., support the Good Law which is *āgama.* Those who cultivate or who realize the Good Law, the *dharmas* aiding Bodhi, etc., support the Good Law which is *adhigama.* As long as such persons exist in the world, the Good Law will last.

It is said (in the *Saṁyuktāgama, TD* 2, p. 177b19) that the Good Law will last one thousand years after the Parinirvāṇa.

This number refers to the *adhigama;*[218] but according to others, the *āgama* will last longer.[219]

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This present treatise is based on the treatises of the Abhidharma [and includes the sense of the Abhidharma, i.2c]. [There are many ways of explaining the Abhidharma:] according to which interpretation is the Abhidharma explained in this treatise?[220]

> 40. The Abhidharma that is established through the interpretation of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr is, in its totality, what I have explained. That some ideas, poorly grasped, are reproduced here is our fault, for only the Munis are authoritative (*pramāṇa*) in the interpretation of the Good Law.[221]

For the most part, this Abhidharma, which has been spoken by me, is the Abhidharma as established by the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīir. That which, herein, has been poorly grasped, is my fault: for the Buddhas and the sons of the Buddhas alone are the authority for the interpretation of the Good Law.[222]

> 41. The Master, the eye of the world, is closed; the witnesses, for the most part, have perished; the Law is put into confusion by persons who have not seen the Truth; and by bad sophists, independent, from whom nothing is gained.

> 42. For he who knows for himself has departed on the Supreme Path, as well as the supports of the Law of the one who knows for himself: the world no longer has a Protector. The defilements, which destroy spiritual qualities, now have full liberty.

> 43. Seeing that the Law of the Muni is in its last breath, and that it is the hour of the forces of defilements, those who desire liberation should be diligent.[223]

This concludes the Eighth Chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam,* entitled "Instruction in the Absorptions."

1. The *Kārikā* has *samāpattiḥ śubhaikāgryam;* but the Sūtra speaks of *samādhi.* On the traditional summary of Chapter VIII and of *samāpatti-samādhi,* see below viii.23 note 128.

2. Paramārtha translates: "*dhyāna* produced through arising, *dhyāna* produced through concentration."

3. *Kośa,* iii.2c, vi.38a-b, 43 a-b, ii.41d. There are three (or two) stages in the heaven of the First Dhyāna, etc. On the "*dhyāna* existences," see viii.12, 14a, 16c, 19c.

4. Pāḷi: *kusalacittekaggatā* (*Visuddhimagga,* 84; see index); *Majjhima,* i.301, *Saṁyutta,* v.21, *Dhammasaṅgani,* 11 (*cittassekaggatā*) (The translator mentions *Yogāvacara's Manual,* p. xxvi); Mrs Rhys Davis, *Psychology,* 1914, 104 (references to the canonical texts). *samādhi=adhicitta,* vi, p. 978; part of the Path, part of Bodhi, vi. 54d, 70; *ṛddhipāda,* vi.69c-d, part of the Śaikṣa and Aśaikṣa, vi.75.

Bodhisattvabhūmi, fol. 82b, quotes viii. 27c-28.

On *samādhi,* a very "scholastic" text in *Majjhima,* i.301.

The *samādhiskandha* embraces three parts of the Path, *samyagvyāyāma, samyaksmṛti,* and *samyaksamādhi* it then follows that one distinguishes: 1. *samādhi* (=*cittassa ekaggatā*); 2. the *nimittas* of the *samādhi* which are the *smṛtyupasthānas;* 3. the *pariṣkāras* of the *samādhi* which are the *samyakpradhānas*; and 4. the cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the *samādhi* which is the cultivation of the *samādhi,* the *pradhānas,* and the *smṛtyupasthānas* ["cultivation" is understood in the sense of *pariśuddhi, paripūri*].

5. Whoever enters into *dhyāna,* that is to say whoever possesses the absorption called *dhyāna,* necessarily also possesses the mental states and the mind (the four *skandhas*), the "discipline of *dhyāna*" (iv. 2), which is a *rūpa.*

6. *Ekālambanatā cittānām* is the definition of the Abhidharma; but one should understand *cittacaittānām*: "The fact that minds and the mental states . . ."

7. Defined in *Kośa,* ii. 24; English trans. p. 190.

8. In the same way that the Vaiśeṣika maintains that a piece of cloth is white *śuklaguṇayogāt,* through conjunction with the quality of white.

9. All minds contain *samādhi,* but a mind associated (*saṁpraykta*) with a weak *samādhi* is not concentrated (*ekāgra*).

10. According to the *Vyākhyā,* the two definitions in the same Sūtra: *adhicittaṁ śikṣa katama / catvāri dhyānāni.* On the three *śikṣās,* see *Aṅguttara,* i.235; ii.194, *Kośa,* vi.43c, p..

In the same way that *adhiśīlaṁ śikṣā* is *śīta,* so too *adhiprajñaṁ śikṣā* is *prajñā,* and *adhicittaṁ śikṣā* is simply *citta.* Now the *dhyānas* are *adhicittam śikṣa,* and are thus *citta*; the *dhyānas,* moreover, are *samādhi,* thus *samādhi* is *citta.*

In the same way that *śīlapariśuddhi* is *śīla, dṛṣṭipariśuddhi* is *dṛṣṭi,* and *vimuktipariśuddhi* is *vimukti.* (See *Kośa,* vi. 76c, p. 1035)

11. The Sarvāstivādin answers.

12. *Māhāvyutpatti,* 245, 1052 1055, *upanidhyātavya, nidhyāyati. Kośa,* i.41c, where the *Vyākyā* explains: *saṁtīraṇam . . . viṣayopanidhyānapūrvakaṁ niścayākarṣaṇam.*

13. This formula figures notably in the Sūtra of the Five Vimuktyāyatanas quoted in *Vyākhyā ad* i.27 (*Mahāvyutpatti,* 81, *Dīgha,* iii.241, *Aṅguttara,* iii.21); *Saṁyutta,* iii.13: *samāhito bhikkhave bhukkhu yathābhūtaṁ pajānāti;* ii.31 *samādhūpanisaṁ yathābhūtaṁ ñāṇadassanam,* etc. And elsewhere, *Nettippakaraṇa,* 66, *Aṅguttara,* v.3, *Visuddhimagga,* 371, etc.

According to all these texts, *samādhi* is necessary for the exact knowledge necessary for salvation. On this point, see *Compendium,* 55, 75; *Kośa,* vi. Foreword p., viii.22d.

14. According to Hsüan-tsang and the glosses of Saeki. According to Paramārtha: "Some other masters say that *ting* 定 (= *samādhi*) is *dhyāna*. What is the meaning of *dhyāna*? Through "ting" one obtains knowing, seeing, so it is called *dhyāna*. Why? Because the mind that obtains *ting* [=the *samāhita* mind] truly knows and sees. The word *dhyāna* signifies *ssu* 思 (*cintā, cetanā*); *liang* 量 (to measure). *Ssu* is *prajñā*. Such is the Siddhānta."

15. As an advance chariot is pulled by two mares bound by a yoke, so *dhyāna* is bound by *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. In the Ārūpyas, calm is great, intellection small; the opposite in Anāgamya (viii.22); in the *dhyānas*, there is equilibrium.

Śamatha = *samādhi* = absorption; *vipaśyana* = *prajñā*.

The editors of the Pāḷi Text Society (against several manuscripts) read *yuganandha* (*Paṭisambhidā*, ii.92 and foll.; *Visuddhimagga*, 149): "Some cultivate *vipassana* preceded by *samatha;*... some cultivate *samatha* preceded by *vipassana*... some cultivate *samatha* and *vipassana* bound together (*samathavipassanaṁ yuganandhaṁ bhāveti*)." "The *dharmas* bound together and which are called *samādhi* and *prajñā* do not go beyond one another... (*samādhipaññāsaṁkhātā yuganandhadhammā aññamaññam anativattamānā*...) *Bodhicāryāvatāra*, viii.4, *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 119, *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, xiv.9. *Compendium*, 55, 75.

In Tantrism, *yuganaddhaka* or *yuganaddhakrama* is the non-distinction of *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, of *grāhaka* and *grāhya*, etc. (*Pañcakrama*, p. 46-48).

16. On defiled *dhyāna*, the story of the monk who believes himself to be a Srotaāpanna of the First Dhyāna, an Arhat in the Fourth, but who in fact remains subject to desire, Przyluski, *Açoka*, 390.

Three bad "meditators," *dhyāyin*, *Kośa*, v. 21b-d trans. p. 800 and note 76; *Majjhima*, iii.14.

17. The meaning of *vitarka, vicāra, prīti*, and *sukha*, is explained below.

In *Niddesa*, p. 373, an interesting essay on the classification of the *dhyānas*.

18. There is a difficulty. How does the author, by saying that the First Dhyāna is *vicāraprītisukhavat*, say implicitly that this Dhyāna also "contains *vitarka*"? In fact, *dhyānāntara* "contains *vicāra*" and "contains *vitarka*." The *Vyākhyā* explains: *yathā dhyānāntare vicāro na prītisukhavān ity avitarko naivam ayaṁ vicāraḥ / viśeṣito hy ayaṁ vicāraḥ prītisukhasahapaṭhitaḥ / vicāraprītisukhavad iti prītisukhavatā vicāreṇa prītisukhena ca saṁprayuktam prathamaṁ dhyānam ity arthaḥ.*

Vasubandhu does not say *vitarkaprītisukhavat*, because he wishes to say that the other Dhyānas lose, in this order, the parts indicated. If one were to define the Second Dhyāna as without *vitarka*, then *dhyānāntara* would be confused with the Second Dhyāna.

19. On the Ārūpyas, see *Majjhima*, i.2, 164, 410, ii.261 (where the first two are ignored), *Visuddhimagga*, lll, 336-340; *Comm. on the Dīgha, Dialogues*, iii. p. 273: *ākāśānañcāyatana* is a *dhyāna* which has the infinity of space for its object; references to the notes of Rhys Davids, *ibid.* p. 216.

20. Paramārth translates: "Separation-sphere-lower arises." Hsüan-tsang: "Separation lower sphere arisen, from whence the division into four." P'u-kuang (*TD* 41, p. 418b16) explains, "It is fourfold because it arises from separation from arising in a lower sphere." Fa-pao (*TD* 41, p. 788c3) says, "It is fourfold by reason of separation from arising in a lower sphere": "separation from arising" signifies "separation from defiled *dharmas*," or rather "to separate oneself and to arise." One arises above because one separates oneself from what is below.

21. *Kośa* iii.3 explains how Ārūpyadhātu, which does not include any places, or stages, is still fourfold from the point of view of the mode of existence of the gods who arise there: *ārūpyadhātur asthāna upapattyā caturvidhaḥ.* The *Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka* (*ad Aṣṭasāhasrikā* 153, 18), after having quoted this definition, adds a line (borrowed from which *Śāstra?*): *dhyānād ūrdhvaṁ sasaṁsthāno rūpeṣadbhāvo 'tha vā* (Sic MSS): "Or rather,

placed above the world of the *dhyānas* (= Rūpadhātu), it includes shape, for there exists there a small amount of *rūpa*." Buddhist cosmology recognizes some heavens superimposed on Ārūpyadhātu in which there are mansions (*kung* 宫); see for example Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, article "Cosmology."

Kathāvatthu, viii.8, xvi.9. The Andhakas maintain that some subtle matter exists in Ārūpyadhātu (by reason of the text = *vijñānapratyayanāmarūpam*, see above p. 1222). See Vasumitra and Bhavya.

The Mahāsāṁghikas and Mahīśasakas,—and the *Vibhāṣā* adds the Vibhajyavādins (see below),—admit the existence of *rūpa*.

Notes of the Japanese editor—*Commentary on the Samayabheda:* The six types of consciousness (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*) exist in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu. But, if *rūpa* exists in Ārūpyadhāu, why is it called Ārūpyadhātu? Because subtle *rūpa* exists there, but not gross *rūpa*.

Vibhāṣā, (*TD* 27, p. 431b6): Some say that *rūpa* exists in Ārūpyadhātu, as do the Vibhajyavādins . . . The Mahāsāṁghikas think that in Ārūpyadhātu there is a *rūpa* which is the result of action.

The *Śāriputrābhidharma* says that, in Ārūpyadhātu, there is a *rūpa*, namely the *rūpa* that forms part of the *dharmāyatana* (*Kośa*, iv. English trans. p. 561).

The Mahāyāna says that in Ārūpyadhātu there is a *rūpa* which is the result of *samādhi*. See *Mahādharmabherīsūtra* (*TD* 9, p. 293c10) and the *Mahāyāna Parinirvāṇa sūtra* (*TD* 12, p. 415a17, a25): "The saints of the Two Vehicles cannot know how the gods of Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana are . . . Only the Buddha knows of those that have life (*ayus*, *shou-ming* 壽命) among the *Asaṁjñin* gods; the same for beings in Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana."

22. *Vyākyā:* "According to others, we should understand: By virtue of the text: *sarvaśo rūpasaṁjñānāṁ samatikramāt*, it is proved that there is no longer any *rūpa* in *ārūpyasamāpatti*." The Japanese editor understands: "Because it is denied that there is *anāsrava saṁvara* in this *samāpatti*."

23. See iii.14a. "Transparent" poorly renders the sense of the word *accha*. This refers to a *rūpa* which can pass through other *rūpas*, a material resembling ether."

24. For "the absorption existences" (*upapatti*), like the "absorptions" (*samāpatti*), become better and better.

25. See ii.14, iii.3.

26. On *saṁsṛṣṭa*, vii. p. 1099, and iii.32a-b.

Mahākoṭṭhita converses with Sāriputta on this subject, *Majjhima*, i.206 (See *Kośa*, ii.45, English trans. p. 233).

27. But the two Chinese versions, here and below, read: *nāmarūpa-vijñānayor*, a reading confirmed by the Pāḷi sources.

However the *Vyākyā* quotes the Sūtra: *tadyathāyuṣman śāruputra dve naḍakalāpyāv ākāśa ucchrite syātām / te'nyonyaniśrite / anyonyaṁ niśritya tiṣṭheyātām / tatra kaścid ekām apanayed / dvītīya nipatet / dvitīyām apanayed ekā nipatet / evam āyuśman śāriputra nāma ca rūpaṁ cānyonyaniśritam anyonyaṁ niśritya tiṣṭhati* . . . Same comparison in *Saṁyutta*, ii.114; but *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna*, not *rūpa* and *nāman*.

28. Argument of the Vibhajyavādins according to the *Vibhāṣā*, see above, note 21.

29. A very close edition, *Saṁyutta*, iii. 53 (trans. of Warren, p. 162).

30. *Vyākyā*. The stanza: *āyur uṣmā'thā vijñānam* . . . "When life, heat and *vijñāna* leave the body, it remains, deserted, insensible, like a piece of wood" (ii.45a), proves that the Sūtra refers only to Kāmadhātu, for 1. there is no physical body in Ārūpyadhātu; 2. in Rūpadhātu,

the body exists, but "does not continue after death": *rūpadhātu tu yadi api kāyo'sti tatra kāyanidhanam* [according to iii.9].

31. The formula for those beings who spontaneously arise (*upādukas*) is : *vijñānapratyayaṁ ṣaḍāyatanam,* for *nāmarūpa* are five *skandhas* which have not yet taken up the state of *ṣaḍāyatana* (*aniṣpannaṣaḍāyatanāvastha*); now *ṣaḍāyatana* exists from the very begining of *upapāduka* beings, *Kośa,* ii.14, p. 175.

32. This results from the Sūtra of which we have the Pāḷi edition in *Dīgha* ii.63: *vijñānaṁ ced ānanda mātuḥ kukṣiṁ navakrāmed api nu tan nāmarūpaṁ kalalatvāya saṁmūrchet / no bhadanta / vijñānaṁ ced ānandāvakrāmya kṣipram evāpakrāmed api nu tan nāmarūpaṁ itthatvāya prajñāyeta / no bhadanta / vijñānaṁ ced ānanda daharasya kumārasya kumārikāyā vā ucchidyeta vinaśyen na bhaved api nu tan nāmarūpaṁ vṛddhiṁ vipulantām āpadyeta / no bhadanta.*

33. The *Udāyīsūtra* (*Kośa,* ii. 44d, English trans. p. 229) says: *bhedāc ca kāyasyātikramya devān kavaḍīkārāhārabhakṣān anyatamasmin divye manomayakāya upapadyate.*
Aṅguttara, iii.192, compare *Dīgha,* i.34, 186.

34. *Prītyāhāravacanāt;* iii.98.

35. *Ye te śāntavimokṣā atikramya rūpāṇy ārūpyāḥ* . . . viii.32.

36. *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 581b19.

37. Compare Udāna, iii.10. *Bhava* defined i.8c.
See the Foreword to Chapters V and VI, p. xxi. Through the first worldly *dhyāna,* which is a certain *dhyāna,* one cannot rise above the First Dhyāna; and thus following. There is no *bhava* by which one can go beyond Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana which is Bhavāgra, the summit of *bhava.* Furthermore. one cannot encounter a definitive departure from a lower state in any superior state of existence, for falling is always possible. Thus one leaves *bhava* only through the Path which does not from part of the Dhātus, and which is not *bhava.*

38. *Vibhāṣa, TD* 27, p. 431b15: Objection of the Vibhajyavādins: If there is absolutely no *rūpa* or physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu, then the *rūpa* of beings who die in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu and who are reborn in Ārūpyadhātu, and who, later, die in Ārūpyadhātu and are reborn below, will have been cut off for 20,000, 40,000, and 80,000 *kalpas.* How is their *rūpa* produced anew? If, as you suppose, their *rūpa,* having been cut off, abandoned (*prahīṇa*), is produced anew, what would prevent us from saying that the *saṁskāras,* even though cut off and abandoned upon the obtaining of Nirvāṇa, would reappear later? In order to avoid this problem, one should admit that *rūpa* exists in Ārūpyadhātu.

39. Paramārtha: "Because it is perfumed (*vāsita*) by a former cause which should ripen in *rūpa,* the mind has the efficacy to now produce *rūpa.*"
It indeed appears that the expression *vāsanā* (*Kośa,* iv.27d, p. 594, vii.28c,p. 1137, 30c, 32d) is foreign to the Sarvāstivāda. However this may be, Saṁghabhadra does not use it.
Saṁghabhadra, in his *Prakaraṇaśāsana* (*TD* 29, p 964b26) says, "What is the meaning of the expression *ārūpya*? It means that there is no *rūpa* there. When one dies [in Ārūpyadhātu] and is born below, the *rūpa* arises from *citta.* We maintain that, in this world, material and non-material (*rūpin, arūpin*) *dharmas* are produced in fact in reciprocal dependence: from the change of the mind there arises the diversity of *rūpa;* when the material organs are modified, the *vijñāna* is likewise different. Thus, when a being dying in Ārūpyadhātu arises below, the series of his mind (*cittasaṁtati*) is found to be favorable to the production of *rūpa,* and, by its force, the *rūpa* of a lower existence if favorable to this arising. However it is not permissible to say that *rupa* arises solely from the mind. It also exists by reason of the series-of-mind-accompanied-by-*rūpa* of a former existence: the *rūpa,* destroyed for a long time, is its own seed. We maintain in fact that *sabhāgahetu* is at one and

the same time past and present (ii.52a, p. 262). For the Arhats who have already attained Nirvāṇa have cut off without residue the series of the *skandhas;* there does not remain any cause which could produce the arising of new *skandhas:* there is no case to which one could apply the example of a being who dies in Ārūpyadhātu [and takes up a new *rūpa*]. (See the argument of the Vibhajyavādins, note 38).

In his *Nyāyānusāra* (*TD* 29, p. 757c17), Saṁghabhadra says, "The *āgamas* quoted by our adversary do not prove that *rūpa* exists in Ārūpyadhātu. His argument from reason has no value, for, even though there is no *rūpa* in Ārūpyadhātu, the *rūpa* of a being of Ārūpadhātu who has just died and is about to be reborn below comes from the mind. We state that in this world. . .

40. iii.3c-d: *nikāyaṁ jīvitaṁ cātra niśritā cittasaṁtatiḥ;* see ii, 41, 45.

41. *Vyākhyā: prayogakāla ākāśādīny ākambanāni.* Hsüan-tsang: The ascetic, in his preparatory exercise, thinks "Space is infinite," "The sixfold *vijñāna* is infinite," "There is nothing."

On the *ārūpyas,* and how one obtains them, see *Majjhima,* i.164, Sutta 121, *Visuddhimagga,* 326 and following.

Vibhāṣā (*TD* 27, p. 432c23): "It is not by reason of its nature or by reason of its object, but by reason of its *prayoga* that *ākāśānantya* receives its name. The beginner (*ādikārmika*) considers the characteristic of emptiness of the top of a wall, of a tree, of a house; when he has 'grasped' this characteristic of infinite *ākāśa.*" In the *ārūpyas,* the ascetic considers *anitya, pratyaya,* etc.

Vasumitra explains how, in *ākiṁcanya* (preparatory stage), the notion of subject and object is dispelled; see above Chap. VII note 323.

42. This is a question as to whether or not there is *saṁjñā* in the fourth *ārūpya,* the sphere of "non-*saṁjñā* and neither non-*saṁjñā.*" *Aṅguttara,* iv.426; *Kathāvatthu,* xiii.12; Vasumitra and Bhavya.

The "absorption of the cessation of *saṁjñā* and *vedanā*" can be obtained only by an ascetic who has entered into this *ārūpya* (ii.44d, English trans. p. 229 and iii.6c). From this fact, one can conclude that *saṁjñā* exists there. (On the subtle-subtle mind, viii.33b).

43. Compare *Majjhima,* i.435, ii.230; *Aṅguttara,* iv.422, *Visuddhimagga,* 335. This refers to the *saṁjñās* of the lower absorptions. In fact one enters into the fourth *ārūpya* by being disgusted with it, by a meditation practiced in the *sāmantaka* of the third *ārūpya.*

44. That is to say "a cause of stupidity" (*saṁmohakāraṇa*).

45. *kasmāt tu tais tad evaṁ gṛhyate,* that is to say, according to the *Vyākyā : tair iti tatsamāpattibhis tad iti naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatanam evaṁ gṛhyata iti naiva saṁjñā nāsaṁjñeti gṛhyata ity arthaḥ /*

46. Hsüan-tsang: The *maulasamāpattis, dhyānas* and *ārūpyas,* explained above are eight in number . . .

Paramārtha: The *maulasamāpattis,* considered as real *dharmas* (or *dravyas*), are solely eight *dravyas:* four *rūpasamāpattis* and four *ārūpyasamāpattis.*

Vyākhyā: samāpattidravyāṇi maulānīti śākhās teṣāṁ nopanyasyanta ity abhiprāyaḥ. The Śākhās or "branches" are the *sāmantakas* (viii. 22a) and *dhyānāntara,* or *asaṁjñisamāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti.*

47. Here we should give up translating *anāsrava* by "pure," a translation justified elsewhere by the synonym *amala, nirmala.*

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 821c17. *Anāsrava samāpatti* is pure in the proper sense of the word; why not call it *śuddhaka?* . . . Some say: The name is established by reason of the difference of meaning. The *samāpatti* which is at one and the same time good (*kuśaka*) and

possessing-*āsravas* (*sāsrava, laukika*), is the first contradiction of the defiled *dharmas:* it is called *śuddha* because the sense of purity is dominant in it. The sense of *anāsrava* is dominant in the Noble Path.

Śuddhaka means *kuśala sāsrava; anāsrava* is the Path. But the *kuśala sāsrava* absorption is *samala, sakaṣāya, saviṣa, sakaṇṭaka, sāsrava,* and *sadoṣa:* how can one call it *śuddhaka*? Now it is called thus, even though it is not absolutely pure, because it is partially so, because it is not mixed with *kleśa;* because it opposes the *kleśas;* because it favors the *anāsrava* absorption which is pure in the true sense of the word; because it is favorable (*anukūla*) to the Path; and because it is the escort of the *anāsravas.*

48. That is to say, "one cannot, having entered into this eighth absorption, meditate on the Path." *Vibhāṣā,* 162.11. One cannot practice the Path in Kāmadhātu, nor in Bhavāgra. See Foreword to Chapters V-VI.

49. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 85.7: *āsvādanasaṁprayuktadhyāna. Aṅguttara,* ii.126: "A person . . . enters and abides in the First Dhyāna; he tastes it, loves it, and finds therein sensible delight (*taṁ assādeti taṁ nikāmeti tena ca vittiṁ āpajjati*). If he dies without having fallen from it, he is reborn in the world of the Brahmakāyikas." The same for the other Dhyānas, with rebirth in the heaven which is suitable to it.

This text is invoked by the Andhakas against the Theravādins in the *Kathāvatthu,* siii.7.

50. One will find in F. Heiler, *Buddhistische Versenkung,* 1922, a very complete European bibliography. The most notable Pāḷi sources are *Vibhaṅga,* 257, *Visuddhi,* 139. Among the European works, Burnouf, *Lotus,* 800, Senart, *Mahāvastu,* i.552 (forgotten by Heiler). It is quite evident that the canonical definitions remain obscure, in spite of the efforts of the Ābhidhārmikas-Ābhidhammikas.

51. In the *Bhāṣya* of the first line, Hsüan-tsang says, "The *kārikā* designates *teng-ch'ih* 等持 (= *samādhi*) by the word *ting* 定 (fixed, set): the words differ, but the meaning is the same. This is why the Sūtra (*Saṁyukta,* 28.21; see also *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 788c19) says "The *ting* 定 (*sthiti*) of the mind, the *teng-ting* 等定 (*saṁsthiti*) of the mind, is what is called *samyaksamādhi*; it is also called *śubhaikāgrya.*"

In the *Bhāṣya* of the third line, Paramārtha says, "By *chu* 住 (*sthiti*) one should understand *śubhaikāgrya,* because *chu* 住 is another name for *samādhi.* The Sūtra says, 'What is *samādhi*? It is the *chu* 住 (fixedness) of the mind in a correct object (*samyagviṣaya*), correct condition (*avasthā*).'"

The First Dhyāna: contains *vitarka, vicāra, prīti* (= *saumanasya,* agreeable sensation of the *manas,* "satisfaction," ii.8a), *sukha* (= *praśrabdhi,* forming part of the *saṁskāraskandha,* ii.25, English trans. p. 191), and *samādhi.*

The Second Dhyāna: contains *adhyātmasamprasāda* (=*śraddhendriya*), *prīti* (=saumanasya), *sukha* (= *praśrabdhi*) and *samādhi.*

The Third Dhyāna: contains *upekṣā* (= *saṁskāropekṣā,* ii. 25, English trans. p. 192), *smṛti, saṁprajanya, sukha* (agreable sensation, *vedanā,* ii.7c), and *samādhi.*

The Fourth Dhyāna: contains *upekṣā* (neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable sensation), *upekṣā-pariśuddhi* (= *saṁskāropekṣā*), *smṛtipatiśuddhi,* and *samādhi.*

52. Here Paramārtha adds "These five in absorption are capable of bringing about opposing *praśrabdhi.*"

53. *Caturaṅgasenavāt:* compare *Samantapāsādikā,* i.146: "In the same way that one understands by "army" the parts of the army and no other (*yathā senaṅgesu eva sanāsammuti*), in this way one understands by Dhyāna the fine parts and nothing else . . . The *Vibhaṅgha* says: "Dhyāna contains *vitarka, vicāra, prītisukha,* and *cittasya ekāgratā*"; . . . thus *cittaikāgratā* is also a part." In this same way the School teaches that *dharmapravicaya* is at one and the same time both Bodhi and a part of Bodhi, that *samyagdṛṣṭi* is both the

Path and a part of the Path, and that absorption from food is both Upavāsa and a part of Upavāsa (iv.29, English trans. p. 597).

54. The formula of this *upekṣā* is given in *Vyākhyā*, iii. 35: *cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā naiva sumanā bhavati [= nānuniyate] na durmanā bhavati [= na pratihanyate] upekṣako bhavati [= nābhujati / kathaṁ nābhujati kiṁ pratisaṁkhyāya āhosvid apratisaṁkhyāya iti viśeṣayann āha] smṛtimān saṁprajānan [= smṛtisaṁprayuktayā prajñayā pratisamīkṣamāṇaḥ]*. As is the case of visual consciousness and its objects, so too for the five other consciousnesses. This sixfold equanimity is the sixfold *sātata, satatavihāra*. See vii.32, note 186.

This is "*majjhatta*" of the mind, in the *Vibhaṅga; Visuddhimagga*, 659.

Samantapāsādikā, i.150, commentary on *upekkhako vihāsim*.

55. It is for this reason that it is said that the Buddha is never *apratisaṁkhyāya upekṣā*. How one can expell bad *upekṣā* by good *upekṣā*, iii.35d.

56. *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27, p. 412a26): The parts of the *dhyānas* have eighteen different names; but how many actual entities are there? Only eleven. In the First Dhyāna, there are five names and five things. In the Second Dhyāna, the parts are four in number, three as in the First and *adhyātmasaṁprasāda*. In the Third Dhyāna, five parts: but the fifth has already been mentioned; and four new ones. In the Fourth Dhyāna, four parts; the last three have been mentioned; one adds the first. . .

In the first two Dhyānas, there is *praśrabdhisukha*, that is, *sukha* consisting of *praśrabdhi;* in the Third, there is *vedanāsukha, sukha* consisting of sensation. The *sukha* of the first two Dhyānas forms part of the *saṁskāraskandha;* the *sukha* of the Third is part of the *vedanāskandha*. . .

The unity of the object of the mind (*cittaikāgrya*) is *dhyāna* because *dhyāna* is by nature *samādhi* (that is to say *cittaikāgrya*). The *samādhi* and the other [*dharmas*] so enumerated are parts of the *dhyāna*.

See *Kośa*, vi. trans. p. 922.

57. In the *Vibhaṅga*, the *sukha* of the First Dhyāna is *cetasika sukha, cetosaṁphassaja sukha;* this *sukha* is accompanied by *pīti* and is thus called *pītisukha; pīti* is *pāmojja . . . attamanatā cittassa*.

On *praśrabdhi*, ii.17c, 25, English trans. p. 191, iv.48 (*saṁskāraskandha*).

Vibhāṣā quoted note 56.

Saṁghabhadra, TD 29, p. 761a2: In our system it is not said that *praśrabdhi* is *sukhendriya* (=agreeable sensation), rather *praśrabdhi* is the cause of *sukha*, the *sukha* part of the first two Dhyānas . . . In Scripture, it is not only the *vedanā sukhā* (agreeable sensation) which is called *sukha;* some other *dharmas* receive this name. Thus it is said that there are three *sukhas, prahāṇasukha, virāgasukha* (?), and *nirodhasukha;* elsewhere it is said that *sukha* is fivefold, *pravrajyāsukha, vivekasukha, śamathasukha, bodhisukha* (see vi.50b, p. 1006), and *nirvāṇasukha*. The term *sukha* thus designates, in the Sūtras, all types of *dharmas* . . .

58. *Vyākhyā ad* iii.32c. The *sukha* of the Third Dhyāna rests only on the *manas*, not on the other organs (*mana evāśritam*). Kāmadhātu has no *sukha* of the sphere of *manas* (*manobhūmika sukha*).

59. "Agreeable sensation having for its support the five organs made up of the atoms, sensation associated with the five consciousnesses (visual . . . touch)." ii 25, English trans. p. 191.

60. Beings arisen in the heaven of the First Dhyāna possess visual consciousness, etc.; but not the persons who have entered into the absorption of the First Dhyāna.

61. *Vyākhyā: samāhitāvasthāntarālasamudācārāt / dārṣṭāntikānāṁ kilaiṣa pakṣaḥ / teṣāṁ hi na dvibhūmikam eva sukhendriyaṁ kāmaprathamadhyānabhūmikaṁ kiṁ tarhi caturbhūmikam*

(= *Sukhendriya* not only belongs to the two "spheres", to Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, but also to the Second and to the Third Dhyāna). *Ata eva ca vibhāṣāyām bhadantena sautrāntikenoktam ābhidhārmikāṇāṁ paramaṭeneva (?) cakṣurvijñānādikam adhastād ūrdhvam ākṛṣyata iti tad evaṁ asyeṣṭam bhavati cakṣurvijñānādikam dvitīyādidhyānabhūmikam api bhavatīty api.* The Ābhidhārmikas think that visual consciousness exists only in Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna (i.46, viii.13a); but they admit that beings in higher Dhyānas see by means of a lower visual consciousness: "the visual consciousness is drawn from below to above as with a machine" (?). In the *Vibhāṣā,* the Sautrāntika Bhadanta thinks that it is simpler to admit that the visual consciousness is of the sphere of the Second Dhyāna . . .

62. How can a mental (*caitasika*) sensation be felt by the body (*kāyena*)?

63. The *Vibhaṅga* (p. 259) here understands *sukha* as *cetasika sukha* (as do the Vaibhāṣikas), and it explains *kāya* as the three *skandhas* of *saññā, saṁkhāra,* and *viññāṇa.*
Kāyena sākṣātkaroti, vi.43c, 58b, viii.9, 35n. *SBE.* 45, p.23.

64. *Vyākhyā: caturthe dhyāne praśrabdhisukhaṁ bhuyo bhavati bahutaraṁ bhavati dhyānāntarebhyaś caturbhasya praśrabdhataravāt / tadbhūyastv 'pi sukhasyāvacanam / caturthe dhyāne sukhaṁ nocyate / tasya sukhasyāvacanād vedanā sukham eva tṛtīya dhyāne na caturthe sukhā vedanāstīti tatra nocyata ity abhiptāyaḥ.*
In the Fourth Dhyāna the *sukha* which consists of *praśrabdhi,* "well-being," is greater than in the lower stages, and yet one does not attribute *sukha* to this stage: hence it results that, in the lower stages the part of *sukha* signifies the sensation of *sukha,* the *sukha* of sensation [and not *praśrabdhisukha*], and that, in the Fourth Dhyāna, there is no sensation of *sukhā.*

65. According to the *Vyākhyā.* The *Bhāṣya* only gives the first words of the Sūtra (as we see in the version of Paramārtha).
a. Hsüan-tsang: Further, because the Sūtra (*Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 123a13) says: *yasmin samaye āryaśrāvakaḥ pravivekajāṁ prītiṁ kāyena sākaṣātkṛtvopasaṁpadya viharati pañcāsya dharmās tasmin samaye prahīyante pañca dharmā bhavanāparipūriṁ gacchanti [iti vistaraḥ yāvad bhāvanīyā dharmāḥ katame / tadyathā prāmodyaṁ (?) prītiḥ praśrabdhiḥ sukhaṁ samādhiś ca.*]
Compare the list in *Saṁyutta,* iv.76. *Aṅguttara,* v.l, etc. (*prāmodyādayaḥ*).
b. Paramārtha: "Further, because the Sūtra distinguishes *praśrabdhi* and *sukha.* As the Sūtra says: *yasmin samaye āryaśravāvakaḥ praśrabdhijāṁ prītiṁ kāyena sākṣātkṛtvā upasaṁpadya viharati.* In the Sūtra *praśrabdhi* is named separately from *sukha.* We know thus that they differ." [The reading *praśrabdhijā* is perhaps a mistake.]

66. *Vyākhā:* "Thus, in the first three Dhyānas, *sukha* is only bodily *sukha.*"

67. *Vyākhyā: samādhijasya abahirbhūtasya kāyavijñānasaṁprayuktasya veditasukhasya samādhyanukūlatvāt.*

68. *Vyākhyā:* A touch consciousness of the sphere of Kāmadhātu cannot grasp a tangible of the sphere of Rūpadhātu from whence it results that the touch consciousness which grasps *praśrabdhi* is of the sphere of Rūpadhātu, and that the agreeable sensation (*sukha*) associated with this consciousness can be a "part of *dhyāna.*"

69. According to Hsüan-tsang: *naiṣa doṣaḥ / praśrabdhipratyayasya vijñānasya utpatteḥ;* according to Paramārtha: *naiṣo'rthaḥ svayam praśrabdhivijñānasya utpatteḥ.*
The *Vyākhyā* gives a very satisfying explanation: "The organ of touch of the person in absorption [even though it is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu], passes into a state such [*tām anasthāṁ gataṁ yad. . .*] that it can be the support of a touch consciousness of a higher sphere.
Saṁghabhadra, *TD* 29, p. 761b10. The Vaibhāṣika: Further, it is inadmissible that, having

for its support (*āśraya*) an organ of touch (*kāyendriya*) of Kāmadhātu, there arises a consciousness of a tangible of the sphere of Rūpadhātu. Thus one cannot say that the touch consciousness (*kāyavijñāna*) of a Kāmadhātu body would grasp a tangible of *praśrabdhi* arisen from *dhyāna*. If one answers us that even though this tangible is produced internally (by supporting itself on an internal object), it is capable of producing a similar consciousness [of a tangible of Rūpadhātu] even though this latter is supported on a body in Kāmadhātu, this response is nothing more than vain words, without reason or texts to sustain it. What reason or text establishes that a body of Kāmadhātu would grasp a *rūpa* which is *praśrabdhi,* and not another tangible? This thesis contradicts the authorities; only the doctrine of the Abhidharma is irreproachable. Here the Sthavira says: How do you know that *praśrabdhi* is called of *sukha*? . . .

70. To the Vaibhāṣikas, *praśrabdhi* (=the part of *dhyāna* called *sukha*) is a *saṁskāra* which can be *anāsrava*. For his opponent, the said part of *dhyāna* is the sensation associated with touch consciousness which knows *praśrabdhi,* a certain tangible.

71. This question is discussed ii.25, English trans. p. 191.

72. Hsüan-tsang adds: "It is said in the Sūtra fifteen *dhātus* are solely *sāsrava*"; *Kośa,* i.31c-d: English trans. p. 95, in the note; see *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 871c11.

73. ii.33, p. 202-4, seei.33, English trans. 97; iv.lld; viii., note 74, 27c-28.

74. The *Vhyākhā* mentions two readings: *vitarkavicārayor ayaugapadyaṁ doṣavacanāc ca* and *doṣāvacanāt* (= *asamavadhānena ca na kaścid doṣa ucyata ity arthaḥ*). Paramārtha follows the second reading.

75. The Sautrāntikas, according to Saeki; above, the Dārṣṭāntikas.

76. Paramārtha (p. 298c24): the ancient masters do not say this. One cannot, according to their authority, know which *dharmas* are parts of the Path(? *pu sui k'o chih* 不隨可知).

77. *Vyākhyā: yogācarabhūmidarśanena vicāryam etat.* Then there follows an exposition of the doctrine of Saṁghabhadra: *tatra kautūhalaṁ pātayety ācāryasaṁghabhadraḥ / ayaṁ cātrārthasaṁkṣepo draṣṭavyaḥ.*

The *dhyānas* contain a large number of *dharmas:* why are certain *dharmas* considered as parts (*aṅga*)? The *dharmas* which are *pratipakṣāṅga* or opposition, *anuśaṁsāṅga* or excellence, and *tadubhāyāṅga* or both opposition and excellence are considered as parts, [In the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu one does not distinguish parts, because the taste of all of them is calmness, *śamathaikarasatā*]. In the First Dhyāna: 1. *vitarka* and *vicāra* are opposed to the bad minds (*vitarka*) of Kāmadhātu (*kāma* or lust, *vyāpāda* or injury, and *vihiṁsa* or killing); 2. *prīti* and *sukha* are obtained when *vitarka* and *vicāra* have expelled their opposites (*vipakṣa*), and through the fact of the separation from these opposites; and 3. *samādhi* or *cittaikāgratā,* concentration or one-pointedness-of-mind through whose force the four other parts exist. In the Second Dhyāna: the *adhyātmasaṁprasāda* is opposed to *vitarka* and *vicāra; prīti* and *sukha* constitute the part of excellence. In the Third Dhyāna: *upekṣā, smṛti* and *saṁprajanya* are opposed to *prīti; sukha* is the part of excellence. In the Fourth Dhyāna: *upekṣapariśuddhi* and *smṛtipariśuddhi* are opposed to *sukha; aduḥkhāsukhavedanā* is the part of excellence. See *Vibhaṅga,* 263.

78. Yogasūtra, i.47.

79. *Śraddhā prasādaḥ;* ii.25, English trans. p. 191.

Vasumitra (in *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 415c28) compares *vitarka-vicāra* to waves which trouble the waters; when they have been expelled the mind is *saṁprasanna,* like the water which becomes clear when the waves have been calmed; thus faith (*śraddhā*) is called *adhyātmasaṁprasāda.*

80. Paramārtha omits these explanations.

81. The *Vyākhyā* gives some examples: *paryeṣakamanojalpāvasthā vitarkaḥ / pratyavekaṣakamanojalpāvasthā vicāraḥ* (see *Kośa*, ii, English trans. p. 203) / *vāksamutthāpikāvasthāvitarkaḥ / tadanyāvasthā vicāra iti bhagavadviśeṣaḥ / avikṣiptāvasthā samādhiḥ / praśāntavāhitavasthā cittasyādhyātmasaṁprasāda iti* / On the existence of *caitasikas* distinct from the *citta* (and of *bhautikas* distinct from the *mahābhūtas*), see ii, English trans. p. 188.

82. Hsüan-tsang: "However reasonable this may be, this is not my system."

83. The Sthaviras, according to P'u-kang (*TD* 41, p. 424c5) and Fa-pao (*TD* 41, p. 792c29).
Hsüan-tsang: How does another school maintain that *prīti* is not *saumanasya*? It says that there is a separate *prīti*, a *caitasika dharma;* as the *sukha* of the Three Dhyānas is totally *saumanasya, prīti* and *saumanasya* are distinct.

84. See ii.7c-8a, p. 161, on *prīti*.

85. Paramārtha (*TD* 29, p, 299a9) transcribes *pi-p'o-li-to ching* 毘波利多經 See also *Kośa*, v.9a, *Madhyāma* (*TD* 1, p. 695b4), *Saṁyutta*, v.213, *Majjhima*, iii.26, *Atthasālinī*, 175.
Hsüan-tsang translates: "The Buddha, in the *Sūtra of the Explanation of the Viparyāsas*, teached the gradual disappearance of the five *indriyas* of sensation, *daurmanasya*, etc. [In the First Dhyāna, the destruction of the *daurmanasya*, in the Second of *duḥkha*], in the Third of *saumanasya*, in the Fourth of *sukha*. Thus *prīti* is *saumanasya*."

86. Definition of the Fourth Dhyāna: *sa sukhasya ca prahāṇād duḥkhasya ca prahāṇat pūrvam eva saumanasyadaurmanasyayor astaṁgamād aduḥkham asukham upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhaṁ caturthaṁ dhyānam* . . .

87. The problem of *señjita* and *āniñjua* is examined iv. 46, English trans. p. 621-3, (vi.24a-b); the *apakṣālas*, iii. 101. *Madhyama*, 5.1, *Majjihima*, i. 454, ii. 261 (*āṇañjasappāyasutta*), *Aṅguttara*, v.135 (*kaṇṭaka*= *apakṣāla*).

88. Compare iii. 101.

89. See *Kośa*, i.30b (above p. 1232) and ii. 31 on the *dhātus* and the *caittas* which exist in Rūpadhātu.

90. Hsüan-tsang: "and because mental satisfaction is gross there" [Thus there is *sukha* of the sphere of *manas* there].

91. Saeki adds: "because mental satisfaction is subtle there."

92. See iv.8a.

93. Hsüan-tsang: "Beings arisen in the three higher *bhūmis* (=Dhyānas) produce three *vijñānakāyas* (eye consciousness, etc.) and an "informative mind" (*vijñapticitta*) of the sphere of the First Dhyāna. See vii.50.

94. See vii.50. Hsüan-tsang: "Beings arisen above produce the *dharma* from below, for example *nirmāṇacitta*."

95. It is through usefulness (*prayojanena*) that these beings produce a *vijñāna* of the First Dhyāna, and not through esteem (*bahumāna*); furthermore, if this *vijñāna* is good, it will contain a retribution which they must create; thus they do not make an effort in order to manifest a good *vijñāna*.

96. *Triprakāram anyatra nirvedhāgīyāt* (see viii.17.)

97. Paramārtha: "In the *Vibhāṣā*."
The *Vyākhā* quotes the *Vibhāṣā: syāc chuddhakaṁ vairāgyeṇa lābheta, parihāṇyā*

vijahyāt / syāc chuddhakam upapattyā labheta, upapattyā vijahyāt / āhu / syāt / katham ity āha / hānabhāgīyaṁ prathamaṁ dhyānam.

98. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 822c14. When one obtains the state of Arhat (or *kṣayajñāna*), one has already obtained the First Dhyāna, of the *anāsrava* class at the moment of entry into *samyaktvaniyāma;* why say that one obtains it upon obtaining the state of Arhat? The text should say that one obtains this Dhyāna at the moment of entry into *samyaktvaniyāma,* and not upon the obtaining of the state of Arhat.

99. Having entered the First Dhyāna the ascetic contemplates the Truths. He possesses the first *anāsrava* Dhyāna. If he continues his contemplation (*pravāhe*) the moment of *anāsrava* Dhyāna is followed by a moment of *anāsrava* Dhyāna; if he leaves (*vyutthānakāle*) this contemplation, the *anāsrava* Dhyāna is followed by a pure or *śuddhaka* Dhyāna.

100. When an ascetic cultivated the mixed absorption (vi.42, vii. 23a) when the *anāsrava* and pure (*śuddhaka*) moments succeed one another, there is an ascending absorption, an "absorption that passes over certain spheres" (viii.18c), i.e., the First Dhyāna is followed by the Second or the Third Dhyāna.

101. After the Third Dhyāna: 1-2, two of this *bhūmi* (*śuddhaka* and *anāsrava*), 3-6, four, two of the Fourth Dhyāna, two of *ākāśānantya;* 7-10, four, two of the First, and two of the Second Dhyāna.
And so on for the Fourth Dhyāna and for *ākāśānantya.*

102. Hsüan-tsang adds: "After [pure] *naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana* there can arise six types of absorption: the pure and the defiled of this same *āyatana,* the *anāsrava* and the pure of the Second and Third Ārāpyas. Following upon the First [pure] Dhyāna, seven types: the three of the First Dhyāna; the *anāsrava* and the pure of the Second and Third. Following upon *ākiñcanya,* eight; following the Second Dhyāna, nine; following *vijñānānantya,* ten; following the other pure absorptions, eleven."

103. Up to here the author has spoken of the *samāpattidhyānas,* absorptions, or states of contemplation, and their succession; but the *kuśalasaṁhita,* the "good mind of absorption," which exists in the *upapattidhyānas,* that is, in Rūapadhātu (=of *dhyāna; brahmaloka,* etc.), and which is acquired through arising (*upapattilābhika*), is also called pure *dhyāna* (*śuddhaka dhyāna*). When a being in Rūpadhātu dies, this pure *dhyāna* comes to an end; can it be followed only by a defiled *dhyāna* of the same sphere? No: "At death, following upon the pure, there is a defiled state of some sphere." In fact, death (*maraṇabhava*) is never absorbed (*samāhita*) (iii.43): a being in Rūpadhātu, at the moment when he dies, never possesses the *dhyāna* of pure absorption. The "mind of reincarnation" (*pratisaṁdhicitta*) which follows "the mind at death" (*maraṇabhava*) will be defiled, not absorbed.

104. Paramārtha translates: "with the exception of the *nirvedhabhāgīya.*"
These four categories are the *duppaṭivijjha dharmas* of *Dīgha,* iii.277. See the source quoted iv.125, English trans. p. 707, vi.20a, p. 707.

105. *Hānabhāgīyā* succeeds upon *hānabhāgīya* when there is no progress, *sthitibhāgīya* succeeds when pure absorption is strengthened and when there is progress (*viśeṣagamana*).

106. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 68.5; see *Kośa,* ii.44d, English trans. p. 229. *Visuddhimagga,* 374 (*Atthasālinī,* 187): *jhānānulomato jhānapaṭilomato jhānukkantito.*

107. According to Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang differs: . . . (3) to cultivate the *sāsravas* and *anāsravas* in a mixed and continuous order (that is to go from the First *sāsrava* Dhyāna to the Second *anāsrava* Dhyāna); (4) to cultivate the *sāsravas* in a discontinuous order (that is to go from the First Dhyāna to the third . . .); (5) the same with respect to the *anāsravas;* (6) to cultivate the *sāsravas* and *anāsravas* in a mixed and discontinuous order. The *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27. p.835b7) differs: 1. a good mind of Kāmadhātu, 2. *sāsrava* absorption, to go and

return, up to Bhavāgra, 3. *anāsrava* absorption, to go and return, 4. *sāsrava* by skipping over, 5. *anāsrava* by skipping over.

108. Hsüan-tsang: 1. for there is no usefulness for a being of a higher sphere to produce a lower absorption; 2. because his own sphere outweighs this absorption; 3. because the power of this absorption is weak; 4. because he has rejected this absorption; and 5. because this absorption is now the object of disgust.

109. See ii.45a-b (English trans. p. 236) ; vi.73a-b; above p. 1228, 1244. *Vyākhyā: yāvad eva saṁjñāsamāpattis tāvad ājñāprativedha iti vacanāt* (*Aṅguttara,* iv.426).

110. We have seen that the *dhyāna* "of delight" has for its object *dhyāna* which is pure (*śuddhaka*), not *anāsrava.* Let us understand then: "It does not bear on the pure *dhyāna* of a lower sphere."

111. The *Vyākhyā,* the text of which is unfortunately unsure, explains: *tṛṣṇāparicchinnatvād bhūmīnām iti / yā yasyāṁ bhūmau tasyām eva bhūmāv anuśayanāṁ (?) tayā sā bhūmiḥ paricchinnā bhavati / anyathā hi tasyottaratvaṁ (?) na sidhyed ekabhūmisthānāntaravat / ata svauttarādharye'pi sthānāntarāṇāṁ trayāṇām trayāṇām aṣṭānāṁ caikabhūmitā sidhyati tṛṣṇāvyatihārayogāt: It is tṛṣṇā* which determines the *bhūmi.* It is thus that the three *sthānas* or "places" of the heavens of the first three Dhyānas and the eight *sthānas* of the heaven of the Fourth Dhyāna constitute only one *bhūmi,* even though these places are superimposed one over the other, because the same *tṛṣṇā* becomes active and grows in all of the *bhūmis* to which is belongs (v.17). See iii.3c, a definition of the Dhātus.

112. Desire for *anāsrava* is not thirst, but "desire for the good". *Kośa,* v.16, p. 794.

113. According to Paramārtha, Hsüan-tsang: "It has for its object all *saṁskṛta* of its sphere, of lower and higher spheres, and *asaṁskṛta.* Nevertheless the morally neutral *asaṁskṛtas* are not the object of an *anāsrava* absorption.

114. In order to become detached from the Fourth Dhyāna, the ascetic enters into the *sāmantaka* of the first *ārūpya* and considers the Fourth Dhyāna as gross, etc. (iv.49): this is the *anantaryamārga* of detachment from the Fourth Dhyāna. See iii.35a, on the *sāmantaka* of *ākāśānantya* and the Ārūpyas.

115. *Vyākhyā: na hi bhavena bhavaniḥsaraṇam astīti* (see above viii. p. 1225).

116. See iii.35d, vii.26a, viii.22c.

117. Consequently *prīti* and *sukha* are absent: *prītisukhayor ayoga iti.*

118. Being paths of detachment, they cannot be associated with delight; thus they are pure.

119. Explanation of the term *anāgamya,* vi.44d, p. 981, note; below, note 125.

Actually the *sāmantakas* or prefatory absorptions of all the *dhyānas* and *ārūpyas* can be called *anāgamya,* because they do not enter the principal absorptions, and because they cut off the *kleśas.* But Saṁghabhadra says that the name *anāgamya* is reserved for the *sāmantaka* of the First Dhyāna in order to show that this *sāmantaka* differs from the others. The ascetic produces it before entering any state of absorption and, when he is in one, he does not experience any delight (*āsvādana*). The other *sāmantakas* are produced by the force of a previous absorption; the ascetic who is in it can experience delight. This does not appear to be reconciliable with the definitions of Vasubandhu. The *Vibhāṣā* says, "It is called *anāgamya,* because it is produced without one having arrived (*an-āgamya*) at the principle sphere (*maulabhūmi*), for the qualities of the principle sphere are absent from it."

120. By saying that the *sāmantaka* is the path by which one becomes detached from a lower sphere: This is according to Paramārtha. The *Vyākhyā* explains the first phrase of the *Bhāṣya*: *aṣṭāsv api dhyānārūpyeṣu yasya yat sāmantakaṁ tasya tena sāmantakacittena*

kliṣṭenāsamāhitena saṁdhibandha ity eṣa siddhānta ity ata idam ucyate yady api sāmantakacitteneti vistaraḥ. The first thought of a *dhyāna* existence, *upapattibhava* (iii.38), belongs to the *sāmantaka* of this *dhyāna;* it is defiled by all of the *kleṣas* of the sphere of this *dhyāna.*

121. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 719c13. Some say that the *sāmantaka* spheres include joy (*prīti*), for the Sūtra says that by being supported by joy one abandons sadness (*daurmanasya*). According to other sources, the joy of the *sāmantaka* of the First Dhyāna includes movement and is not like of the principle *dhyāna* . . . The following two *sāmantakas* include *sukha. Vibhāṣā,* 164.5: The Dārṣṭāntikas say that the *sāmantakas* are only good; it is explained that they are good, defiled, or neutral.

122. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Because he who does not produce the principle absorption is also attached to the *sāmantaka.*" The *Vyākhyā* says: By reason of the aptitude (*paṭutva*) of the *anāgamya:* he can be *anāsrava,* and he can also be associated with delight. Such is the intention (of this passage). Saṁghabhadra explains: *maulapratispardhitvād āsvādanasamāpattisadbhāvāt.*

123. Pāḷi sources: *Points of Controversy,* p.329 (*Psychological Ethics,* p. 43, 52, *Theragāthā,* 916, with another *pañcaṅgika samādhi*) *Kośa,* viii.2a-b, p. 5, and 23c.

On *dhyānāntara* and the theory of the Saṁmitīyas and Andhakas, see *Kathāvatthu,* xvii.7.

124. According to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha has "This *dhyāna* is not associated with *vitarka.* It is called *dhyānāntara,* because it differs from the two *dhyānas.* As it outweighs the First Dhyāna, it is not placed in the First Dhyāna. It is not placed in the Second, etc., in view of the absence of *viśeṣa.*"

I doubt that the Chinese translators really understood this.

The *Vyākhyā* says: The *Bhāṣya* has *dhyānaviśeṣatvāt,* that is, the first principle *dhyāna,* through the absence of *vitarka,* becomes more distinguished and receives the name of *dhyānāntara: tad eva maulaṁ prathamaṁ dhyānaṁ vitarkāpagamād viśiṣṭaṁ dhyānāntaram ucyata ity arthaḥ.*

125. Saṁghabhadra reproduces the text of Vasubandhu and adds some useful explanations on *anāgamya* and *dhyānāntara.* We shall put this explanations into paragraphs.

a. *Dhyānāntara,* which is included in the First Dhyāna, differs from this latter by the fact that it has less *vitarka.* In the higher sphere (Second Dhyāna, etc.), what are the *dharmas* whose suppression would give rise to a *dhyānantara*? Thus there is a *dhyānāntara* in the First Dhyāna, but not in the higher spheres.

b. Doesn't the Sūtra say that the seven absorptions (*samāpatti*)—namely the Four Dhyānas and the first three *ārūpyas*—are the support [of pure *prajñā,* of the "qualities," viii.20a, 27c]? Furthermore how do you prove that there is an *anāgamya,* and a *dhyānāntara*?

c. We know that there is an *anāgamya* by Scripture and by reasoning.

The Sūtra says, "He who is not capable of entering into the First Dhyāna, etc., and of remaining in it, obtains down here the destruction of the *āsravas* by means of an *āryan* or pure (*anāsrava*) *prajñā.*" If there were no *anāgamya,* what would be the support of this *prajñā*?

Furthermore, the *Sūtra of the Good Precepts (Suśīla-Sūtra?)* says, "There is a person delivered-through-Prajñā (*prajñāvimukta,* vi.64) who has not obtained the principle *dhyāna* (*mauladhyāna:* the *dhyāna* itself)." Now is it not by being in the *dhyāna* that the ascetic obtains the deliverance-through-*prajñā*? Thus there is a *dhyāna* which is not the *mauladhyāna,* namely the preliminary *dhyāna,* the *anāgamya.* On the mixed character of *anāgamya,* iii.35d.

d. The Sūtra says, with respect to *dhyānāntara,* that there are three *samādhis, sa-vitarka,*

sa-vicāra, etc. (viii.23c). It says that the First Dhyāna contains *vitarka* and *vicāra;* and that, in the Second and the following Dhyānas, *vitarka* and *vicāra* have ceased. If there were no *dhyānāntara,* what *samādhi* would "possess *vicāra* and not *vitarka*"? Because the *citta-caittas* cease gradually, it follows that there would be a *dhyāna* with *vicāra* but without *vitarka.*

Furthermore, out from *dhyānāntara,* what would be the cause of the arising of Mahābrahmā the King of the World (*Kośa,* viii.23b)?

e. The Buddha does not speak of *anāgamya* and *dhyānāntara,* because both are included the First Dhyāna. The word "*dhyāna*" includes them also.

f. The first "vestibule," *sāmantaka,* is called *anāgamya* because one would distinguish it from the others. A *dhyāna* does not arise before one has entered into this first *sāmantaka.* (See above vi.44d, p. 981.)

126. Elsewhere *abhisaṁskāravāhya;* see iv.78c,. (*vahati* = *gacchati*), vi.66a, 71d.

127. See ii.41d.

128. Not in Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang, *samāpatti* = *teng-chih* 等至, *samādhi, teng-ch'ih* 等持 (to grasp, *dhar*).

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 821c2. Opinions differ on the difference between *samādhi* and *samāpatti. Samādhi* is understood as a momentary (*kṣaṇika*) absorption; *samāpatti* as a prolonged (*prābandhika*) absorption. The *samādhis* always involve the mind (*citta*); they are *sacittaka*; this mind can be either *samāhita,* absorbed, or *vyagra* (or *vikṣipta,* i.33c-d), dispersed. The *samāpattis* (ii.44d, English trans. p. 231) can be accompanied by mind or not (for example *asaṁjñisamāpatti* and *saṁjñāveditanirodhyāsamāpatti*). Thus we have: 1. exclusively *samādhi,* the [semi]-absorption associated with the *vyagra* mind [We do not understand how a non-*samāhita* mind can be in *samādhi,* see above note 4; but it is certain that a mind in Kāmadhātu can be in *samādhi,* viii.25a, etc.]; 2. exclusively *samāhita,* the states free from mind; and 3. *samādhi* and *samāpatti,* all states of absorbed mind. *Śamatha* is a state accompanied by an absorbed mind.

A traditional summary of the Eighth Chapter holds that it treats of 1. the *dhyānas,* 2. the *ārūpyas,* 3. the *samāpattis* (all of which are "absorbed," *samāhita,* with or without mind (see ii.44d, p. 231); and of 4. the *samādhis,* that is to say in the proper sense of the word, the *śūnyatāsamādhi* group (viii.24).

129. *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 538c3, *Dīrgha, TD* 1, p. 110a24, *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 132a18 (not closely related); *Dīgha,* iii. 219, 274, *Majjhima,* iii. 162, *Saṁyutta,* iv. 363, *Aṅguttara,* iv. 300, *Kathāvatthu,* ix.8 and trans. p. 239, note; elsewhere only *savitarka-savicāra* and *avitarka-avicāra* are distinguished, *Saṁyutta,* v.lll, etc. [The role of *avitakka-avicāra* in the reading of the mind of another, *Dīgha,* iii.104.] See *Compendium,* Introduction, 58, *Visuddhimagga,* 169.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 744b24. The Dārṣṭāntikas think that there is *vitarka* and *vicāra* up to Bhavāgra.

130. On *vitarka-vicāra,* see above note 18.

131. Hsüan-tsang: "This refers to the First Dhyāna and its *sāmantaka.*"

132. *Dīrgha, TD* 1, p. 50b1, *Ekottara, TD* 2, p. 630b3; *Dīgha,* iii.219: *suññato samādhi, animitto samādhi, appaṇihito samādhi; Dhammasaṅgaṇi,* 344, 505; *Vibhaṅga,* Preface, p. xviii; *Atthasālinī,* 221 and foll.; *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* xviii, 77-79. *Aṅguttara,* iii.397, *animitta cetosamādhi.* Below note 140.

a. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 538a27. The *samādhis* are numberless; why say that they are three? From the point of view of their opposition (*pratipakṣa*), their intention (*āśaya*), and their object (*ālambana*): 1. *śūnyatā-samādhi* opposes the belief in a self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*); as it considers things under the aspects of non-self and emptiness, it is opposed to the aspects of self and mine; 2. *apraṇihitasamādhi* is the *samādhi* in which there is no intention (*āśaya*), no will (*praṇidhāna*) with respect to any *dharma* of the Three Dhātus (or *bhava, tribhāva,*

threefold existence, i.8c). There is no complete absence of *praṇidhāna* with respect to the Path; but, although the Path rests on *bhava,* intention relative to the Path is not related to *bhava;* 3. *ānimittasamādhi* has an object free from the *nimittas,* namely from *rūpa, śabda,* etc. For others, the three *samādhis,* in this order, oppose *satkāyadṛṣṭi, śīlavrata* and *vicikitsā.*

b. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* fol. 106a, arranges the *samādhis* in the following order: *śūnyatā, apraṇihita,* and *ānimitta,* and gives a definition of them very different from that of Vasubandhu:

tatra katamo bodhisattvasya śūnyatāsamādhiḥ / iha bodhisattvasya sarvābhilāpātmakena svabhāvena virahitaṁ nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ vastu paśyataḥ yā cittasya sthitiḥ ayam asyocyate śūnyatāsamādhiḥ / apraṇihitasamādhiḥ katamaḥ / iha bodhisattvasya tad eva nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ vastu mithyāvikalpasamutthāpitena kleśena parigṛhītatvād anekadoṣaduṣṭaṁ samanupaśyato yā āyatyāṁ tatrāpraṇidhānapūrvakā cittasthitir ayaṁ asyāpraṇihitasamādhir ity ucyate / ānimittasamādhiḥ katamaḥ / iha bodhisattvasya tad eva nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ vastu sarvavikalpaprapañcanimittāny apanīya yathābhūtaṁ śāntato manasi kurvato yā cittasthitir ayam asyocyate ānimittasamādhiḥ /.

The second *samādhi* refers to conditioned (*saṁskṛta*) things through which one does not form any *praṇidhāna;* the third to unconditioned things (i.e. Nirvāṇa), the object of *praṇidhāna;* the first to non-existent (*asat*) things, the self, mine, with respect to which one does not form either *praṇidhāna* or *apraṇidhāna,* but which one regards solely as empty.

133. Calm = *nirodha* = Nirvāṇa, has four aspects of *nirodha, praṇīta, śānta,* and *niḥsaraṇa,* vii.13a.

134. Hsüan-tsang: "This *samādhi* has the four aspects of *nirodha; nirodha* can be called *śama* [or *śānta*]."

135. On *ānimitta* as noun and adjective, see Wogihara, *Bodhisattvabhūmi* p. 19-20. On *nimitta,* see *Kośa,* ii.14c.

136. The "emptiness" of the Hīnayāna should be studied in greater depth.

137. See i.7c-d, note 33. *Majjhima,* i.135: . . . *evam eva kho bhikkhave kullūpamo mayā dhammo desito nittharaṇatthāya no gahaṇatthāya / kullūpamaṁ vo bhikkhave ājānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātabbā prāg evādhammā.*

Vajracchedikā, p.23: . . . *na khalu punaḥ subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena dharma ugrahītavyo nādharmaḥ / tasmād iyaṁ tathāgatena saṁdhāya vāg bhāṣitā / kolopamaṁ dharmaparyāyam ājānadbhir dharmā eva prahātavyāḥ prāg evādharmā iti.*

Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.33: *adhigata upeya paścāt kolopamatvād upayasyāpi prahāṇam.*

Compare the *bhisī* (*vṛṣī,* raft) of the *Suttanipāta,* 22: "I have passed over . . . there is no (further) use for a raft."

In *Saṁyutta,* iv.174-175, the *magga* is a raft, but it is not said that one should abandon it.

The *Vajracchedikāṭīkā* (Tanjur, Mdo, xvi.237b) quotes the *Ratnakaraṇḍa,* where the formula: *kolopamaṁ dharmaparyāyam . . prāg evādharmāḥ* is completed by the words: *ye dharmāḥ prahātavyā na te dharmā nāpy adharmāḥ.*

One should examine the meaning of *dharma* and *adharma* in these sources.

138. See viii.5.

139. Excluding Kāmadhātu, Bhavāgra, and the *sāmantakas* from the *sāmantaka* of the Second Dhyāna.

140. *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* ii.35: *tayo me bhikkhave vimokkhā suññato vimokkho animitto vimikkho appaṇihito; ibid.* ii.67. *Dhammasaṁgaṇi,* 344, *Atthasālinī,* 223, *Visuddhimagga,* 658 (*Compendium,* 211, 216); *Nettippakaraṇa,* 90, 119, 126; *Milinda,* 413. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 73, the Three Vimokṣamukhas, *śūnyatā, animittam, apraṇihitam; Madhyamakavṛtti,* 246: *trīṇi vimokṣamukhāni śūnyatānimittāpraṇihitākhyāni vimuktaye vineyebhyo bhagavatā*

nirdiṣṭāni . . . ; Madhyamakāvatāra, 319; Deva, *Catuḥśatikā,* p. 497; *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* I.17.14 (with *nirodhasamāpatti,* the three Vimokṣas constitute the *āryavihāra* of the Buddha).

141. According to *Ekottara,* 26.5

The *Vibhāṣā* (see below) and Hsüan-tsang (in the *Kośa*) call these *samādhis chung* 重 - *samādhis,* "repeated" *samādhis,* "accumulated" *samādhis,* since they are *śūnya-śūnya . . .* The thought that inspires the theory of these *samādhis* is clearly explained by Saṁghabhadra (in his *Prakaraṇāśāsana, TD* 29. p. 971b26), "In the same way that one burns the wood of the funeral-pyre which first burned the body, so too when the absorption of emptiness (*śūnyatāsamādhi*) burns the *kleśas,* the ascetic namely produced *śūnyatāsamādhi* in order to obtain disgust-abandon with respect to the first emptiness (=the first *śūnyatāsamādhi*)."

The *Vibhāṣā* treats of these *samādhis, TD* 27, p. 543a27 (and c5 and following): 1. At what moment does one obtain them? According to one opinion, in *darśanamārga,* when one obtains *abhisamayāntika* (vii.21a); according to another opinion, in *bhāvanāmārga,* when the detached (*virakta*) Āryan obtains *nirmāṇacitta* (vii.49c); according to a third opinion (the orthodox opinion), at the moment of *kṣayajñāna* (vi.44d), because, at this moment, the ascetic cultivates all the impure (*sāsrava*) good *dharmas* of the three spheres (vii.26c). 2. Does one obtain them without effort? 3. After which *jñānas*? 4. In what spheres (viii.27b)? 5. With what *āśraya* (viii..27a)? 6. What *ākāras* do they take up?

142. The *Vyākhyā,* doubtlessly quoting a Śāstra or the *Vibhāṣā: āha / kim atra kāraṇaṁ yac chūnyatāśūnyatāsamādhiḥ śunyatākāra eva na punar anātmākāro'pi śūnyatāvad iti / atrocyate / śūnyatākārapravṛttaśūnyattāpṛṣṭhenotpattir na punar anātmākārapravṛttaśūnyatāpṛṣṭheneti / atrocyate / tadutpattyanukūlyāt sa eva hi śūnyatākāraḥ śūnyatāsamādhis tasya śūnyatāśūnyāsamādher utpattāv anukūlyenāvatiṣṭhate nānātmākāraḥ / na hy evam anātmadarśanam udvejayati yathā śūnyatādarśanam / dṛṣṭeṣu hy anātmato bhaveṣv abhiratir asti saṁsāre śūnyatādarśanābhāvāt / tadyathādhvagasyāsaṁbādhādhvadarśanād api prītiḥ / ekākinas tu tacchūnyatvād aprītir iti / tadvat. Śūnyatāśūnyatāsamādhi* follows a *śūnyatāsamādhi* which has the aspect of *śūnya,* not one which has the aspect of *anātman. Śūnyatā* disgusts more than *anātmatā:* one continues to find pleasure in things which one recognized as *anātman,* as a traveller sees with pleasure a path little frequented (*asaṁbādha; MSS: asaṁbandha*), but, alone, be has a fear of the path because it is empty.

143. *dūṣaṇīyatvāt. Vyākhyā: so'śaikṣasamādhir dūṣayitavya iti.*

144. See viii.35b-d.

145. There are two *nirodhas* of *ānimittasamādhi:*

a. *anityatānirodha* [or *svalakṣaṇanirodha* or *svarasanirodha*] (i.20a, English trans. p. 77, ii.45c): the extinction of which is the law of all conditioned things (*saṁskṛta*).

b. *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* (see i.5c, 6c-d, ii.55d, English trans. p. 280). Here the word *nirodha* cannot be legitimately translated by extinction, but it is not impossible to say what it refers to: when an Arhat leaves the *ānimittasamādhi,* some pure or impure thoughts arise in him which are no longer of this *samādhi*; if these thoughts had not arisen, some new moments of the *ānimittasamādhi* would have arisen. When these other thoughts arise, the Arhat takes possession of *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* of the new moments of *ānimittasamādhi* which, lacking causes, would not arise.

Vyākhyā: kathaṁ tasya [ānimittasamādher] apratisaṁkhyānirodhaḥ / aśaikṣād ānimittāt samādher vyutthitasya tadanantaraṁ ye sāsravāḥ kṣaṇā atikrāmanty anye vānāsravā(s) yadi te notpannāḥ syur aśaikṣā ānimittakṣaṇā utpannāḥ syuḥ / teṣāṁ sāsravāṇām anyeṣām anāsravāṇām votpattikāle teṣām aśaikṣāṇām ānimittakṣaṇānām apratisaṁkhyānirodho abhyate pratyayavaikalyā / tam apratisaṁkhyānirodham ālambate śāntākāreṇa.

Ānimittānimittasamādhi thus takes the *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* of the *ānimittasamādhi*

as its object, for this *nirodha* is the enemy of this *samadhi* (*tatpratyarthikabhūtatvāt*) and the ascetic desires to become disgusted (*vidūṣaṇam abhilaṣan*) with this *samādhi*.

146. As we have seen in i.6c. *Pratisaṁkhyānirodha* is the *nirodha* which one obtains by a type of *prajñā* called *pratisaṁkhyā*.

The *Vyākhyā* explains: *apratikūlatvāt / yad dhi prtikūlam āryāṇāṁ tatsaṁyogavisaṁyogāya yatante / visaṁypogaś ca pratisaṁkhyānirodhaḥ.*

The pure *dharmas* are *aheya*, i.40a, English trans. p. 112.

147. Saṁghabhadra (in his *Prakaraṇaśāsana, TD* 29, p. 972a3) says, "The *śānta* [characteristic or aspect] indicates only cessation (*chih-hsi* 止息); *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* thus has the characteristic of *śānta;* the prolonged practice of the Path (*āryamārga*) (which culminates in *śūnyatā, apraṇihita,* and *ānimittasamādhi*) includes fatigue, so one produces pleasure (*sukhalakṣaṇa*) with respect to its cessation."

148. If the ascetic were to consider the *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* of *ānimittasamādhi* under the aspect of *nirodha* or extinction, he would not consider it as "calm," *śānta;* he would consider it under an aspect which renders it hateful, and as a consequence he would not take a dislike to *ānimittasamādhi.*

149. As we have seen iv.9d.

150. The *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* of a certain *kleśa* is not the *visaṁyoga* (ii.55d) of this *kleśa.* Let us suppose that an ascetic takes possession of the *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* of good or bad *dharmas,* but he remains bound to these *dharmas* because their possession (*prāpti*), which alone can cut off the possession of *pratisaṁkhyānirodha,* has not been cut off. [A good example, *Kośa,* vi.23: the possessor of *kṣānti* contains the *apratisaṁkhyānirodha* of the *kleśas* whose *pratisaṁkhyānirodha* can only be attained by *darśanamārga.*]

151. Only the *akopyadharman* Arhat, by reason of his sharp faculties, has the power (*sāmarthya*) to produce them; not the other Arhats. The *Vyākhyā* explains: *tebhyo dṛṣṭadharmaśukhavihāratvād āsaṅgāspadabhūtebhyo 'śaikṣebhyaḥ śūnyatādisamādhibhyo vaimukhyārtham aparasamādhīn samāpadyante.*

152. On *samādhibhāvanā,* above note 4; *Visuddhi,* 371.

The *Vyākhyā* quote the Sūtra: *asti samādhibhāvanā āsevitā bhāvitā bahulīkṛtā dṛṣṭadhrmasukhavihārāya saṁvartate / asti . . . divyacakṣurabhijñājñānadarśanāya saṁvartate / asti . . . prajñāprabhedāya saṁvartate / asti . . . āsravakṣayāya saṁvaratate.*

On the value of *āsevita, bhāvita, bahulīkṛta,* the *Vyākhyā* says: *āsevitā niṣevitā bhāvanayā / bhāvitā vipakṣaprahāṇatayā / bahulīkṛtā vipakṣadūrīkaraṇatayā.* When this refers to the paths of action, iv.85a.

Dīgha, iii.222, *Aṅguttara,* ii.44: *atth'āvuso samādhibhāvanā bhāvitā bahulīkatā diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārāya saṁvattati . . . ñaṇadasanapatilābhāya . . . satisaṁpajaññāya . . . āsavānaṁ khayāya saṁvattati.*

In *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (I,13, fol. 82), the theory of the three *samādhibhāvanās* is modified:

tatra katamo bodhisattvānāṁ dhyānasvabhāvaḥ / bodhisattvapiṭaka-śravaṇacintāpūrvakaṁ yal laukikaṁ lokottaraṁ bodhisattvānāṁ kuṣalaṁ cittaikāgryaṁ cittasthitiḥ śamathapakṣyā vā vipaśyanāpakṣyā vā . . . tadubhayapakṣyā va ayaṁ bodhisattvānāṁ dhyānasvabhāvo veditavyaḥ / tatra katamad bodhisattvānāṁ sarvadhyānam / tad dvividhaṁ laukikaṁ lokottaraṁ ca / tat punar yathāyogaṁ trividhaṁ veditavyaṁ dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihārāya dhyānaṁ bodhisattvasamādhiguṇanirhārāya dhyānaṁ sattvārthakriyāyai dhyānam / tatra yad bodhisattvānāṁ sarvavikalpāpagataṁ kāyikacaitasikapraśrabdhijanakaṁ paramapraśāntaṁ manyanāpagatam anāsvāditaṁ sarvanimittāpagataṁ dhyānam idam eṣāṁ dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihārāya veditavyaṁ / pratisaṁvidām araṇāpraṇidhijñānādīnāṁ guṇānāṁ śrāvakāsādhāraṇānām acchinirhārāya saṁvartate idam bodhisattvasya dhyānaṁ samādhiguṇābhirnirhārāya veditavyam . . .

153. The fourth *pāda*, the version of Paramārtha appears to be: *prajñāprabhedāya saṁskārajāḥ;* the version of Hsüan-tsang: *prajñāprabhedāya prāyogikaśubhabhāvanā.*

The theory of Harivarman, *TD* 32, no. 1646, chap. 158, is very different from that of the Abhidharma.

154. On the *dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāras, Kośa,* ii.4, vi.42c, 58b, 65b, (note 415).

Vihāra = *samādhiviśeṣa* (ii., note 229).

According to ii.4, English trans. p. 157, happiness here below depends on *ājñātavīndriya* and thus supposes the state of Arhat; it consists of the fact of experiencing the "satisfaction" and the "well-being" of deliverance from the defilements (*kleśavimuktiprītisukhapratisaṁvedanā*); in other words, this happiness is the enjoyment (*upabhoga*) of Nirvāṇa) ii.6, English trans. p. 159).

We should distinguish *śāntavihāra* from *sukhavihāra,* the former being *nirodhasamāpatti* (ii.43b), which is similar to Nirvāṇa (the *śānta vimokṣas,* viii. p. 10, *Majjhima* i.472). We owe to Saṁghabhadra (above note 57) the fact that the word *sukha* does not necessarily signify "agreeable sensation"; but *sukhavihāra,* being *pratisaṁvedanā,* is "sensation."

According to the *Vibhāṣā,* the *sukhavihāras* solely refer to the four fundamental *dhyānas,* pure (*śuddhaka*) or *anāsrava,* not to the prefatory spheres (*sāmantakas*) or the *ārūpyas.*

In Buddhaghosa, the Arhats (compare *Majjhima,* iii.4) cultivate the right *samāpattis* (four *dhyānas* and four *ārūpyas*) "in order to agreeably pass the day with their minds concentrated" (*ekaggacittā sukhaṁ divasaṁ viharissāma*), and the ninth *samāpatti* (*saṁjñāveditanirodha*) "in order to agreeably pass seven days delivered in mind, having attained *nirodhā,* Nirvāṇa in this world": . . . *sattāham acittakā hutvā diṭṭheva dhamme nirodhaṁ nibbānaṁ patvā sukhaṁ viharissāma* (*Samantapāsādikā,* i.156).

155. The *Vyākhyā* explains the value of these two words. *Jñāna* is a discernment (*prajñā*) associated with the mental consciousness (*manovijñānasaṁprayukta*) which includes *vikalpas* (or "judgements" as here: "Beings, endowed with bad bodily actions . . .;" *Darśana,* on the contrary, is discernment associated with the visual consciousness, and as such free from *vikalpa* (*avikalpika prajñā,* see i.33a-b, English trans. p. 97).

Some references to *jñānadarśana:*

i. Worldly insight-consciousness.

a. The Buddha possesses *asaṅga apratihata jñānadarśana* with respect to the past, present, and future (last three *āveṇikas* of the *Mahāvyutpatti,* 9. *Kośa,* vii. note 162); this *ñāṇadassana* is *atīraka, Dīgha,* iii.134.

Ñāṇadassana has previous existences for its sphere, *Nettippakaraṇa,* 28.

b. The ascetic obtains *ñāṇadassana* through *ālokasaññāmanasikāra* (by having, both day and night, the idea that it is daytime, *divāsaññā*); in this way *sappabhāsaṁ cittaṁ bhāveti, Dīgha,* iii.223.

c. The Bodhisattva obtains *ñāṇadassana* after *samādhisampad,* before the *jhānas, Majjhima,* i.203.

d. The Bodhisattva, before Bodhi, purifies his *ñāṇadassana:* he *saṁjānātis* the *obhāsa* but does not see the *rūpas;* then the gods, *Aṇuttara,* iv.302.

e. The Nigganṭha affirms that "going, staying in place, lying down, awaking, *ñāṇadassana* is present in me without interruption," *Aṅguttara,* i.220, iv.428.

f. The *jñānadarśana* of Śakra views what is below, *Avadānaśataka,* i.189.

g. *Bodhisattvasya sarvavidyāsthāneṣv avyāhataṁ pariśuddhaṁ paryavadātaṁ jñānadarśanam* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi,* I.xv, *Muséon* 1906, 22a); later, by virtue of *vipaśyanāpariśuddhi,* this *jñānadarśana* acquires *pṛthuvṛddhivaipulyatā.*

ii. Consciousness, knowledge, *saṁbodha.*

a. *Kośa,* vi.75b, *ñāṇa* = *dassana; Majjhima,* i.173: *ñāṇam nesaṁ dassanam udapādi: akuppā no vimutti; Mahāvyutpatti,* 81.9: *vimuktasya vimukto'smīti jñānadarśanaṁ bhavatī;* this is the *vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha* (*ibid.* 4.5, *Kośa,* vi. p. 1033, vii. p. 1157).

b. *Kośa*, vi.54, *darśana* = *cakṣus, jñāna, vidyā, buddhi.*
c. *Mahāvyutpatti*, 245.51: *samyak pratyātmaṁ jñānadarśanaṁ pravartate.*
d. *Aṅguttara*, ii.200: *abhabbā te ñāṇadassanāya anyttarāya abhisambodhāya.*

156. Why does the text say: "The *abhijñā* of divine sight has *jñānadarśana* for its result," and not: "The cultivation of the absorption of the *abhijñā* of divine sight has *jñānadarśana* for its result?" The *Vyākhyā* explains:
āha / divyacakṣurabhijñā jñānadarśanāya saṁvartata ity uktam na ca divyacakṣurabhijñāḥ samādhibhāvanā / atrocyate / ayaṁ phale hetūpacāraḥ / yasya hetoḥ samādhibhāvanāyā divyacakṣurabhijñā phalaṁ tatra phale hetūpacāraḥ / jñānadarśanāya samādhibhāvaneti / yeṣāṁ punar ayaṁ pakṣaḥ ṣaḍvidhā muktimārgadhīr (vii.42) iti dhyā nasaṁgṛhīt eva mānasā vimuktimārgaḥ ṣaḍ abhijñā iti teṣām acodyam evaitat teṣāṁ vimuktimārgāṇāṁ samādhitatvāt / pūrvaka eva tu pakṣo'bhidharmakośacintakānām ity avagantavyam / divyacakṣuḥśrotravijñānayor abhijñātvenābhīṣṭatvāt.

157. *Vyākhyā: prajñāprabhedāyeti prajñāviśeṣākarṣāya* = *vaiśeṣikaguṇābhinirhārāya, Kośa*, vi., note 415. Compare the expression *iddippabheda*, vii.trans. p. 1157.

158. The *dharmas* or *guṇas*, "qualities," of the Three Dhātus are *aśubhā, ānāpānasmṛti, araṇā* (viii.36), *praṇidhijñāna* (vii.37), *pratisaṁvid, abhijñā, vimokṣa* (viii.32), *abhibhvāyatana*, etc. The pure "qualities" are *vimokṣamukha* (viii.25), *vyutkrāntakasamāpatti* (viii.18c), *āsravakṣayābhijñā*, etc.

159. *Vyākhyā: traidhātukā anāsravā iti traidhātukā asubhā . . . / atra tu samādhisaṁprayogāt prāyokigānāṁ guṇānāṁ samādhibhāvanety upacāraḥ.*

160. *Vyākhyā: bodhisattvo hi karmāntapratyavekṣaṇāya niṣkrānto jambumūle prathamaṁ dhyānam utpāditavān* (see *Kośa*, iii. 41) / *bodhimūle ca devaputramāraṁ bhaṅktvā prathame yāme divyaṁ cakṣur utpāditvām/ tena divyena cakṣuṣā sattvān cyutyupapattisaṁkaṭasthān abhivīkṣya tatparitrāṇāya madhyame yāme dhyānavimokṣasamāpattīḥ saṁmukhīkṛtavān / te'sya prāyogikaguṇāḥ prajñāprabhedāya jāyante / tatas tṛtīye yāme caturthaṁ dhyānaṁ niśrita niyāmam* (vi.26a) *avakramya yāvadvajropamena samādhinā sarvayojanaprahāṇam kṛtavān* (Compare *Majjhima*, i.22). On the conquest of Bodhi by the Bodhisattva, vii. p. 1145.

161. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 420b8. "Why explain the Immeasurables immediately after the *dhyānas*? Because the *dhyānas* give rise to or produce the Immeasurable; because the *dhyānas* and the Immeasurables reciprocally occasion one another; because the Immeasurables are the best qualities among [those that produce the] *dhyānas.*"

162. *Mahāvyutpatti*, 69; *Dīgha*, iii.223, *catasso appamaññāyo; Dīrgha, TD* 1, p. 50c24, *Ekottara, TD* 2, p. 658a21, *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 563b8.

These are the Four Brahmavihāras. *Visuddhimagga, Atthasālinī*, 192, *Itivuttaka*, 15, *Bodhisattvabhūmi, Muséon*, 1911, p. 177, *Yogasūtram* i.33; cultivated by a Rājarasipravrajita, *Divya*, 122.

Considered by many sects as parts of Bodhi (Bhavya), *Kośa*, vi. p.281; they figure in the presentation of the Path, *Aṅuttara*, i.38, between the *dhyānas* and the *smṛtyupasthānas.*

On *maitrī* and *araṇā, Kośa*, vii.36; formula of *maitrī*, iv.124; difference between *karuṇā* and *mahākaruṇā*, vii.37.

Saṁghabhadra (in his *Nyāyānusāra, TD* 29, p. 769b17) observes here that the Immeasurables do no good to another. Why are they good and not morally neutral? Because they oppose hatred, etc.; because they assure the mind of mastery over itself.

On the miracles that *maitrīsamāpanna* manifests, *Divya*, 1886.2, *Cullavagga*, v.6, 1; *Dīgha*, ii.238, etc.

163. Paramārtha omits the second reason. P'u-kuang (*TD* 41, p. 433a10), because they produce immeasurable retributive results and outflowing results. Three reasons in Fa-pao

(*TD* 41, p. 798b18).

164. *Vyākhyā: adveṣasvabhāvatvān maitrī vyāpādapratipakṣaḥ / duḥkhāpanayanākāratvāc ca karuṇā duḥkhopasaṁjārākārāyā vihiṁsāyāḥ pratipakṣo bhavati / muditā cārateḥ pratipakṣaḥ saumanasyarūpatvāt / upekṣā ca mādhyasthayāt kāmarāgavyāpādayoḥ pratipakṣa iti* (*apalṣapātitve nāpy anunīto nāpi pratihata iti*), v.47, note 170.

165. Saṁghabhadra (in his *Nyāyānysāra, TD* 26, p. 769b16) says the contrary: *Aśubhā* and *upekṣā* oppose, in this order, sexual desire and the other desires. On the attachment to visible things, below viii.32a.

166. We do not mean to say that a single *dharma, upekṣā*, possesses two natures; we mean to say that the word *upekṣā* designates both non-desire and non-hatred.

167. *Sukhitā vata sattvāḥ.* The meaning is: "May they be happy!" *Maitrībhāvanā* analyzed as *puṇyakriyāvastu*, iv.112c; its efficacy, iv.121b; above note 162.

168. *Duḥkhitvata sattvāḥ.* The intention is: "May they be delivered from suffering!"

169. Compare the *anumodanā* of the Mahāyāna (*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Third Chapter).

170. The absence of sympathy (*anunaya*) and antipathy (*pratighāta*). On *saṁskāropekṣā*, iii.35d.

171. See ii.72, English trans. p. 320, *adhimuktimanasikāra;* vi.9, viii.32, 34, 35.

172. *Dīgha*, i.250, iii.223, etc.

173. *Maulaśuddhakadhyānabhūmikatvāt:* "They have the fundamental *dhyānas* of the *śuddhaka* or pure category for their sphere" (viii.5). The prefatory (*sāmantaka*) absorptions bring about worldly abandoning of the defilements, not fundamental absorptions (viii.21c).

174. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 427b14. Do the Apramāṇas bring about the abandoning of the defilements? No. The abandoning (*prahāṇa*) of the defilements is of two types, temporary abandoning and definitive abandoning. Concerning the first abandoning, the Sūtra says that the Apramāṇas cause abandoning; of the second, the Samādhiskandha says that they do not bring about the abandoning.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 819b10. Why do the Apramāṇas not bring about the abandoning of the defilements? For the following reasons: 1. on account of the diversity of their aspects; sixteen aspects cut off the defilements: the four aspects of the Apramāṇas do not; 2. the Apramāṇas are *adhimuktimanasikāra;* and only *tattvamanasikāra* cuts off the defilements; 3. the Apramāṇa are *anugrahamanasikāra* (*tseng-i* 增益), beneficial act of attention; and only the acts of attention which do not have this characteristic cut off the defilements; 4. the Apramāṇas have for their object the present; and only the Path which has the three time periods, or the *asaṁskṛta* for its object, cuts off the defilements; and 5. only *ānantaryamārga* cuts off the defilements; and the Apramāṇas are obtained at the moment of *vimuktimārga.*

175. Hsüan-tsang adds: "He has the idea that they are delivered from suffering and obtain happiness."

176. Hsüan-tsang adds: "From equanimity one passes through the other categories to the moment when one has, for his greatest friends, the same though as for those to whom he is indifferent."

177. References given by Saeki: *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 582a17, p. 694a28 and following, *Dīrgha, TD* 1, p. 490c3, p. 489b27, *Prakaraṇapada, TD* 26, p. 720c23-721b3, *Samyukta-hṛdaya, TD* 28, p. 927a19, *Tattvasiddhi* (*Ch'eng-shih lun*), *TD* 32, p. 15. 10, and the *Amṛta-śāstra, TD* 28, p. 976a18.

Dīgha, ii.70 (*Lotus*, 824; *Dialogues;* O. Franke, 212), *Atthasālinī* 190, *Paṭisambhidā*

magga, ii.38, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, 248 (seven).

Mahāvyutpatti, 70 (according to the *Saṁgītiparyāya*, *TD* 26, p. 443a26); Chavannes, *Religieux éminents*, p. 164, compare the *Mahāvyutpatti* and the *Numerical Dictionary*.

Vasubandhu follows *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 434b15, where the *svabhāva* (nature) of the Vimokṣas, their *bhūmi* (the stage in which one produces them), their *āśraya* (the persons who produce them), their *ākāra* (aspect), their *ālambana* (object), their *smṛtyupasthāna* (of which "application of mindfulness" they consist), their *lābha* (mode of acquisition), etc. are explained.

178. Text of the *Vyākhyā:*

a. *rūpī rūpāṇi paśyati.*

b. *adhyātmam arūpasaṁjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati.*

c. *śubhaṁ vimokṣam kāyena sākṣātkṛtvopasaṁpadya viharati.*

d. *sarvaśo rūpasaṁjñānāṁ samatikramāt pratighasaṁjñānām astaṁgamān nānātvasaṁjñānām amanasikārād anantam ākāśam anantam ākāśam ity ākāśānantyāyatanam upasaṁpadya viharati tad yathā devā ākāśānantyāyatanopagāḥ.*

e. *punar aparaṁ sarvaśa ākāśānantyāyatanaṁ samatikramyānantaṁ vijñānam anantaṁ vijñānam iti vijñānānantyāyatanam upasaṁpadya viharati tadyathā devā vijñānānantyāyatanopagāḥ.*

f. *punar aparaṁ sarvaśo vijñānānantyāyatanaṁ samatikramya nāsti kiṁ cid ity ākiñcanyāyatanam upasaṁpadya viharati tadyathā devā ākiñcanyayāyatanopagāḥ.*

g. *punar aparaṁ sarvaśa ākiñcanyāyatanaṁ samatikramya naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatanam upasaṁpadya viharati tadyathā devā naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatanopagāḥ.*

h. *punar aparaṁ sarvaśo naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatanaṁ samatikramya saṁjñāveditanirodhaṁ kāyena sākṣātkṛtvopasaṁpadya viharaty ayam aṣṭamo vimokṣa iti.*

179. It is very difficult to interpret this formula.

a. The Pāḷi sources read *rūpī rūpāṇi passati;* the *Vyākhyā* comments: *rūpī rūpāṇīti svātmani rūpāṇi vibhāvya bahir api rūpāṇi paśyati.*

Paramārtha, Hsüan-tsang, one of the versions of the *Mahāvyutpatti*, 70, and Harivarman (in his *Tattvasiddhi*), read *adhyātmaṁ rūpasaṁjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati* (which is the formula of the Abhibhvāyatanas, viii.35).

b. The exegesis of the Abhidhamma is developed in *Paṭisambhidā*, ii.38a and elsewhere: the ascetic considers *rūpa* (blue, *nīla*, etc.) which is internal and external (First Vimokka), and then only external *rūpa* (Second Vimokka). It appears probable that the *Kośa* intends the same.

c. What is the meaning of the expression *rūpāṇi vibhāvya* (*Vyākhyā* quoted above a.)? According to *Atthasālinī*, 163: "In the expressions *rūpaṁ saññaṁ vibhāvehi*, the word *vibhāvanā* signifies *antaradhāpana*, to make disappear." Above, *Kośa*, viii.3a, *vibhūtarūpasaṁjñā* = which makes the notion of *rūpa* disappear.

Harivarman translates *vibhāvanā* as "to expell, break." "First Vimokṣa: *adhyātmaṁ rūpasaṁjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati* [=He grasps the notion of internal *rūpa* (=of the body) as being horrible (*aśubha*), and continues to see external *rūpa:* The ascetic, by this Vimokṣa breaks and rends (*p'o-lieh* 破裂) *rūpa*. How do we know this? Because, in the Second Vimokṣa, it is said: *adhyātmam arūpasaṁjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati.* The ascetic is termed *adhyātmam arūpasaṁjñī*, because he has broken internal *rūpa*. By this we know that in the First Vimokṣa the ascetic sees only external *rūpa*, the internal *rūpa* having been eliminated. In the Third Vimokṣa, the external *rūpa* also having been eliminated, the ascetic no longer sees internal and external *rūpa*. This is what is called the notion of *rūpa*, he abandons-destroys desire; he does not see any internal or external *ātman*." Compare *Suttanipāta*, 1113: *vibhūtarūpasaññissa sabbakāyappahāyino* (the Chinese reads *kāma*) *ajjhattaṁ ca bahiddhā ca n'atthi kiṁ cīti passato.*

180. Hsüan-tsang differs. Kārikā: The Vimokṣas are of eight types. The first three are

non-desire (*alobha*); two are in two absorptions; one in one absorption . . . *Bhāṣya*: . . . the first two are, by their nature, non-desire, because they oppose desire. The Sūtras (*Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 582a17) define Vimokṣa by saying that the ascetic sees (*paśyati*): [it does not mean that Vimokṣa is sight; it expresses itself thus] because seeing increases Vimokṣa. Hsüan-tsang puts into the text of Vasubandhu the definition of *Vibhāṣā* volume 84 (*TD* 27, p. 434b28) [where it is noted that the eighth Vimokṣa is a *cittaviprayuktasaṁskāraskandha*].

181. This opposition is *dūrībhāvapratipakṣa* "opposition which renders distant" (v.61, p. 855) for, from the fact that the ascetic enters into the First Dhyāna, attachment to the *rūpa* of Kāmadhātu is already abandoned (*prahīṇa:* by means of a *prahāṇapratipakṣa* realized in *anāgamya,* viii. p. 1268, line 25).

182. See iii.43: One does not die in a state of *samādhi.*

183. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p.434c1: Why are they called Vimokṣas? What is the meaning of *vimokṣa?* The meaning of *vimokṣa* is "rejection" (*ch'i-pei* 棄背, to discard, turn the back on) . . . The first two reject the mind of desire for *rūpa* (*rūpalobhacitta*); the third rejects *aśubhāsaṁjñā;* the Four Vimokṣas of Ārūpyadhātu each reject the mind of the sphere immediately below; the Vimokṣa of *nirodhasamāpatti* rejects any thought having an object (*sālambanacitta*). Consequently the meaning of *vimokṣa* is "rejection." The Bhadanta says that the Vimokṣas are so called because they are obtained by the force of *adhimokṣa;* according to Pāśva, because they are the locus wherein one rejects.

184. See ii.44d, vi.64a, viii.196. *Majjhima,* i.160, 301,333,400,456, *Aṅguttara,* iv.426,448.

185. Hsüan-tsang corrects: "because it turns its back on everything that has an object (*sālamba*)," that is to say, the mind and mental states.

186. Hsüan-tsang: "The Eight Vimokṣa is called Vimokṣa because it delivers . . . "
It is evident that the possession of the Eighth Vimokṣa, [which confers the name of Kāyasākṣin and, when one is an Arhat, the name of Ubhyatobhāgavimukta], assures perfect mastery in absorption, the complete deliverance of *vimokṣāvaraṇa* (vi.64a); but the version of Paramārtha is doubtless correct, for the possession of the first two Vimokṣas, which supposes the cultivation of the First Dhyāna, makes this same cultivation sharper by "making more distant" the *rūpa* already abandoned (above note 181), by giving the mind *karmaṇyatā* (see following note). The Third Vimokṣa surpresses obstacles to the Vimokṣas of the sphere of Rūpadhātu (*rūpivimokṣāvaraṇa,* below note 198).

187. The obstacle is the ineptitude of the mind (*akarmaṇyatā*) which causes a person detached from the three Dhātus to be incapable at the same time of entering the First Dhyāna.

188. *Vibhāṣā TD* 27, p. 774a14: The Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins maintain that a subtle mind is not destroyed in *nirodhasamāpatti.* According to them, there is no being (*sattva*) without matter (*rūpa*), and there is no absorption without the mind. If absorption were free from mind, the vital organ (*jīvitendriya*) would be cut off; one would say that [the ascetic] is dead and not that he is in an absorption. In order to refute this opinion, one indicates that *nirodhasamāpatti* is absolutely without mind. See *Kośa,* ii.44d, note 253.

189. Definition of Bhavāgra, viii.4c.

190. According to the Mahāyāna, the "entering mind" of this absorption is always *anāsrava,* and the leaving mind is of two types, *anāsrava* or *sāsrava* . . . Among the Buddhas, the Eight Vimokṣas are *anāsrava;* among others, the Eighth is always *anāsrava,* the first seven are of two types accordingly as they have for their nature worldly or transworldly knowledge (*laukikalokottarajñāna*).

191. *Anvayajñāna* is the Path with the exception of the part of Path relative to Kāmadhātu. The *Vyākhyā* indicates the spheres where the Vimokṣas are cultivated: eleven spheres by excluding seven *sāmantakas.*

192. *Vyākhyā: āha / katamaḥ punar apratisaṁkhyānirodhas teṣām ālambananam / atrocyate / aśaikṣasyānimittasya samādher apratisaṁkhyānirodham ālambate / ete hy ārūpyā vimokṣā ānimittānimittasamādhisvabhāvāḥ saṁbhavanti* (viii.26c).

193. *Ākāśa* is the object of the *ākāśānantyāyatana* Vimokṣa.

194. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 436b10: Because he wishes to assure himself whether the *kuśalamūlas* are complete (*man* 滿) or not. The ascetic thinks: Even though I contemplate the horrible (*aśubha*), I do not produce any defilements, but I do not know if the *kuśalamūlas* are complete; if, by contemplating the agreeable, the defilements do not arise, I would know that the *kuśalamūlas* are complete.

195. See vii.42, 48. On *abhinirhāra,* see Speyer, *Avadānaśataka,* ii.221; index of the *Mahāvastu* and the *Divya; Mahāvyutpatti,* 21.88, 25.12; Lévi *ad Sūtrālaṁkāra,* iv.12; Rhys Davids-Stede.

On *ārya ṛddhi* in Pāḷi sources, vii. p. 1168.

196. *Vyākhyā: atra sākṣātkṛtveti pratyakṣīkṛtyety arthaḥ / upasaṁpadya viharatīti tāṁ samāpattiṁ samapadya viharatīty arthaḥ.*

vi.43c, 58b (p. 1006), 63; viii. p. 1232. *Uttarādhyayana,* v.23, *SBE,* 45, p. 23.

Compare the expressions *phusati cetosamādhim, nirodham* (*Dīgha,* 184), and *catasso appamaññāyo* (*Theragāthā,* 386), etc.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 776a21: In the other Sūtras, the Bhagavat employs, in the definition of the Eight Vimokṣas, the expression *kāyena sākṣātkṛtvā upasaṁpadya viharati;* notably in the *Mahāhetupratyayasūtra* ... Some say: "The Third and Eighth Vimokṣas are found at the end of the two Dhātus ..." Some say: "These two Vimokṣas are found at the end of two *bhūmis* ..."

197. *Vyākhyā: prathamadvitīyābhyāṁ vimokṣābhyāṁ tṛtīyasya vimokṣasya prādhānyāt / rūpivimokṣāvaraṇasākalyaprahāṇād āśrayaparivṛttitas tṛtīyasya sākṣātkaraṇam uktam / aṣṭamasyāpi pradhānyād ārūpyavimokṣāvaraṇasākalyaprāhāṇād āśrayaparivṛttitaḥ sākṣātkaraṇam uktam:* "The Sūtra says that the ascetic manifests (*sākṣātkaraṇa, pratyakṣīkaraṇa*) the Third Vimokṣa because this Vimokṣa outweighs the first two. It includes the abandoning of all the obstacles which are opposed to the Vimokṣas of *dhyāna* (*rūpivimokṣa*): once he has acquired it, he possesses a suppleness of mind which permits the realization, without effort, of the first three Vimokṣas. And this because it includes an *āśrayaparivṛtti,* a certain transformation of the *āśraya* or physico-psychological complex. So too the Eighth Vimokṣa outweighs the preceding Vimokṣas because it includes the abandoning of all the obstacles to the Vimokṣas of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu.

The Third Vimokṣa is obtained by an ascetic who cultivates the Fourth Dhyāna, the highest sphere of Rūpadhātu; the Eighth, by an ascetic who cultivates Bhavāgra, the highest sphere of Ārūpyadhātu.

a. iv.56, English trans. p. 631, *āśrayaparivṛtti* by the Path of Seeing, etc.; 14c, *parivṛttavyañjana:* "whose sex has been changed"; 38, *āśrayatyāga, āśrayavikopana:* "abandoning, overthrowing the *āśraya* by death, by hermaphroditism"; the *Dharmakāya,* vii., note 196. The *Sūtrālaṁkāra* prefers the expression *āśrayaparavṛtti.*

b. *āśraya* = "the body endowed with organs." iii.41; among the organs, the *manas,* ii.5, i.20a (p. 78). A synonym of *āśraya* is *ātmabhāva,* v.2c. See also i.34d (p. 99), ii.55d (p. 285), vii. 21b, and elsewhere. The translation "personality" is not bad, for example vi.21 has: "a feminine personality ... " Certain qualities can only have for their support (*āśraya*) persons

of the Three Dvīpas; one only obtains them with a human *āśraya.*

In a different usage of the word, a certain *dhyāna,* or a certain *bhūmi* is the *āśraya,* or the support, of the acquisition of a certain "knowledge," etc.

198. *Dīgha,* ii.110. iii.260, *Saṁyutta,* iv.85, *Majjhima,* ii.13, *Visuddhimagga,* 175, *Atthasālinī,* 187.

Mahāvyutpatti, 71; *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* xx-xxi.44.

When an ascetic considers the six *āyatanas* (physical matter, sound, etc.) without producing any bad ideas, these *āyatanas* have prevailed, *abhibhūta:* such as the ten *abhibhāyatanas, Saṁyutta,* iv.77.

References of Saeki: *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 799c25, *Dīrgha, TD* 1, p. 55c26, *Amṛta-śāstra, TD* 28, p. 976a25, *Saṁgītiparyāya, TD* 26, p. 445b19, *Prakaraṇapada, TD* 26, p. 721b4, *Saṁyukta-hṛdaya, TD* 28, p. 927b19, and *Tattvasiddhi.*

In the *Madhyama* version, *ch'u-ch'u* 除處 "expelling *āyatana,*" Paramārtha, *chih-ju* 制入, Hsüan-tsang, *sheng-ch'u* 勝處 (*abhi-āyatana*). The *abhibhūya* of the formula *tāni rūpāṇy abhibhūya* is translated by *chih-hsiu* 制修 (control-*bhāvana*) or by *ch'u* 去 (to expel, *vinodana, apanayana, vibhāvana*).

199. Pāḷi: *eko bahirdhā.*

200. *Vyākhyā: jānāti . . . paśyati.* Paramārtha: *jānāmi paśyāmi.*

On *jñāna* and *darśana,* above viii.27c.

201. On *ākārayati,* vi. p. 931, vii,p. 1144

202. The classical list *Aṅguttara,* v.46, 60 (Comm. i.27.10), *Majjhima,* i.423. ii.14, *Dīgha,* iii.268 (*Sumaṅgala,* i.115, Franke, p.210); *Visuddhi,* 110, replaces the last two by *āloka, paricchinnākāsakasiṇa* (see Childers); the last two omitted occasionally in *Paṭisambhidā.* On *ālokamanasikāra,* etc., vii. p. 1160, 1177.

Visuddhimagga, 425 (see Index and Warren, 293), *Atthasālinī,* 185, *Compendium, passim;* Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism,* 252; Kern, *Geschiedenis,* i.393 ("universal or cosmic circles"); *Yogāvacara-Manual,* p. xxix; Rhys Davis-Stede.

Mahāvyutpatti, 72, *Saṁgītiparyāya,* 11th section, *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* vii. 9, xx. 44.

These summary remarks in the *Kośa* have been extracted from a more complete treatise in the *Vibhāṣā.*

203. Paramārtha sometimes (*TD* 29, p. 303b12) translates *kṛtsna* as *pien* 徧 (= total), sometimes (p. 303b18) as *wu-pien* 無邊 (= *ananta*). There are Ten Kṛtsnāyatanas (*pien ju* 徧入). They are called *kṛtsna* (*wu-pien*) because they totally embrace one type without interval-crack. What *dharmas* are *kṛtsna* (*wu-pien*)? Earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white: these contain *rūpa* (literally: *rūpalakṣaṇāni*) . . . There are some masters who say that the *vāyukṛtsnāyatana* (*feng wu-pien ju* 風無邊入) has tangible things for its object.

The *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 440b17, translates *kṛtsna* by *pien* 遍: . . . They are called Kṛtsnāyatanas for two reasons: because they do not present any interval (*chien* 間), and because they are extended (*kuang-ta* 廣大): on the one hand, the act of imaginative attention (*adhimuktimanaskāra*) bears exclusively on blue, etc., without being mixed with any other characteristic; on the other hand, the act of attention, bearing on all blue, etc., has for its object an infinite characteristic. The Bhadanta says: "Because their object is large-extended (*k'uan-kuang* 寬廣), and because there is no interval-crack (*chien-hsi* 間隙)."

204. This last phrase is not in Hsüan-tsang.

205. This problem is examined *Visuddhimagga,* 415.

206. The cause or *hetu,* is the *ārūpya* absorption acting as *sabhāgahetu,* that is to say, leading to a new *ārūpya* absorption.

207. Someone who produces an *ārūpya* absorption falls from this absorption, dies, and is reborn in a heaven of Rūpadhātu by virtue of some former action: there he will produce a new *ārūpya* absorption because the preceding *ārūpya* absorption is close (*āsanna*). Someone frequently enters an *ārūpya* absorption: he has a strong habit (*abhīkṣṇābhyāsa*) with respect to it; he dies, is reborn into Rūpadhātu, and here he will produce an *ārūpya* absorption again.

In the same way, born in Ākāśānantyāyatana, one could produce a higher *ārūpya* absorption, Vijñānānantyāyatana, etc.

208. Someone accomplished an action which sould be retributed in Ārūpyadhātu, not immediately upon his death, but in a later birth (iv.50). By reason of other actions "of immediate retribution," he is first reborn in Rūpadhātu. The imminence of the retribution of the action retribuable in Ārūpyadhātu makes this person produce an *ārūpya* absorption. This is necessary fot the retribution of this action, for not being detached from the sphere where he is born (*adhastād avītarāga*), namely of Rūpadhātu, this person could not be reborn in Ārūpyadhātu if he were not detached from it, by an *ārūpya* absorption of the said sphere.

209. When the universe perishes by fire, Kāmadhātu and the heavens of the First Dhyāna disappear; when it perishes by water, the heavens of the Second Dhyāna disappear; when it perishes by wind, the disappearance also includes the spheres of the Third Dhyāna (*Kośa*, iii.100c-d). Thus, at the end of the world, all beings should be reborn in spheres sheltered from this destruction, and so they should produce absorptions entailing rebirth in the heavens of the Second, Third or Fourth Dhyāna.

Hsüan-tsang: The receptacle or physical world begins to perish by the force of *dharmatā*. Such is the law of nature (*dharmatā*) of beings in the lower spheres that they produce higher *dhyānas*, because, under these circumstances (*avasthā*), the good *dharmas* undergo full development by the force of this *dharmatā*. Beings in the two higher Dhātus (in the heavens of the Fourth Dhyāna and in Ārūpyadhātu) produce *ārūpyasamāpatti* by the force of cause and actions, and not by the force of *dharmatā*, for the Anabhraka gods, etc. (Fourth Dhyāna) are not affected by the three catastrophies.

Vibhāṣā, *TD* 27, p. 779a28: Why do beings in Rūpadhātu first produce the *dhyānas*, the *ārūpyas*, and not *nirodhasamāpatti*? They produce the *dhyānas* by reason of three causes (*pratyaya*): 1. by the force of cause (*hetubala*): in a former existence, they produced, and destroyed, the *dhyānas;* 2. by the force of action (*karmabala*): they did and accumulated actions of necessary retribution which should be retributed in a later existence in a sphere of *dhyāna;* this action will give forth its fruit; and 3. by the force of the "nature of things" (*dharmatā*): when the world perishes, beings in the lower spheres are necessarily reborn above . . . The first two reasons hold for the production of the *ārūpyas*.

210. *Vyākhyā: keyaṁ dharmatā nāma / kecit tavat sautrāntikā āhuḥ / eṣām eva dharmāṇāmudbhūtavṛttīnāṁ pūrvadhyānavāsanādhipatyāt tadutpattāv upadeśam antareṇa dhyānotpattāv ānuguṇyaṁ dharmatā prakṛtiḥ svabhāva ity arthaḥ // vaibhāṣikā api kecid āhuḥ / paurvajāgarikāt sabhāgahetoḥ niṣyandaphalam dhyānotpādanaṁ tadupadeśam antareṇānyato dharmateti.*

On *dharmatā*, see ii.46, English trans. p. 248, iv.17a, 20, 67, vi.34a.

211. On *vāsanā*, see vii. p. 1137 to 1143. Here, the good *dharmas* are *adhipatipratyaya*.

212. As long as the Good Law lasts, it is possible to know all the *dharmas*, pure and impure, to which Dhātu and sphere they belong, their aspect, etc.

213. According to Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang: All these diversely specified *dharmas* have for their goal the expansion and duration of the Good Law. What is the Good Law? How long will it last?

214. The Saddhamma is threefold: *pariyattisaddhamma:* all the words of the Buddha in the Three Piṭakas; *paṭipattisaddhamma:* the thirteen *dhutaguṇas,* the fourteen *khandhakavattas,* the eighty-two *mahāvattas, sīla, samādhi,* and *vipassanā;* and *adhigamasaddhamma:* the four *ariyamaggas,* the four fruits and Nirvāṇa (*Samantapāsādikā,* i.225). See below note 219.

215. The twelve *aṅgas* are enumerated in the *Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka:*
sūtraṁ geyaṁ vyākaraṇaṁ gāthodānāvadānakam /
itivṛttikaṁ nidānaṁ vaipulyaṁ ca sajātakam /
upadeśo'dbhutā dharmā dvādaśāṅgam idaṁ vacaḥ //

216. It appears that "holiness" is not too bad an equivalent for *adhigama,* since *adhigama* is defined as being "the *dharmas* attendant upon Bodhi plus the results of *brahmacarya.*" [It is through the *bodhipākṣikas* that *brahmacariya* is *addhaniya ciraṭṭhitika, Dīgha,* iii.27.] Moreover *adhigama* signifies "penetration, intelligence."

Adhigama is a synonym for *satyābhisamaya* (see vi.27) in the definition of the three *prajñās* or discernments: A fool (*bāla*) is one who lacks innate (*upapattilābhikā*) *prajñā* which proceeds from the traces of a former cultivation (*pūrvābhyāsavāsanānirjātā*); unlearned (*aśrutavān*) is one who lacks the *prajñā* which arises from the Teaching (*āgamajā*); an ordinary person (*pṛthagjana*) is one who lacks the *prajñā* which arises from *adhigama,* which arises from the comprehension of the Truths (*yasyādhigamajā satyābhisamayajā nāsti . . .*) (iii.28a).

The *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* in the definition of "refuge" (*pratisaraṇa*), defines *jñāna,* which is a refuge—as *adhigamajñāna* created from absorption, *bhāvanāmya* (See iv. English trans. p. 655, notes 341 to 343 and below Chapter IX, trans. Hsüan-tsang, xxix.15a, note).

217. a. Hsüan-tsang translates: "As long as there are bearers, preachers, and acquirers, the Law will endure."

The two Chinese translators distinguish three categories: the first two (those who bear and those who preach) with respect to the *āgama;* the third (those who acquire) with respect to the *adhigama.* The *āgama* lasts as long as the first two categories exist; the *adhigama* lasts as long as the third exists. Thus the Law lasts because of these three classes of persons.

Paramārtha (*TD* 29, p. 303c23) adds: Why? Because there are two causes of the duration of the Good Law: speaking correctly and receiving correctly. There are some other masters who say that the Law lasts one thousand years: this is in reference to the *adhigama,* not to the *āgama* which lasts longer. Why? In the future, persons capable of bearing the Law will be of two types: those who believe by reason of hearing, and those who believe by reason of correct intelligence (? *cheng-chieh* 正解). The gods protect these persons in order that the *āgama* and the *adhigama* do not quickly disappear. Consequently one should, both literally and in meaning, meditate and practice.

b. Saṁghabhadra (in his *Nyāyānusāra, TD* 29, p. 775b1) corrects Vasubandhu on many points and adds some interesting details: The Saddharma of the Bhagavat is twofold, *āgama* and *adhigama.* The *āgama* is Sūtra, Vinaya, and Abhidharma. The *adhigama* is the pure path (*anāsravamārga*) of the Three Vehicles. [For Vasubandhu, this is the *bodhipākṣikas* which are not all necessarily pure.] As long as the *adhigama-saddharma* lasts in the world, the *āgama-saddharma,* increased and sustained by it, also lasts. At present, in the East, the *adhigama-dharma*pis disappearing; the *āgama* has much disappeared. As the *adhigama-dharma* flourishes in the North, the good *āgama* of the Bhagavat is being extended and augmented. Consequently, this is the land of the supreme knowledge of the Tathāgatas (. . . *jñānagocara*). The Āryans dwell therein; the correct sense of the Abhidharma flourishes in this country; not in the East, etc., where tradition and practice are impossible (??). The *āgamadharma,* essentially depends on its "bearers" (*dhātar,* those who have learned it) and preachers in order for it to last in the world; the *adhigama* lasts solely depending on "those who practice" (*pratipattar*). But these are not only the supports of the *adhigama;* the *āgamadharma* also depends on *pratipattar:* as long as persons practice the Dharma without error (*aviparīta*), the *adhigama* will last; as long as the *adhigama* lasts, the *āgama* will last.

For the disappearance of the Law in the West, compare the Dreams of Kṛkin, *Vinaya of the Mahīśāsakas* (*Wu-fen Lü, TD* 22, p. 172a7), Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes,* II. p. 348. The eleventh dream (a piece of water whose center is troubled but whose sides are calm and clear) signifies that the Good Law will begin to disappear in the Middle (Kingdoms), but that it will prosper in the frontier kingdoms.

218. The *Vyākhyā* approves of this explanation: *eṣa eva pakṣo yukta iti paśyāmaḥ.*

219. a. Condition for the duration of the Law (respect for the Buddha; no mention of years), *Aṅguttara,* iv.84. *anāgatabhaya,* iii.15, 108, etc.

Why the Law of certain Buddhas lasts a long time, *Suttavibhaṅga, Pārājika,* i.3.3, *Samantapāsādikā,* i.184, *Kośa,* vii.p. 1145.

The Arhat prolongs his life in order to prolong the Law, *Kośa,* ii. English trans. p. 165. The Law is protected by humans and gods, *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 177b22. Lévi and Chavannes, "Les seize Arhats protecteurs de la Loi," *J. As.,* 1916, ii.9; J. Przyluski, *Açoka,* Chap. VII. Development of eschatological ideas relative to the Law, and also 207, 336, 399, 452.

b. *Cullavagga,* x.1.6: "If women had not been admitted, this *brahmacariya* would last a long time, it would last one thousand years; but as they have been admitted, this *brahmacariya* will not last for a long time: the Saddharma will last five hundred years." No mention of years in the *Bhikṣuṇīkarmavācanā* (Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 1920, p. 125)., nor in Rockhill, *Life,* p.60.

Same doctrine in the *Pi-ni-mu ching* (*TD* 24, p. 818c5), where the explanation is given by Kāśyapa (Przyluski, *Açoka,* p. 173); see also *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 607b8 (quoted by Saeki). Saeki also quotes the *Vinaya of the Mahīśāsakas* (*TD* 22, p. 186a14) "If the Bhikṣuṇīs observe the eight *gurudharmas,* the Law will last one thousand years."

But, in the *Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins* ("judgment of Ānanda"), the duration of the Law is limited to one thousand years because women have beens admitted. Same doctrine in the other texts relative to the First Council (Przyluski, *ibid.*).

Aśokāvadāna, and many other texts, have one thousand years; the *Mahāmāyāsūtra, TD* 12, p. 1013b21 - 1014a2, has fifteen hundred years (Przyluski, p. 161-173); see also the [*Fo lin nieh-p'an chi*] *Fa-chu ching, TD* 12, p. 1113a2-c10.

I-ching (Takakusu, 106) quotes the *Vinaya:* "As long as there is a *karmācārya* (? "the Upholders of rules"), my Law will not be destroyed. When there will be no person who "upholds and supports" the *karman,* my Law will end," and again: "As long as my precepts exist, I shall live." *Sum. Vil.* i.11.

c. Five successive disappearances: *adhigama, paṭipatti, pariyatti, liṅga,* and *dhātu,* in *Manorathapūraṇī,* i.87, *Anāgatavaṁsa* (Minayev, *JPTS.* 1886 and Warren, 481).

Three disapearances, *adhigama, paṭipatti,* and *liṅga,* in *Milinda,* 133.

"Disappearance of the shadow of the Buddha ... and how many Arhats do we have who can preserve the Good Law? It is said in a Treatise: The Great Lion has closed his eyes and his witnesses have disappeared one after the other ...," *I-ching,* Takakusu, p. 106 [compare above p. 1282].

The *Vajracchedikāṭīkā,* Mdo, xvi. fol. 234a, explaining *Vajracchedikā,* p. 22: *paścime kāle paścime samaye paścimāyāṁ pañcaśatyāṁ saddharmavipralopakāle vartamāne:* "It is well known (*prasiddha*) that the teaching of the Bhagavat lasts five times five hundred years; this is why the text specifies: during the last period of five hundred years, for it is then that the five *kaṣāyas* (iii.4c, 93a) increase."

Nanjo (in Max Müller, *SBE.* 49, p. 116) mentions the *Mahāsaṁnipātasūtra* (*TD* 13, p. 363a29): In the first five hundred years, the Bhikṣus and others will be "strong in deliberation" (will obtain *satyābhisamaya?*); in the second period of five hundred years, they will be strong in meditation (*samādhi, dhyāna*); in the third, in Scripture (*śruta*); in the fourth, the building of monasteries; and in the fifth, in quarrels and slander. The White Law will become invisible.

d. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 226c6: In the Period when the Saddarma of Kāśyapa began to perish, a *pratirūpaka* Dharma arose; when this has arisen, the Saddharma will have perished." *Saddharmapuṇḍarikā,* 67.7: "The Saddharma of Padmaprabha will last thirty-two *antarakalpas;* when it is destroyed, the *saddharmapratirūpaka* will last the same number of *kalpas*"; 377: "The Saddharma of Jitasvararāja was destroyed, and in the period when the *saddharmapratirūpala* was disappearing, this religion (*śāsana*) was overrun by Bhikṣus who attributed to themselves spiritual gifts which they did not possess . . . . "

220. According to Hsüan-tsang. According to Paramārtha: I have presented in this treatise the Abhidharma of the Buddha Bhagavat. Have I presented it according to the school of the Sautrāntikas or as it is presented in the *Vibhāṣā?*

According to the *Vyākhyā:* Is the Abhidharma that I have taught here, namely the *Abhidharmakośa,* the Abhidharma of the canonical Treatises, the Abhidharma of the *Jñānaprasthāna,* etc.?

221. *Vyākhyā: yo'yam iti vistaraḥ / yo'yam ihābhidharmakośalakṣaṇo 'bhidharma uktaḥ kim eṣa eva śāstrābhidharmo jñānaprasthānādhilakṣaṇo deśito'ta idam ucyate / kāśmīravaibhāṣikanītisiddha iti vistaraḥ / kaśmīre bhavāḥ kāśmīrāḥ / vibhāṣayā dīvyanti vaibhāṣikā iti vyākhyātam etat / santi kāśmīrā na vaibhāṣikā ye vinayacintādayah sautrāntikā ity bhadantādayah / santi vaibhāṣikā na kāśmīrā ye bahirdeśakā ity ubhayaviśeṣaṇam // teṣāṁ nītyā yaḥ siddho 'bhidharmaḥ sa prāyeṇeha mayā deśitaḥ / arthād uktaṁ bhavati / anyanītisiddho'pi deśita iti // yad durgṛhītaṁ kāśmīravaibhāṣikanayenānyanayena vā tad ihavacane 'smadāgo 'smadaparādhaḥ // kiṁ kāraṇam ity āha / saddharmanītau munayaḥ pramāṇam iti / saddharmasyāgamādhigamalakṣaṇasya nītau varṇane munayo buddhā bhagavanto buddhaputrāś cāryaśāradvatīputrādayaḥ pramāṇaṁ sarvākārasarvadharmāvabodha āptā ity arthaḥ.*

222. a. Hsüan-tsang: "The discussion of the Abhidharma of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr [=the Five Hundred Arhats, according to Saeki] is correctly established. [There is perhaps a mistake here with respect to the sense of *siddha.*] It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. That which is false is my fault. The authority for judging the Dharma is only the Buddhas and the Mahāśrāvakas."

b. Saṁghabhadra (in his *Nyāyānusāra, TD*29, p. 775b18): ". . . It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. Here the Sautrāntika [= Vasubandhu] presents his fundamental thought, saying: Depending on the *Mahāvibhāṣā,* discussing the principles of the Abhidharma of the Saugatas of this land, and making an effort to correctly understand to the end that the Good Law will last a long time for the salvation of beings, I have composed this treatise. The great bulk of this book presents the system [of the *Vibhāṣā*]; a smaller part follows other paths, for example with respect to physical matter as shape (*saṁsthānarūpa,* iv. English trans. p. 557), with respect to the past and future (v.27), etc. But the nature of the *dharmas* is very profound, and my intelligence is weak: I am not capable of diligently searching out (*ch'in-ch'iu* 勤求) the Preacher of Truth (*yathābhūtavādin*) (?). Consequently, in the interpretation (*nīti*) presented in this long treatise, if one small part is poorly supported (*durgṛhīta* = *pien-liang* 貶量 = of contestable authority; the meaning is perhaps "If I have, sometimes, reproduced some incorrect doctrines . . . "), it is my fault. The Buddhas, having accumulated the provisions of knowledge (*jñ ānasaṁbhāra*) know any object of consciousness. The Pratyekabuddhas cannot judge the characteristics of the *dharmas;* even less the Śrāvakas, for the Dharma that they realize depends on a teaching. Thus, in order to judge the *dharmas,* there are only the true great Munis. By this we know that the Abhidharma is truly the word of the Buddha. One should accept it with faith, practice-meditate on it correctly, and diligently search out deliverance."

c. Paramārtha (*TD* 29, p. 304a5): The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr possess the two *cheng*[1] = 二證 . This Abhidharma—the *Abhidharmakośa*—has been presented by me, in

general, conforming to their doctrine. If there is here anything that is badly grasped, it is my fault. In lieu of *cheng* capable of correctly judging the Good Law, only the Buddhas Bhagavats are the supreme measure (*pramāṇa*). Why? Because they immediately see all the *dharmas*. Apart from Scripture (*āgama*) and the Path (*mārga*), the Āryaśrāvakas of the Buddha are not even a mediocre measure in correctly judging the Good Law.

1. What is this twofold *cheng* (= *sākṣin, pratibhū*, etc.)? Perhaps persons who possess the *āgama* and the *adhigama* (as explained viii.39a), in other words the *āgama* and the *mārga*.

223. The first stanza is quoted in *I-ching*, Takakusu, p. 106.

Vyākhyā: nimīlite śāstari lokacakṣuṣīti / parinirvṛte bhagavati lokasya cakṣurbhūte mārgāmārgasaṁdarśake / anenāndhabhūtatāṁ lokasya darśayati // kṣayaṁ gate sākṣijane ca bhūyaseti / sākṣād draṣṭari sākṣī / mārgāmārgajño bhagavan iti ye'dhigatatattvā bhagavataḥ sākṣijanaḥ sahāyabhūtaḥ / tasmin parinitvāṇe kṣīṇe / avidyāndhādṛṣṭatattvair niravagrahair niraṅkuśaiḥ svayaṁdṛṣṭikatayā kutarkāpannair bhavadhir bhagavataḥ śāsanaṁ granthataś cārthataś cākulaṁ kṛtam // gate hi śāntiṁ paramāṁ svayambhuvītyādi pūrvaślokoktasyārthasya heturūpo'yaṁ dvitīyaḥ śloka upanyasyate / buddhabuddhaputreṣu hi parinirvṛteṣv anāthajagati śāsanāntardhānahetubhir dṛṣṭyādibhir malair doṣair niraṅkuśaiḥ svayaṁ yathecchaṁ iha loke'dye samprati caryate / bhāvasādhanam etat // tataś caivaṁ kaṇṭhagataprāṇam ivety arthaḥ / tad viditvā / balakākaṁ ca mālānāṁ doṣāṇāṁ na pramādyaṁ mumukṣubhir iti bhāvasādhanam iti.

CHAPTER NINE

Refutation of the pudgala

Oṁ. Homage to the Buddha.

Is there any liberation outside of Buddhism?[1]

No, there is not.

What is the reason for this?

There is no liberation outside of this teaching, because other doctrines are corrupted by a false conception of a soul. The word as other doctrines conceive it is not a metaphoric expression for a series of *skandhas*. By the power of their belief in this soul as a substantial entity, there arises clinging to the soul, the defilements are generated,[2] and liberation is impossible.

How do we know that the word "soul" is only a designation for a series of *skandhas*, and that no soul exists in and of itself?[3]

We know this because no proof establishes the existence of a soul apart from the *skandhas*, no proof by direct perception, nor any proof from inference.[4] If the soul were a real entity, separate like other entities,[5] it would be attained (i.e., known) either by direct perception as are the objects of the five sense consciousnesses and the object of mental consciousness,[6] or by inference, as are the five *indriyas*.

In fact, the five organs are known through inference. In the world, despite the presence of general causes, a result is not produced if certain specific causes are absent: for a sprout to be generated, one needs not only water, earth, and human effort, but also a seed. In the same way, even though general causes — the presence of an external

object, attention, etc.,—are present, the blind and the deaf do not see and hear to the extent that the non-blind and the non-deaf see and hear. The first are lacking, whereas the second have the specific causes for visual and auditory consciousness: these are the organs, material organs that are made of an invisible and intangible matter, and which is known only through inference.[7]

There is neither direct perception nor inference of a soul independent of the *skandhas*. We know then that a real soul does not exist.

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The Vātsīputrīyas admit a *pudgala* which is neither identical to the *skandhas* nor different from them.[8] We should examine whether this *pudgala* exists as an entity or as designation of a nominal existence. If it has a separate existence, like physical matter, then the *pudgala* exists as an entity. If it is only a collection, like milk, then it exists as a designation.[9]

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] What is wrong with admitting the first or the second hypothesis?

If the *pudgala* is an entity, it will be different from the *skandhas*, because its nature is separate, as the *skandhas* are different one from another (or it will be produced by causes and then it will not be eternal as you say), and you will have to name its causes; or it will be unconditioned: and this is a non-Buddhist opinion; and if it is unconditioned, the *pudgala* will be useless.[10] (It is thus false to believe that the *pudgala* is an entity.)But if you admit that the *pudgala* exists only as a title of designation, you will abandon your doctrine and you will be placed within our doctrines.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] We do not say that it is an entity, and we do not say that it exists only as a designation of the *skandhas*: for us the designation *pudgala* occurs in necessary relationship to present, internal *skandhas* (*skandhān upādāya*).[11]

A blind response, containing little to enlighten us! What does the expression "in relation to" mean? If you explain *skandhān upādāya* as *skandhānāṁ lakṣate* (characterized by the *skandhas*), you must then say "The designation *pudgala* occurs by taking the elements as an object": this is to recognize that *pudgala* is a word designating the *skandhas*, the same as the designation "milk" occurs taking as its object the constituents of milk—color, etc. If you explain *skandhān upādāya* as *skandhān pratītya* "conditioned by the *skandhas*," the same conclusion follows. You admit, in fact, that it is the *skandhas* which are the cause of the designation *pudgala*.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] This is not the way that we conceive of the *pudgala* and its relationship with the *skandhas*, but rather as the world conceives of fire and its relationship with fuel.

How does it conceive of fire and its relationship with fuel?

The world conceives of fire "in relation to fuel": they do not conceive of fire independent of fuel; they believe that fire is not identical with fuel nor different from fuel. If fire were different from fuel, fuel would not be hot; if fire were the same as fuel the consumed would be the consumer. In the same way we do not conceive of the *pudgala* as independent of the *skandhas*; we hold that the *pudgala* is neither identical to the *skandhas* nor different from the *skandhas*: if it were different from the *skandhas*, it would be eternal and thus unconditioned; but if it were identical to the *skandhas*, it would then be susceptible of annihilation.

***

Define the terms "fire" and "fuel," so that I can better understand what the expression "fire in relation to fuel" signifies.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] What shall we say to you? The consumed is the fuel, the consumer is fire.

But that is precisely what I want to know with precision: what

is the thing consumed, and what is the thing that is the consumer?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In the world, a thing to be burned, not on fire, wood, is called the combustible matter (i.e., fuel), the consumed;[12] the thing that exercises the action of burning, bright, very hot, in flames, is called the consumer or fire. The series that constitutes the fuel, is ignited by the fire, and it is reduced to ashes;[13] by means of fire, each moment of existence of the series of fuel is made different from the preceeding moment. The fire and fuel are both made up of eight substances;[14] consequently, fire is generated by reason of the fuel, as milk ferments and vinegar is created by reason of milk and wine. This is why the world agrees in saying that fire exists "in relation to fuel."

If this were the case, fire is different from the fuel, as their time-periods are different: there is first fuel, and then fire. If your *pudgala* exists in relation to the *skandhas*, as fire exists in relation to fuel, you then have to admit that, since it is produced by reason of the *skandhas*, it is different from the *skandhas*, and that it is, moreover, transitory.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In the thing set on fire, wood, etc.,[15] one of the substances, namely a tangible object which is heat, is the fire; the other substances are the fuels. Then your remark on the priority in time of the fuel does not hold.

But fire and fuel, generated at the same time, are "separate," since their characteristics are distinct.[16] The meaning that you attribute to the expression "in relation to" has not yet been explained.[17] Since fire and fuel are generated at the same time, how can one say that fire exists in relation to fuel? Fire, which is one of the substances of the object on fire, does not have fuel for a cause, which is the other substances of the said object, since all these substances were generated at the same time, each from its own, separate cause. One can say no more than that the term "fire" had for a cause (or object) fuel, since this term is applied to the tangible "heat."[18]

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] The expression "fire in relation to fuel"

means that the fire has fuel as its basis, or that the fire coexists with fuel.[19]

This means that the *pudgala* coexists with the *skandhas* or that it depends on the *skandhas*: this then admits that it differs from the *skandhas*. And logic demands also that, as fire does not exist when fuel is absent, likewise the *pudgala* does not exist without *skandhas*. You do not admit these conclusions; then your explanation is worthless.

Fire is not different from fuel (p. 1315, line 18), because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot.

What does "hot" mean? If "hot" is defined as being the tangible "heat" (namely fire), as has been done above, then fuel will not be hot (since fuel is the object on fire, without the tangible element "heat"). If "hot" is that which is associated with heat (i.e., if one admits that fuel is termed hot by reason of its association with heat), then this means that different things (of "heat") are called "hot": the one tangible "heat" is designated by "fire" and all that is associated with this tangible is designated by the name "hot." To think thus is to confess that fuel is termed hot although it is different from fire or from the tangible "heat."[20] The Vātsīputrīyas are thus justified in saying that "fire is not different from fuel since fuel is hot."

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Wood on fire is called fuel; it is also called fire.

Explain then the meaning that you attribute to the expression "fire in relation to fuel"! The *pudgala* (the active data of relation, of the *upādāya*) will be identical to the *skandhas* (passive data of the said "relation"): no reasoning can establish the non-identity (of these two). The thesis of the Vātsīputrīyas, that the *pudgala* exists in relation to the *skandhas* as fire exists in relation to fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis.

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The *pudgala* is ineffable in that which concerns its relationship—its identity or non-identity—with the *skandhas*. How can they distinguish "five categories of things susceptible of being known":[21] 1-3. conditioned things, in other words, past, present, and future things; 4. unconditioned, or non-caused things, and 5. the ineffable (or *pudgala*)"?

The *pudgala*, in fact, should also be ineffable from this point of view: if it is ineffable, one cannot say either that it is a fifth category, nor that this is not a fifth category.[22]

***

Let us examine what this word "*pudgala*" depends on. If it depends on the *skandhas*, then the *pudgala* exists solely as a designation, as the expression *pudgala* depends on the *skandhas* and not on a real *pudgala*. If it depends on a real *pudgala*, why did the Vātsīputrīyas say that the designation "*pudgala*" is "in relation to the *skandhas*"? Then would have had to say "in relation to the *pudgala*." But, in fact, they do not maintain that the *pudgala* is established in relation to a *pudgala*. Moreover the expression *pudgala* is a simple designation of *skandhas*.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Given the *skandhas*, the *pudgala* is perceived:[23] that is why we say that the designation "*pudgala*" is "with relation to the *skandhas*."

But color is perceived when diverse causes are present, the eye, light, etc.; may we thereby conclude that the designation "color" is "with relation to these diverse causes"?

***

Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses—consciousnesses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness—is the *pudgala* perceived?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] It is perceived by all six consciousnesses. When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter (=a body), it indirectly discerns the *pudgala*,[24] and then we can say that the *pudgala* is known by the eye consciousness. But the relationship of the *pudgala* with physical matter, be it identical or different, is inexpressible. The same for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness recognizes the *dharmas* (mind and mental states), it indirectly discerns the *pudgala*; it is then known by the mental consciousness, but its relationship with these states is inexpressible.

It follows from this explanation too that the *pudgala* exists solely as a designation exactly like milk. When the eye consciousness recognizes the color of milk, it indirectly discerns the milk: the milk is then known by the eye consciousness and one cannot say that the milk is the same thing as its color or is different from its color. The same for ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness: the body consciousness recognizes tangibles; from whence there is the consciousness of milk; the milk is then known by the body consciousness without which one could only say that the milk is identical to the tangible, or different from the tangible. In fact milk is not fourfold: then it is not color, smell, taste, tangible; but furthermore, one cannot say that the milk is not made of these four. The conclusion is that one metaphorically designates a complex of elements by "*pudgala*," the same as the designation "milk" is understood as a coming together of color, smell, etc. They are merely names without reality.

What meaning do you therefore attach to the phrase, "When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter, it indirectly discerns the *pudgala*"? Do you want to say that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the *pudgala*, or that the perception of physical matter and the *pudgala* takes place at the same time?

If the Vātsīputrīyas answer that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the *pudgala* but that, nevertheless, one cannot say that the *pudgala* is different from physical matter, then the condition and the causes of the perception of physical matter—eye,

light, an act of attention—would not be different from physical matter.

If the Vātsīputrīyas answer that one perceives the *pudgala* at the same time as one perceives physical matter,[25] we would question whether one perceives the *pudgala* by the same operation which perceives physical matter, or by a different operation.

In the first hypothesis, the *pudgala* is only physical matter and the designation "*pudgala*" applies only to physical matter. It is then impossible to distinguish "This is physical matter; that is *pudgala*." Without this distinction, how can one prove that there is physical matter and that there is a *pudgala*? The existence of the *pudgala* cannot be proven by this distinction.

In the second hypothesis, since the time of the two perceptions is different, the *pudgala* will be as different from color and shape as yellow is from blue, as former is from latter.

The same reasoning follows for the other *skandhas*.

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] As one cannot say that the *pudgala* is the same thing as color and shape, nor that it is different from color and shape, likewise the perception of the *pudgala* is not the same as the perception of the color and shape, nor different from this perception.

This point of view obliges you to say that the perception of the *pudgala*, being ineffable, is not made part of the category of "conditioned things": but now you do not admit this thesis, since, for you, all perception is "conditioned".

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If the *pudgala* is an entity that one cannot define as being

matter (the *rūpa skandha*,) nor as being non-matter (the four non-material skandhas, *vedanā skandha*, etc.), why did the Blessed One say that "matter and the other *skandhas* are not self"?[26]

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The *pudgala*, you say, is attained by the eye consciousness. Is this consciousness generated by color and shape, or by the *pudgala*, or both? In the first hypothesis, one cannot maintain that this eye consciousness perceives the *pudgala*, because the *pudgala* is not the object of this consciousness, as neither is sound. In fact, all consciousnesses that are produced having as their condition a certain thing, has this same thing as an "object as condition": now the *pudgala*, not being a condition of the eye consciousness, cannot be its object. Thus the visual consciousness does not perceive the *pudgala*.

The other two hypothesis contradict the Sūtra which says that the eye consciousness is generated by reason of two things,[27] namely, by the eye and by physical matter and shape. The Sūtra says"Oh Bhikṣus, eye consciousness is generated having the eye as its cause (*hetu*) and physical matter as its condition (*pratyaya* = *ālambanapratyaya*). All eye consciousness is by reason of the eye and physical matter."[28]

If the *pudgala* is the cause of the eye consciousness, it will be impermanent, because the Sūtra says, "All causes and all conditions that produce consciousnesses are impermanent."

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] We admit then that the *pudgala* is not an object as condition (*ālambana*) of consciousness.

[Very well; but then it is not discernible (*vijñeya*), an object of *vijñāna*; if it is not discernible, it is not cognizable (*jñeya*), the object of *jñana*; if it is not cognizable, how can one prove that it exists? If one cannot prove that it exists, your system collapses.]

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You have said that the *pudgala* is discerned by the six consciousnesses.[29] But, if it is discerned by the eye consciousness, it will be, like physical matter and shape, different from sound; if it is discerned by the ear consciousness, it will be, like sound, different from physical matter and shape. And thus for those (consciousnesses) that follow.

Moreover, your thesis is in contradiction to the Sūtra. The Sūtra says, "Oh Brāhmin, the five organs (of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) have distinct spheres (*gocara*) and objects (*viṣaya*). Each one of them perceives its own sphere and its own object,[30] and does not perceive the sphere or the object of the others. And the mental organ perceives the spheres and the objects of the first five organs, and they have the mental organ as their refuge."[31] Or rather would you say, in agreement with the Sūtra, that the *pudgala* is not the object (of the five organs)? In this case, it would not be discerned (by the five organs), and you put yourself in contradiction to your own system.[32]

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] (You affirm, according to the Sūtra, that each of the five organs has its own object, and you thus conclude that the *pudgala* is not the object of eye consciousness). But, according to the Sūtra, the mental organ also has its own object (and this is in contradiction to your system).[33] In fact, the *Ṣaṭprāṇakopama-sūtra* says, "Each of these six organs has its own object and its own sphere; each seeks after its object and its sphere."[34]

This Sūtra does not intend to speak of the six organs, because the five material organs and the five consciousnesses which are dependent on them do not possess the desire to see, to hear, etc.

This Sūtra understands, by organ of the eye, etc., the mental consciousness which is induced and dominated by the eye, etc.[35] By this fact, the mental consciousness which is isolated—that is to say, which is not induced and dominated by one of the five material organs, but solely by the mental organ—does not have any desire with regard to the spheres and objects of the five organs, but solely with regard to the *dharmāyatana*. Thus the *Ṣaṭprāṇakopama-sūtra* does not contradict the Sūtra previously quoted.

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The Blessed One has said, "Oh Bhikṣus, I declare to you all the *dharmas* that should be penetrated (*abhijñeya*) and known (*parijñeya*), namely: the eyes, physical matter, eye consciousness, eye contact, the sensation which is produced having as a cause eye contact, painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant sensation.... And thus following to: "the sensation which is produced having as its cause contact with the mental organ: these are what should be penetrated and known."[36] This text teaches us that the *dharmas* to be penetrated and comprehended are only those enumerated. The *pudgala* does not figure in this list: then it is not susceptible of being discerned (*vijñeya*). In fact, the speculative consciousness (*prajña*) by which one penetrates or comprehends, has the same sphere (*viṣaya*) as does ordinary consciousness (*vijñāna*).[37]

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The masters who maintain that the eye sees the *pudgala* should learn that the eye sees only that which is real in the *pudgala* (namely physical matter: the same for the other five organs). They fall into the abyss of harmful views in saying that it sees a soul in what is not a soul.[38]

Furthermore, the Buddha explained that the word *pudgala*

designates the *skandhas*. In the *Sūtra of Man*,[39] he said, "Supported by the eye, having physical matter for its object and condition, the visual consciousness arises: by reason of the coming together of these three, contact arises; at the same time there arises sensation, thought, the act of attention, etc."[40] The last four terms—*vijñāna, vedanā, saṁjñā, cetanā*—are non-material *skandhas*: the eye and physical matter are the *rūpa skandhas*. Here is then all that one speaks of when one says "man." In order to express various nuances, one inserts various words, such as *sattva*, being, *nara*, man, *manuja*, born of Manu, *manava*, young man, *poṣa*, he who is nourished, *jīva*, vital principle, *jantu*, he who is born,[41] *pudgala*, person. One says to oneself, "My eye sees physical matter," and according to current usage, "This venerable one is of such a name, of such a family, of such a *gotra*, of such food, of such happiness and of such suffering, of such length of life; he lasts a time; he terminates his life in such a manner.[42] Oh Bhikṣus, know that these are only manners of speaking, words, expressions conforming to the usage of the world, because there are only impermanent things in the *pudgala*, conditioned things, born of causes and conditions, created through deeds."

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The Blessed One declares that the Sūtras of explicit meanings are the authority. The Sūtras that we have quoted are of explicit meaning; one cannot draw a divergent explanation from them.[43]

Moreover, 1. The Blessed One said to a Brāhmin, "When I say that all exists, I mean that there are twelve sources of consciousness (*āyatana*, i.20a)."[44] Then if the *pudgala*[45] is not included in the twelve *āyatanas*, it does not exist; and if it is included one cannot say that it is ineffable.

2. The Vātsīputrīyas read a Sūtra which says, "All that is of the eye, all physical matter... the Tathāgata, Oh Bhikṣus, embraces this group (namely the twelve *āyatanas*), terms them 'all,' establishes that 'all' exists, so many *dharmas* in themselves." Now, there is no

pudgala there: how can one say that the *pudgala* is a real entity?

3. The *Bimbisāra-sūtra* says, "A stupid, ignorant Pṛthagjana becomes attached to words, and he imagines that there is a self; but there is no self nor things pertaining to self, but only past, present and future painful *dharmas*."[46]

4. The worthy (*arhatī*) Śilā[47] said to Māra, "You fall into wrong views by wrongly maintaining that there is a being in the group of conditions (*saṁskāras*) which is empty: the wise understand that such a being does not exist. As the name 'chariot' is given to a group of parts, the world uses the word 'being': one should know that this is a group of *skandhas*."

5. In the *Kṣudrakāgama*,[48] the Buddha said to the Brāhmin Daridra,[49] "Daridra, those who understand the Truths can deliver themselves from all fetters: through the mind (there is) defilement, and also purification through the mind.[50] The self, in fact, does not have the nature of a soul; it is through error that one thinks that a soul exists; there is no being (*sattva*), no soul, but only *dharmas* produced through causes: *skandhas*, sources-of-consciousness (*āyatana*), *dhātus*, that constitute the twelve limbs of existence; examined in depth, there is found to be no *pudgala* there. Seeing that the interior is empty, see that externals are empty;[51] and there is no ascetic who meditates on emptiness."[52]

6. The Sūtra[53] says, "Five calamities proceed from the belief in a soul: one creates a theory of the soul, of a being, of a vital principal; one is not distinguished from heterodox teachers; one takes a road which is not the Way; his mind does not enter into emptiness, his faith does not satisfy him, he is not established in it to his satisfaction, there is no propensity (for liberation); the Āryan qualities are not purified in him."

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] These texts are not authoritative, because

they are not read in our tradition.

What then is the authority in your system, your tradition or the words of the Buddha? If it is your tradition, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not a child of the Śākyan. If it is the word of the Buddha, why do you not recognize the authority of all the words of the Buddha?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] The texts you have quoted are not the authentic word of the Buddha,[54] since our tradition does not read them.

That is not a good reason.

Why is this?

Because all the other traditions read these texts,[55] and because these texts do not contradict any other Sūtras, nor philosophic truths.[56] Also, when you embolden yourself to brutally reject them by saying, "They are not authentic because we do not read them," this is only pure impudence contrary to all good sense.

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The position of the Vātsīputrīyas is moreover more inadmissable since their sect reads a Sūtra which says, "The *dharmas* are not soul and do not contain a soul."[57]

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Without doubt we read this Sūtra. But the *pudgala* is neither the *dharmas* which serve as its support, nor is it different from these *dharmas*; that is why it says that "no *dharma* is a soul."

Very well; but it is taught that the *pudgala* cannot be discerned by the mental consciousness, since the Sūtra establishes clearly that the mental consciousness is produced by reason of two conditions,[58] the mental organ (*manas*) and the *dharmas*. Besides how would you explain the Sūtra which says, "To recognize a soul in what is not soul is a mistake of ideas, of mind, and of view"? [59]

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] This Sūtra says that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in that which is not a soul; it does not say that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in what is a soul.

What is understood by "that which is not a soul"? Would you say that it concerns the *skandhas, āyatanas* and *dhātus*? This contradicts your theory that the *pudgala* is not identical to physical matter, etc.[60] Further, a Sūtra says,[61] "Oh Bhikṣus, know that all the Brāhmins and monks that contemplate a soul, contemplate only the five *skandhas*-of-attachment." Then this (contemplation) is not a soul, because the self that one recognizes as a soul is solely the *dharmas* that are not a soul but which one falsely imagines to be a soul.[62] Another Sūtra[63] says, "All those that have remembered, do remember, or shall remember their various past existences—their remembrance is solely with regard to the five *skandhas*-of-attachment." Then there is no *pudgala* in any of this.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] But the same Sūtra says, "In the past, I was handsome (literally: I possessed physical matter)."[64]

This declaration is for the purpose of indicating that the saint capable of recollecting his past lives remembers the variety of characteristics of his series of these existences. But the Buddha does not mean that he sees a real *pudgala* possessing, in a past life, such physical matter, etc.: for to think such is to fall into *satkāyadṛṣṭi*. Or rather, if such is the meaning of this sentence, then its sole purpose is to reject it as non-authentic.[65] We conclude that the Sūtra, insofar as it attributes the possession of physical matter, etc., to a soul, has in view "a self of designation", as one speaks of a pile which, being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which, being only a succession (of waters), has no permanence.[66]

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:[67]] The Blessed One would then not be

omniscient, since the mind and mental states are not capable of knowing all the *dharmas*, seeing that mind and mental states change, arising and perishing from moment to moment. Omniscience can belong only to a soul, a *pudgala*.

We would reply that the *pudgala* would be eternal if it does not perish when the mind perishes: a thesis which contradicts your theory of a *pudgala* about which one can only say that it is eternal or non-eternal. We do not say (as do the Mahāsāṁghikas) that the Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all the *dharmas* at one and the same time:[68] "Buddha" designates a certain series: to this series there belongs this unique ability that, by a single act of modulating his mind, he immediately produces an exact consciousness of the object relative to which a desire for knowing has arisen: one then calls this series "Omniscient." One moment of thought is not capable of knowing everything. On this point, there is a verse: "As fire, by the capacity of its series, burns all, so too does the Omniscient One—but not by a universal, simultaneous knowledge."[69]

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] How do you prove that (the word "Omniscient"should be understood as a series, and not as a particular self of universal knowledge)?

It is spoken of in the Scriptures, on the subject of the Buddhas of the past, present and future. For example the verse: "Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future, and Buddhas of the present destroy the sorrows of many."[70] But, in your system, the *skandhas* of existence belong to the three periods of time, but not the *pudgala*.

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] If the term *pudgala* only designates the five *skandhas*-of-attachment, how can the Blessed One say, "Oh Bhikṣus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the burden."[71]

Why may it not be explained in these terms?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Because, if the *pudgala* is only a name given to the *skandhas*, it cannot be the bearer of a burden.

Why not?

Simply because it is unheard of.

Do not speak then of an ineffable *pudgala*. No one has ever ascertained the existence of an ineffable thing. And moreover you will have to account for the other statements of the Sūtra that thirst (or desire) is the taking up of the burden: as thirst is a *skandha*, the "burden" (is too), and it is unheard of that a burden takes itself up. The "taking up of the burden" is included within the *skandhas*, and so too the bearer of the burden. These are the *skandhas* that the Blessed One designated by the name of "*pudgala*, the bearer of the burden," as one sees in the explanation given a little farther on in the same Sūtra.

After having said that the burden is the five *skandhas*-of-attachment, that the taking up of the burden is thirst, and that the laying down of the burden is the abandoning of thirst, it is said that the bearer of the burden is the *pudgala*; but fearing that one understands the *pudgala* inexactly, as an eternal, ineffable, real entity, he explains, "(It is only to conform to the use of this world that one says:) This venerable one, of such a name, of such a *gotra*," and the rest (as in the *Sūtra on Man*, above), in order that one might well know that the *pudgala* is effable, impermanent, and without a unique nature.[72] The five *skandhas*-of-attachment are painful in their nature: they receive then the name of "burden"; each of the former moments of the series attract each of the latter moments: it receives then the name of "bearer of the burden."[73] The *pudgala* is then not an entity.

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] The *pudgala* exists [as an entity,] as the

Sūtra says, "To say that apparitional beings[74] do not exist is a false view."[75]

Who denies the existence of apparitional beings? We admit the existence of these beings in the sense that the Blessed One understands them. For him, "apparitional beings" designates a series of *skandhas* (the series of five *skandhas* of an intermediary being), susceptible of going to another world without the intervention of a womb, an egg, or of moisture forms of birth. To negate the existence of an apparitional being so defined, is a false view, because this type of series of *skandhas* truly exists.

If you maintain that the negation of the *pudgala* is false, you wil have to say how this false view is given up. It cannot be given up by Seeing, nor by Meditation, for on the one hand, the *pudgala* is not included within the Truths, and, on the other hand, false views are not given up by Meditation but by Seeing.[76]

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] But a Sūtra says, "A *pudgala* arises (*utpadyate*) in this world..."[77] Now this does not refer to the five *skandhas*, but to an entity.

Such is not the meaning of the Sūtra that only metaphorically designates as a unit that which exists only as a complex; as the world speaks of a grain of hemp, or a grain of rice, or of a heap, or a word.[78] Further, since the Sūtra attributes an arising to the *pudgala*, it is therefore conditioned (*saṁskṛta*).

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] When it refers to the *pudgala*, the word "to arise" does not have the same meaning as when one speaks of the *skandhas* arising. For the *skandhas*, to arise means to exist after having been non-existent. One says that the *pudgala* arises because, at that moment, it takes on different *skandhas*[79] (for example the *manas* of a human instead of the *manas* of an animal). As one says in the world, when a certain person acquires a certain knowledge, that a sacrificer, or a grammarian is born; when a

layman takes on certain characteristics, one says that a *bhikṣu*, a monk of a certain sect is born: one does not mean by these expressions that there has really been a birth of a sacrificer, or a monk. And again in the same way, through the acquisition of a certain trait, one says: an old man is born, a sick person comes into being.

This explanation of the phrase, "A *pudgala* arises in this world" has been condemned by the Blessed One. In the *Paramārthaśūnyata-sūtra*,[80] the Blessed One said, "There is action; there is result;[81] but, besides the causal production of the *dharmas* (which give the impression of a permanent agent), one does not maintain the existence of an agent which abandons these *skandhas* and which takes up other *skandhas*."[82] And in the *Phālguna-sūtra*: "I do not say that there has been one who takes."[83] There is then no *pudgala* that gives up or takes up the *skandhas*.

Nevertheless, let us examine your examples: "A sacrificer is born." What is the nature of that which became a sacrificer? Would you say that a "soul" became a sacrificer? But you have to precisely prove the existence of a "soul." Would you say that it is a series of minds and mental states? But minds and mental states appear from instant to instant after having been non-existent[84] and they are not capable of abandoning and grasping. Would you say that it is the body (the organ of sense)? The same difficulty holds. Notice then that the knowledge the acquisition of which by a so-called person makes him a sacrificer, differs from this person: it would be then, by a legitimate comparison, that the *skandhas* acquired by a *pudgala* differ from the *pudgala*; and this goes against your definition of a *pudgala*. As for the example of an old man and a sick person, there is a succession of different bodies: to hold that an old man is the transformation of a young man is the Sāṁkhya thesis of transformation (*pariṇāma*), a thesis already refuted.[85] Then your examples are without value. And if you say that the *skandhas* arise, but that the *pudgala* does not arise, it follows that the latter differs from the *skandhas* and is eternal. You maintain again that the *skandhas* are five in number, but that the *pudgala* is one: this is to again recognize that the *pudgala*

differs from the *skandhas*.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Your position is totally parallel (to ours), since you say that the primary elements, earth, etc., are four; but that secondary matter (*upādāyarūpa*)—color, for example—is one; but that, nevertheless, secondary matter does not differ from the primary elements.[86]

This objection does not go against us, but only against the teachers who say that secondary matter is the four elements.[87] But, to adopt the opinion that you wrongly attribute to us, we say that in the manner that secondary matter is made up of the four elements, in that way the five *skandhas* constitute the *pudgala*.

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] If the *pudgala* is only a word serving to designate the five *skandhas*, why did the Buddha not declare that the vital principal (*jīva*) is the body?[88]

Because the Buddha takes into consideration the intention (*āśaya*) of whomever asks him questions. The person who asks this question of the Buddha understood by *jīva*, not a being, a simple designation of the *skandhas*, but a person, a real living entity; and he was thinking of this person when he asked if the *jīva* is identical to the body or different from the body. Now this *jīva* does not absolutely exist; and so the Buddha only maintained that it is neither identical to nor different from the body, and then the Blessed One condemned the two answers. In like manner one cannot say that the hairs of a tortoise are hard or soft.[89]

The ancient masters have already explained this difficulty. There was once a venerable one named Nāgasena, possessor of the three knowledges (*vidyās*), the six higher knowledges (*abhijñās*), and the eight liberations (*vimokṣas*). At that time, the King of Kalinga went up to him and said, "I have come with the intention of clearing up my doubts. But monks are verbose:[90] shall we agree

that you answer plainly to the questions that I ask?" Nāgasena accepted his request and the King asked, "Is the vital principal identical to the body or different from the body?" "To this question," said Nāgasena, "there are no grounds for answer." "Haven't we agreed that you shall answer plainly? Why speak off the point and not answer?" "I wish to ask the King concerning a doubt. But kings are verbose: shall we agree that the King answers plainly to the question that I shall ask?" The King consented and Nāgasena asked, "Do the mangos in the King's palace give sweet fruit or bitter fruit?" And the King answered him, "There are no mango trees within my palace." Nāgasena protested as the King had protested, saying, "Haven't we made an agreement? Why speak off the point and not answer?" "But," said the King, "as there are no mangos in my palace, how could there be any sweet or bitter fruits?" "In the same way, Oh King, the vital principal does not exist: one cannot then answer your question and say that it is identical to the body or different from the body."[91]

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] But, if the *pudgala* does not exist, why didn't the Blessed One answer that the *jīva* absolutely does not exist?

Because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner, that questioning on the *jīva* may be with the idea that the *jīva* is a series of *skandhas*. If the Blessed One answered that the *jīva* absolutely does not exist, the questioner would have fallen into false views. Furthermore, as the questioner was not capable of understanding "dependent origination" (*pratītyasamutpāda*), he was not a fit receptacle for the Good Law: the Blessed One then did not tell him that the *jīva* exists except by way of designation.

The explanation that we have given here is the same that the Blessed One formulated: "Ānanda, the wandering monk Vatsagotra came to me to ask a question thusly: 'Is there, or is there not a soul (*ātman*]?' I did not answer him. In fact, to answer that there is a soul is to contradict the truth of things, because no *dharma* is a soul nor has any relationship with a soul; and if I had answered that there is no soul, I would have increased the folly of Vatsagotra,

for he would have thought: 'I had a soul, but this soul does not now exist.'[92] For, in comparison to the folly of the belief in the existence of a soul, this second folly is graver. Whoever believes in the soul falls into the extreme view of eternity; whoever believes that the soul does not exist falls into the extreme view of annihilation. Thoughtless error, heavy error[93]...", and so on. It has been said:[94]

1. Taking into consideration the injury that heresy does and, also, the falling off of good deeds, the Buddhas teach the Law in the manner in which a tigress carries its young.[95]

2. Those who believe in the reality of the soul are torn by the teeth of heresy; those who do not recognize the conventional self let their good actions fall away, and perish.[96]

And again:

1. Since a real *jīva* does not exist, the Buddha does not say that the *jīva* is identical or non-identical; he does not say any more than that the *jīva* does not really exist, fearing that one would only negate the conventional *jīva*.[97]

2. Series of *skandhas*, actions, and the results of actions are what are termed *jīva*: if the Buddha were to negate the *jīva*, he would negate actions and their results.

3. And if the Buddha does not say that the so-called *jīva* is in the *skandhas*, it is because he sees that the questioner is not capable of tolerating the teaching of emptiness.

4. It is then because of the state of mind of Vatsa that the Buddha, asked if there was a soul, yes or no, did not answer. But if the soul were to exist, why wouldn't he have answered that it exists?[98]

The Buddha did not answer four questions relative to the eternity of the world (*loka*):[99] again this is because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner. If such a person understands *loka* to be a soul (*ātman*), the four alternatives are incorrect, since the soul does not absolutely exist. If he understands *loka* to be transmigration or *saṁsāra*, the four alternatives are

incorrect: if transmigration is eternal, no one could obtain Nirvāṇa; if it is not eternal, all would obtain Nirvana by spontaneous annihilation, and not through effort: if it is both eternal and non-eternal, some would never obtain Nirvāṇa, whereas others would obtain it spontaneously; finally, to say that *loka*, in the sense of *saṁsāra*, is neither eternal nor non-eternal, is to say that beings both would and would not obtain Nirvāṇa: a contradiction in terms. In fact, Nirvāṇa is possible through the Way; then no categorical response is acceptable. In the same way the Buddha did not answer the Nirgranthaśrāvaka who held a bird in his hand and asked if this bird was dead or alive.[100]

The four questions as to whether the world is infinite, namely if it has an end or not, has the same sense as the questions relative to the eternity of the world,[101] and present the same defect.

How do we know that "the infinity of the world" should be understood in this sense? The wandering monk Uktika,[102] after having asked the Buddha about infinity, resorted to a ruse in order to repeat his question and asked, "Does the whole world obtain deliverance through the Way, or only a part of the world?"[103] The elder Ānanda then said to him, "You have already posed this question, Uktika. Why do you repeat it by changing the terms?"

If the Blessed One did not explain concerning the four questions relative to the existence of the Tathāgata after death, this is again because he took into account the intentions of the questioner. Such a person understood the Tathāgata to be a "soul" liberated from the defilements.

We ask in our turn those who hold to a "soul:" The Blessed One, according to you, declared that the *pudgala* exists, indescribable: why did he not declare that the Tathāgata exists after death?

If [the Vātsīputrīyas] answer that the Buddha kept silent on this point because he feared that the disciple, by admitting the survival of a *pudgala* named Tathāgata, would fall into the view of eternity, we would then ask why the Blessed One predicted to Maitreya, "In the ages to come, you will be a Tathāgata, an Arhat, a

Saṁyaksambuddha;"[104] and speaking of one of his deceased disciples, he said, "He is at present reborn in such a place."[105] Are not these discourses defiled by the opinion of permanence?

If [the Vātsīputrīyas] answer that the Blessed One does not say anything concerning the deceased Tathāgata because, seeing at first the *pudgala*, he now no longer sees the *pudgala* once it has attained Nirvāṇa; it is then through ignorance that the Tathāgata does not make any declaration concerning the deceased Tathāgata, and to speak thus is to deny the omniscience of the Master. Rather one should believe that if the Blessed One abstains from all declarations, it is because the "soul" that the questioner alluded to in speaking of the Tathāgata does not absolutely exist. If [the Vātsīputrīyas] say that the Blessed One sees the *pudgala*, which is in Nirvāṇa, but that he still does not make a statement on this subject; and that the *pudgala* exists but is not, at the same time, an object of a statement of the Blessed One, we then conclude that [the Vātsīputrīyas] admit that the *pudgala* is permanent.

If [the Vātsīputrīyas] say that "whether the Blessed One does or does not see the *pudgala*" is indescribable, they then proceed to say that all is indescribable, and that one can only say that the Blessed One is omniscient or non-omniscient.

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] The *pudgala* really exists, as it is said, that "To say that I really, truly do not have an *ātman*[106] is an incorrect opinion."

This is not a proof, for it is also said that it is an incorrect opinion to affirm the existence of an *ātman*.[107] Scholars of the Abhidharma think that a belief in the existence of an *ātman* and a belief in its non-existence are two extreme opinions, as they identify them with the two branches of "the opinion that consists in believing in extremes." This doctrine is certain, as it is formulated in the *Vatsagotrā-sūtra*, "Ānanda, those who affirm a

soul fall into the extreme of the belief in permanence; those who deny a soul fall into the extreme of the belief in annihilation..."[108]

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[The Vātsīputrīyas]: If the *pudgala* does not exist, what is it that wanders in *saṁsāra*? In fact, one can only allow that *saṁsāra* itself wanders. Further the Blessed One has said, "Beings misled by ignorance, bound by thirst, wander here and there, either among beings in hell, among animals, among *pretas*, humans, or the gods; thus for a long time they experience all suffering."[109]

How does the *pudgala* wander in *saṁsāra*? Would you say that this wandering consists in abandoning old *skandhas* and in taking up new *skandhas*? But we have shown that this explanation is inadmissable. A good explanation is simple: one says that when a flame burns a field it travels, although they be only moments of flame, because it constitutes a series; in the same way the harmony of the *skandhas* which is constantly repeated receives, metaphorically, the name of being; supported by thirst, the series of *skandhas* travels in *saṁsāra*.

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[The Vātsīputrīyas]: If only the *skandhas* exist, we do not see how one can explain these words of the Blessed One, "In the past, I was the teacher Sunetra."[110] In fact, in the hypothesis of the existence of the individual *skandhas* metaphorically termed "soul," past *skandhas* are not the same as present *skandhas*, and so the Blessed One cannot express himself in this manner.

But what is the thing that the Blessed One calls "soul"? The *pudgala*, you would say: then, since the "soul" is permanent, a past "soul" is identical with a present "soul". For us, when the Blessed One said, "I was the teacher Sunetra," he teaches us that the *skandhas* that constitute his present "soul" formed part of the

same series as the *skandhas* that constituted Sunetra. In the same way one says, "This fire has been burning here."

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You affirm the existence of a real soul: we hold that only the Buddhas, Tathāgatas would see it (because it is subtle). But if the Buddhas see a soul, they would produce a firm belief in a soul; from this belief in a soul there would be produced among them a belief in things pertaining to a soul; from these two beliefs there would be produced among them affection for the soul and for things pertaining to a soul. The Blessed One said in fact that "whosoever believes in a soul, believes in things pertaining to a soul; believing in things pertaining to a soul, they become attached to the *skandhas* as they form a soul and things pertaining to a soul." There would be then *satkāyadṛṣṭi* among the Buddhas; they would be bound by affection for a soul and for things pertaining to a soul; and they would be very far from liberation.

[The Vātsīputrīyas]: Affection is not produced with regard to a soul. We explain: when one recognizes a soul in what is not the soul, as do the non-Buddhists, one feels affection for this pretended soul; but, when one sees the soul in that which is truly the soul, namely the ineffable *pudgala*, as do the Buddhas, no affection is produced with regard to the soul.

This statement has no support. The Vātsīputrīyas, without any shadow of reason, introduce the sickness of heresy into the teachings of the Master. Whereas there are those who admit an ineffable *pudgala*, others deny the existence of all the *dharmas*;[111] non-Buddhists imagine a soul apart from all other substances. All these doctrines are wrong and present the same flaw in that they do not lead to liberation.

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If the soul does not absolutely exist,[112] how can a mind—which perishes as soon as it is generated—be capable of remembering an object perceived a long time before? How is it able to recognize an object similar to what it has formerly perceived?

Memory and recognition are generated immediately, in a series, from a certain type of mind, when this type of mind arises from the idea of object already perceived and which one calls "object of the memory."

[Now then, let us first examine memory.]

What is the type of mind from whence memory immediately shoots up?

We answer: It's a certain mind (*citta-viśeṣa*), bent towards the object of memory, a mind in which one finds ideas related to that thing or resembling that thing, or even "resolutions" of a certain nature, etc.; with the condition however that the power that this mind possesses to produce memory is not paralysed by a psycho-somatic change arising from sickness, from grief, from mental trouble, or the disturbing influence of magic formulas, etc.[113]

1. It is necessary that a bending of the mind be produced, an act of attention, towards the object; 2. it is necessary that the mind involves an idea resembling the object, in the case where one remembers by reason of resemblance (for example, I remember fire perceived a long time ago because the idea of fire is placed in my mind by the sight of present fire); 3. or it is necessary that the mind involves an idea in relation to the object, in the case where one remembers without there being resemblance (for example, I remember fire because the idea of smoke is placed in my mind by the sight of smoke); 4. or it is necessary that the mind involves a *praṇidhāna*, or resolution, an *abhyāsa*, or habit (for example, the resolution has been placed in the mental series, "I shall remember this at such a time"); 5. also when it is of this nature—that is to say, when it presents the characteristic 1. and one of the characteristics 2 - 4—if the thought does not proceed from the idea of the object of memory—that is to say, if the mind so envisaged is

not produced in a series where the idea of a certain object has been placed by perception, if this mind does not proceed from this idea—the mind cannot produce memory; 6. when it is not of this nature, even though it proceeds from an idea of the object of memory, it cannot produce memory.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] How can one mind see and another mind remember? It is contrary that Yajñadatta remembers an object that Devadatta has seen.

That is right. There is no connection between Devadatta and Yajñadatta: Their minds are not in the relationship of cause and effect, as is the case for minds which form series. Indeed, we do not say that one mind sees an object and that another mind remembers this object, because these two minds belong to the same series. We say that one past mind, bearing a certain object, brings about the existence of another mind, the present mind, capable of remembering this object. In other words, a mind of memory is generated from a mind of seeing, as fruit is generated from the seed through the force of the last stage of the transformation of the series. This point has been clarified. Memory is generated after recognition.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In the absence of a soul, who remembers?[114]

[Vasubandhu:] What do you understand by "to remember"?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] To grasp an object by the memory.

[Vasubandhu:] Does "to grasp" differ from memory? [The Vātsīputrīyas:] Memory is the agent of the action "to grasp."[115]

[Vasubandhu:] We have explained what is the agent of this action: it is the cause of memory, namely a certain type of mind.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] But, if it is only a certain type of mind that is the cause of memory, how can one say that Caitra remembers?

[Vasubandhu:] One gives the name Caitra to a series; a mind of memory is generated, in this series, from a mind of seeing, and by reason of this fact one says that Caitra remembers.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In the absence of a soul, whose is the

memory?

[Vasubandhu:] What is the sense of the genitive "whose"? [The Vātsīputrīyas:] This genitive designates its master.

[Vasubandhu:] Explain by an example how you understand that someone is the master of memory. [The Vātsīputrīyas:] As Caitra is the master of the cow.

[Vasubandhu:] In what is Caitra the master of the cow?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In that he directs and employs the cow as he pleases.

[Vasubandhu:] To what then is the memory directed and employed by a master, for whom you search with great pains.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] It is directed and employed on the object that one wants to remember (that is to say, it is employed on remembering).

[Vasubandhu:] To what purpose?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] For the purpose of memory.

[Vasubandhu:] What idle talk! I direct and employ a certain thing with a view to the same thing! Explain to me then how memory is employed: do you want to say that one transmits it to a certain place? Do you want to say that one causes it to be produced?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Memory does not die out; it is then not transmitted. One causes it to be produced.

[Vasubandhu:] What you call "master" is then simply the cause, and what you call "subject" is simply the result. In fact the cause, by its command, operates the result; it is then "master"; and the result, in that it is subordinate to the cause at the moment of its arising, is called "subject." Since the cause suffices as master, why require a self to which you could attribute memory? Memory belongs to whatever causes memory. Complexes of *saṁskāras*, or the five *skandhas* forming a homogeneous series, are called

"Caitra" and "cow." One says that the Caitra-series possesses the cow-series, because the Caitra-series is the cause of the geographic displacement and the various changes of the cow-series. There is not there any one, real entity "Caitra," nor another entity called "cow;" there is not, for the Caitra-series, any quality of owner or master outside of its quality of cause.

[As with memory, so too with recognition.]

We would answer, *mutatis mutandis*, to the questions: "Who knows? To whom do we attribute consciousness?" and to other similar questions, "What feels, what makes ideas?" as we have responded to the questions, "What remembers? To whom do we attribute memory and recognition?"

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Certain scholars[116] say that the soul (*ātman*) exists, as existence (*bhāva*) depends on an existing being (*bhavitar*), as the walking of Devadatta depends on Devadatta. Walking is an action, and Devadatta is the active being. In the same way consciousness (*vijñāna*) and all action depends on a "base of support" (*āśraya*), "one who knows (*vijñatar*)," the agent.

We would ask what it is that they understand by "Devadatta." If they regard Devadatta as a real individual, we have discussed and refuted this theory. Devadatta is an imaginary individual and not an individual entity; Devadatta is only the name that one gives to the series of *saṁskāras*. In the sense that one could say that such a Devadatta walks, in the same sense we can say that Devadatta knows.

How does Devadatta walk? "Devadatta" is only a homogeneous series of *saṁskāras*, moments of existence replaced without interruption and roughly similar one to another. The foolish see within this series an entity which would be the cause of the action that this series generates in a different place, the cause by the efficacy of which the successive moments of the existence of the

body of Devadatta is produced in different places. In fact, the walking of Devadatta is simply the act of the generation of the series which is the body in different locations; the cause of this action—that is to say, the previous moment of the series—receives the name of "walker."

It is in this sense that we say that Devadatta walks, in order to designate a walk totally similar to that of fire or sound: the fire walks, the sound walks, that is to say, the fire-series and the sound-series go being generated from one place to another.[117] In the same way the world says that Devadatta knows (*vijānāti*) because the complex which is Devadatta is the cause of consciousness (*vijñāna*); and, in order to conform to received usage, the Āryans also express themselves in this manner, which is inexact.

Nevertheless, a Sūtra says that the consciousness knows the object. What does the *vijñāna* do with regard to the object?

Nothing: It is simply produced resembling the object. In the same way that fruit, although it does nothing,[118] is said to correspond to the seed, to reproduce the seed, because it is produced resembling the seed;[119] the *vijñāna* also, although it accomplishes no action with regard to the object, is said to know the object because it is produced resembling the object. This resemblance of the *vijñāna* consists in that it has the appearance of the object.[120] By reason of this appearance one says that the *vijñāna* knows the object which is only one of its causes; the organ is also a cause of the *vijñāna*, but one does not say that the *vijñāna* knows the organ because the *vijñāna* does not take the aspect of the organ. This manner of speaking, "The *vijñāna* knows," is again justified from another point of view. Several successive moments of *vijñāna* are produced with regard to the object: the previous moment is the cause of the later moment; the *vijñāna* is then a cause of *vijñāna*; it is then called the agent (*kartṛ*) since it is the cause:[121] one attributes the action of knowing to it as one attributes the action of ringing to a bell or the action of moving to a lamp.

One says that the lamp moves: here is what the moving of the lamp consists of: "lamp" is the name metaphorically attributed to

the uninterrupted series of moments of the flame that one sees, wrongly, as a "unity." When one of these successive moments is produced in place other than that of the preceeding moment, one says that the lamp moves. But there does not exist a "mover" apart from and distinct from the moment of the fire. In the same way, one metaphorically designates a series of minds by *vijñāna*, or consciousness: when one moment of mind is produced relative to a new object, one says that the consciousness knows this object. One says that the consciousness knows: the same way that one says that "physical matter" exists (*bhavati*), is produced, lasts, without there being an "exister" (*bhavitṛ*), a "producer," "anything that lasts," distinct from what is called its existence, etc.[122]

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[The Sāṁkhya]:[123] If the later consciousness (*vijñāna*) is produced from the previous consciousness and not from a soul (*ātman*), why is not the later consciousness always similar to the previous consciousness? Why do not consciousnesses succeed themselves in a determined order, as do shoots, stems, leaves, etc?[124]

Answer to the first question: Because everything that is produced through causes, i.e., conditioned things, presents the character of "transformation" (*sthityanyathātva*); this is the nature of conditioned things: in the series which they form, the latter should differ from the former. If it were otherwise, the ascetics who had entered into meditation—in which the body and the consciousness are always produced in the same way, the successive moments of the series being identical—would not spontaneously get out of meditation.[125]

As for the second difficulty: The production of consciousness is subject to a certain order. If a certain mind should be produced after a certain mind, it will be produced after this mind.[126] On the other hand, certain consciousnesses present a partial similarity that obliges them to produce one another by reason of the

particular character of their *gotra*.[127] For example, upon the idea of "woman"[128] there immediately arises the idea (among ascetics) of detesting the body of a woman, but (among non-ascetics) there immediately arises the idea of a wife or daughter. Later, following upon the differing development of the succession of ideas, the idea of a woman reproduces itself.[129] This second idea of a woman would have the capacity of producing the idea of the detesting the body, or the idea of wife or daughter, accordingly as it has either of these ideas as *gotra*, that is to say, as a seed; but not when it does not have a similar *gotra*.[130] And again innumerable different ideas can succeed the idea of a woman, and that by reason of multiple causes. Among all these ideas, those are produced first which are the most "numerous"—having formed a series in the past—the most "alive," the "nearest"—as these ideas have most strongly impregnated the mental series:[131] except, of course, at the moment when other ideas are produced by a certain state of the body or by certain external objects.

But why does the consciousness, which has most strongly impregnated the mental series, not continue to so impregnate it without ceasing?

Because, as we have said, transformation is a characteristic of the mental series; this characteristic is eminently propitious for the production of the result of ideas, having medium or small force.

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Here we have, in an incomplete and summary manner, explained the causes and conditions of the order of the reciprocal generation of different categories of consciousness. Complete knowledge of these causes belongs only to the Buddha. Thus the stanza says, "All the types of causes which go to produce a peacock feather—no one can know them except the Omniscient Ones: this is the power of knowledge of Omniscience (to know a thing completely)."[132] The causes of the variety of material things are

difficult to know; how much more difficult is it to penetrate the variety of causes and conditions of non-material things, minds and mental states![133]

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A certain non-Buddhist[134] believes that the consciousnesses are produced from a soul. One can successfully oppose his objections vainly formulated against us: Why isn't the latter consciousness the same as the former consciousness? Why aren't the consciousnesses produced in a fixed order?

This master[135] explains the variety of consciousnesses and the absence of a fixed rule to their arising by the diversity that he terms "the conjunction (*saṁyoga*) of the soul with the *manas* or mental organ." This explanation does not hold. No type of conjunction is proved.[136]

On the other hand, reasoning shows that two things in conjunction should be delimited, that is to say, localized in distinct places. Judge if your definition of conjunction, "possession succeeding upon non-possession,[137] admits of the same conclusion as our reasoning, namely that the soul is delimited, localized.[138] (Whence it follows that the soul is not omnipresent: and this contradicts your system.)[139]

It also results from your definition of conjunction that, when the *manas* moves—it goes to such and such a part of the body—the soul should also move to make a place for it (and then it is not *niṣkriya*, or exempt from action) or that it should perish (and then it is not *nitya*, or eternal).[140] On the other hand, you cannot admit that the soul is in partial conjunction[141] with the *manas*, for, according to you, the soul is an entity without parts.

[142]Supposing also that there is conjunction between the permanent soul and an always immoveable *manas*, how does one explain the diversity of the conjunction (necessary for the diversity of consciousness)? Would you say that this diversity results from

the diversity of the *buddhi*, "intelligence," (which is a quality, *guṇa*, of the soul)? But the *buddhi* presents the same difficulty as the *manas*: if the soul is not diversified, how would *buddhi* be diversified? Would you say that the diversity of the *buddhi* results from the diversity of conjunction of the soul and the *manas*, a variety which results from the *saṁskāras*? In this hypothesis, the soul serves no purpose; why not say that the diversity of consciousnesses comes from the consciousness itself which is diversified by the *saṁskāras*? The soul does not intervene in the beginning of consciousness, and to say that consciousness comes from a soul is to be as the charlatan who, although drugs suffice for the healing of the sickness, pronounces some magic syllables: Phuṭ! Svāhā!

You would say without doubt that consciousness, like the *saṁskāras*, exists through conjunction with the soul: but this is merely a statement without proof. But you would insist, saying that the soul is its support (*āśraya*): please explain by an example the nature of the relationship of the support and the supported. The consciousness (that the *saṁskāras* influence) and the *saṁskāras* themselves are not a picture or a fruit that the soul supports as a wall supports a picture or as a plate supports fruit: in fact, on the one hand, one would have to admit physical contact (between the soul and the thought-*saṁskāras*); and, on the other hand, the picture and the fruit exist independently of the wall and the plate.

You say that you do not understand the support that the soul furnishes the thought-*saṁskāras* to be thus: the soul supports thought-*saṁskāras* as earth supports smell, color, taste, touch. We rejoice in this comparison, for it establishes the non-existence of the soul. In the same way that one cannot perceive the existence of earth independently of smell, etc.—what one designates by the word "earth" is only a collection of smells, etc.—in this same way there is no soul existing apart from the thought-*saṁskāras*: the thought-*saṁskāras* are what one designates by the word "soul". Who can obtain the idea of "earth" apart from smell, etc.?

But, if "earth" does not exist apart from smells, etc , how can one qualify certain smells, etc., as properties of earth: "The smell,

the taste of earth?"

One expresses oneself thus with a view to distinguishing: in other words, one wants to indicate that certain smells, tastes, etc., are what is termed "earth," not other smells or tastes which are termed "water." In the same way, one designates a certain thing as being "the body of a wooden statue" indicating by that that it is of wood, and not of baked clay.[143]

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If the soul produces the consciousnesses by reason of the variety of the *saṁskāras*, why doesn't it produce all the consciousnesses at the same time?

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] Because the strongest *saṁskāra* opposes the weakest *saṁskāra* in producing its result. And if the strongest *saṁskāra* does not constantly produce its result, it is for the same reason that you have given in explaining the traces (*vāsanās*) abandoned by the consciousness in the series: we think that the *saṁskāras* are not permanent and are subject to change.

But then of what use is a soul? Diverse consciousnesses would be generated by the diverse force of the *saṁskāras*, since there is no difference in nature between your *saṁskāras* and our *vāsanās*.[144]

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] One cannot do without the soul. Memory, the *saṁskāras*, etc.,[145] are things (*padārthas*) that are termed "attributes" (*guṇa*); these attributes must of necessity have for their substratum, or support (*āśraya*), a "substance" (*dravya*) and, among the nine substances (earth, etc.), the soul, since it is inadmissable that memory and the other mental qualities would have for their substratum any substance other than the soul (namely earth, etc.), since the soul alone is intelligent.

But this system of substances and attributes is not proved. [You say that memory, the *saṁskāras*, etc., are things included within the category of "attributes" and are not substances: we do

not agree.] We think that all that exists is "substance." A Sūtra says that "the result of the religious life consists of six substances (namely the five pure *skandhas* and *pratisaṁkhyānirodha*)." It is false that memory, etc., has the soul as its substratum: as we have criticized the idea of a substratum.

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[The Vaiśeṣikas say:] If the soul does not really exist, what is the result of actions?

The result of actions is that the "soul" experiences pleasure or pain.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] What do you understand by "soul"?

It is what one speaks of when one says "I," the object of the idea of self, the *skandhas* or object.

How do we know this?

It is to the series of *skandhas*, that is, to the *skandhas*—to one's body, to one's sensations—that one becomes attached; as the idea of "I" is generated with reference to the idea of white and other similar ideas: in the world does one not say "I am white, black, old, young, thin, fat"? What one regards as white, etc.,—evidently the *skandha* of physical matter—is also what one regards as "I." The "soul" imagined by the Vaiśeṣika is different from white, etc.; but, in fact, the idea of "I" is relative only to those *skandhas* and not to any "self" imagined [by the Vaiśeṣikas.]

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] It is through metaphor that the world designates the body by the word "I" when it says, "I am white." This metaphor is justified because the body is in the service of the true "I."

So be it: one metaphorically calls what is used by the "I" by the

name of "I." But one cannot explain in this manner the consciousness that says "I" (with regard to the body, sensations, consciousness, etc.)[146]

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] If the idea of "I" has the body for an object why is not this idea generated with regard to the bodies of others?

Because there is no relationship between the series of *skandhas* of others and this idea. When the body or mind is in a relationship with the idea of "I"—a cause and effect relationship—this idea is generated with regard to this body and this mind; but not with regard to the *skandhas* of others. The habit of considering "my" series as "I" exists in "my" series from the very beginning.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] If there is no "soul," to what do you attribute the idea of "I"?

We have answered this question when we explained what memory belongs to.[147] The master of memory is simply the cause of memory. It is the same for the idea of "I".

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[The Vaiśeṣikas:] What is the cause of the idea of "I"? It is a defiled mind, impregnated by this same idea of self, and having for its object the series of minds wherein it is produced.

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[The Vaiśeṣikas:] In the absence of a soul, who has suffering or pleasure? The *āśraya* within which suffering or pleasure is produced, in the same way that a tree is said to have flowers, a forest has fruit. And the *āśraya* in question may belong to any of the six internal *āyatanas*, the eye-*āyatana*, etc.[148] This has been explained [in the First Chapter.]

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[The Vaiśeṣikas:] In the absence of a soul, who is it that does a deed? Who is it that tastes the result?

What do you understand by "he who does," and "he who tastes"?

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] We understand this to be the agent, the taster.[149]

Your explanation is merely words and explains nothing. The Vaiśeṣikas here invoke the doctrine of the Grammarians.[150] They say that the agent is he who has independent power, that the taster is he who enjoys the result of the deed. In the world he who possesses independent power with regard to a certain action is considered as the "agent"; for example, Devadatta, having the power to bathe himself, to seat himself, and to walk, is called "the bather," "the sitter," and "the walker."

This definition is not admissable. What does one understand by "Devadatta"? If one understands this to be a soul, the example is not proved, and is without value. If one understands a certain coming together or complex of *skandhas*, then Devadatta is indeed an agent, but he is not "an independent agent and creator of deeds." Action is threefold[151] —body, speech, and mind. That which produces bodily action is the wind agitating the body; the body and the mind depend again on their causes and conditions; these causes and conditions depend in their turn on their causes and conditions: in all this there is not any simple entity, a "producer" dependent on itself or, in other words, independent. For everything that exists depends on causes and conditions. The soul as you understand it does not depend on causes and conditions; furthermore, it does nothing: it is not then an independent agent. Nowhere does anyone maintain the existence of an agent conforming to your definition, "He who possesses independent power is termed an agent." That which one terms the agent of a certain action, is, amongst all its causes, that which is the principal cause of this action. Now even if we were to define the agent in this manner, your "self" is not an agent.

What is in fact the principal cause of the beginning of bodily action?[152] Memory causes a wish or a desire for action to surge up; from desire there proceeds imagination; from imagination there proceeds effort which gives rise to a vapor which sets in motion bodily action. In this process, what activity do the Vaiśeṣikas attribute to a "soul"? This soul is certainly not an agent of bodily action. Vocal and mental action can be explained in the same way.

You say that the "soul" enjoys the result, because it discerns or knows the result: but soul has no role in discerning the result; it does not figure among the causes that produce consciousnesses as we have shown above.[153]

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] If there is no soul, why do good and bad deeds not die out in "non-living things"?[154]

Because the "non-assumed" elements, not constitutive of living beings, are not susceptible of serving as a support for sensation, etc. Only the six internal organs are the support of sensation, etc.; not a soul, as we have proved.

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[The Vaiśeṣikas:] In the absence of a soul, how can past action, which is now destroyed, produce a future result?

To this question we would answer now by asking how, even though a soul were to exist, destroyed action can have the force of producing the result. The Vaiśeṣikas would have it that the result is generated from merit or from demerit (*dharma, adharma*),[155] inherent attributes (*guṇa*) of the soul, supported by the soul: but we have criticized the idea of a substratum or "support"[156] and shown that it is not rational.

According to the Buddhists, future results are not generated from destroyed action;[157] results are generated from the last moment in the evolution of a series that has its origin in action.[158]

How does fruit proceed from the seed? One says, in the world,

that fruit is generated from a seed. But in speaking in this way, one does not intend to affirm that the fruit is generated from a destroyed seed, nor that the fruit arises immediately after the seed (that is to say, from a "dying" seed). In fact, the fruit is generated from the last moment in the evolution of a series that has its origin in the seed. The seed successively produces a sprout, a stalk, a leaf, and finally the flower that brings the fruit into existence. If one says that the seed produces the fruit, this is because the seed, through a series of intermediate stages, projects in the flower the efficacy of producing the fruit. If the efficacy of producing the fruit, efficacy which is found in the flower, did not have the seed as its original cause (as its antecedent, or *pūrva*), then the flower would not have produced a fruit resembling its seed. In the same way, one says that although a result is generated from an action, it is not generated from destroyed action, nor is it generated immediately after the action: it is generated from an ultimate moment in the evolution of a series issuing from the action.

Series, or *saṁtāna*, means the material and mental *skandhas* succeeding without interruption in a row which has an action for its original cause. The successive moments of this row are different: there is then evolution (*pariṇāma*), or transformation of the series. The last moment of this evolution possesses a special efficacy, the capacity of immediately producing the result: it is distinguished, in this regard, from other moments; it is then termed *viśeṣa*, or the ultimate moment of evolution.

For example, when the mind at death is "associated with attachment," it possesses the capacity of producing a new existence. This mind has for its antecedents many actions of all types: nevertheless, it is the efficacy projected by a weighty action that informs (or qualifies) the last thought; in the absence of heavy action, the efficacy is projected by near action; in its absence by habitual action; and in its absence by the action of a previous life.[159] There is a stanza (by Rāhula) which says, "Weighty action, near action, habitual action, old action: these four die in this order."[160]

There is good reason to establish a distinction between a

retributive result and an out-flowing result. When the force that produces a retributive result has given forth its result, this force is abolished.[161] But the force that produces an out-flowing result, a force projected by a "cause similar to its effect" (*sabhāgahetu*), does not perish by the production of its result; when it is defiled, this force perishes by the force of its opposition; when it is not defiled, it perishes through Nirvāṇa, which involves the abolition of the series, both physical matter and mind.

Why is a new retribution not generated from the retributive result as a new fruit is generated from the fruit of a tree, or as a fruit is also a seed?[162]

But a new fruit is not generated from the fruit seed.[163]

From what is the new fruit generated, if not from the evolution of a new series?

The first fruit seed, encountering the conditions necessary for evolution (water, earth, etc.), finally produces the ultimate moment in the evolution—from whence the new fruit arises. When it produces the shoot, the old fruit takes the name of seed. If, before any evolution, (before any germinative processes), it is given the name of seed, it is an anticipative name, a name justified by the similarity of the ungerminated seed and the germinated seed. In the same way here: when a retributive result[164] (body, etc.) encounters the conditions that produce good and bad—good teaching, bad teaching—it gives rise to minds that will be rewarded, namely bad or good-impure minds. From these minds there proceeds an evolution of their series that results in an ultimate state from whence a new retribution will emerge. This is not generated under any other conditions. The example then justifies our thesis.

One can also take into account the nature of the retribution by another example (that shows that a new retribution does not necessarily succeed the first). If one colors the flower of a lemon tree with milk, a certain evolution of the plant series will take place which will cause the seed of the new fruit to be red. But the

red seed, once planted, will not generate another red seed. In the same way the retribution of an action does not produce a new retribution.[165]

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I have, to the measure of my intelligence, taught in a summary and outline manner the result of actions. Only the Buddhas know how the series, impregnated by actions diverse in nature and in force, evolve from such a type that, arriving at such a stage, it produces a certain result: There is a stanza, "Action, the impression caused by the action, the active entry of this impression, the result that results from it—no one if not a Buddha, knows all this in the totality of its processes."[166]

Seeing then, by a path of demonstrative arguments, that the doctrine of the teaching of the Buddhas is perfect, and rejecting the opinion of those blind through bad views and through bad steps, the non-blind see.[167]

In fact, this doctrine of the non-existence of the soul is the only road to the city of Nirvāṇa; although illumined by the rays which are the words of this sun which is the Tathāgata, although followed by thousands of saints, and although it is without obstacles, it is not seen by persons of weak insight.[168]

In this book one will find but a summary indication for the use of intelligent persons: but poison (of belief in soul), once within a wound, will spread itself everywhere by its own force.[169]

Preliminary Notes

I. According to the Tibetan, this is "The Ninth Chapter (*Kośasthānam*) entitled An Exposition of the Refutation of the Pudgala" (*gan zag dgag pa bstan pa zhes bya ba mdzod kyi gnas dgu pa; Mdo* 64, Cordier, p. 394).

But the colophon to the Eighth Chapter says that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* ends with that Chapter: *chos mnon pa'i mdzod kyi bśad pa las sñoms par 'jug pa bstan pa zhes bya ba mdzog kyi gnas brgyad pa'o / chos mnon pa'i mdzod 'di rdzogs so* = *Abhidharmakośabhāṣye Samāpattinirdeśo nāma aṣṭamaṁ kośasthānam / samāpto'yam Abhidharmakośaḥ.*

According to the colophon of the *Vyākhyā,* this Chapter is "The Determination of the Pudgala, An Annex to the Eighth Chapter" (*aṣṭamakośasthānasaṁbaddha eva pudgalaviniścayaḥ*). And according to the *Bhāṣyam,* this section is entitled "The Treatise on the Refutation of the Pudgala," *Pudgalapratiṣedha-prakaraṇa* (iv.73, p. 650), or "The Refutation of the Doctrine of the Soul," *Ātmavādapratiṣedha* (v.27, p. 818).

To certain commentators, the last of the final stanzas of the "Ninth Chapter" refer to the entire *Kośabhāṣyam;* for others,— who appear to be the wiser, —to only the Refutation of the Pudgala.

Evidently the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam,* an exposition of the doctrines of the Abhidharma according to the principles of the Vaibhāṣikas, ends with Kārikā viii.40. The stanzas which follow on p. 1355 are the conclusion of the work.

The so-called "Ninth Chapter" does not contain any Kārikās; here Vasubandhu teaches many doctrines which are common to both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, but, on the whole, he adopts the position of the Sautrāntikas.

Saṁghabhadra does not concern himself with the Ninth Chapter.

The stanzas on p. 1355 are, we would say, the conclusion of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam.* Hsüan-tsang (TD 29, p. 152b17-22) places them at the end of his Chapter VIII; Paramārtha, on the contrary, makes them the preamble to Chapter IX (*TD* 29, p. 304a15-20). Thus it is evident that the "Treatise on the Refutation of the Pudgala" importunes,—if one can say this,—these stanzas (see below note 1).

II. Vasubandhu refutes the doctrines of the Pudgalavādins, "followers of the *pudgala,*" and he calls them Vātsīputrīyas. The *Vyākhyā* explains: *vātsīputrīyā āryasāṁmatīyāḥ* (see note 8). The sources (Vasumitra, Bhavya, and Vinītadeva) do not agree in their enumeration of the sects or schools which admit a *pudgala.*One will finds some information in *Nirvāṇa,* 1926, p. 34, and in a version of Vasumitra's treatise which I hope to publish in the *Collection de Matériaux pour l'étude du Bouddhisme,* by J. Przyluski.

The question is asked: are the Pudgalavādins Buddhists? Yaśomitra is very plain in this: *na hi Vātsīputrīyāṇāṁ muktir neṣyate bauddhatvāt;* "one does not pretend that they cannot obtain deliverance, for they are Buddhists" (see note 8). An opposite opinion, however, is given on p. 1338 (Hsüan-tsang, *TD* 29, p. 156c25) and in the final stanzas where the Pudgalavādins are included among the Tīrthikas.

Lcan-skya hu-thug-hu expresses a very widespread opinion when he says that the five schools of the Mahāsṁmitīyas, admitting that the "self" is a "person", cannot be considered as Buddhist (Wassilief, p. 270).

Śāntideva (*Bodhicaryāvatāra,* ix.60) says, "The followers of a *pudgala,* internal non-believers (*antaścaratīrthika*), admit a soul (*ātman*) called *pudgala,* and say that this soul is neither identical to the *skandhas,* nor different from them: otherwise one can see that they enter into the philosophy of the non-Buddhists." They call themselves Buddhists, *saugatammanya.*

Candrakīrti (*Madhyamakāvatāra,* vi.86) says, "The non-Buddhists (*tīrthikas*) speak of a *pudgala,* etc.; seeing that the *pudgala* and other supposed principles do not have any activity,

the Buddha declared that the mind alone is active. To say 'non-Buddhists' is a general manner of speaking; for there are Buddhists ('some sectarians of this Dharma') who admit a *pudgala*. From a certain point of view (*rnam pa gcig tu na* = *ekaprakāreṇa*), they are not Buddhists, for, like non-Buddhists, they do not correctly understand the sense of the Teaching. Consequently, this designation ('non-Buddhist') is extended to all. It says in the *Ratnāvalī*, 'The world, with the Sāṁkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, and Nirgranthas, believe in a *pudgala*, in the *skandhas*, and in other principles. We would ask them if they teach the means to pass beyond being and non-being (or rather: if they pass beyond the affirmation and the negation of existence)... ' Consequently one must consider those who believe in the *skandhas*, etc., as persons outside (*bāhya*)." (We see that the "followers of the *skandhas*" or *skandhavādins*, that is to say, the orthodox Buddhists of the Hīnayāna, are, like the followers of the *pudgala*, excluded from the Good Law).

III. The classical etymology of *pudgala* is represented in the Tibetan by *gaṅ zag* and in the Chinese (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 207.7) as *ts'eng-chien* 增損 : *pūryati galati ca* (*Sarvadarśana;* and Sarad Candra Das and S. Lévi's translation of the *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, p. 259: "through which demerit increases and merit decreases, and vice versa").

Buddhaghosa, in his *Visuddhimagga*, 310, has: *pun ti vuccati nirayo tasmin galantīti puggalā*.

The *Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka*, commenting on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* 19.2, proposes the etymology: *punaḥ punar gatiṣu līyate*, which is reflected in the translation of Hsüan-tsang "which, on many occasions, takes up the *gatis*."

The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* has: *sattvadṛṣṭyā jīvadṛṣṭyā pudgaladṛṣṭyā bhavadṛṣṭyā vibhavadṛṣṭyā ucchedadṛṣṭyāḥ śāśvatadṛṣṭyāḥ svakāyadṛṣṭyā etāsām evamādyānāṁ dṛṣṭīnāṁ prahāṇāya dharmaṁ deśayiṣyatīti tenārthena bodhisattvo mahāsattva ity ucyate.*

The *Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka* has: *tatrāhaṁkārādhānārthena ātmā / āhito'haṁkāra etasminn iti kṛtvā / sīdanātmakatvāt sattvaḥ / jīvitendriyavaśena nikāyasabhāge parisamāpte vartata iti jīvaḥ / punaḥ punar gatiṣu līyta iti pudgalaḥ / āvirbhavatīti bhavaḥ / tirobhavatīti vibhavaḥ / nāstīdānīm abhūt pūrvam ity ucchedaḥ (prasajyate) asti yac (ca) svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śāśvataḥ / ātmātmīyākāreṇa pañcaskandhadarśanam / evamādyānāṁ dṛṣṭīnām ...*

We would remark that the etymology of *sattva* is as we have encountered in *Kośa*, v.7, note 27 (reading of S. Lévi). Buddhaghosa gets *sattva* from *sakta*, etc.

On other synonyms of *pudgala*, see above p. 1324 (Hsüan-tsang, *TD* 29, p. 154a28)

IV. Among the sources which must be compared with the present Treatise on the Refutation of the Pudgala, we would point out: 1. *Kathāvatthu*, i.1 (translation of S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy*); 2. *Vijñānakāya*, *TD* 26, number 1539, Chap. II (translated and analyzed in Etudes Asiatiques, 1925, i. p. 358-376); 3. *Sāṁmitīyaśāstra*, *TD* 32, number 1649, an analysis of which will be published in the *Collection de Matériaux pour l'étude du Bouddhisme*, by Przyluski). Vasubandhu quotes part of these last two treatises: some indications on this subject are in the notes of our translation.

On the other hand, the *Sūtrālaṁkāra* of Asaṅga (edited and translated by S. Lévi, 1907-1911), xviii.92-103, depends to a certain extent on the *Treatise* of Vasubandhu. We would mention for example the discussion of the relationship between fire and fuel, the use of the same scriptural texts, and the demonstration of the inactivity of the *pudgala*.

A dependence by Śāntideva (for example, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* ix.73) and his commentator on Vasubandhu is no less evident.

Vasubandhu's observations on the inability of an *ātman* to transmigrate, and on the relationship of fire and fuel, is seen in the *Madhyamakasūtras*, x.14 and xvi.2.

All of the refutation to the *pudgala* in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, is, one could say, inspired by Vasubandhu; for example vi.146: "Some maintain the real existence of a *pudgala*, of which one cannot say that it is identical to the *skandhas* or different from them, permanent or impermanent; it is known by the six *vijñānas*, and it is the object of the idea

of self."

In his small *Treatise*, Vasubandhu refutes not only the followers of the *pudgala*, —Buddhists albeit heretical, —but also some non-Buddhists, the Grammarians, the Sāṁkhyas, and the Vaiśeṣikas. He quotes Vārṣagaṇya (v.27, translation, p. 818). He has some details concerning the positions of these non-Buddhists which can be compared with the traditions preserved by Paramārtha and K'uei-chi (Takakusu, *T'oung-pao*, 1904, and *JRAS*, 1905).

V. An argument of the Pudgalavādins, not mentioned by Vasubandhu, is pointed out in the *Vyākhyā* for i.42 (p. 85 of the Petrograd edition). The Sūtra says: *cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā na nimittagrāhī*... "Having seen visibles by the eye, he does not conceive any affection..." As the eye sees, so too the *pudgala* sees by the eye (*yasmāc cakṣuḥ paśyati tasmāt pudgalaś cakṣuṣā paśyati;* see below note 38).

The *Vyākhyā* for iii.43a admits the two hypotheses that Vasubandhu attributes death (*cyuti*) to the mind (*citta*), or to the *pudgala*.

Buddhaghosa, in his *Manorathapūraṇī*, i.95, explains in terms of which Vasubandhu would approve, why the Bhagavat speaks of a *pudgala*, even though a *pudgala* does not exist.

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1. *Vyākhyā: kiṁ khalv ato'nyatra mokṣo nāstīti / na pramādyaṁ mumukṣubhir iti vacanād ayam eva mokṣopāyo nāsty ato'nyo mokṣopāyas tad atra moktukāmaiḥ pramādo na kartavya ity arthād uktam ācāryeṇa / codakaḥ pṛcchati kiṁ khalv ata iti vistaraḥ.*

Vasubandhu said, "Those who desire deliverance should apply themselves without weakness to this doctrine." That is to say, "There is no deliverance outside of this doctrine." The opponent answers, "Is there then no deliverance . . . "

2. On this subject, see the stanza of the Stotrakāra (=Mātṛceta, Takakusu, *I-tsing*, p. 156):

sāhaṁkāre manasi na śamam yāti janmaprabandho
nāhaṁkāraś calati hṛdayād ātmadṛṣṭau ca satyām /
anyaḥ śāstā jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādī
nānyas tasmād upaśamavidhes tvanmatād asti mārgaḥ //

"As long as the mind (*manas= citta*) is accompanied by the idea of "I," the series of rebirths cannot be stopped; the idea of "I" is not removed from the heart as long as there exists the view that there is a soul (*ātman*). Now there is not in the world any master who teaches the non-existence of the soul (*nairātmya-vādin*), except you. Thus, there is not, outside of your doctrine, any other path of deliverance."

Compare the stanzas attributed to the Ācārya, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, 492: *yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṁ tasyāham iti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ / snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇādoṣāṁs tiraskurute . . .*

The same for Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, vi.120 (quoting the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 340), "Seeing through, *prajñā* that all defilements and all evil (*kleśa, doṣa*) comes from the idea of self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), and taking into consideration that the object of this idea is the soul (*ātman*), the ascetic (*yogin*) denies the soul."

3. Saeki cites a commentary on the Vijñaptimātra, 2,4: a. the *asaṁskṛtas* do not exist; b. that which exists (*asti-dharma= bhāva*) is of three types: things known through direct perception, matter (color), the mind; things like pots and clothes (*hsien shou yung fa* 現受用法); things like the organs (*yu tso yung fa* 有作有法); c. three conceptions of the self: identical to the *skandhas*, different from the *skandhas*, neither identical or different.

4. *Āgama*, the proof from authority, is not mentioned because it is included within *anumāna*, inference.

5. Entity = *bhāva;* Hsüan-tsang translates this as *yu-fa* 有法 which calls to mind the *atthidhamma* of Buddhaghosa.

6. *Vyākhyā: pratyakṣam upalabdhir iti pratyakṣaṁ ity upalabdhiviśeṣaṇam / pratyakṣaṁ tad upalabdhiḥ pratyakṣata upalabdhir ity arthaḥ / athavā pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam upalabdhir upalabhyate'nayā ity upalabdhiḥ /*

On *upalabdhi*, i. English trans. p. 74, ii. p. 205 , *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, p. 155.

The object of the mental consciousness is defined by Yaśomitra: (*upalabdhir*) *dharmāyatanasya vedanādilakṣaṇasya yogiviṣayasya ca* = the perception of the *dharmāyatana* (that is to say, *vedanā*, etc.) and of things which the Yogins perceive. (In fact the mental consciousness of the Yogins knows the minds and mental states of others, vii.11).

But how can perception (*upalabdhi*) by the *manas* be *pratyakṣam*, immediate or direct perception? In fact the *manas* which has just arisen is known by the *manas* which immediately follows (i.17): *manasaś ca kiṁ pratyakṣam upalabdhiḥ / samanantaraniruddhaṁ hi mano'nantarotpannena manovijñānena vijñāyate.* There is a difficulty here. Some other masters (the Sautrāntikas) think that the mind knows itself: the subject and the object of the consciousness are both directly perceived: *raktaṁ vā dviṣṭaṁ vā sukhasaṁprayuktaṁ vā duḥkhasaṁprayuktaṁ vā* (iv. 49) *ity evamadi svasaṁvedyatayā (pratyakṣam) ity apare / tad etad dvividhaṁ pratyakṣaṃ grāhyagataṁ grahakagataṁ vā.*

7. *Vyākhyā: maharṣipraṇidhijñānaparicchinnatvād asty eva cakṣurādikam indriyaṁ*

cakṣurvijñānādikāraṇam iti / sarveṣām avivādāc ca.
See i. 9c (*Vyākhyā*, p. 25), 44a. On *praṇidhijñāna*, see vii.37.

8. *Vyākhyā: Vātsīputrīyā Āryasāṁmatīyāḥ / anena vitathātmadṛṣṭiniviṣṭatvalakṣaṇo hetur anaikāntika iti darśayati / na hi vātsīputrīyāṇāṁ mokṣo neṣyate bauddhatvāt / atha vā prākpakṣavirodhaḥ / sāpakṣālo'yam pakṣo nāsty ātmā ity anena darśayati.*
From two things, one. The Vātsīputrīyas believe in a certain type of real self: now they are Buddhists, and one cannot deny that they can obtain deliverance: thus the author is wrong in saying that a false conception of the self creates an obstacle to deliverance. Or rather the thesis which denies the self is false.
On the *avaktavyatā* of the *pudgala*, see, for example, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 283.

9. Color, sound, etc., are distinct things (*bhinnalakṣaṇa*); milk, a house, and an army are complexes of colors, tastes, odors, and tangibles, of straw and wood, of elephants, horses, and chariots, not of separate things, *bhāvāntara:* milk is nothing other than color, etc.
Compare *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, xviii.92: *prajñaptyastitayā vācyaḥ pudgalo dravyato na tu.*

10. Yaśomitra quotes this stanza of Dharmakīrti:
varṣātapābhyāṁ kiṁ vyomnaś carmaṇy asti tayoḥ phalam /
carmopamaś cet so'nityaḥ khatulyaś ced asatphalaḥ //
Sarvadarśana, p. 10 (1858); *Nyāyavārttika*, ii.1, 5, Tātparya, 164; in *Ślokavārttika: khatulyaś ced asatsamaḥ; Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, ii. 60, etc.
If the *pudgala* is unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*), eternal, unmodifiable, it is like space, it is like not existing. There exists only that which is "capable of action" (*arthakriyā*), that which is momentary (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*): a thesis of the Sautrāntikas; for the Vaibhāṣikas, the *asaṁskṛtas* (space and the two *nirodhas*, i. 5c) exist.

11. For the Vātsīputrīya, as for Vasubandhu, the *skandhas* of the past and of the future do not exist. The meaning of the expressions *ādhyātmika* (or *abhyantara*) and *upatta* is explained in *Kośa*, i. 34d, 39a-b.

12. The *Vyākhyā* attributes this paragraph to the author, not to the Vātsīputrīyas.

13. For certain commentators, *idhyate* and *dahyate* are equivalent.

14. *Aṣṭagravyaka* (ii.22): the four *mahābhūtas* or primary substances, and the four *upādāyarūpas*, from *rūpa* (the visible) to the tangible.

15. The thing on fire (*pradīpta*) is a complex; it is at one and the same time burner (fire) and the thing burning (*indhana*): in fact this thing is constituted of four elementary substances (above note 13), and one of these substances which is "heat" is the fire.

16. Earth and water are different, for their *lakṣaṇas* differ; the same holds for the burner and the thing burned.

17. *Vyākhyā: upādāyarthas tu vaktavya iti/ ananyatvād ity abhiprāyaḥ.* We must give the word *upādāya* an explanantion that justifies the thesis that fire and fuel are not different.

18. The fuel is made up of three *mahābhūtas*, and fire is its *uṣmalakṣaṇa*, the fourth *mahābhūta*. They arise at the same time, like two horns.

19. One should understand: *indhanaṁ upādāya* = *indhanaṁ āśritya:* the fire takes it support from the fuel. Or rather the meaning is that of *sahabhāva*, co-existence, or *sahotpāda*, co-arising.

20. Paramārtha: If he says, "that which is hot by its nature (the fire) is called hot. The object in question (fuel), although different from fire which is hot by nature, becomes hot through its association with that which is hot by its nature," we conclude that it is not incorrect to say that fire and fuel differ.

21. See below note 32. See the *Sāṁmitīyanikāyaśāstra.*

22. Stcherbatski, p. 832, differs.

23. This is perhaps better translated, "is ascertained."

24. The Chinese *fen-pieh kuan* 分別觀 maintains the version "to discern." "By reason of physical matter, etc., which the eye perceives (as its own object), the visual consciousness "indirectly knows," "knows in second rank" the *pudgala,* because physical matter is the support (*upādāna*) of the *pudgala.* And one cannot say that the *pudgala* is physical matter.

25. In this hypothesis physical matter is not the cause of the perception of the *pudgala:* there is perception of the *pudgala* "through relationship" with physical matter.

26. Compare *Saṁyutta,* iv. 166.

27. Not by reason of three.

28. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 57c18. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the first words, *cakṣur bhikṣo hetur (cakṣurvijñānotpādāya / rūpaṁ bhikṣo pratyayaḥ . . .).*

Vyākhyā: hetur āsannaḥ pratyayaḥ / viprakṛṣṭas tu pratyaya eva // janako hetuḥ pratyayas tv ālambanamātram ity apare / paryāyāv etāv ity apare. See ii. 61c, vii. 13a, p. 1112, 1113.

29. Saeki has a note (fol. 14a) on the Dārṣṭāntika theory of the six *vijñānas.*

30. Thus none of them "perceive" a *pudgala.*

31. *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 791b11-17: *svakaṁ gocaraviṣayaṁ pratyanubhavanti / nānyad anyasya gocaraviṣayaṁ pratyanubhavati / manaś caiṣāṁ pratisaraṇam.*

Saṁyutta, v.218: *pañcimāni brāhmaṇa indriyāni nānāvisayāni nānāgocarāni nāññamaññassa gocaravisayaṁ paccanubhonti / katamāni pañca . . . / imesaṁ kho pañcannaṁ indriyānaṁ nānāvisayānaṁ nānāgocarānaṁ na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṁ paccanubhontānaṁ mano paṭisaraṇaṁ mano ca nesaṁ gocaravisayaṁ paccanubhoti.*

On the formula *manaś caiṣāṁ pratisaraṇam,* the *Vyākhyā* says: *anusaṅgenedam uktam / nedam udāharaṇam / tathāpi tu manaś caiṣām indriyāṇāṁ pratisaraṇam iti tadapekṣāṇīndriyāṇi vijñānotpatta vijñānotpattau kāraṇaṁ bhavantīty arthaḥ.*

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 449a16. The Dārṣṭāntikas say, "The objects of the six *vijñānakāyas, cakṣurvijñāna,* etc., are distinct." They say, "The *manovijñāna* has a distinct object; it does not bear on the objects of the five *vijñānas, cakṣurvijñāna,* etc." They say, "The six *vijñānas* bear solely on external objects; they do not bear on the internal (*ādhyātmika,* see p. 1313) organs, nor on the *vijñāna.*" In order to refute this opinion, it is explained that the first five *vijñānas* have distinct objects, bearing solely on external objects, not bearing on the organs and the *vijñāna;* but that the *manovijñāna* has an object common to the five *vijñānas* and also a different object, which bears on the internal organs and also on the *vijñāna.* It has been explained, *Kośa,* i.48a, that among the eighteen *dhātus,* thirteen are the object of a single *manovijñāna* with the exclusion of visible things, of sounds, etc., which are also the object of the *cakṣurvijñāna,* etc.

32. The words in parentheses are according to Hsüan-tsang.

Bhāṣya and *Vyākhyā: na vā pudgalo viṣaya iti (yadi sūtraṁ pramāṇīkriyate) / na ced viṣayaḥ (yadi na kasya cid vijñānasya viṣayaḥ) na tarhi vijñeyaḥ (tataś ca pañcavidhaṁ jñeyam iti svasiddhānto bādhyate)* (above note 21).

Paramārtha: Or rather the *pudgala* is not an object. If it is not an object, it is not discerned by the six consciousnesses.

33. In spite of the Sūtra, you affirm that the object of the mental consciousness is general; so too, in spite of the Sūtra, you affirm that the *pudgala* is discernible by the visual consciousness.

34. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 313a15, *Ekottara, TD* 2, p. 723c18; *Saṁyutta*, iv.198. *ṣaḍ imānīndriyāṇi nānāgocarāṇi . . . kukkurapakṣisṛgālaśiśumārasarpamarkaṭāḥ ṣaṭ prāṇakāḥ kena cid baddhā madhye granthiṁ kṛtvotsṛṣṭāḥ / te svakaṁ svakaṁ gocaravisayam ākāṅkṣante / grāmākāśaśmaśānodakavalmīkavanā kāṅkṣaṇād evam ṣaḍ imānīndriyāṇi*...

35. The desire (*ākāṅkṣaṇa*) to see, to understand, etc., is certainly foreign to the organs of sight, hearing, etc., which are material (*rūpasvabhāvatvāt*), and also to the visual consciousness, the auditory consciousness, etc., which are non-imaginative (*nirvikalpakatvāt*). This refers, under the name of the organ of the eye (*cakṣurindriya*), to the mental consciousness led by the predominating, specifying action of this organ, *tadādhipatyādhyāhṛta*.

36. *Saṁyutta*, iv.29: *sabbaṁ bhikkhave abhiññāpariññeyyam / kiṁ ca bhikkhave abhiññāpariññeyyam / rūpaṁ bhikkhave abhiññāpariññeyyam cakkhuviññāṇam* . . .

37. Compare Vasumitra, *Sectes*, on *jñeya, vijñeya,* and *abhijñeya*.

38. This according to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha: "The master who believes in a self says, 'I see the *pudgala* through (由 *yu* by means of) the eye'; as he sees that there is a self in (於 *yü*) that which is not a self, he falls . . . "

The *Bhāṣyam* has the word *anātmanā* which the *Vyākhyā* glosses as *cakṣuṣā cakṣurvijñānenety arthah*. Thus one should understand the *yu* of Paramārtha in the sense of the instrumental, "As he sees, through that which is not a self—that is to say through the eye, through the visual consciousness . . . "

Stcherbatski: "This idea of yours that there is an existing self who through the opening of his eyes contemplates other selves, this idea it is which is called Wrong Personalism."

One can draw the conclusion from the formula *cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā* that the *pudgala* sees through the eyes; *Vyākhyā ad* i.42, p. 117 (Petrograd ed.). *Cullaniddesa* 234 has: *cakkhunā puriso ālokati rūpagatāni*. See below n. 67.

39. According to Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang. Stcherbatski, "In the Ajita-sermon."

40. Version of Paramārtha. This is the well-known text: *cakṣuh pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam / trayāṇāṁ saṁnipātaḥ sparśaḥ / sahajātā vedanā saṁjñā cetanā*... See iii. 32a-b.

41. Paramārtha transcribes; Hsüan-tsang: *nara=na ramate, mānava-ju-t'ung* 儒童 = scholar-*kumāra, jantu,* "who is born".

A Yogācārin commentary quoted by Saeki says: *sattva,* because all the Āryans truly see that only the *dharmas* exist, no other thing; or rather because there is affection therein (*sattva* from *sakta,* as in Buddhaghosa?); *manoja* (*i-sheng* 意生), because it is constituted by the *manas* . . . *pudgala,* because it goes frequently taking up realms of rebirth without the power to be disgusted with them; *jīva,* because it presently lives through union with the *āyus* (*Kośa,* ii.45); *jantu* (*sheng* 生), because all the *dharma* which exist are endowed with arising.

Other lists contain thirteen names. Among them, *yakṣa, Suttanipāta,* 875.

On *sattva,* see Ledi Sadaw, *JPTS,* 1914, 133, Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology,* 1914, 83. We have seen that *sattva* signifies "that which perishes," v. n. 27 and above p. 1319.

42. See below note 71.

43. The Sūtra of the four "authorities," "supports," is quoted in the *Vyākhyā ad* ii.46, English trans. p. 241: *catvārīmāni bhikṣavaḥ pratisaraṇāni / katamāni catvāri / dharmaḥ pratisaraṇaṁ na pudgalaḥ / arthaḥ pratisaraṇaṁ na vyañjanam / nītārthaṁ sūtraṁ pratisaraṇaṁ na neyārthām / jñānaṁ pratisaraṇaṁ na vijñānam.*

Mahāvyutpatti, 74, where the order differs: *arthapratisaraṇena bhavitavyaṁ na*

vyañjanapratisaraṇena, dharma . . . jñāna . . . nītārthasūtrapratisaraṇena . . . (Extracted from the *Hsien-yang, TD* 31, Tokyo, xviii.7,10a).

Dharmasaṁgraha, 53; *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* xviii.31-33; *J.As.* 1902, ii.269, *Madhyamakavṛtti,* 268, 598.

Pratisaraṇa, pratiśaraṇa (*Divya,* 427.22, 176.26, where the editor translates the word as "confidence") is translated *rton pa* (confidence) and *rten-pa* (support), *i* 依 (support), and *liang* 量 (authority).

i. *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* I.xvii.

kathaṁ bodhisattvaś caturṣu pratisaraṇeṣu prayujyate.

iha bodhisattvaḥ arthārthī parato dharmaṁ śṛṇoti na vyañjanābhisaṁskārārthī / arthārthī dharmaṁ śṛṇvan na vyañjanārthī prakṛtayāpi vācā dharmaṁ deśyamānam arthapratisaraṇo bodhisattvaḥ satkṛtya śṛṇoti.

punar bodhisattvaḥ kālāpadeśaṁ mahāpadeśaṁ ca (*Dīgha,* ii. 124, etc.) *yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti / prajānan yuktipratisaraṇo bhavati na sthavireṇābhijñānena vā pudgalena tathāgatena vā saṁghena vā ime dharmā bhāṣitā iti pudgalapratisaraṇo bhavati / sa evaṁ yuktipratisaraṇo na pudgalapratisaraṇas tattvārthān na vicalati aparapratyayaś ca bhavati dharmeṣu.* (*aparapratyaya= gzhan las śes ma yin, Madhyamakavṛtti,* xxiv.8).

punar bodhisattvas tathāgate niviṣṭaśraddho niviṣṭaprasāda aikāntiko vacasy abhiprasannas tathāgatanītārthasūtraṁ pratisarati na neyārtham / nītārthaṁ sūtraṁ pratisarann asaṁhāryo bhavaty asmād dharmavinayāt / tatra hi neyārthasya sūtrasya nānāmukhaprakṛtārthavibhāgo 'niścitaḥ saṁdehakaro bhavati / sacet punar bodhisattvo nītārthe'pi sūtre'naikāntikaḥ syād evam asau saṁhāryaḥ syād asmād dharmavinayāt.

punar bodhisattvaḥ adhigamajñāne sādarśī (?) bhavati na ca śrutacintādharmārthavijñānamātrake / sa yad bhāvanāmayena jñānena jñātavyaṁ na tac chakyaṁ śrutacintāvijñānamātrakena vijñātum iti viditvā paramagaṁbhīrān api tathāgatabhāṣitān dharmān śrutvā na pratikṣipati nāpavadati /

evaṁ . . . caturṇāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ prakāśitaṁ bhāṣitasyārthasya yukteḥ śāstur bhāvanāmayasya cādhigamajñānasya.

ii. *arthaḥ pratisaraṇam . . .* A notion expressed in the *Mahāvagga,* i. 23, 4, *Majjhima,* ii.240; developed in the *Laṅka: arthapratisaraṇena bhavitavyam . . .* and again *arthānusāriṇā bhavitavyaṁ na deśanābhilāpābhiniviṣṭena.* A "word" is like a finger which touches the object that one should see; one must remove the finger in order to see the object (*Laṅka* quoted in the *Subhāṣitasaṁgraha,* ed. Bendall, fol. 34).

On the relation between the *attha* and the *vyañjanas,* see *Dīgha,* iii. 127-129, *Nettippakaraṇa,* 21.

iii. *dharmaḥ pratisaraṇaṁ na pudgalaḥ.* Variant: *yuktipratisaraṇo bhavati na pudgalapratisaraṇaḥ.*

The refuge is the truth itself, not authority whatever it may be, even the Buddha. This is the teaching of the *Majjhima,* i.265. He who says, "These *dharmas* are taught by a Sthavira, a person possessing the *abhijñās,* the Tathāgata, or the Saṁgha," is *pudgalapratisaraṇa.*

Do not lose sight of the teaching of the *mahāpadesās,* below note 56.

iv. A *nītārtha* Sūtra is a *vibhaktārtha* Sūtra, "of explicit meaning"; a *neyārtha* Sūtra is of undetermined meaning, of meaning yet to be determined (*Vyākhyā ad* iii.28). iv.30, English trans. p. 614, calls for a Sūtra of explicit meaning. Vasumitra, *Sectes.*

It appears that the sole canonical text of interest here is *Aṅguttara,* i.60: to attribute to the Tathāgata that which has not been said; to not recognize as said by him that which he has said; to consider as *neyyattha* a *nītattha* Suttanta, and vice versa. (The theory of the Sūtra exact in its words but badly understood, *Dīgha,* iii. 127-128, can lead to the distinction between *nītattha* and *neyyattha* Sūtras).

Nītattha and *neyyattha* in the *Nettippakaraṇa* (where the meaning conforms to the letter, *yathārutavasena ñātabbattham,* where the meaning should be determined through reflection, *niddhāretvā gahetabbattham*); and in the *Dīpavamsa* (Oldenberg, ed., p. 36) quoted in the Introduction to the *Commentary on the Kathāvatthu* (*JPTS,* 1889, p. 3). "To

confuse *pariyāyabhāsita* and *nippariyāyabhāsita* (compare *Visuddhimagga*, 473, 499: that which should not be understood literally, and that which should be understood literally, *nītattha* and *neyyattha;* to attribute another meaning (other than the true meaning) to what has been said with a certain intention (*saṁdhāya bhaṇita*): thus, respecting the letter destroys the meaning; to create pseudo-Sūtras . . . "

Atthasālinī, 91, "We shall weigh the sense of the Sūtra that you allege . . . "

Saṁghabhadra, iii.25 (Tokyo xxiii.4, 33b16). According to the Sthavira, all *āryā deśanā* promulgated by the Buddha himself (*tathāgatabhāṣita*= *ahaccavacana* of the *Nettippakaraṇa*, 21) is *nītārthasūtra;* the other Sūtras are *anītārtha*. Saṁghabhadra observes initially that this definition is not found in Scripture; then it is bad reasoning: for there are Sūtras not promulgated by the Buddha which are *nītartha*, and vice versa. Examples follow. It is said, "It is impossible to say, if not through *abhimāna* (or "presumption"): I shall enter into the *ānimitta* without supporting myself on the void" (These words are not by the Buddha himself, yet the Sūtra is *nītārtha*) . . .

The Schools, as we see in Wassiliev, 329, and in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, vi. 94, are not in agreement in placing Sūtras in these two categories.

v. We have seen that, according to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *adhigamajñāna* is absorption consciousness (*bhāvanāmaya*), whereas *vijñāna* is consciousness obtained through hearing and reflection (*śrutacintā*).

According to the Vibhajyavādins, *jñāna* is good in and of itself; *vijñāna* is good when it is associated with *jñāna* (*Kośa*, iv.8b, note 46): it can be understood that *jñāna* is "supermundane knowledge," and that the *vijñāna*, worldly knowledge, is good when it is consecutive to supermundane knowledge.

According to iv.75, an opinion of the "ancient masters," *adhigata* (what one knows by absorption) forms part of the *vijñāta:* but this refers to a worldly consciousness, a worldly absorption.

(In the *Sūtra of the Four Pratisaraṇas*, *jñāna* primarily designates the knowledge of the Āryans, *anāśravajñāna*, exactly as *prajñā* is, among all the *prajñās*—which can be *avyākṛta*, *kliṣṭa*, or *kuśala*,—the pure *prajñā*). See above notes 36 and 37.

Some notes in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, xxv, 16, p. 65, 74. *Jñāna* is distinguished from *vijñāna* in the *Gīta*, iii.41, vi.8, vii.2, ix. 1, xviii.42.

44. *Saṁyukta*, *TD* 2, p. 91a27, "All, that is to say, the twelve *āyatanas*, the eye, etc."; *Kośa*, v. trans. p. 819, *Mahāniddesa*, 133, *Saṁyutta*, iv.15: *sabbaṁ vuccati dvādasāyatanāni*.

On *sarva*, *sabba*, see *Kośa*, v.27c, Warren, p. 158, Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Points of Controversy*, 85, Stcherbatski, *Central Conception*, 5; *Nirvāṇa* (1925), p. 139.

45. Hsüan-tsang here translates Pudgala= *shu ch'u chu* 數取處 = "who frequently takes up rebirth," see above note 41.

46. This Sūtra is quoted in *Kośa*, iii.28a-b. (*Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 45).

One can compare the Sūtra quoted in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, vi. at the beginning (*Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 252, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 217, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix.73, an extract of the *Pitāputrasamāgama*): *bālo bhikṣavo* (or *mahārāja*) *aśrutavān pṛthagjanaḥ prajñaptim anupatitaś cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā saumanasyasthānīyāni abhinivīsate . . .*

The *Vyākhyā* for iii.28a explains *prajñaptim anupatita iti yathā saṁjñā yathā ca vyavahāras tathānugataḥ*. (It defines *bāla*, etc). Here we have the gloss: *yatraiva prajñaptiḥ kṛtā ātmā iti vyavahārārthaṁ tatraivātmety abhiniviṣṭa ity arthaḥ*.

47. Paramārtha omits the first stanza. Śilā=shih-lo 世羅, translated as "small mountain"; without doubt the Selā of *Therāgāthās* 57-59 who has a conversation with Māra. Stanzas attributed to Vajirā in the *Saṁyutta*, i.135, trans. in the "Psalms," p. 190 (*Kathāvatthu*, trans. p. 61, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 246, 257).

48. Tibetan: *luṅ-phran-tshegs*. Hsüan-tsang, "in the *Tso-āgama*"; Paramārtha, "in the

Hsiao-āgama" (*TD* 2, number 100).

49. *P'o-t'o-li* 婆柁梨 =old-beam-pear (Hsüan-tsang)= waves-cover-profit (Paramārtha); Stcherbatski reads: Bādarayana.

50. Paramārtha: Listen, Oh Bādari, (you shall obtain) the power to deliver yourself from all bonds; through them, the mind is defiled, through them also it is purified. The self does not have the nature of a self; through error, one imagines (*fen-pieh* 分別) it; there is no self, no *jantu;* only *dharmas,* cause and results . . .

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 731b11: Through trouble and defilement (*saṁkleśa*) of the mind, the being (*sattva*) is troubled, defiled; through the purification (*vyavadāna*) of the mind, the being is purified; the two masculine and feminine organs exercise sovereignty over two things, *sattvabheda* and *sattvavikalpabheda* (see *Kośa,* ii. English trans. p. 154).

Saeki remarks: the first stanza exhorts one to the hearing of the Truths.

51. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 37a12: *Satkāyadṛṣṭi* is opposed by the ten types of *śūnyatā, adhyātmaśūnyatā,* etc. (See the complete lists of the *Mahāvyutpatti,* 37= *Madhyamakāvatāra,* v.180= *Śatasāhasrikā,* 215; the *Abhisamaya* has twenty *śūnyatās.*)

Saeki refers to the *Saṁyuktahṛdaya,* (*TD* 28, p. 925b28).

52. *śūnyam ādhyātmikaṁ paśyan paśya śūnyaṁ bahirgatam /*
na vidyate so'pi kaścid yo bhāvayati śūnyatam //

This third stanza (with the reading *paśya paśya*) is attributed to the Bhagavat without any other details in the *Madhyamakavṛtti,* p. 348. The reading *paśya paśya* is recommended by the Chinese versions: *jo kuan nei chih kung* 若觀內之空 , "If you visualize that the interior is empty" (Paramārtha); *chi kuan* 既觀 (Hsüan-tsang). The *Gauḍakārikā,* very likely written under Buddhist influence, has: *tattvam ādhyātmikaṁ dṛṣṭvā tattvaṁ dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ* (ii. 38).

Hsüan-tsang translates the last line, "A seer capable of meditating on emptiness is not to be found." The *Vyākhya* glosses: *yogy api nāsti yaḥ śūnyatām abhyasyati.*

53. This text (according to Stcherbatski, from the *Kṣudrāgama*) is quoted in the *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* xviii.101 (p. 158) as an extract from the "Pentades" (*pañcakeṣu,* Chinese: "In the *Ts'eng-wu* 增五 *Sūtra= Pañcottara?*" S. Lévi): *pañcakeṣu pañcādīnavā ātmopalambha iti deśitāḥ / ātmadṛṣṭir bhavati jīvadṛṣṭiḥ / nirviśeṣo bhavati tīrthikaiḥ / unmārgapratipanno bhavati / śūnyatāyām asya cittaṁ na praskandati na prasīdati na santiṣṭhate nādhimucyate / āryadharmā asya na vyavadāyante.*

These readings are confirmed by the Tibetan and the *Vyākhyā,* so close in fact that the Tibetan corresponds to an original *ātmadṛṣṭir bhavati sattvadṛṣṭir jīvadṛṣṭiḥ;* the same for the *Vyākhyā: ātmadṛṣṭir bhavati yāvaj jīvadṛṣṭir iti prathama ādīnavaḥ.* Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha replace *jīvadṛṣṭi* with "to fall into the *dṛṣṭigatas.*" The phraseology *praskandhati . . .* in the *Aṅguttara,* iii.246; *Dīgha,* iii.240, *Saṁyutta,* iii.133: . . . *me nibbāne cittaṁ na pakkhandati na ppasīdati na saṁtiṭṭhati na vimuccati* (var. *nādhimuccati*) / *paritassanā upādānam uppajjati paccudāvattati mānasam.* (The editor of the *Saṁyutta* punctuates after *paritassanā*).

54. *Vyākhyā: kenāpy adhyāropitāny etāni sūtrāṇīty abhiprāyaḥ.*

a. "Sūtras promulgated by the Tathāgata (*tathāgatabhāṣita*), profound, of profound meaning, supermundane (*lokuttara*), teaching emptiness (*suññatāpaṭisaṁyutta*): they do not listen to them with faith, they do not lend them an ear, they do not recognize them as true (*aññācittam na upaṭṭhāpessanti*) . . . But the Sūtras made by poets (*kavikata*), poetical (*kāveyya*), of artistic syllable and phonemes, external (*bāhiraka*), promulgated by disciples (*sāvaka-bhāsita*), these they believe . . . It is thus that the Sūtras of the first category will disappear . . . " (*Saṁyutta,* ii.267).

Aṣṭasāhasrikā, 328: *yad etat tvayedānīṁ śrutaṁ naitad buddhavacanaṁ kavikṛtaṁ kāvyam etat / yat punar idam ahaṁ bhāṣe etad buddhabhāṣitam etad buddhavacanam.*

b. See Saṁghabhadra, Tokyo, xxiii.3, 6a, 25b (translated in *Nirvāṇa,* 1925, p. 23); *mūlasaṁgītibhraṁśa, Kośa,* iii.12d, 13a (Dreams of Kṛkin); *muktaka sūtra,* iii.4c; *apāṭha eva,* see below note 65.

Discussion on the text of the Sūtras, iii.30b, and elsewhere.

55. *Vyākhyā: Tāmraparṇīyanikāyādiṣu.* (The school of Taprobane is named in *Vyākhyā ad* i.17a, English trans. p. 75, note 85).

56. See the texts on the four *mahāpadesas* (*Dīgha,* ii.123, *Dialogues,* ii.133, note, *Aṅugttara,* ii.167, *Nettippakaraṇa,* 21-22; Rhys Davids-Stede break this up as *mahā-padesa,* against the commentator of the *Netti*) and the rule, "That which is in the Sūtra ... that which does not contradict *dharmatā*" (that is to say the *paṭiccasamuppāda, Netti*), *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* i.10, *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* ix.42, p. 431, *Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka. kālāpadeśa,* above note 43.

57. *sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ* (*Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 66b14ff.) *Vyākhyā: na caita ātmasvabhāvāḥ na caiteṣv ātmā vidyata ity anātmānaḥ.*

Sūtrālaṁkāra, xviii.101 (p. 158): *dharmoddāneṣu sarve dharmā anātmāna iti deśitam.*

58. If the mental consciousness bears on the *pudgala,* it will arise from the *pudgala* in the quality of being its object; thus it would arise from three conditions.

59. *Aṅguttara,* ii.52; *Kośa,* v.9.

60. The thesis: *nātmā skandhāyatanadhātavaḥ,* contradicts the thesis: *no tu vaktavyāṁ rūpāṇi vā no vā* (see above note 24).

61. *Saṁyutta,* iii.46: *ye keci bhikkhave samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā anekavahitam attānaṁ samanupassamānā samanupassanti sabbe te pañcupādānakkhandhe samanupassanti etesaṁ vā aññataram.* Same text quoted in the *Madhyamakāvatāra,* vi. 126c-d.

62. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 38a7. The *ātman* is supposed to be *abhinnalakṣaṇa, aviśiṣṭalakṣaṇa, nitya, avikāra,* without arising-old age-sickness-death. How is it that the Tīrthika says, "Gautama, I think that *rūpa* is *ātman* ... ?" Why *rūpa* is not *ātman,* vii. 13a.

63. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 11b23: (*ye kecid anekavidhaṁ pūrvanivāsam* ...) *iman eva pañcopādānaskandhān samanusmarantaḥ samanvasmārṣuḥ samanusmaranti samanusmariṣyanti vā.*

64. Only the *pudgala* can be designated by the word "I," *aham.*

65. If the word "I" is understood as you say, the Buddha, when he says "I," is evidently defiled by *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* "the view of personalism." This, as we know, is of some twenty points (*viṁśatikoṭika*): *rūpam ātmeti samanupaśyati / rūpavantam ātmānam .../ ātmīyaṁ rūpam ... / rūpe ātmānam ...* (*Mahāvyutpatti* 208; *Madhyama TD* 1, p. 788a25; *Samyutta* iii.3, 16, etc.) The *Vibhāṣā* gives four examples reproduced in the *Mahāvyutpatti: svāmivat, alaṁkāravat, bhṛtyavat, bhājanavat.*

66. *Vyākhyā: ekasmin kṣaṇe samavahitānāṁ bahūnāṁ rāśiḥ / bahuṣu kṣaṇeṣu samvahitānāṁ dhārā / rāśidṛṣṭāntena bahuṣu dharmeṣu pudgalaprajñaptim darśayati / dhārādṛṣṭāntena bahutve sati rūpavedanādīnāṁ skandhānāṁ pravāhe pudgalaprajñaptim darśayati.* There are other examples as the word *ādi* indicates, for example, the chariot (*yānaka*).

67. Saeki quotes the *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 42c20: "As the Vātsīputrīyas say, it is the *pudgala* that knows, not knowledge (*jñāna*)."

68. According to the commentary on the *Samayabheda,* the Mahāsāṁghikas think that the Buddha, having cultivated his mind during numerous *kalpas,* can, in a single moment of thought, know *sarvadharmasvabhāvaviśeṣa.*

Saeki quotes the *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 43a11, "Is there a knowledge (*jñāna*) capable of knowing all the *dharmas*? Yes, *lokasaṁvṛtijñāna* ... " (See *Kośa,* vii.18c). The

Saṁyuktahṛdaya (see above note 51), "One says universal knowledge (*sarvajñāna*) because he knows all. By "all" one should understand the twelve *āyatanas*, their specific characteristics and their general characteristics." See vii. p. 1146 On the omniscience of the Buddha, his knowledge of the future, etc., see *Kośa* i.1, ii.62 (p. 300), vii.30, 34, p. 1146, 37a.

69. The *Buddhabhūmi, TD* 26, p. 309c9, refutes this stanza.
"Those are vain words. The *paracittajñāna* (knowledge of the mind of another), at the moment when it grasps a thing, does not grasp other things; because it does not know other things, it is not universal knowledge. The series also does not grasp (all), because it knows present being. In your system, it knows solely the general characteristics of a part of the *dharmas*. And if this is the case, it is only by metaphor that the Tathāgata is called omniscient . . . "

70. *Mahāvastu*, iii.327.
ye cābhyatītasaṁbuddhā ye ca buddhā hy anāgatāḥ /
yaś cāpy etarhi saṁbuddho bahūnāṁ śokanāśakāḥ //
Udānavarga, xxi.10, frag. Stein, *JRAS*. April, 1924. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 322a22, *Saṁyutta*, i.40, *Aṅguttara*, ii.21.
If the Buddha is a "self," it should enter into the fifth category, "the ineffable," distinct from the three time periods and from *asaṁskṛta* (see above p. 1318).

71. *Bhārahārasūtra* (*Sūtrālaṁkāra*, xviii.102) or simply the *Bhārasutta* (*Visuddhi*, 479, 512).
bhāraṁ ca vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhārādānaṁ ca bhāranikṣepaṇaṁ ca bhārahāraṁ / tac chṛṇuta sādhu ca suṣṭhu ca manasikuruta bhāṣiṣye / bhāraḥ katamaḥ / pañcopādānaskandhāḥ / bhārādānaṁ katamat / tṛṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatra tatrābhinandinī / bhāranikṣepaṇaṁ katamat / yad asyā eva tṛṣṇāyāḥ paunarbhavikyā nandīrāgasahagatāyās tatra tatrābhinandinyā aśeṣaprahāṇaṁ pratiniḥsargo vyantībhāvaḥ kṣayo virāgo nirodho vyupaśamo'staṁgamaḥ / bhārahāraḥ katamah / pudgala iti syād vacanīyaṁ yo'sāv āyuṣmān evaṁnāmā evaṁjātya evaṁgotra evamāhāra evaṁsukhaduḥkhapratisaṁvedī evaṁdīrghāyur evaṁcirasthitika evam āyuṣparyanta iti (*Vyākhyā*; without doubt the text of the *Ekottara, TD* 2, p. 631c16).
In the *Saṁyutta*, iii.25, there is the order: *bhāra, bhāhāra, bhārādāna, bhāranikkhepana.* Numerous variants. The "bearer" is defined: *puggalo ti ssa vacanīyam / yo yam evamnāmo evaṁgotto ayam vuccati bhikkhave bhārahāro.*
Discussed by Saṁghabhadra, xxiii.3, fol. 56a.
Nyāyavārttika (*Bib. Ind.*) p. 342; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix.72, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, vi.42, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I.xvii, Warren, 159, 240, Minayev, *Recherches*, 225; E. Hardy, *JRAS*., 1901, 573 (who explains the Sūtra like Vasubandhu), *Dialogues*, i.27. The *prāṇas* and the burden, Deussen-Geden, *Upaniṣads*, 221.

72. The phrases between parentheses are the additions by Hsüan-tsang.
Vyākhyā: yadi dravyasan syāt pudgalaḥ / bhārahāraḥ katamaḥ / pudgala iti syād vacanīyam ity etāvad evoktaṁ syāt / tatra sūtre pareṇa sa na vibhaktavyaḥ syāt yo'sāv āyuṣmān iti vistareṇa yāvad evamāyuṣparyanta iti / prajñaptisatpudgalapratipattyarthaṁ hy etat pareṇa viśeṣaṇam ity abhiprāyaḥ.
If the *pudgala* exists as a thing, to this question "What is the bearer?", the Buddha would simply respond, "What is suitable to be called the *pudgala*"; he would not add the explanations, "It is such a venerable one, of such a name . . . of such an end of life." The aim of these is to show that the *pudgala* exists only through designation.

73. The Tibetan, according to Stcherbatski, gives, "The earlier *skandhas* torment the later ones; they are thus called burden and bearer of the burden." Paramārtha: the *skandhas* torment (lit. destroy) the *skandhas*, namely the earlier ones torment the later ones; in order to indicate that they present the characteristic of bearer and of burden, the text employs

expressions." It is thus that the *Vyākhyā* is understood: "The text has: among the *skandhas*, etc. The *skandhas* which cause one to suffer, the causes of suffering, receive for this reason the name of burden. The following, those which are tormented, receive for this reason the name of bearer of the burden." (*skandhānām iti vistaraḥ / tatra ye upaghātāya saṁvartante duḥkhahetavaḥ skandhās te bhāra iti kṛtvoktāḥ / uttare ye pīḍyante te bhārahāra iti kṛtvoktāḥ*).

74. On apparitional beings and the intermediate existence, see iii.8c.

75. According to the *Sāṁmitīyanikāyaśāstra*, the Third Chapter.

Vibhāṣā, *TD* 27, p. 988a14, "This world does not exist; the other world does not exist; there are no apparitional beings"; this is a false view, a negation of causes (Compare iv.78, 79b and v.7, p. 777). "There are no apparitional beings": there are some non-Buddhist (*bāhya*) masters who say that all beings arise by reason of seed and blood, etc.; that there are no beings who arise without *pratyayas*, suddenly, of themselves . . . According to some, apparitional beings are beings in the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*); to deny this world and the other world is to deny *upapattibhava;* to deny apparitional beings is to deny *antarābhava.*

The text of the *Karmaprajñāpti* (chap. iv. Mdo, 62 fol. 218) differs from the usual version, "There is neither gift, nor sacrifice, nor oblation, nor good action, nor evil action, nor retributive result of good and evil actions. This world does not exist, nor does the other one. There is neither father, nor mother, nor apparitional beings. There is not in this world any well gone, well come Arhat, who knows and realizes by himself this world and the other, thinking, 'My births are destroyed, the religious life well practiced . . . '"

76. *Kośa,* Chap. v and vi, p. xvi. The *pudgala,* as you understand it, is not contained within the Truths: it is not Suffering (=the *skandhas* of attachment), nor Arising, nor Extinction, nor Path. Thus if the negation of the *pudgala* is, as you say, a false view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), this false view cannot be expelled by Seeing the Truths. In fact a "view" (*dṛṣṭi*) is expelled through Seeing the Truth with which it is in contradiction (*yasmin satye vipratipannā*). On the other hand, a defilement is abandoned through Meditation (*bhāvanā*) when this defilement has for its object a thing abandoned through Meditation, a thing which is necessarily included within the Truth of Suffering or of Arising (*bhāvanāprahātavyo hi kleśo bhāvanāprahātavyam eva vastu duḥkhaṁ samudayaṁ vālambate*) . . . Moreover no "view" is abandoned through Meditation.

77. *Ekottara, TD* 2, p. 561a18, p. 569b20. Paramārtha: "A *pudgala* arises in this world; arisen, it is for the use, profit, and happiness of many"= *Aṅguttara,* i.22, *ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahujanahitāya . . .*

This text is used in the *Sāṁmitīyanikāyāśāstra.*

78. The grain of *tila* is made up of eight substances, a word is made up of syllables.

79. Thus we recognize that it arises; but it is not, for that, "conditioned."

80. *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra* in the *Samyukta, TD* 2, p. 92c15: When the eye arises, Oh Bhikṣus, there is no place from whence it comes, and when it perishes, there is no place to which it goes. In this manner the eye is not real and yet it arises (*pu shih erh sheng* 不實而生); having arisen, it perishes. There is retribution for action, yet there is no agent: when these *skandhas* are destroyed, other *skandhas* continue (*hsiang hsu* 相續): outside of any *dharmasaṁketa.* The ear . . . By *dharmasaṁketa* (*su shu fa* 俗數法) we understand: if this is, then that exists . . . If ignorance exists, then the *saṁskāras* exist. . .

By bringing together the different fragments preserved in our sources, we obtain a section of the Sūtra: *cakṣur bhikṣava utpadyamānaṁ na kutaś cid āgacchati / nirudhyamānaṁ ca na kva cit saṁnicayaṁ gacchati / iti hi bhikṣavaś cakṣur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā*

ca prativigacchati (*Kośa,* v.27, trans. p. 814) / *asti karma asti vipākaḥ / kārakas tu nopalabhyate ya imāṁś ca skandhān nikṣipati anyāṁś ca skandhān pratisaṁdadhāti anyatra dharmasaṁketāt* (the text that we have here, and also *Kośa,* iii.18, *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* xviii.101, *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* ix.73 which presents some variants) / *atrāyaṁ dharmasaṁketo yad utāsmin satīdaṁ bhavati asyotpādād idam utpadyate* (*Kośa,* iii.18, *Bodhicaryāvatāra, ibid.*) / *avidyāpratyayāḥ saṁskārāḥ . . .*

81. See *Kośa,* v.27, p. 814; Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhi,* 602, quotes the Ancients (*Porāṇa*): *kammassa kārako natthi vipākassa ca vedako.* (We see, p. 513, that *dukkha, kamma, nibbuti,* and *magga* exist, but not *dukkin, kāraka, nibbuta . . .*)

Same doctrine, or same text, in the sources of the Mahāyāna, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* vi.84, *Śikṣāmuccaya,* 244, 262, *Sūtrālaṁkāra* (which depends on Vasubandhu), xviii.101.

82. The meaning of the expression *anyatra dharmasaṁketāt* (*chos su brdar brtags pa ma gtogs pa*) is not in doubt. The *Vyākhyā* explains: *dharmasaṁketād iti prātītyasamutpādalakṣaṇāt:* "outside of the combination of the *dharmas,* that is to say, outside of the successive causation of the *dharmas*"; and elsewhere (*ad* iii.18): *saṁketa= hetuphalasaṁbandhavyavasthā.* But Paramārtha understands *saṁketa* as "metaphorical designation," from whence the translation, "One does not maintain the existence of an agent . . . except when, conforming to worldly usage, one says that the *dharmas* are a *pudgala.*"

83. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 182a17; *Saṁyutta,* ii.14. Paramārtha: "I do not say that a being, apart from the series of the *dharmas,* takes up the elements." The Sanskrit edition has: *upādatta iti phālguna na vadāmi / ahaṁ ced evaṁ vadeyam upādatta iti atra te kalpaḥ syād vacanāya ko nu bhadanta upādatta iti.*

Note nevertheless that the Bhagavat speaks of the man "who casts off this body and takes up another body," *taṁ ca kāyaṁ nikkhipati aññaṁ ca kāyam upādiyati* (*Saṁyutta,* iv.60). (In the way that the flame which goes far without fuel has for the mind its support (*upādāna*) so too the being who casts off this body and has not (yet) taken up another body has thirst for his support, *ibid.* 400). We have seen above, note 41, the etymology of *pudgala: punaḥ punar. . .*

84. Saeki quotes the *Sāṁmitīyanikāya Śāstra,* i.7 (fol. 2b).

85. *Pariṇantum* means to transform oneself, *anyathātvamāpattum.*

On *pariṇāma,* iii.43a, 100a-b, v.26, p. 809; the *saṁtatipariṇāma* of the Sautrāntikas is very different, ii.36c, iv.4a.

86. On the relationship between the primary elements (*mahābhūta*) and secondary matter (*upādāyarūpa, bhautika rūpa*), see i.35, ii.22, 65.

87. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 661c14: "Buddhadeva maintains that *rūpa* is solely *mahābhūtas,* that mental states (*caittas*) are solely mind (*citta*); he says: *upādāyarūpa* is solely a type (*viśeṣa*) of the *mahābhūtas;* the mental states are solely a type of mind . . . The *mahābhūtas* see (when they form the organ of the eye) . . . There is no *upādāyaśabda* apart from the primary elements (that is to say: sound, *śabda,* is not a separate thing existing independently of the primary elements). It is the primary elements which are called *upādāyaśabda.*"

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 730b26: Buddhadeva says: Twenty-two names (*mahābhūmikas,* etc.), but solely one real thing, the *mana-indriya . . .* The conditioned *dharmas* are of two natures, *mahābhūtas* and *citta.* Apart from the *mahābhūtas,* there is no *upādāyarūpa:* apart from *citta,* there are no *caittas.*

Compare i, note 146; ii, p. 188.

Saeki: "Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of Buddhadeva, etc., that the primary elements and secondary matter do not differ; but, as this is not the "correct meaning" (*ch'eng i* 正意) of the Sarvāstivādins, he says that it is *doṣa,* an "error."

88. The Sūtra of Vatsagotra, *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 245c10. The Bhagavat said to the monk

Vatsagotra, "If one is of this opinion (*dṛṣṭi*), 'The world is eternal; this is true; any other theory is false,' this is *dṛṣṭiviparyāsa* (v.9d), this is *kuan-ts'a chien* 觀察見 (*dṛṣṭiparāmarśa,* v. p. 778). 'The world is not eternal . . . the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death': this is *dṛṣṭiviparyāsa.*"

89. On the "questions to be rejected," *Kośa,* v.22, *Nirvāṇa,* 1925, p. 108, where we see that Malebranche reasons quite closely to Vasubandhu.

90. We have *Divya,* 358: *bahubollaka śākyaputrīya.*

91. The present passage of the *Kośa* has been pointed out by S. Lévi, *AIBL.,* 1893, 232. Chavannes has translated a very similar recension in *Cinq Cents Contes,* iii.120 (according to Nanjio 1329, *Ratnakaraṇḍa Sūtra* (?), Tokyo, xiv.10, fol.39), the same recension in Takakusu, "Chinese translations of the *Milindapanho,*" *JRAS,* 1896, p. 7. See Pelliot, "Les noms propres du Milinda,"JAS, 1914, ii.380-381. (It appears indeed that the "Milindra" of the Tibetan text of the *Avadānakalpalatā* is a rash correction by the editor). Finally, Paul Demiéville, in a fine article on the Chinese versions of the *Milinda, BEFEO,* 1924, p. 64, completes our information.

92. Compare *Saṁyutta,* iv.400. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 245b11: Vatsagotra asks, "Gotama, is there an *ātman?*" The Bhagavat does not answer. He asks a second, a third time; and the Bhagavat, a second, a third time does not answer . . . And the monk Vatsagotra, in his evil (*pāpikā*), false view, says, "The Śramaṇa does not know how to answer my question." The Bhagavat says to Ānanda, "If I were to answer him that there is an *ātman,* then I would increase the false view that he already has; if I were to answer him that there is no *ātman,* would his first folly-doubt not increase? Infatuated, he would say, 'The *ātman,* which existed, is now annihilated.' The opinion that he has of the existence of an *ātman* is the opinion of permanence; to think that this *ātman* is annihilated is the opinion of annihilation. The Tathāgata, avoiding these two extremes, teaches the Dharma of the middle: if this is, then that exists . . . if ignorance exists, then the *saṁskāras* exist . . . "

93. Missing in Paramārtha.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 38a19: In the *Brahmajālasūtra,* it is said that the 62 *dṛṣṭigatas* have *satkāyadṛṣṭi* for their root; in the *Sūtra of the Lion's Roar,* it is said all the diverse opinions of the Brahmins and monks rest on two opinions, the opinion of existence and the opinion of non-existence (*bhavadṛṣṭi, vibhavadṛṣṭi, yu-chien* 有見 and *wu-yu-chien* 無有見); what is the difference between the declarations of these two Sūtras? From the point of view of arising (*samutpāda*), it is said that all the *dṛṣṭigatas* have *satkāyadṛṣṭi* for their root; from the point of view "*t'ui-ch'iu* 推求 " (to thrust-search out), it is said that the diverse opinions rest on the opinions of existence and non-existence. See above, p. 1336.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 1002b6: *Bhavadṛṣṭi* is *śāśvatadṛṣṭi,* and *vibhavadṛṣṭi* is *ucchedadṛṣṭi,* that is, the view of existence is the view of permanence or eternity, and the view of non-existence is the view of annihilation. Although bad opinions (*kudṛṣṭigata*) are of numerous types, they are all included by these two opinions.

94. *Vyākhyā: Bhadantakumāralābhaḥ.*On Kumāralābha, see Péri, *Date de Vasubandhu,* p. 22.

95. *Vyākhyā: dṛṣṭir eva daṁstrā / tayāvabhedham apekṣya deśayanti buddhā dharmaṁ nairātmyaṁ tatpratipakṣeṇa / bhraṁśaṁ ca karmaṇām apekṣya kṛtavipraṇāśam apekṣya pudgalāstitvam iva darśayanto'nyathā deśayanti / vyāghrīpotāpahāravad iti / yathā vyāghrī nātiniṣṭhureṇa dantagrahaṇena svapotaṁ apaharati / nayati māsya daṁṣṭrayā śarīra [ ] kṛtaṁ bhūd iti / nāpy atiśithilena dantagrahaṇena tam apaharati / māsya bhraṁśaḥ pāto'smin viṣaye bhūd iti yuktenaiva grahaṇenāpaharatīty arthaḥ / tathārthadarśane kāraṇaṁ darśayann āha / ātmāstitvam iti vistaraḥ /*

96. For the second stanza, the *Vyākhyā* is less clear: *ātmāstitvaṁ pratipannaś cet kaścid dṛṣṭidaṁṣṭrayā satkāyadṛṣṭilakṣaṇayā bhinnaḥ sa vineyajanaḥ syād aprāpya saṁvṛtīti (?) (saṁvṛtinītim?) dharmasaṁketam ajānānaḥ kuśalapotasya kuśalakarmaṇo vyāghrīpotabhūtasya bhraṁśaṁ kuryān nāsti karmaṇaḥ phalam iti.*

97. *Vyākhyā: prājñaptika iti prājñaptau bhavaḥ prājñaptikaḥ saṁvṛtisann api pudgalo nāstīti kaścid gṛhṇīyād ity ato nāstīti nāvocat.*

98. The *Vyākhyā* has the last *pāda:* omitted by Hsüan-tsang.

Paramārtha: 3. This person is not capable of understanding the correct teaching of real emptiness; thus, when he asked if, yes or no, there is a soul, the Buddha did not say there was no soul. 4. And since he takes into consideration the intention of the questioner, if the soul existed, why did he not say that it existed? So too, on the question of his non-existence after Nirvāṇa, he said nothing because then the questioner would have fallen into difficulties.

99. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 246b2: Vatsa asks, "By reason of the consciousness of which *dharma* are you not of the opinion, you do not say that the world is eternal . . . that the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death?" "By reason of the consciousness of *rūpa, vedanā,* etc."

100. *Vyākhyā: nirgranthaśrāvakacaṭakavad iti / nirgranthaśrāvakeṇa caṭakaṁ jīvantaṁ gṛhītvā bhagavān pṛṣṭaḥ kim ayaṁ caṭako jīvati na veti / tasyāyam abhiprāyaḥ / yadi śramaṇo gautama ādiśej jīvatīti sa taṁ nipīḍanena mārayitvā darśayet / yadi punar bhagavān evam ādiśen mṛta iti sa taṁ jīvantam eva darśayet / kathaṁ nāmāyam ajña iti loko jānīyād iti tasyābhiniveśaḥ / bhagavatā tv asyāśayaṁ jñātvā na vyākṛtam / tvaccittapratibaddham evaitaj jīvati vā na veti . . . nābhihitam / tadvad etan na vyākṛtam.* Perhaps according to Tokyo, xxiv, 9, *J.As.* 1925, i.38.

101. The *catuṣka* (group of four questions): "Is the world infinite (*anantavān*)? etc." has the same meaning as the *catuṣka*: "Is the world eternal (*śāśvata*)? . . . "

If this is the case, how are there fourteen separate points, namely three *catuṣkas* and one *dvika* (Is the vital principle the body? . . .)? To this question the *Vyākhyā* answers: *paryāyarūpatvavyavasthāne'pi caturdaśatvaṁ bhavatīty adoṣaḥ.*

102. *kun tu rgyu smra byed kyis.* Chinese transcription: *U-ti-chia* 嗢底迦 . Stcherbatski: Vatsa. The Tibetan version guarantees Uktika.

This is the Paribbājaka Uttiya of the *Aṅguttara,* v.193-195 (perhaps different from the Uttiya of the *Saṁyutta,* v.22,166) who interrogates the Bhagavat on fourteen points (beginning with the eternity of the world); the Bhagavat answers, "This is not explained by me . . . "; Uttiya asks, "What do you explain?"; the Bhagavat answers, "I explain the Dhamma . . . for Nirvāṇa". Thereupon Uttiya asks, "Does the whole world, half the world, or a third of the world attain to Nirvāṇa through this Dhamma?" The Bhagavat keeps silent. Ānanda then intervenes and explains to Uttiya that he is asking that which has already been asked (To ask if the whole world attains to Nirvāṇa is to ask if the world is eternal). The Bhagavat teaches how one attains to Nirvāṇa: all those who have attained to it, are now attaining to it, and who shall attain to it, do so by the Path.

In *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 247c18, Uktika's first question concerns the infinity of the world.

Do all beings attain to Nirvāṇa? *Dīgha,* ii.147 (yes), *Mahāvastu,* i.126 (yes), *Milinda,* 69 (no). Here we have the correct answer.

The redactor of the *Brahmajāla* understands the "infinity of the world" in the sense of "infinite in space" (*Dīgha,* i.23: horizontal infinity, not towards the zenith or the nadir; on this point *Kośa,* iii.3d, to the end); it varies its formulas: it examines whether the self and the world are eternal, whether the world is infinite.

103. Uktika asks: *kim tu sarvo loko'nena mārgena niryāsyati / āhosvid ekadeśo lokasya.*
In the Pāḷi recension: *sabbo ca tena (dhammena) loko niyyissati upaḍḍho vā tibhāgo vā.*

104. On Maitreya, see Péri, *BEFEO;* xi.455, Przyluski, *Aśoka*, 169, 171, 332. *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 510b19 (66th Sūtra: he will come at a period when human life is 80,000 years long), *Dīrgha*, 6th Sūtra, *TD* 1, p. 41c29 and *Dīgha*, iii.76, *Śālistambasūtra* (see *Kośa*, iii. 28a-b). We are reminded of Ajita and Tissametteya of the *Suttanipāta*, 1032, 1040. *Milinda*, 159; *Anāgatavamsa* in Warren, 482; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Hastings, i.414. Ajita Maitreya and Mithra Invictus?

105. Saeki quotes the *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 244a14, "Gautama, is the vital principal the body? This has not been explained. Is the vital principal something else? Is the body something else? This has not been explained. It is strange that the monk Gautama explains, on the subject of a deceased disciple, that 'Such a one is reborn in such a place . . . ' and that the monk Gautama does not explain that the vital principle is something else, and that the body something else again."

Saṁyukta, TD 2, p. 213a27, sermon to Nanda: The disciple endowed with an unmoveable faith who desires long life and beautiful *rūpa*, shall obtain them. The disciple endowed with the *avetyaprasādas*, is, at the end of his life, reborn among the *devas* and obtains ten qualities (*Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 2, p. 215b10, c9 and following, *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 545b15 and following).

106. *satyataḥ sthititaḥ*.Hsüan-tsang: *ti ku chu ku* 諦故住故 . Gloss of the Japanese editor: *chu ku*= *neng chu ku* 能住故 : "capable of lasting." Paramārtha: *i-shih i-chu* 依實依住

107. *astīty api dṛṣṭisthānam uktam.* Hsüan-tsang: *o chien ch'u* 惡見處 =*kudṛṣṭisthāna.*
This discussion is based on the *Sāṁmitīyanikāyaśāstra.*

108. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 255c13: The Bhagavat says, "You say that there is cause: I say so also; you say that there is no fruit: this is a foolish doctrine." There are two doctrines, in all two extremes: the Bhagavat avoids the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of permanence, and he teaches the Middle Way. He also says, "I am not in contradiction with the world; but the world is in contradiction with me."

Vibhāṣā, 77.17 ". . . he who says that (the *jīva*) is different from the body, is not the body, enters into the opinion of permanence. He is not of non-Buddhist doctrines (*bāhya mārga*), he is not of evil opinions (*kudṛṣṭigata*) who does not enter into the opinions of annihilation or of permanence. All the Tathāgatas, in order to oppose this, teach the path between the two, namely: *rūpa* and the mind are not annihilated, are not permanent." See above note 93.

109. *Saṁyukta, TD* 2, p. 42b3. Only Paramārtha quotes the Sūtra in full; Hsüan-tsang and the Tibetan do not have the first phrase. Compare *Saṁyutta*, ii.78, iii.149: *anamataggāyaṁ saṁsāro pubbakoṭi na paññāyati avijjānīvaraṇānaṁ sattānaṁ taṇhāsaṁyojanānam saṁdhāvataṁ saṁsaratam.*

The same argument in the *Sāṁmitīyanikāyaśāstra.*

From the point of view of the Mādhyamikas, neither the permanent nor the impermanent can transmigrate: *nityasya saṁsṛtir nāsti naivānityasya saṁsṛtiḥ / svapnavat saṁsṛtir proktā tvayā tattvavidāṁ vara* (*Catustava*, quoting *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, ix.108).

110. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 424c15. *Sunetro nāma śāsteti saptasūryodayasūtre'yam eva bhagavān ṛṣiḥ sunetro nāma babhūveti.*

The *Saptasūryasūtra* of the *Aṅguttara*, iv.103, does not identify Sunetra with the Bhagavat: *bhūtapubbaṁ bhikkhave Sunetto nāma satthā ahosi titthakaro kāmesu vītarāgo . . .* (Compare *Aṅguttara*, iii.371, 373). We also find some details in the *Vibhāṣā* on the rebirth of Sunetra's disciples and on the rebirth of Sunetra (*TD* 27, p. 424c15 and following). There is no mention of Sunetra in the fragments of the *Saptasūrya* of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 247 and the *Karmaprajñapti*, Mdo. 62, fol. 66a. In the *Saundarananda*, xi.57, we only see that Sunetra is the Bhagavat.

111. *Vyākhyā: ya ekeṣāṁ pudgalagrāha iti vātsīputrīyāṇām / ekeṣāṁ sarvanāstigrāha iti madhyamakacittānām.* This is the only reference to the Madhyamaka system that the work of Vasubandhu contains.

The translation is according to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha: "Thus, without cause or reason, one introduces the malady of opinion into the Good Law of the Tathāgatas: there are some scholars who deny *nairātmya* and produce a belief in the existence of an *ātman;* there are, furthermore, some masters who deny the existence and affirm the non-existence of everything; the non-Buddhists believe in an *ātman* conceived as a separate thing. In the Good Law, some masters produce a belief in an *ātman* and a belief in universal non-existence. None of these masters obtain deliverance, because they do not differ from one another."

112. Saeki quotes a Vijñaptimātra commentary: If the self is not real, who remembers, who recognizes things, who recites and retains books, who repeats texts, who loves some and hates others, who loves what is good and hates the rest? . . . The Vātsīputrīyas have a reasoning: "(In the system of our adversaries) beings (*sattvas*) do not remember because they are not selves, like space."

For eight different explanations of the cause of memory, see *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 55a18: There are some masters who maintain that the self is by its nature real, namely the Vātsīputrīyas who say, "We say that there is a self that remembers what has been done; first oneself experiences, and then it is oneself that remembers. If there were no self, how could one remember what has been done? . . ." Again there are some masters who say, "The previous mind goes and says to the later mind: I did this; you, retain it and remember it . . . It is thus that one remembers what has been done."

Vibhāṣā, p. 56a7, teaches the "right" doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins.

For an explanation of memory in the Madhyamaka school, see notably *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* ix.24 (against the Vijñānavāda), 73 (against the Pudgalavāda), 101.

Milinda, 78-80; Demiéville, 161, *Compendium,* Introduction, p. 42 (according to the *Paṭṭhāna*).

On memory, see *Kośa,* i.33 (p. 97), ii.24 (p. 190), 24a (p. 194), vi.15, p. 927.

113. *Vyākhyā: smṛtiviṣayasaṁjñānvayāc cittaviśeṣād iti / smṛtiviṣayo'nubhūto'rthaḥ / tatra saṁjñā sānvayo hetur asyeti smṛtiviṣayasaṁjñānvayaḥ / cittaviśeṣaḥ kiṁcid eva cittam na sarvam ity arthaḥ / tasmāt smaraṇaṁ bhavati pratyabhijñānaṁ vā // evam ubhayaviśeṣaṇe kṛte pṛcchati kīdṛśāc cittaviśeṣād iti / āha / tadābhoga iti vistaraḥ / yasmin smartavya ābhogas tadābhogaḥ / sa ca tena sadṛśāḥ saṁbandhinaś ca saṁjñādayo ye te vidyante 'syeti tadābhogasadṛśasaṁbandhisaṁjñādimāṁś cittaviśeṣaḥ / ādigrahaṇena praṇidhānanibandhābhyāsādigrahaṇam / āśrayaviśeṣaś ca śokaś ca vyākṣepaś cādir eṣām iti āśrayaviśeṣaśokavyākṣepādīni / tair anupahataprabhāvaś cittaviśeṣaḥ sa evam anena pradarśito bhavati / tasmād īdṛśāc cittaviśeṣāt smṛtir bhavati /*

tad idam uktaṁ bhavati / tadābhogavataḥ : yadi tatrābhogaḥ kriyate / sadṛśasaṁjñādimataḥ : yatra sādṛśyāt smṛtir bhavati / saṁbandhisaṁjñādimataḥ : yatrāntareṇāpi sādṛśyam dhūmādidarśanāt smṛtir bhavati / praṇidhānanibandhābhyāsādimataś ca : yatra praṇidhānam atra kāle smartavyam abhyāso vāsya smaraṇe // āśrayaviśeṣādibhir anupahataprabhavad iti / vyādhilakṣaṇena āśrayaviśeṣeṇa śokena vyākṣepeṇa anyatra kāye / ādiśabdagṛhītaiś ca karmavidyādibhiḥ /

tādṛśo 'pīti vistaraḥ / tadābhogavān (tatsadṛśa) saṁjñādimān anupahataprabhāvo'pīty arthaḥ / atadanvaya ity asmṛtiviṣayasaṁjñānvaya ity arthaḥ / bhāvayitum utpādayitum // anyādṛśa ity atadābhogayāvatsaṁjñādimān upahataprabhāvo vā.

The commentators on Hsüan-tsang debate this. P'u-kuang (*TD* 41, p. 447a22-b10) has three explanations of *smṛtiviṣayasaṁjñānvaya,* three explanations of resemblance (*sadṛśa*) (that Fa-pao rejects, *TD* 41, p. 809a11 and following), two of necessary conjunction (*saṁbandhin*), etc. (see Saeki, xxx, fol. 7a, 8b-9a).

114. The *Vyākhyā* explains (below p. 1342) the discussion relative to the question, "In the absence of a soul, what knows?" *evaṁ ko= vijānātīti vistaraḥ.* It suffices to replace *vijānāti* with *smarati, vijñāna* with *smaraṇa.*

115. Paramārtha, "Not different from memory, for the memory grasps"; Hsüan-tsang, "No difference of memory, only (grasping) comes from the agent,"

116. According to the commentators of Hsüan-tsang, these masters are the Sāṁkhyas; according to the *Vyākhyā,* this formula is that of the Grammarians; for Stcherbatski, Vasubandhu here continues his controversy with the Vātsīputrīyas: and in fact the *Vyākhyā* says that this argument tends to prove the existence of the *pudgala.* See *Kośa,* iii.28a, for a discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda,* and a refutation of the *vaiyākaraṇacodya* (objection of the Grammarians), "There is no action (*kriyā*) without an agent (*akartṛkā*)." The *bhūti* is not different from the *bhavitar.*

117. *Vyākhyā: gacchatigamanābhidhānavad iti / yathā jvālā gacchati śabdo gacchatīti gacchatiśabdābhidhānam / yathā jvālāyāḥ śabdasya vā gamanam evaṁ devadatto gacchati devadattasya gamanam / anena dṛṣṭāntena vijānāti devadatta iti sidhyati.*

It is the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins that *gati* (or *gamana*) is impossible, iv.2b, English trans. p. 552-4.

118. *Vyākhyā: parispandam akurvad apīty arthaḥ /*

119. *Vyākhyā: kāraṇasādṛśyena kāryātmalābhāt.*

"Response to a seed," "to reproduce the seed," Hsüan-tsang: *ch'ou* 酬 =to make parallel, respond to.

The *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 480a14, explains that one cannot attribute the action of *saṁyoga, samanvāgama* (*ch'eng chiu* 成就), Rosenberg, 204; see above, p. 1346, *saṁyoga* (= *ho* 合) neither to a *pudgala* nor to the *dharmas:* the first does not exist, the second are bare of any activity. No *dharma* is either the agent or the object of an action of *saṁyoga.* But, as there is cause-result, defilement-purity, bond-deliverence, process-ceasing, so too the quality of being *saṁyukta* or *asaṁyukta* exists.

120. The consciousness of blue has a blue "aspect."

121. *Vyākhyā: kāraṇam kartṛbhūtam iti kṛtvā / tad yathā nādasya kāraṇaṁ ghaṇṭa iti ghaṇṭo rautīty ucyate.*

122. *Vyākhyā: yathā ca bhavitū rūpasya bhāvāj janitur jāteḥ sthātuḥ sthiter anarathāntaratvam evaṁ vijñāne'pi syād vijñātur vijñānasya vijñānād bhāvād anarthāntaratvam.* (See the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins on *jāti,* ii, English trans. p. 242).

"The existent," Paramārtha, *neng-yu* 能有 ; Hsüan-tsang, *yu . . . che.* 有 . . . 者

Paramārtha: As the world says, "physical matter exists, arises, lasts." Now the existing thing (*bhavitṛ*), etc., does not differ from existence (*bhāva*), and yet nevertheless one employs two words. So too one employs two words for *vijñāna.*

123. According to Saeki. The Vaiśeṣikas, according to the *Vyākhyā: vaiśeṣikamatānusārād vā . . .*

124. Why does one successively have *gobuddhi, strībuddhi, mahiṣabuddhi,* the idea of cow, woman, and buffalo? Why does not the *mahiṣabuddhi* follow *gobuddhi?*

The Japanese editor understands, "Why is not the latter mind parallel to the former mind, good, defiled, etc. . . . ?"

125. *Vyākhyā: nikāmena paryāptena samāptena dhyānena samāhitānām . . .*

126. See, for example, *Kośa,* ii. 71b.

127. *Vyākhyā: gotraviśeṣād iti bhāvanāviśeṣāt.* Below *gotra* is explained as *bīja,* "seed." The

gloss *bhāvanāviśeṣāt* gives a translation, "by reason of the particular manner in which they perfume the series."

128. *Vyākhyā: strīcittad iti vistaraḥ / strīcittāt (= stryālambanāc cittād) anantaram tatkāyavidūṣaṇācittam (= tasyāḥ striyāḥ kāyasya vidūṣaṇāyai yadi parivrājakasya anyasya vā sādhoś cittam utpannam bhavati) tatpatiputrādicittaṁ vā (= tasyāḥ patiputrādayaḥ / ādiśabdena duhitrādayo gṛhyante / tadālambanaṁ cittam tatpatiputrādicittam).* Hsuan-tsang, " . . . the mind of an impure body."

129. See ii. 36, English trans. p. 211.

130. *Vyākhyā: tat paścād utpannaṁ strīcittaṁ samarthaṁ bhavati tatkāyavidūṣaṇācittotpādane tatpatiputracittotpādane vā / kasmāt / tatgotratvād iti / tatkāyavidūṣaṇācittaṁ tatpatiputrādicittaṁ vā gotraṁ bījam asyeti tadgotram . . .anyathety atadgotram.*

131. *Vyākhyā: atha punaḥ paryāyeṇeti vistaraḥ / paryāyeṇa ayugapat / strīcittāt tatkāyavidūṣaṇācittam / tatas tatpaticittam / tatas tatputracittam / tata eva ca tadduhitṛcittam / tata eva ca tadupakaraṇādicittam utpannaṁ bhavati / tataḥ strīcittād anantarotpannebhyaś cittebhyo yad bahutaraṁ pravāhataḥ paṭutaraṁ śaktita āsannataraṁ vāsyotpādyasya cittasya tad eva cittam utpadyate / tadbhāvanābalapaṭutvāt* (MS. - *balaṁ yastvāt*) *tasya bahutarasya paṭutarasyāsannatarasya vā bhāvanāyā balavattaratvāt /*

On *bhāvanā* (*hsiu* 修, *hsiu-hsi* 修習) or *vāsanā,* see iv.27d, 123c, vii.28c, 30c, 32d, viii.3d.

132. *Vyākhyā: evaṁ hy āhur iti sthavirarāhulaḥ.* See also *Vyākhyā* (Petrograd edition, 1918), p. 6:
sarvākāraṁ kāraṇaṁ ekasya mayūracandrakasyāpi /
nāsarvajñair jñeyaṁ sarvajñajñānabalaṁ hi tat //

133. An observation that one reads in the *Atthasālinī,* 142, *Milinda,* 87, *Kośa,* ii.24, English trans. p. 190.

134. *Vyākhyā:* the Vaiśeṣika.

135. The version of Hsüan-tsang strays from the original on many points: "If they say that the variety of the *vijñānas* (consciousnesses) depends (*apekṣa*) on the variety of the conjunction (of the soul) with the *manas,* we answer: No; 1. because the conjunction of the soul with another thing is not proved; 2. because the conjunction of two things is delimited (*fen-hsien* 分限) (that is to say two things can be joined on only one side). They themselves define conjunction: "possession succeeding upon non-possession": the conjunction of the soul and the *manas* should be delimited; 3. because, if the *manas* changes (*i-ch'uan* 移轉), the soul should also change; 4. or rather the soul should perish with the *manas.* If they say that conjunction is partial, we answer: No. For there are not diverse parts in one soul. To suppose that there is conjunction if the soul is permanent and if the *manas* is not modified (*pieh-i* 別異), how can conjunction be diverse? If they answer that (this diversity) depends on the diversity of *buddhi,* the difficulty is the same (as when they explain that variety depends on the *manas*): we then ask how *buddhi* is diverse. If they say that, through dependence on the *saṁskāras,* the conjunction of the soul and the *manas* is diverse (*jo tai hsing pieh wo i ho che* 若待行別我意合者), it means that a single mind, through dependence on a variety of *saṁskāras,* produces the variety of the *vijñānas.* What then would be the purpose of the soul?"

136. *Vyākhyā: na / anyasaṁyogāsiddheḥ / naitad evam / kasmāt / tābhyām ātmananobhyām anyasya saṁyogasyāsiddheḥ / na hi saṁyogo nāma bhāvaḥ kaścid asmākaṁ siddho'sti.*
A Buddhist does not admit the existence of an entity called *saṁyoga.*

137. This is the definition of the Daśapadārthī, H. Ui, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy,* 1917, p. 271. Stcherbatski quotes the *Praśastapāda: aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṁyogaḥ,* and observes that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra,* vii.2, 9, differs.

138. *Vyākhyā: paricchinnadeśatvaprasaṅgaḥ / yatrātmā na tatra manaḥ yatra mano na tatrātmeti.* (Where the soul is, there is no *manas*).

139. An addition of Paramārtha.

140. *Vyākhyā: tato lakṣaṇād aprāptipūrvikā prāptiḥ saṁyoga iti manaḥsaṁcārād yaṁ yaṁ śarīradeśaṁ manaḥ saṁcarati tatas tata ātmā saṁcaraty apaitīti prasajyate / tadyathā yaṁ yaṁ pṛthivīpradeśaṁ puruṣaḥ saṁcarati tatas tata ātapo'pasarpati / tathā ca satiniṣkriyatvam asya bādhitaṁ bhavatīti sa eva pratijñādoṣaḥ.*

vināśasya vā / prasaṅga iti vartate / ātmana iti ca // yatra yatra manaḥ saṁcarati tatra tatrātmā vinaśyatīti sa eva cātra pratijñādoṣa ātmano nityatvanivṛtteḥ.

141. *Vyākhyā: pradeśasaṁyoga iti cet / syān matam ātmanā pradeśena saṁyogo manasaḥ / ātmanā vā pradeśena manasā saha saṁyogaḥ / yasmin śarīrapradeśe mano'vasthitaṁ bhavati tadgatenātmapradeśena mano na saṁyujyate / pradeśāntarena tu parśvataḥ* (MS *-ntapālvataḥ*) *saṁyujyate / tasmād aprāptipūrvakatve'pi saṁyogasya aprāptenaiva ātmapradeśena manaḥ saṁyujyata iti // tan na / tasyaiva tatpradeśatvāyogāt / na hy ātmano'nyapradeśā vidyante / na caivātmaiva ātmanaḥ pradeśo yujyate.*

One can suppose that the *manas*, when it occupies a certain part of the body, is not in conjunction with the part of the soul which is found in this part of the body, but rather with the other parts of the soul. Conjunction follows non-conjunction: the *manas*, being displaced, is found in conjunction with a part of the soul with which it was not in conjunction, namely that which occupies the part of the body that the *manas* has just quit.

142. *Vyākhyā: astu vā saṁyoga iti vistaraḥ / abhyupetyāpi saṁyogaṁ tathāpi nirvikāratvād aviśiṣṭe manasi kathaṁ saṁyogaviśeṣaḥ kathaṁ viśiṣṭaḥ saṁyogo bhavati yata evam uktaṁ manaḥsaṁyogaviśeṣāpekṣatvād iti / buddhaviśeṣāpekṣatvād iti cet sa evopari codyate kathaṁ buddhiviśeṣa iti kathaṁ na nityam īdṛśam evotpadyate cittam aviśiṣṭe ātmanīti / kāraṇaviśeṣād hi kāryaviśeṣa iṣyate śaṅkhapaṭahādiśabdavat / saṁskāraviśeṣāpekṣād ātmamanaḥsaṁyogād iti cet / syān matam nityam aviśiṣṭe'py ātmani manasi ca saṁskāraviśeṣāpekṣād ātmamanasoḥ saṁyogād buddhiviśeṣa iti / tad uktaṁ bhavati saṁskāraviśeṣād bhāvanāviśeṣalakṣaṇād ātmamanaḥsaṁyogaviśeṣas tad (viśeṣād buddhi) viśeṣaḥ / atra brūmaḥ cittād evāstv iti vistaraḥ /*

143. Paramārtha: If there is no "earth" by itself independent of the quality of smell, etc., why does one say that earth has four qualities? In order to distinguish: in order that others may know that smells, tastes, etc., receive the name of "earth," etc., that there is not, separately, earth, etc. In the same way one says: "the reflection of wood."

144. On *saṁskāra, bhāvanāviśeṣa,* see H. Ui, p. 162.

145. On the *padārthas, guṇas,* and *dravyas,* see H. Ui, p. 93 and foll. Discussion of the *guṇin* and the *guṇa, Kośa,* iii. 100a-b.

146. Hsüan-tsang: But the object of the notion of "I" is not of this sort. The text has *na tv ahaṁkārah;* the *Vyākhyā: na tv aham ity evamākāraḥ pratyaya ity arthaḥ.*

147. See above, p. 1341, line 2.).

148. *Vyākhyā: yathā tathoktam iti / yathā kṛtvāśrayaḥ ṣaḍāyatanam tathoktaṁ tadvikāravikāritvād āśrayas cakṣurādaya ity arthaḥ* (i.45a) / *Pañcaskandhakaṁ bhavān udāharatīty adhikṛtam.*

Vasubandhu is referring to his work, the *Pañcaskandhaka.*

149. According to Hsüan-tsang and to the Tibetan (Stcherbatski). Paramārtha: "*Kartar* is one who creates that which did not exist; *upabhoktar* is one who presently obtains the result of a former action."

150. Stcherbatski: the Logicians; Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha: "Those who explain

the *dharmalakṣaṇas.*" But Stcherbatski states that the definition of these masters is that of *Pāṇini,* i.4, 54: *svatantraḥ kartā.*

We see, *Kośa,* iii.27 (p. 413), that the Grammarians, or Vaiyākaranas, protest against the thesis of "action without an agent" (*akartṛkā kriyā*). In the same passage, certain masters (*kecid vādinaḥ*) maintain that *pratītyasamutpāda* supposes a support, namely an *ātman.*

151. *Vyākhyā: tasya tu svātantryaṁ nāstīti darśayann āha trividhaṁ cedaṁ karmeti vistaraḥ / kāyasya cittaparatantrā vṛttiḥ cittapravartitvāt kāyakarmaṇaḥ / cittasyāpi kāye vṛttiḥ svakāraṇaparatantrā manodharmamanaskārādiparatantrā / tasyāpy evam / tasya cittasvakāraṇasya svakāraṇaparatantrā vṛttir iti nāsti kasya cid api svātantryaṁ kāyasya cittasya cittakāraṇasyānyasya vā / pratyayaparatantrā hi sarve bhāvāḥ*

caturbhiś cittacaittā hi samāpattidvayaṁ tribhiḥ

dvābhyām anye tu jāyante iti vacanāt (ii.65) /

ātmano'pi ca nirapekṣasya buddhiviśeṣādyutpattāv akāraṇatvābhyupagamān na svātantryaṁ sidhyati / tasmān naivaṁlakṣaṇa iti svatantraḥ karteti.

152. *Vyākhyā: tasyākāraṇatvaṁ upadarśayann āha / ... pūrvaṁ smartavyārthe smṛtir utpadyate / smṛteś chandaḥ kartukāmatā / chandād vitarkaḥ cetanāviśeṣo'bhisaṁskāralakṣaṇaḥ prajñāviśeṣo'bhisaṁskāralakṣaṇaḥ prajñaviśeṣo vā yogācāranayena vaibhāṣikanayena tv abhinirūpaṇāvikalpalakṣaṇaḥ* (The MS is perhaps incorrect. Here Hsüan-tsang translates *vitarka* with the two characters which, elsewhere give *vitarka-vicāra.* For the Vaibhāṣikas, *vitarka* signifies here (*abhi*)*nirūpaṇā vikalpa,* one of the three *vikalpas* defined in *Kośa,* i.33a; one type of *prajñā* (*prajñāviśeṣa*) which consists of examining, or deliberation. For the Yogācārins, *vitarka* signifies *prajñāviśeṣa abhisaṁskāralakṣaṇa: one prajñā* which has the characteristic of action or decision. For the author, *vitarka* is a *cetanā,* "volition," the characteristic of which is "to create" (*abhisaṁskar*) (*Kośa,* i.15a) / *vitarkāt prayatno vīryam / prayatnād vāyuḥ / tato vāyoḥ karma deśāntarotpattilakṣaṇam iti kim atrātmā kurute.*

153. *Vyākhyā: vijñāne pratiṣedhād iti yaivopalabdhis tad eva vijñānam / vijñāne cātmanaḥ sāmarthyaṁ pratiṣiddhaṁ cittād evāstu saṁskāraviśeṣapekṣan na hi... phuṭsvāhānām iti / yathā tathoktam iti / tadvikāravikāritvād āśrayaś cakṣurādaya iti* (i.45a-b) / *yathā kaḥ kasyāśrayaḥ ... naiva sa evam āśrayaḥ* (note 145).

154. According to the formula: *na hi bhikṣavaḥ karmāṇi kṛtāny upacitāni bāhye pṛthivīdhātau vipacyante / api tūpātteṣu skandhadhātvāyataneṣu...*(*Divya,* 54 and *passim*). On *sattvākhya, upātta,* see *Kośa,* i.10b, English trans. (p. 65), 34c (p. 98), 39 (p. 107), iv.5d (p. 569).

155. H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy,* 75, 98; *Kośa,* iv.2b (p. 555).

156. Above, p. 1347.

157. For the Sarvāstivādins, the cause of retribution "gives forth" its fruit when it is past (ii.57, 59); as a consequence, the past exists (v.25a-b, p. 807). Vasubandhu remarked (v. p. 818) that the Sautrāntikas do not admit that the result arises directly from action. For the different results of action, see iv.85.

See *Madhyamaka,* xvii. 6 and following, "If an action lasts until its retribution, it would be eternal ... " The doctrine that Vasubandhu presents here is refuted xvii.12; the opinion of Candrakīrti, xvii.13: When an action arises, there also arises in the series a *dharma* unassociated with the mind, morally neutral, destroyed through *bhāvanā,* that is called *avipraṇāśa,* which produces the result of the action.

From another point of view, the *aṅkura* cannot arise from either the destroyed *bīja,* or from a non-destroyed *bīja; Catustava,* quoted in *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 97, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā,* ix.108.

158. For *karmasaṁtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa,* see ii.36c (p. 211).

159. Hsüan-tsang: For example the mind "associated with attachment" at the end of life. Although there are some traces (*vāsanās*) projected by all types of actions capable of producing a new existence, nevertheless that which manifests itself (at death), is (the mind) produced by heavy, near, and habitual action; not any other. There is a stanza . . .

160. *Vyākhyā: yathoktam iti / sthavirarāhulena / yad guru yac cāsanannam iti vistaraḥ / ekasmin saṁtane catvāri karmāṇi gurv āsannam abhyastaṁ pūrvakṛtaṁ ca / eṣāṁ caturṇām guru karma pūrvam iti tribhyas tat pūrvaṁ vipacyate / āsannābhyastapūrvakṛtānām apy āsannaṁ pūrvam iti tat pūrvaṁ dvābhyāṁ vipacyate / abhyastapūrvakṛtayoś cābhyastaṁ pūrvam ity ekasmāt pūrvaṁ vipacyate / asatsu eteṣu pūrvajanmakṛtaṁ vipacyate āparaparyā-yavedanīyam.*

An *ārya* stanza, like note 166.

161. Better: . . . the capacity to produce the retributive result, the capacity that a cause places in the series . . . See *Kośa,* iii.37c. This problem has been pointed out *ad* iv.50, note 217, where one will find a part of this bibliography. The Andhakas affirm that *vipāka* is a *vipākadhamma:* retribution admits of a new retribution (*Kathāvatthu,* vii.10); the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, warranted by *Suttanipāta* 654, affirm: *sabbam idaṁ kammato;* the Theravādin are made to say that the murderer commits murder through retribution for murder: and Nirvāṇa becomes impossible (*Kathāvatthu,* xvii.3). The *Madhyamakāvatara,* vi.41, demonstrates that there is no new *vipāka* after *vipāka.* In the *Karmaprajñapti* (Mdo. 62, fol. 249b), Maudgalyāyana refutes the Nirgranthas who maintain that all sensation proceeds from previous actions (comp. *Majjhima,* ii.214): the sufferings of penance that the Nirgranthas impose upon themselves are, say the Nirgranthas, "retribution": "According to you, one experiences the retribution of a new retribution." "Do you admit purification, deliverance, Nirvāṇa?" "Yes." "Then do not say that a new retribution arises from retribution."

We have seen, iv.58, that *daurmanasya* and *cittakṣepa* are not retribution; but they can necessarily proceed from troubled elements (*mahābhūta*), which is retribution.

162. Here we have several words which I have not translated. According to Hsüan-tsang: *ch'ieh fei pi yü shih fa chieh teng* 且非譬喻是法皆等 = "The example is not *dharma*-totally-similar," and according to Paramārtha: *tz'u chung i-ch'ieh so-li-i yü pi-i pu-pi hsi t'ung* 此中一切所立義與譬義不必悉同 = "Here the meaning established by all should not be totally parallel with the meaning of the example."

The Japanese editor puts this phrase in the mouth of Vasubandhu; the same for Stcherbatski, who translates: "The example may not fit in every detail. But even supposing it to be fitting, does it prove your tenet? Is new corn produced directly from old corn?"

Further, p. 1354 line 28 Hsüan-tsang, concluding his explanation of this example says: *ku yü t'ung fa* 故喻同法 : "Thus the example is parallel (*sadharma*)"; Paramārtha: *tz'u pi yü li-i t'ung* 此譬與立義同 : "Thus the example is analogous to the established meaning," or "Thus this example confirms our thesis."

163. We follow the version of Hsüan-tsang. Compare the whole of the paragraph of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* 472-473.

Vyākhyā: viklittiviśeṣajād iti bhūmyudakasaṁbandhāt phalasya sūkṣmo vikāro viklittiḥ / tasya viśeṣaḥ / sa evātiprakṛṣtaḥ / tasmāj jāto vikāraviśeṣaḥ / tasmāt phalāntaram utpadyate / kīdṛśād vikāraviśeṣād iti darśayann āha / yo hi tatra bhūtaprakāro'ṅkuraṁ nirvartayati sa tasya bījam iti tasyāṅkurasya bījaṁ nānyo bhūtaprakāro na pūrvabījāvastho bhūtaprakāra ity arthaḥ // bhāvinyā tu saṁjñayeti / odanaṁ pacati saktuṁ pinaṣṭīti yathā bhāvinyā saṁjñayā vyapadeśaḥ evaṁ pūrvako'pi saṁtāno aviklinnabījāvastho bījam ity ākhyāyate / bhavinyā'nayā saṁjñayeti / sādṛśyād veti viklittiviśeṣajena bhūtavikāraviśeṣeṇa sadṛśaḥ sa pūrvakaḥ saṁtāna iti kṛtvā bījam ity ākhyāyate /

164. On *vipākaja,* see i.37 English trans. (p. 103), ii.10, 53b (p. 270), 54c (p. 275), 57a (p. 288), 71b (p. 315), iv.11.

165. *Vyākhyā: phale raktaḥ kesara iti phalābhyantare kesaraḥ / yatra bījapūrakarase āmlo'vatiṣṭhate // na ca sa tasmāt punar anya iti / na rasaraktaḥ kesaras tasmād uktāt kesarāt punar upajāyate kiṁ tarhi prākṛta evāraktaḥ kesara upajāyata ity arthaḥ // idam atrodāharaṇam / yathā lākṣārasaraktamātulaṅgapuṣpaphalād* (MS. *lākṣārasaraṁ tat mā°*) *raktakesarān na raktaṁ kesarāntaraṁ punar bhavati evaṁ karmajād vipākān na punar vipākāntaram iti / āha cātra /*

cittaṁ hy etad anantabījasahitaṁ saṁtānato vartate /
tat tad bījam upaiti puṣṭim udite svapratyaye cetasi /
tat puṣṭaṁ drumalabdhavṛtti phaladaṁ kālena saṁpadyate /
raṅgasyeva hi mātulaṅgakusume'nyas tasya tatkesare // punar āha /
karpāsabīje puṣpe ca mātulaṅgasya rañjite /
lākṣayā jāyate raktaṁ yathā karpāsakesaram //
tasminn astam ite raṅge saṁtānād bhāvitakramāt /
karmaṇy astam ite caiva bhāvanātaḥ phalodayaḥ //

To these stanzas one should compare those quoted in the *Sarvadarśana* (beginning of the chapter on Jainism):

yasminn eva saṁtana āhitā karmavāsanā /
phalaṁ tatraiva badhnāti kārpāse raktatā yathā //
kusume bījapūrāder yal lakṣādy upasicyate /
śaktir ādhīyate tatra kā cit tāṁ kiṁ na paśyasi //

The first of these stanzas is quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 73 (introduced by *tad uktam*); compare Ānandagiri *ad* 2.2.27 (*vāsanāvaicitryāt*), and the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (Calcutta, 1873) p. 102 (*lākṣārasāvasekād vā dhavalimānam apahāya raktatām upādāyanuvartamānaṁ kārpāsabījam . . .*). The first line of the second stanza is used by Kumārila, *Ślokavārttika*, p. 267. On these different sources, see "Bouddhisme d'aprés les sources brâhmaniques," *Muséon*, 1902 (quoted in part, p. 63).

166. Forming without doubt part of the same work as the stanza, note 160.

Vyākhyā: karmeti sarvaṁ tadbhāvanaṁ karmabhāvanāṁ tasmād bhāvanāyā vṛttilābhaṁ tadvṛttilābhaṁ tatas tadvṛttilābhāt phalam ity etac catuṣṭayam niyamena yadṛcchayā / buddhād anyaḥ śrāvakādiḥ sarvathā sarvākāraṁ na prajānātīty arthād uktaṁ bhavati buddha eva tat sarvam sarvathā prajānātīti.

167. Understand: "looks towards Nirvāṇa" or "sees in this doctrine."

168. Paramārtha adds a stanza here: The Buddha Bhagavat says to Pūrṇa, 'Strive to keep this Dharma, for he who cultivates insight and conduct according to this Dharma will of necessity obtain the five qualities'.

169. *Vyākhyā:* a. *itikaraṇaḥ parisamāptyarthaḥ / pradarśanārtho vā // eṣāṁ buddhānāṁ pravacanadharmatāṁ suvihitena hetor mārgeṇa hetumārgeṇa śuddhāṁ niravadyāṁ niśamya dṛṣṭvā // andhās tīrthyā yathābhūtadarśanavaikalyāt / kutsitā dṛṣṭiḥ kudṛṣṭiḥ / tasyāś ceṣṭitāni kudṛṣṭiceṣṭititāni / vividhāni kudṛṣṭiceṣṭitāny eṣām iti vividhakudṛṣṭiceṣṭitāḥ/ svargāpagargahetāv apratipannā mithyāpratipannāś cety arthaḥ // tasmād evaṁvidhānāṁ kapilolūkādīnāṁ mataṁ darśanam apavidhya tyaktvā yānti saṁsārān nirvāṇam iti vākyādhyāhāraḥ / ke te sattvāḥ / prajñācakṣuṣmanta āryaśrāvakāḥ // atha vā tām eva pravacanadharmatāṁ yānti pratipadyanta ity arthaḥ /*

pravacanadharmatā punar atra nairātmyam buddhānuśāsanī vā // anya āhuḥ / pravacanaṁ sūtrādidvādaśāṅgavacogatam / tasya dharmatā svākhyātatā yuktyupetatvān nirvāṇapravaṇatā ca nirvāṇadyotanat / yathoktam / sarva ime dharmā nirvāṇapravaṇāḥ nirvāṇaprāgbhārāḥ nirvāṇam evābhivadanto'bhivadantīti / anātmasaṁjñinaś ca nirvāṇe śāntasaṁjñāḥ saṁtiṣṭhante ātmocchedāśaṅkāpagamād iti tad evam anandhā eva yānti nāndhāḥ / andhās tu bhramanty eva saṁsārārṇave nairātmyam apaśyantaḥ / tad darśayann āha imāṁ hitivistaraḥ /

b. *iyaṁ nirātmatā / nirvāṇam eva puraṁ nirvāṇapuram / tasyaikā vartanīti nirvāṇapuraikamārgo nānyo mārga ity arthaḥ // tathāgata evādityo gambhīradharmāvakāśakatvād ādityabhūtas tathāgataḥ / tasya vacāṁsi / tāny evāṁśavaḥ / tair bhāsvatī ālokavatī tathāgatādityavacoṁśubhāsvatī // āryāṇāṁ sahasrair vāhitety āryasahasravāhitā // vivṛtā samitā // imāṁ nirvāṇapuraikavartanīm tathāgatādityavacomśubhāsvatīṁ vivṛtām api nirātmatāṁ prajñācakṣuso viśadasyābhāvād avidyākośapaṭala-paryavanaddhanetratvād vā mandacakṣus tīrthiko vātsīputrīyo vā nekṣate /*

trayaś ceha mārgaguṇā varṇyante / tadyathaikāyanatā abhipretadeśaprāyaṇāt / sālokatā yato niḥśaṅko gacchati / yātānuyātatā ca parimarditasthāṇukaṇṭakāditvād yena sukhaṁ gacchati / tatsādharmyeṇeyam nirātmatā vartanī draṣṭavyā // caturbhiś ca kāraṇair mārgo na vidyate sa (- -) tamaskatayā / prakāśito'py ādityena avāhitatayā / bahupuruṣavāhito'py āvṛtatayā vivṛto'pi draṣṭur mandacakṣuṣkatayā / teṣām ihaikam eva kāraṇam asya mārgasyādarśana uktam / yato draṣṭṛdoṣeṇaivāyaṁ mārgo na dṛśyate na mārgadoṣeṇeti yata eṣa mandacakṣur etāṁ na paśyatīty avagantavyam /

c. *iti digmātram evedam iti sarvam iti yathoktam / dig eva digmātram / evakārārtho mātraśabdaḥ / dik pramāṇam asyeti digmātram iti vā / mahato'bhidharmaśāstrād alpam idam upadiṣṭam / mayeti vākyaśeṣaḥ // keṣām / sumedhasām matimatām ity arthaḥ / tādarthye ṣaṣṭhī / kiṁvad ity āha / vraṇadeśe viṣasyeva svasāmarthyavisarpiṇa iti / yathā viṣaṁ svasāmarthyād vraṇadeśaṁ prāpya sarveṣv aṅgapratyaṅgeṣv abhyantarvisarpatīti matvā kena cit tasya vraṇadeśaḥ kṛtaḥ kathaṁ nāmedaṁ visarpatīti / evaṁ sumedhasaḥ svasāmarthyavisarpitvād viṣasthānīyā ity atas tesāṁ sumedhasām udghaṭitajñānāṁ prājñānām idam upadiṣṭaṁ mayā katham alpena granthena mahad abhidharmaśāstram kāśmīravaibhāṣikanītisiddham arthataḥ pratipadyerann iti // apare punar vyācakṣate digmātram evedam itīdam eva nairātmyapratiṣedham adhikṛtyoktam iti / kāśmīravaibhāṣikanītisiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyaṁ kathito'bhidharma ity* (viii.40) *anenaivārthasyābhihitatvād iti.*

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